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RYLE v. BANCROFT NEUROHEALTH

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County
Apr 28, 2011
C.A. No. 10A-03-016 WCC (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2011)

Opinion

C.A. No. 10A-03-016 WCC.

Submitted: January 3, 2011.

Decided: April 28, 2011.

Appeal from Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. AFFIRMED.

Cynthia L. DePue, Esquire; Legal Services Corporation of Delaware, Inc., Wilmington, Attorney for Appellant.

Peter L. Frattarelli, Esquire; Archer Greiner, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Bancroft Neurohealth.

Katisha D. Fortune, Esquire; Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.


OPINION


This is an appeal by Donise Ryle ("Appellant") from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ("Board") affirming the decision of the Appeals Referee finding Appellant disqualified from receiving benefits under 19 Del.C. § 3314(2) because Appellant was discharged from her work for just cause. Upon review of the record in this matter, this Court hereby affirms the decision below.

19 Del. C. § 3314(2) provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

For the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual's work for just cause in connection with the individual's work and for each week thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount.

Facts

Appellant was employed as a program associate for Bancroft Neurohealth from October 2004 until August 2009. The Appellant was formally discharged from her employment as of August 28, 2009 for having a suspended driver's license and for driving a company vehicle while on a suspended driver's license, in violation of company policy.

Bancroft Neurohealth operates a facility to care for developmentally and brain-injured individuals. The facility is located at 201 Derby Court, Old Post Farms, Newark, DE 19702. The Appellant lived at the facility until August 10, 2009 and assisted with the care of the individuals who lived in the facility. As a program associate, the Appellant's duties included assisting residents with their daily needs, such as shopping and banking. The Appellant was an authorized driver for the company and was required to maintain a valid driver's license as a condition of continued employment.

Bancroft Neurohealth maintains a driving policy, which is printed in the employee handbook. According to the policy, employees "must have an acceptable driver's record in order to be considered to [sic] and to continue their employment with Bancroft." Furthermore, the policy states that it is the employee's responsibility to inform Bancroft about any changes in his or her driving record during the course of employment and that Bancroft "does conduct driver history checks upon hire, randomly and for cause." Employees who fail to "maintain an acceptable driver record" or fail to "appropriately report changes in driver's record" will be subject to "corrective action up to [and] including termination." The Position Description for Program Associate, which was signed by the Appellant, specifically requires employees to maintain a "[v]alid driver's license" "with no provisional restrictions."

R. at 36.

Id.

Id.

R. at 49.

In August 2009, the Appellant's driver's license was suspended for failure to answer a summons and for default on a fine. The Division of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") sent notice of the suspension via certified mail to the Appellant's Derby Court address on or around August 5, 2009. The Appellant, who was on vacation from the end of July until August 11, 2009, claims she never received this notice. The DMV subsequently sent the Appellant a letter dated August 14, 2009, informing her that the bank had returned a check written by the Appellant and that her license would be suspended as of August 28, 2009 if the fine was not paid. The Appellant worked the weekend of August 14-16 and drove a company vehicle during that time.

Bancroft received notice of the Appellant's license suspension on August 14, 2009 from the company "that runs the driver's license authorization." In response to this notification, Bancroft requested a Driver Record Service Report on the Appellant, which showed that the Appellant's license was suspended on August 13, 2009. A Bancroft supervisor discussed the suspension with the Appellant on August 17, 2009 and instructed her to resolve the issue. She was also told that her driving privileges would be suspended for two weeks. It is unclear if and when the fine was paid and when the Appellant's license was reinstated, but the Appellant was formally terminated from her employment at Bancroft on August 28, 2009.

R. at 37.

The Appellant's driver's license had been suspended on several previous occasions during her employment with Bancroft prior to the 2009 suspension. According to the Driving Record report issued at Bancroft's request, the Appellant's license had also been suspended in 2006, 2007, and 2008.

