. . ." In Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 588, 77 S.E. 768 (1913), this Court held unconstitutional under this section a statute which prevented a person not an attorney from taking office as a recorder's court judge after he had been elected. Since that time the section was amended to read as it currently does, with reference to "qualified voter" and stating that the eligibility is for "election by the people to office."

ed or appointed to the office shall take and subscribe the following oath...." ); N.C.G.S. § 11-7 (2007) (providing that " every person elected or appointed to hold any office of trust or profit in the State shall, before taking office or entering upon the execution of the office, take and subscribe to the following oath ..." ); Town of Hudson v. Fox, 257 N.C. 789, 790, 127 S.E.2d 556, 556 (1962) (noting that commissioners " were qualified by taking the required oath" ); Suddereth v. Smyth, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 307, 308, 35 N.C. 452, 453 (1852) (observing that a deputy clerk is not qualified until he " tak[es] the oaths to support the constitutions of the United States and of this State, and an oath of office" ).          By enacting N.C.G.S. § 128-7, the General Assembly has essentially provided the type of " assurance for the faithful discharge of the duties of the office," State ex rel. Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 486, 489-90, 162 N.C. 588, 593, 77 S.E. 768, 769 (1913) (emphasis omitted), that this Court has previously recognized as well within the legislature's role and the dictates of the Constitution. See also [363 N.C. 836] State ex rel. Lee v. Dunn, 73 N.C. 595, 604-08 (1875) (holding that the General Assembly could not impose any additional qualification on eligibility for elective office, other than what is provided in the Constitution, and concluding that requiring a sheriff to tender a bond and receipts for taxes collected is not an added qualification).

For example, the North Carolina high court interpreted a constitutional clause which stated, " Every voter in North Carolina, except as in this article disqualified, shall be eligible to office" to be exclusive while observing that if the constitution were worded negatively, as is Washington's, then the legislature could add qualifications. State ex rel. Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 588, 591, 77 S.E. 768 (1913) (quoting N.C. Const. art. VII, § 7). The North Carolina Supreme Court therein stated the obvious: "It is true that where a Constitution provides that 'no person shall be elected or appointed to any office unless he possesses the qualifications of an elector,' the Legislature can prescribe additional qualifications."

The General Assembly cannot render any 'voter' ineligible for office by exacting any additional qualifications . . . ." State ex rel. S. B. Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 588, 591, 77 S.E. 768, 769 (1913); see also Starbuck v. Havelock, 252 N.C. 176, 179, 113 S.E.2d 278, 280 (1960); Cole v. Sanders, 174 N.C. 112, 114, 93 S.E. 476, 477 (1917) (Clark, C.J., concurring); State of N.C. by the At. Gen'l, Hargrove, ex rel. Lee v. Dunn, 73 N.C. 595, 602-03 (1875). To be eligible for election to office under Article VI, Section 6, one must be: twenty-one years of age, a qualified voter, and not otherwise disqualified under the Constitution.

29 C.J.S., Elections 243, and cases cited therein. See also State ex rel. Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 588, 77 S.E. 768 (1913). Accordingly, numerous courts have held that when a majority or plurality of votes are cast for an ineligible candidate, the fact that the winning candidate is ineligible and not qualified to take office does not entitle the runner-up to be declared elected to the contested office.

As to power of General Assemblyto create a district coterminus with a county and delegate toit governmental powers: 148 S.C. 229, 146 S.E. 12; 41 S.E. 631. As to the General Assembly having no power toimpose qualifications on who shall hold office, except as providedin the constitution: 162 N.C. 588, 77 S.E. 768; 174 N.C. 112, 93 S.E. 476. As to the validity, or invalidity, ofthe actions of the board: 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481. Asto when constitutional amendments are, or are not, retroactive: 129 S.C. 188, 123 S.E. 822; 144 S.C. 391, 142 S.E. 650.

Rose v. Sullivan, 56 Mont. 480, 185 P. 562. Typical of decisions where cases discuss affirmative rather than negative constitutional provisions is Sprill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 589, 77 S.E. 768, 769, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 515. At the election in November, 1912, Bateman was elected by the people of Washington county recorder of the "Recorders Court of Plymouth," an office created by statute.

