A defendant put on trial for any offense, felony or misdemeanor, for which imprisonment is a penalty, has a constitutional right to counsel which may only be waived by voluntary and knowing action. Callaway v. State, 197 Ga. App. 606, 607 ( 398 S.E.2d 856) (1990); Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga. App. 666, 669 ( 482 S.E.2d 403) (1997). The trial judge has the duty of determining whether the defendant has voluntarily and knowingly waived the right to counsel and validly elected to exercise the alternative right to proceed pro se. McCook v. State, 178 Ga. App. 276-277 ( 342 S.E.2d 757) (1986); Burnett v. State, 182 Ga. App. 539, 540 ( 356 S.E.2d 231) (1987).
“When determining whether there has been an informed and intelligent waiver of such a right, each case must be determined upon its own peculiar facts and circumstance.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga.App. 666, 669(3), 482 S.E.2d 403 (1997). To facilitate appellate review, the trial court should make an express finding on the record that the defendant has validly chosen to proceed pro se and should ensure that the record reflects that the defendant's choice was made after the defendant was made aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of proceeding without counsel.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga.App. 666, 669(2), 482 S.E.2d 403 (1997). Supra.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga. App. 666, 669 (3) ( 482 SE2d 403) (1997). "The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused."
" However, such proposed waiver does not set forth that the defendant understood the possible defenses to the charges, circumstances in mitigation, that the state cannot place the defendant's character in evidence, a detailed description of trial procedure, and the statement of any plea offers and the consequences, to constitute a knowing relinquishment of the right of counsel in addition to knowing that there is a right of counsel. See Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga. App. 666, 669 (3) ( 482 S.E.2d 403) (1997); see also Cook v. State, 227 Ga. App. 674 ( 490 S.E.2d 812) (1997). The trial court's order stated that "I have satisfied myself that [Hamilton] has decided to forego the assistance of counsel and represent himself [sic] and that this decision is free, voluntary, and intelligent.
The right to counsel attaches when an accused is placed on trial for any offense, felony or misdemeanor, for which he faces imprisonment. Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga. App. 666, 669 (3) ( 482 S.E.2d 403) (1997). While the right to counsel, like all constitutional rights, may be knowingly and intelligently waived, the trial court bears "the serious and weighty responsibility" of conducting an investigation to assure that the waiver is intelligent and competent.
"Thus, the trial transcript clearly indicates that defendant was not denied the right to counsel by the trial court, but instead knowingly, understandingly and voluntarily elected to represent himself .... Under the circumstances of this particular case, we find no error requiring a reversal of the conviction." Rutledge v. State , 224 Ga. App. 666, 670 (3), 482 S.E.2d 403 (1997) (citation and punctuation omitted). (b) Assuming, arguendo , that the trial court erred in allowing Rutledge to represent himself, any perceived error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Citation omitted.) Rutledge v. State , 224 Ga. App. 666, 669 (3), 482 S.E.2d 403 (1997). As a result,
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga.App. 666, 668(1), 482 S.E.2d 403 (1997). See Mayo v. State, 277 Ga.App. 282, 283(1)(a), 626 S.E.2d 245 (2006); Gerlock, 283 Ga.App. at 230–231(1), 641 S.E.2d 240;Williams v. State, 199 Ga.App. 544, 544–545(1), 405 S.E.2d 539 (1991).
Evidence that Cooper used a dealer's scale to distribute marijuana into individual packages of similar weight, his possession of a larger bag of marijuana along with empty individual plastic bags, his possession of a total amount of 6.85 grams of loose marijuana, his admission that he would do whatever it takes to make money, and the officer's observation of what might have been an interrupted sale transaction combined together adequately support his intent to distribute conviction. See Williams v. State, 303 Ga.App. 222, 224–225(2), 692 S.E.2d 820 (2010); Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga.App. 666, 668(1), 482 S.E.2d 403 (1997). Judgment affirmed.