Opinion
CASE NO. 21-CV-23596-DLG
2022-09-30
Evgeny RYZHOV, Plaintiff, v. Alejandro MAYORKAS, acting Secretary of United States Department of Homeland Security, and Ur Mendoza Jaddou, Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Defendant.
Evgeny Ryzhov, Miami, FL, Pro Se. David James Byerley, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, Natalie Diaz, U.S. Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
Evgeny Ryzhov, Miami, FL, Pro Se. David James Byerley, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, Natalie Diaz, U.S. Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant. ORDER DONALD L. GRAHAM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31).
THE COURT has considered the Motion, pertinent portions of the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 12), Plaintiff, is a Russian citizen who practices law in several European countries. In May of 2019, Plaintiff was granted asylum in the United States. Thereafter, he requested a travel document, which was issued by the USCIS and remained valid for one year, in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 223.3(a)(2). In May of 2020, he applied for another travel document, which was denied for failure to pay the correct filing fee. Plaintiff refuted the applicability of the filing fee and submitted four subsequent applications without paying the applicable filing fee. Each application was accompanied by a request for a travel document with a validity period of longer than one year. Each request was denied for failure to pay the correct filing fee. In December of 2020, Plaintiff submitted another application for a travel document along with a check for the filing fee. The application was approved, and a travel document was issued on July 22, 2021.
On October 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant action. On December 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting two claims seeking a declaratory judgment finding the one-year validity period of the refugee travel document is unconstitutional, and one claim for monetary relief pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) Motions to Dismiss
"Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) take one of two forms: 'facial' attacks and 'factual' attacks." Butts v. ALN Grp., LLC, 512 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (citing McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007)). "A facial attack requires the Court to merely look at the complaint to see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction," while a factual attack "challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits are considered." Id. "In the face of a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that jurisdiction exists." OSI, Inc. v. United States, 285 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446, 62 S.Ct. 673, 675, 86 L.Ed. 951 (1942); Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss
Allegations within a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "The statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the ground upon which it rests." Thomason v. Alabama Home Builders Licensure Bd., 741 F. App'x 638, 641 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)).
"For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, consider allegations of the complaint as true, and accept all reasonable inferences." Omar ex rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, for a claim to have facial plausibility, a Plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. Therefore, "[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id.
Moreover, the Court's review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is ordinarily limited to the face of the complaint and any attachments thereto. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 2201Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief are governed by the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. In deciding a motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the court must consider "whether the facts alleged, under all circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between the parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941). Further, "the decision to entertain a declaratory judgment is discretionary." Hackett & Assoc., Inc. v. GE Capital Info. Tech. Sols., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's Claims for Declaratory Relief - Counts I, II
i. Plaintiff's Claims Are Moot .
In Counts I and II of Plaintiff's Complaint, he requests a declaratory judgment finding that the one-year validity period for a Refugee Travel Document is unconstitutional. More specifically, he argues that such a short validity period violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
As argued by the Defendants, this case contains no "case or controversy" and is, therefore, outside of the jurisdiction of this Court. As stated by the Supreme Court, the Federal Judiciary is confined "to its constitutionally limited role of adjudicating actual and concrete disputes, the resolutions of which have direct consequences on the parties involved. Such a dispute 'must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.' " United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1537, 200 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2018)(quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges the one-year validity period of a Refugee Travel Document is too short, and as a result, infringes upon refugees' constitutional rights. Defendants argue these claims are moot because the requested relief will have no direct consequence on Plaintiff, who is now a lawful permanent resident and no longer requires a Refugee Travel Document to depart from or reenter the United States.
Notably, Defendants' argument relies on information contained in the copy of Plaintiff's approved I-485 Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, which was attached to the Motion, but not to the Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 31-1). On a motion to dismiss, the court may take judicial notice of a fact outside of the pleading "provided that it is central to the plaintiff's claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity." Kuber v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of Am., 423 F. Supp. 3d 1326, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citing Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2005); Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1135 (11th Cir. 2002)). Further, "[a] district court may take judicial notice of public records within its files relating to the particular case before it or other related cases." Cash Inn of Dade, Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 938 F.2d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 1991)(internal citations omitted). Several district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have taken judicial notice of USCIS decisions and other information readily available on the websites of government agencies, finding such information was not subject to reasonable dispute and was capable of accurate and ready determination. See Xiong v. Johnson, No. 2:20-CV-0045-66MRM, 2020 WL 5500215, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2020) (taking judicial notice of plaintiff's approved I-485 application where such information was readily available and verifiable through the he USCIS website's 'case status online' tool); Horne v. Potter, 392 F. App'x 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2010). See FAS Cap., LLC v. Carr, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1266 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (taking judicial notice of information available on government agency website, reasoning, "[s]everal courts have defined 'public records' to include facts found on the websites of the FDIC and other government agencies."); Laroque v. Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 6:20-CV-788-WWB-EJK, 2021 WL 7084102, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2021) (taking judicial notice of USCIS's decision on Plaintiff's Form I-485).