R. at 21.

Procedural History

The Appellant filed a claim for unemployment benefits on September 3, 2009. The Claims Deputy denied the claim on September 23, 2009, finding that the Appellant was disqualified from receiving benefits under 19 Del. C. § 3314(2) because she had been discharged from her work for just cause. The Appellant subsequently appealed. A hearing took place before the Appeals Referee on October 28, 2009, at which the Appellant appeared on her own behalf and Debbie Weikle, a Bancroft human resources official, testified on behalf of the employer. In a decision mailed October 29, 2009, the Appeals Referee affirmed the Claims Deputy's denial of benefits, finding that the Appellant was disqualified from receiving benefits because the Appellant "reasonably should have known that her license was suspended" and therefore the employer had just cause to discharge her from her employment.

The Appellant then appealed to the Board, which held a hearing on January 13, 2010. At each stage of the administrative proceedings, the Appellant has insisted that she had not known that her driver's license was suspended until she was notified by a supervisor on August 17. The Appellant testified on her own behalf before the Board that she was on vacation from the end of July until August 11, 2009 and never received the certified letter from the DMV informing her of her license suspension. She claimed that she did not receive the letter because the mail at the home is received and distributed by the residents, which sometimes results in letters not receiving their intended recipient. Furthermore, the Appellant testified that her managers knew of the suspension as of August 14, 2009, but they allowed her to work from August 14 to August 16.

R. at 58.

R. at 59.

R. at 39.

Deborah Weikle, the human resources specialist, testified before the Board on Bancroft's behalf that program associates were required to maintain valid driver's licenses and that employees are required to notify Bancroft of problems with their licenses. Bancroft also presented testimony by Karen Reece, who testified that management did not receive the mail at the 201 Derby Court facility and that the Appellant should have received her own mail. The Board affirmed the Referee's denial of benefits on March 25, 2010, finding that Bancroft had just cause to discharge the Appellant for violating a company policy and concurring in the Referee's finding that the Appellant reasonably should have known of her license suspension.

R. at 69-70.

R. at 44, 45.

The Appellant filed a pro se appeal in this Court on March 29, 2010 but subsequently obtained counsel to timely file her Opening Brief on October 21, 2010. Neither Bancroft nor the Board filed a response brief.

Standard of Review

When reviewing an appeal from the Board, this Court's role is limited to evaluating the record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party in order to determine if the record before the Board included substantial evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate support for the Board's conclusions and that the Board's conclusions are free from legal error. Substantial evidence is defined as evidence from which an agency could fairly and reasonably reach the conclusion that it did.

Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. of Dept. of Labor v. Duncan, 337 A.2d 308, 309 (Del. 1975).

Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981).

The Board acts as the finder of fact and it is the Board's duty to resolve any conflicting testimony and evidence presented and to decide which is more credible. Thus, this Court accepts the Board's findings of credibility and weight of the evidence. Accordingly, if the record supports the Board's findings, the Court should accept those findings even if the Court might reach a different conclusion upon review of the facts presented.

Reeves v. Conmac Sec., 2006 WL 496136, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 21, 2006).

Id.

Id.

Discussion

The Appellant first contends that the Board erred in finding that Bancroft had just cause in connection with the employment to dismiss the Appellant. The Appellant argues that she did not know that her license was suspended and therefore her conduct could not rise to the level of willful or wanton as is required to support a finding of just cause. This Court has reviewed the Board's decision and the record in this case and finds that the Board committed no legal error in finding that the Appellant was discharged for just cause in connection with her employment.

In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of proving just cause by a preponderance of the evidence. The Board properly defined just cause as "a willful or wanton act or pattern of conduct in violation of the employer's interest, the employee's duties, or the employee's expected standard of conduct." Willful and wanton conduct is defined as "that which is evidenced by either conscious action, or reckless indifference leading to a deviation from established and acceptable workplace performance; it is unnecessary that it be founded in bad motive or malice."

Barton v. Innolink Systems, Inc., 2004 WL 1284203, *1 (Del. Super. May 28, 2004).

R. at 44 (quoting Majaya v. Sojourner's Place and Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2003 WL 21350542 (Del. Super. 2003)).

MRPC Financial Mgmt. LLC v. Carter, 2003 WL 21517977 (Del. Super. June 20, 2003).

