Opinion
2012-12-21
Alessandro SACCHETTI, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Michael L. GIORDANO, DPM, Defendant–Appellant. (Appeal No. 1.)
Damon Morey LLP, Buffalo (Amy Archer Flaherty of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Pamela R. Halpin, East Rochester, for Plaintiff–Respondent.
Damon Morey LLP, Buffalo (Amy Archer Flaherty of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Pamela R. Halpin, East Rochester, for Plaintiff–Respondent.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he sustained as a result of defendant's alleged podiatric malpractice. Following a trial, the jury found defendant liable for plaintiff's injuries and awarded damages to plaintiff. Defendant made a posttrial motion to set aside the jury's verdict on the ground that it is not supported by legally sufficient evidence and to direct a verdict in his favor. In the alternative, defendant requested that a new trial be granted because, inter alia, the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Supreme Court properly denied defendant's posttrial motion.
Contrary to defendant's contention, plaintiff established a prima facie case of podiatric malpractice. Indeed, “there is a valid line of reasoning supporting the jury's verdict that defendant deviated from the applicable standard of care ... and that such deviation was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries” ( Winiarski v. Harris [appeal No. 2], 78 A.D.3d 1556, 1557, 910 N.Y.S.2d 814;cf. James v. Wormuth [appeal No. 2], 93 A.D.3d 1290, 1291, 941 N.Y.S.2d 388). We reject defendant's alternative contention in support of his posttrial motion that the verdict on liability is against the weight of the evidence. We conclude that the verdict “is one that reasonable persons could have rendered after receiving conflicting evidence[ and thus we] should not substitute [our] judgment for that of the jury” ( Herbst v. Marshall, 89 A.D.3d 1403, 1403, 933 N.Y.S.2d 461).
Finally, contrary to defendant's contention, the jury awards for past and future lost wages are supported by legally sufficient evidence and are not against the weight of the evidence. While plaintiff did not become a union electrician until after he was treated by defendant, “ ‘[r]ecovery for lost earning capacity is not limited to a plaintiff's actual earnings before the [injury], ... and the assessment of damages may instead be based upon future probabilities' ” ( Huff v. Rodriguez, 45 A.D.3d 1430, 1433, 846 N.Y.S.2d 841;see Kirschhoffer v. Van Dyke, 173 A.D.2d 7, 10, 577 N.Y.S.2d 512).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.