) In other words, voters are eligible to office except as they are disqualified, and the word "persons" appearing in section 8, while comprehensive enough to include women, only applies to voters, as they are the only persons referred to in the article. This is the construction placed on these sections of the Constitution in Lee v. Dunn, 73 N.C. 602, which is cited with approval in State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 588. The Court says: "The Constitution, Art. VI, sec. 1, prescribes the qualification of voters to be as follows: 'Every male person, etc., 21 years old or upwards, who shall have resided in this State twelve months next preceding the election and thirty days in the county in which he offers to vote, shall be deemed an elector.'

Breeden raises the further question that even if he were rendered ineligible for failure to file the proper pre-election statement of expenditures, it would not have the effect of electing Freeman, who did not receive a majority of the votes cast, but would only render the election nugatory. In other words, he says the majority vote received by him would prevent the election of Freeman. While we find it unnecessary to pass upon this contention, it may not be amiss to state that this position has strong support from courts in other jurisdictions. Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 588, 77 S.E. 768; McKinney v. Barker, 180 Ky. 526, 203 S.W. 303, L.R.A. 1918E, 581; 18 Am. Jur., Elections, Section 263; Annotation 133 A.L.R. page 319. We shall now determine whether Breeden should be declared the nominee.

Messrs. N. Heyward Clarkson, Jr., and John C. Payne, of Columbia, for Frank Jenion Tyson as Amicus Curiae, cite: As to the unconstitutionality of the method of appointing,or electing, certain members of the Board: 138 S.C. 468, 136 S.E. 891; 167 S.C. 476, 166 S.E. 637; 171 S.C. 432, 172 S.E. 434; 189 S.C. 85, 200 S.E. 95; 116 S.C. 216, 107 S.E. 924; 35 S.C. 344, 14 S.E. 819; 55 S.C. 90, 32 S.E. 828; 192 S.C. 231, 6 S.E.2d 276; 117 S.C. 545, 109 S.E. 275; 94 S.C. 207, 77 S.E. 860; 186 S.C. 290, 195 S.E. 539; 191 S.C. 183, 4 S.E.2d 254; 76 S.C. 574, 57 S.E. 536; 182 S.C. 378, 189 S.E. 361; 107 S.C. 209, 92 S.E. 479; 162 N.C. 588, 77 S.E. 768; 120 Ala. 623, 24 So. 952; 200 Ark. 204, 138 S.W.2d 377; 208 Minn. 338, 293 N.W. 914; 280 Mich. 649, 274 N.W. 445; 32 Cal. 76; 117 N.E. 565; 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E.2d 699; 22 R.C.L. 428; 167 Mo. 680, 67 S.W. 592, 90 A.S.R. 430; 11 Mich. 139, 83 Am. Dec. 731; 183 Ill. 226, 55 N.E. 663, 47 L.R.A. 802, 75 A.S.R. 103; 116 So. 72; 2 A.L.R. 882, 32 A.L.R. 1406, 119 A.L.R. 1462; 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394; 156 Ind. 187, 59 N.E. 468, 83 A.S.R. 187, 51 L.R.A. 748; 188 S.C. 21, 198 S.E. 409; 295 U.S. 495, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 55 S. Ct. 837, 97 A.L.R. 947; 298 U.S. 238, 80 L.Ed. 1160, 56 S.Ct. 855; 260 U.S. 48, 67 L.Ed. 124, 43 S.Ct. 51; 293 U.S. 388, 79 L.Ed. 446, 55 S.Ct. 241; 49 P.2d 1140; 259 N.W. 420; 28 N.E.2d 64; 139 Pa. Sup. 569, 13 A.2d 84; 116 So. 72; 104 Kan. 141, 177 P. 360, 2 A.L.R. 880; 194 Ky. 34, 237 S.W. 1086, 27 A.L.R. 920; 265 S.W. 475; 221 Ill. 9, 77 N.E. 321; 37 Mont. 393, 96 P. 719; 139 Ga. 609, 77 S.E. 818; 157 S.W. 769. Messrs.