Opinion
A21-1485 A21-1486 A21-1487 A21-1488
04-22-2022
Kurt Rylander, Respondent (A21-1485), v. Matthew James Beland, Appellant (A21-1485, A21-1486), Heidi Hamre-Rylander, Respondent (A21-1486), and Matthew James Beland, Appellant (A21-1487, A21-1488), v. Kurtis Rylander, Respondent (A21-1487), Heidi Hamre-Rylander, Respondent (A21-1488).
Polk County District Court File Nos. 60-CV-20-894, 60-CV-20-895, 60-CV-21-747, 60-CV-21-760
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Kirk, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
Jennifer L. Frisch Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Matthew James Beland and respondent Heidi Hamre-Rylander are divorced. Following their divorce, Hamre-Rylander married respondent Kurt Rylander(collectively, the Rylanders). In early 2020, Beland and Hamre-Rylander were engaged in highly contested post-dissolution proceedings.
Respondent Kurt Rylander is also named as "Kurtis Rylander" in the caption of two of the cases of this consolidated appeal.
2. In May 2020, Beland filed petitions for separate harassment restraining orders (HROs) against each of the Rylanders on behalf of himself and his minor children. Beland's petitions were assigned case numbers 60-CV-20-894 and 60-CV-20-895. Affidavits accompanying each petition contained allegations of various acts of harassment directed at Beland, Beland's children, Beland's then-fiancée and attorney Sarah Kyte, and Kyte's children.
3. The district court initially denied Beland's petitions without an evidentiary hearing. We reversed this decision. Beland v. Hamre-Rylander, No. A20-0957, 2021 WL 416735, at *4 (Minn.App. Feb. 8, 2021). On remand, Kyte filed a notice of representation on behalf of Beland and a notice of advocate-witness. The Rylanders moved to disqualify Kyte as counsel pursuant to Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.7, arguing that Kyte was a necessary witness.
4. The cases were assigned to a referee. Following a hearing, the referee found Kyte to be a necessary witness and disqualified Kyte from representing Beland as counsel. Beland requested the district court to reconsider the ruling of the referee, but the district court affirmed the order disqualifying Kyte as counsel.
5. The Rylanders each filed individual petitions for HROs against Beland. These petitions were assigned case numbers 60-CV-21-747 and 60-CV-21-760 (hereinafter cases 747 and 760). In their petitions and supporting affidavits, the Rylanders alleged that both Beland and Kyte committed acts of harassment. The Rylanders moved to disqualify Kyte as counsel in cases 747 and 760, and the district court granted the motion. Beland and Kyte appealed the disqualifications of Kyte as counsel in each of the four related HRO cases, and this court consolidated the appeals.
Prior to this consolidated appeal being heard, we determined Kyte lacked standing to appeal her disqualification and ordered her dismissed as an appellant.
6. "We review the district court's decision regarding disqualification of counsel for an abuse of discretion." State by Swanson v. 3M Co., 845 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Minn. 2014). A district court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law, makes findings that are unsupported by the record, or resolves the discretionary question in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record. Bender v. Bernhard, N.W.2d,, No. A20-1234, slip op. at 8 (Minn. Mar. 9, 2022); Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2021) (same); Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997) (same). We review the district court's interpretation of a rule of professional conduct de novo. Prod. Credit Ass'n of Mankato v. Buckentin, 410 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Minn. 1987).
7. The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct provide that an attorney cannot act as a witness and represent a client in the same proceeding unless the attorney's testimony relates to an uncontested issue or the value of legal services rendered, or if disqualification would work substantial hardship on the client. Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.7. The supreme court explained:
If the evidence sought to be elicited from the attorney-witness can be produced in some other effective way, it may be that the attorney is not necessary as a witness. If the lawyer's testimony is merely cumulative, or quite peripheral, or already contained in a document admissible as an exhibit, ordinarily the lawyer is not a necessary witness . . . .Humphrey ex rel. State v. McLaren, 402 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Minn. 1987). The availability of other witnesses who can testify to relevant facts renders an attorney a non-necessary witness. State v. Fratzke, 325 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1982). "The rule does not, however, contemplate that a party can force the disqualification of his opponent's attorney simply by calling him as a witness or stating that he intends to call him as a witness." Id. at 11.
8. We see no abuse of discretion by the district court in its determination that Kyte is a necessary witness in all four HRO proceedings. Kyte admitted that she could be a witness when she filed a notice of advocate-witness with the court. Beland also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Rylanders had failed to join necessary parties, including Kyte. At the hearing to resolve this motion, Kyte confirmed that she was a necessary party to the proceedings. Kyte is also repeatedly referenced in all four petitions and the supporting affidavits either as a victim or perpetrator of harassment. The record reveals that Kyte is a material fact witness who has extensive knowledge of the facts at issue. Thus, her testimony would not be merely "cumulative" or "peripheral," as she is extensively intertwined with the allegations contained in all four petitions. McLaren, 402 N.W.2d at 541. Lastly, Kyte appeared to argue to the district court that her "credibility" is at issue to support Beland's argument that she is a necessary party. We agree that Kyte's credibility is a relevant issue in these matters, and she is therefore a necessary witness to the proceedings.
9. Disqualification of counsel, however, is not warranted when it would impose a substantial hardship on the client. Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.7(a)(3). Comment four to the rule explains that, in determining whether disqualification would impose a substantial hardship, the district court must give due regard to the effect of disqualification on the client and must balance the interests of the client against the likelihood that counsel's testimony will mislead the tribunal or cause prejudice to the opposing party. Id., 3.7 cmt. 4. In weighing these interests, "[i]t is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness." Id.
10. Neither the referee nor the district court properly balanced the interests of Beland against the chance that Kyte's testimony would mislead the tribunal or cause prejudice to the Rylanders. Although the district court made conclusory findings of fact and law regarding the hardship that Beland could face, it did not specifically address factors contemplated by the rule related to the effect Kyte's testimony would have on the Rylanders and the tribunal, such as "the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses." Id. Without sufficient findings balancing these competing interests, we must remand the matter to the district court for the limited purpose of making express findings based on the existing record balancing the competing interests contemplated by Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.7.
11. Beland has also filed a motion to strike portions of the Rylanders' brief because it allegedly contains facts not in the record. The record on appeal is limited to "documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any." Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. "An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below." Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988). However, we may deny a motion to strike as moot if the challenged facts are irrelevant to the resolution of the appeal. See Drewitz v. Motorwerks, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 231, 233 n.2 (Minn. 2007). Here, the extraneous facts relate to prior sanctions against Beland and are not relevant to the question presented to us, namely whether Kyte should be disqualified as Beland's attorney. We therefore deny the motion to strike as moot.
12. The Rylanders filed a motion for attorney fees associated with responding to Beland's motion to strike and for preparing its motion for attorney fees. An award of attorney fees on appeal lies within the discretion of this court. Fabio v. Bellomo, 489 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn.App. 1992), aff'd, 504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993). We deny the Rylanders' motion because Beland was invited to respond to disparaging allegations the Rylanders chose to include in their submission that are entirely irrelevant to the limited issue on appeal.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is reversed and remanded.
2. Beland's motion to strike and the Rylanders' motion for attorney fees are denied.
3. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. --------- Notes: [*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.