Violation of a reasonable company rule may constitute just cause for discharge where the employee is aware that the policy exists and may be cause for discharge. This Court has established a two-part analysis to determine whether an employee's discharge for violating a company rule constitutes just cause: (1) whether a policy existed, and if so, what conduct was prohibited, and (2) whether the employee was apprised of the policy and if so, how was she made aware. Knowledge of a company policy may be imputed to the employee where there is evidence of a written policy, such as an employer's handbook. An employer must warn an employee that her conduct could lead to termination.

McCoy v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 1996 WL 111126, *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 7, 2006) (citing P arvusa v. Tipton Trucking Co., Inc., C.A. No. 92A-12-009 (Del. Super. Dec. 1, 1993)).

Id.

Id.

Id.

The Board applied the correct legal standard in its opinion. At the hearing, Bancroft's representative presented evidence that the employee handbook included the company's written policy requiring its employees to maintain a valid driver's license, to notify the employer of any problems with the employee's license, and a warning that the employee's failure to do so could result in penalties up to and including termination. It was reasonable for the Board to conclude that the Appellant knew or should have known of the company's policy regarding driver's licenses at the time her license was suspended. The Board also received evidence that the official position description for a program associate included "valid driver's license" as one of the conditions for continued employment, and that the position description was reviewed and signed by the Appellant each year at her annual performance review. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that a policy requiring Bancroft employees (particularly program associates) to maintain a valid driver's license and to notify the employer of any problems with their licenses existed and that the Appellant would have been aware of such a policy. The record also supports the conclusion that the employer through its handbook provided notice that the range of consequences for failure to comply with this policy included termination. Accordingly, the Board did not commit legal error in finding that the Appellant was dismissed for just cause.

The Appellant further contends that the Board abused its discretion by capriciously disregarding relevant evidence that the Appellant did not know that her license had been suspended when she worked and drove the company vehicle on the weekend of August 14-16, 2009. In support of her argument, the Appellant relies on this Court's decision in Ridings v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, in which the Court concluded that the Board erred by excluding testimony relevant to the issues raised by the unemployment claim. The Ridings Court also concluded that the Board denied the claimant's right to due process by encouraging the claimant to give up his right to testify live before the Board in favor of reading a transcript of the claimant's testimony before the referee.

407 A.2d 238 (Del. Super. 1979).

Id. at 240 ("It was error to exclude such testimony from the record where claimant's job responsibilities and training were in issue.")

Id.

The Appellant here makes no claim that the Board excluded relevant evidence. The Appellant contends that the Board failed to consider the implications of her testimony that she was on vacation from the end of July until August 11 or her testimony that she did not receive the DMV letter dated August 14. In other words, the Appellant is not challenging any action taken by the Board but rather the Board's conclusions, which were drawn from evidence in the record before it. It is not the role of this Court to second-guess the factual findings of the Board or the weight of the evidence, and it will not do so here. Equally important to the Court in making this decision is the fact that the Appellant's license had been suspended on at least two prior occasions for similar violations. As such, she was on notice that the failure to pay the required fine would result in a license suspension, in violation of company policy. So while she may not have known of the actual letter from DMV, she clearly would have realized her conduct would lead to a suspension of her driving privileges. The ministerial step of the actual receipt of the letter is thus immaterial.

While it is unclear from the record, the Court suspects that the employer was unaware of the earlier suspensions, and the pattern of non-disclosure of these past events led to the decision to terminate her employment.

After reviewing the entire record in this case, the Court finds that there was substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that the Appellant reasonably would have known of her license suspension and to support the Board's conclusion that Bancroft had just cause to dismiss the Appellant.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is hereby AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

RYLE v. BANCROFT NEUROHEALTH

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County
Apr 28, 2011
C.A. No. 10A-03-016 WCC (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2011)
Case details for

RYLE v. BANCROFT NEUROHEALTH

Case Details

Full title:DONISE RYLE, Appellant, v. BANCROFT NEUROHEALTH and UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE…

Court:Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County

Date published: Apr 28, 2011

Citations

C.A. No. 10A-03-016 WCC (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2011)