Opinion
Civil Action 00-0410-CB-C.
October 20, 2000.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forms pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action has been referred to the undersigned for recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(l)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4). It is recommended that the claims against Defendants Mobile County, Alabama, Mobile County Metro Jail, and the Mobile County Jail Medical Staff be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) because the claims against these Defendants are either frivolous or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. However, this action will proceed against the Sheriff of Mobile County, Alabama, Jack Tillman.
Plaintiff sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis by filing his Motion to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Docs. 2 5). Plaintiff was granted IFP status and was ordered to pay a partial filing fee (Doc. 6). Instead of paying the partial filing fee, Plaintiff paid the entire $150.00 filing fee. Section 1915(e)(2) states: "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that. . . (b) the action or appeal — (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[.]" Section 1915A (b)(l) also provides for the dismissal of an action suing government officials on these grounds even though the $150.00 filing fee has been paid. Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 274 (5th Cir. 1998).
I. Complaint. (Doc. 1)
Plaintiff named as Defendants Mobile County, the Mobile County Metro Jail ("jail"), Mobile County Jail Medical Staff, and Sheriff Jack Tillman. Plaintiff alleges that on January 24, 2000, while at the jail, he submitted a request for medical treatment. Plaintiff claims that eventually on February 29, 2000, he received medical treatment from a medical staff member, Mr. Singleton, who pushed the ear-light into Plaintiff's ear, causing severe pain which continues today. Plaintiff contends that when he complained about this treatment, he was denied further treatment by Mr. Singleton for his condition. Plaintiff avers that his condition became bronchitis, which Nurse Rasmey confirmed on March 11, 2000. Plaintiff alleges that he complained through the grievance procedure to the security staff, but was treated unprofessionally by all staff members, and that he received poor medical treatment as a result of his complaints.
Plaintiff adequately identified Defendant Tillman when he named the Sheriff of Mobile County as a Defendant. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1992). Thus, the Court provided the name of the person who was sheriff at the time of the alleged deprivation.
Plaintiff asserts that he was forced to sleep on the floor in a two-man cell which was occupied by four inmates. Plaintiff maintains that he was bitten by spiders and other bugs when he slept on the floor and that this arrangement was very unsanitary. For relief, Plaintiff seeks damages, the termination of Mr. Singleton, proper medical care, and relief from the overcrowded conditions at the jail.
II. Discussion.
A. Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) .
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a claim may be dismissed as "frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are immune from suit, id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833, the claim seeks to enforce a right which clearly does not exist, id., or there is an affirmative defense that would defeat the claim, such as the statute of limitations, Clark v. Georgia Pardons Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1990). Judges are accorded "not only the authority to dismiss [as frivolous] a claim based on indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations."Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).
The predecessor to this section was 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d).
B. Defendant Mobile County Metro Jail and Mobile County Jail Medical Staff.
In order to bring a viable § 1983 action, Plaintiff must name as a defendant an entity that is subject to being sued. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992). The capacity of a party to be sued is "determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held. . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b); see Dean, 951 F.2d at 1214.
Under Alabama law, the sheriff, or a jailer who is appointed by the sheriff, "has the legal custody and charge of the jail in his county and all prisoners committed thereto. . . ." Ala, Code § 14-6-1 (1995). Generally, a sheriffs department operates a county jail. However, an Alabama sheriffs department is not a legal entity that is subject to being sued. Dean, 951 F.2d at 1214; King v. Colbert, 620 So.2d 623, 626 (Ala. 1993); White v. Birchfield, 582 So.2d 1085, 1087 (Ala. 1991). Then, it follows that a subdivision of a sheriffs department, such as the jail, is not a legal entity that can be sued. See Marsden v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 856 F. Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a jail is not an entity subject to being sued); see also House v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, No. 98 C 788, 1998 WL 89095, at *2 (N.D.III. Feb. 13, 1998); May v. North County Detention Facility, No. C 93-1180 BAC, 1993 WL 300290, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 1993). Accordingly, the Court determines that Defendant Mobile County Metro Jail is not a suable entity. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim against the jail lacks legal merit and is due to dismissed as frivolous.
Likewise, the Court finds that the Defendant Mobile County Jail Medical Staff is a subdivision of the sheriffs department and is not a legal entity that is subject to being sued. See Johnson v. Sheahan, No. 94 C 618, 1994 WL 494803 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 8, 1994) (ruling that the jail's medical staff "is neither a person nor an entity subject to suit because of the lack of a legal existence"); accord Humphrey v. Bowles, 125 F.R.D. 657, 664 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (finding that there is no cognizable governmental entity or political subdivision such as the jail's maintenance staff), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the undersigned finds that the claims against the Defendant Mobile County Jail Medical Staff are due to be dismissed without prejudice as frivolous.
Plaintiff only identified the jail medical staff as a defendant in section III of the complaint and failed to identify in section III as a defendant a specific individual connected to his medical claims. The complaint form advises Plaintiff that "the persons who are listed as defendants in section III of the complaint are deemed by the Court to be the only defendants to this action." (Doc. 1, at 2)
C. Defendant Mobile County.
Plaintiff's claim against Mobile County is "lack of medical treatment cruel and unsecure confinement — county jail" and relies on the facts in the general description of his action to support this claim. In order to state a claim against a local governmental entity in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff is required to allege that "his injury was caused by `a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.' Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A local governing body may also be held liable for "constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental `custom' . . .," but may not be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability.Id. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018." Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 225 F.3d 1243, 2000 WL 1269679 (11th Cir. Sept. 7, 2000).
Plaintiff is relying on the same facts that he lodges against all of the other Defendants to support his claim against Mobile County. Plaintiff's allegations do not refer to a policy or a custom of Mobile County that was deliberately indifferent to a deprivation of his constitutional rights and do not contain allegations to support the conclusion assertion of an unsecured building. See Id. Rather, Plaintiff's allegations reflect that he is attempting to hold Mobile County vicariously liable for the acts of officials managing the jail on a daily basis. Vicarious liability, however, is not recognized under § 1983 as a basis for liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant Mobile County, and that the claims against Mobile County are due to be dismissed.
III. Conclusion.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the claims against Defendants Mobile County, Mobile County Metro Jail, and the Mobile County Jail Medical Staff be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) because the claims against these Defendants are either frivolous or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.