Opinion
C.A. NO. 99A-12-011-NAB.
Submitted: March 27, 2000.
Decided: May 31, 2000.
Appeal From a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Decision Affirmed.
Erica Russell, New Castle, Delaware, Pro Se Claimant.
James J. Hanley, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, for the Board.
ORDER
Having reviewed the parties' submissions, as well as the record below the Court finds and concludes as follows:
1. Claimant Erica Russell appeals the denial of her petition for unemployment insurance benefits, arguing that she was discriminated against by the Department of Labor (Department). Her appeal is opposed by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (Board). The Board argues that there is no evidence of discrimination or administrative error and that the Board followed its standard practices in determining the outcome of Claimant's petition.
Claimant's employer at the time of her discharge, Geiger Services, is not a party to the action because Claimant's appeal of the determination was disposed of on procedural grounds.
2. The record shows the following facts. Claimant started to work for Geiger Services on March 5, 1999. On Friday, September 24, 1999, she gave notice of her intention to quit in two weeks. On Tuesday, September 28, she was told not to return to work so her replacement could be hired and trained. That was her last day at Geiger. Claimant filed with the Department a petition for unemployment insurance benefits for the period of time from which she was let go (Wednesday, September 29) until the end of her two-week notice period (Friday, October 8). In response, she received from the Department a Notice of Determination, dated October 21, which granted her benefits for the week of October 4 through October 8, but not for the three days of the previous week. The Notice clearly stated that the last day to appeal the decision was October 31, 1999, which was a Sunday. Claimant therefore had until Monday to file a timely appeal.
In its answering brief, the Board notes that, because the final day of the appeal period fell on a Sunday, Claimant could have timely filed her appeal on Monday, November 1, 1999. Because the Board did not cite to a Board rule for this proposition, the Court assumes that the Board relies on Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(a), which provides in part as follows: "In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, by order of court, or by statute, . . . [t]he last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday or Sunday, or other legal holiday, or other day on which the office of the Prothonotary is closed, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day on which the office of the Prothonotary is open." Although Rule 6 governs time periods for filing documents with the Prothonotary of the Superior Court, the Board apparently follows a similar practice of allowing an appeal to be filed on the next day that the office of the Department is open, when the final day of the statutory period falls on a week-end or holiday.
3. Claimant filed her appeal in person on Tuesday, November 2, 1999. She told the claims deputy that she had not received the Notice of Determination until 2:00 p.m. on Monday, November 1, 1999. Her appeal was rejected as untimely pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3318 (b), and Claimant appealed. A hearing was held by an appeals referee who affirmed the decision of the claims deputy that Claimant's appeal was untimely.
Title 19 Del. C. § 3318 (b) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Unless a claimant or a last employer who has submitted a timely and completed separation notice in accordance with § 3317 of this title files an appeal within 10 calendar days after such Claims Deputy's determination was mailed to the last known addresses of the claimant and the last employer, the Claims Deputy's determination shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith.
4. Claimant filed a timely appeal with the Board. The Board reviewed the record and denied Claimant's application for further review. In its written decision, the Board found that the Notice of Determination was mailed to Claimant's last known address and that she received it prior to the expiration of the appeal period. The Board recognized that the statutory appeal deadlines are jurisdictional and concluded that the claims deputy's original determination was final and binding because Claimant's appeal was untimely. The Board did not see fit to exercise its discretion to initiate further proceedings on the matter. Claimant filed a timely appeal to this Court.
5. This Court's function on appeal of a decision an administrative tribunal such as the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is limited. The Court is to determine whether the Board's factual findings are supported by substantial record evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In its appellate role, this Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility or make its own factual findings. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the Board's findings.
General Motors v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1965).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994).
Johnson v. Chrysler, 213 A.2d at 66.
Title 29 Del. C. § 10142 (d).
6. The record shows that Claimant views the jurisdictional time bar to her appeal to be unduly harsh. Claimant therefore assumes that she is the object of discrimination at every level of the administrative process. Although Claimant's opening brief does not identify any basis for the alleged discrimination, her Notice of Appeal alleges discrimination of the basis of "age and experience." However, Claimant does not identify any facts of record to support this allegation. Her unsupported assertion that a claims deputy contacted Geiger Services to ensure that the documentation was submitted does not constitute evidence of discrimination. As a factual matter, the Court concludes that the allegations of discrimination are not supported by substantial evidence.
7. Claimant also objects to the Board's denial of her request for further review. This decision was a discretionary act within the Board's authority. A decision by an administrative agency is not an abuse of discretion "unless it is based on clearly unreasonable or capricious grounds [or] the Board exceeds the the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice." The Delaware Supreme Court has found that the "statutory ten-day time limit for filing an administrative appeal is reasonable." In this case, where the Board reviewed the relevant facts and appropriately applied the law to those facts, the Board's decision to uphold the ten-day rule was not arbitrary or capricious. Where there is no error of law or abuse of discretion, and the findings below are supported by substantial evidence, this Court must affirm the tribunal's decision.
Title 19 Del. C. § 3320; Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Supr., 591 A.2d 222 (1991). See also Connors v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95A-05-007, Lee, J. (May 22, 1996).
K-Mart, Inc. v. Bowles, Del. Super., C.A. No. 94A-10-007, Cooch, J. (Mar. 23, 1995), Order at 4-5.
Funk, 591 A.2d at 225.
For all these reasons, the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board must be and hereby is AFFIRMED .
It Is So ORDERED.