Defendant has provided a copy of Plaintiff's approved I-485 form which is consistent with the information available using the USCIS website's "case status online" tool. The USCIS website indicates that Plaintiff received a green card on December 2, 2021. Plaintiff argues his claims should not be dismissed but does not dispute the validity of the approved I-485 application, or the information contained therein. Accordingly, the Court will take judicial notice of the approved I-485 application (ECF No. 31-1), the validity of which is undisputed by the Plaintiff and verifiable through a government agency website.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims for declaratory relief are moot and must be dismissed.
ii. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim
Even if a case or controversy existed in this matter, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Plaintiff's claims for declaratory relief stem from the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to travel, as afforded by the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court has recognized, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, "forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993). While "the constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified . . . [t]he Court has made it plain that the freedom to travel outside the United States must be distinguished from the right to travel within the United States." Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306, 101 S. Ct. 2766, 2781, 69 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981)(emphasis added)(internal citations omitted). While the latter is considered a fundamental right, the former is simply a liberty interest, which "can be regulated within the bounds of due process." Id. Accordingly a policy which infringes upon the right to international travel will generally be subject to rational basis review. Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 177, 99 S. Ct. 471, 475, 58 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1978)("[u]nless the limitation imposed by Congress is wholly irrational, it is constitutional in spite of its incidental effect on international travel."); Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 935, 945 (11th Cir. 2013) ("When a challenged law does not infringe upon a fundamental right, we review substantive due process challenges under the rational basis standard."). Furthermore, the right to international travel afforded to aliens in the United States is limited even further, and is "subject to restrictions not applicable to citizens." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587, 72 S. Ct. 512, 517, 96 L. Ed. 586 (1952).
Under the rational basis standard of review, the Court must grant the challenged statute, "a strong presumption of validity." F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2102, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993). The plaintiff challenging the statute, therefore, has "the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support it." Id. at 315, 113 S. Ct. 2096. "Moreover, because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute . . . a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." Id.
As argued by the Defendants, the one-year validity period of the Refugee Travel Document allows the government to more easily ascertain whether asylum shall be terminated, or whether an asylee is eligible for a change of status based on their return to their country of nationality, their acquisition of new nationality, or their presence in the United States for a period of at least one year. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(c)(2)(D)-(E) (stating, asylum may be terminated if the asylee has returned to their country of nationality with permanent resident status, or has acquired new nationality); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1159(a)(1)(A) (stating, an alien is eligible to apply for an adjustment of status after being "physically present in the United States for at least one year").
As stated by the Eleventh Circuit, "[w]here there are 'plausible reasons' for Congress' action, 'our inquiry is at an end.' " U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993)(quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S. Ct. 453, 461, 66 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1980)). Accordingly, the Court finds that the one-year validity period serves a legitimate government interest, and Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden. Therefore, his claims for declaratory relief must be dismissed. B. Plaintiff's Bivens Claims - Count III
Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint asserts Bivens claims against Defendants, based on allegations that they deprived Plaintiff of his protected interest in following a chosen profession.
The Supreme Court, in Bivens, established an implied federal cause of action in the absence of express statutory authority, allowing a plaintiff to recover money damages against federal officers who have violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). In Bivens, the Court found that the plaintiff could assert claims against agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics based on violations of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. Since the opinion in Bivens, the Supreme Court has extended this implied cause of action to claims stemming from (i) a United States Congressman's discrimination against a staff member on the basis of sex in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and (ii) prison officials' failure to provide prisoner with proper medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 228, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 2268, 60 L. Ed. 2d 846 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 14, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 1469, 64 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1980).
Notably, "Bivens claims can be brought against federal officers in their individual capacities only; they do not apply to federal officers acting in their official capacities." Nalls v. Coleman Low Fed. Inst., 307 F. App'x 296, 297 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 521-22, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001)). The allegations of Plaintiff's complaint clearly state that the claims are asserted against, "1) Alejandro Mayorkas, sued only in his official capacity, [as] the Acting Secretary of United States Department of Homeland Security and 2)Ur Mendoza Jaddou, sued only in her official capacity, [as] the director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services." (ECF No. 12 at 2). Thus, Plaintiff's Bivens claims against each defendant, as alleged in Count III, must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED AND AJUDGED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF. No. 31) is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 12) is hereby DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 30th day of September, 2022.