Opinion
Civil No. 03-4889 (PAM/RLE).
October 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
On August 8, 2000, a complaint-warrant was issued in Hennepin County that charged Plaintiff Charles Russell of making terrorist threats, a felony. The warrant set bail at $20,000, along with a conditional release requirement with intensive supervision. On September 26, 2000, Russell was arrested and brought to the Hennepin County Adult Detention Center ("ADC"). Russell's first appearance was on September 27, 2000, and bail was revised to $10,000, with a conditional release and no contact with the victim requirement. On November 9, 2000, Russell appeared before Judge Bruce Hartigan for a pretrial conference and entered a guilty plea. No bail was required, but the record reflected that release was still conditional and that Russell was to have no contact with the victim. (See Beitz Aff. Ex. I.) A presentence investigation was ordered and the case referred to probation. (See Chapman Aff. Ex. A.) Russell was returned to ADC at approximately 3:40 p.m.
Russell believed that he was to be immediately released. After about two hours, Russell asked the guards when he would be released. Russell was required to fill out an inmate request form, or "green slip," with his inquiry. While detained, Russell submitted at least two of these "green slips," arguing that he was to be immediately released. (Johnson Aff. Exs. C-4, C-5.) Each time, the guards referenced his file that indicated that the judge ordered a conditional release and no contact with the victim. (See id.; see id. Ex. F; Beitz Aff. Ex. I.) Russell eventually made a call to his attorney on November 14, 2000. After speaking with his attorney, he was released one day later.
A conditional release requires that probation meet with the inmate concerning the conditions. Once that occurs, probation signs the inmate's booking sheet, which signals the ADC Records Unit to begin the discharge process. (See Anderson Aff. Ex. G.) Probation did not immediately meet with Russell to sign him out, and the parties dispute the follow-up procedures used between ADC and probation throughout this process. Nonetheless, on November 15, 2000, ADC received an amended court order from Judge Hartigan, that stated, "Defendant should be NBR [no bail required] with no contact with victim rather than CR [conditional release]." (Johnson Aff. Ex. E.)
On February 22, 2001, Russell was sentenced by Judge Hartigan. Though imposition of his sentence was stayed, one of the conditions required that he serve a 53-day term at ADC. He was given 53 days credit for the time that he spent at ADC between September 26, 2000, and November 15, 2000 (which totaled 51 days). (Johnson Aff. Ex. J.)
Russell claims that Defendant Hennepin County employs unlawful release procedures. In particular, Russell contends that Hennepin County's current procedure results in long and unnecessary delays for inmates, simply delaying "all releases until the system is ready `in its sweet time' to make releases." (Pl.s' Mem. in Opp'n at 6.) Russell also contends that the delay in releasing him violated his federal and state constitutional rights. He also brings a common law claim of false imprisonment. Defendants' Motion pertains to all of these claims.
Defendants are Hennepin County and Sheriff McGowan, as policy makers, and individuals Michele Smolley, Thomas Merkel and Richard Estensen. Russell concedes that Smolley, Merkel and Estensen should be dismissed from this case because they were not involved in the policy, custom or practice of the ADC.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik v. Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995).
B. Federal claim
Russell's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 argument is two-fold. First, Russell contends that Defendants' failure to release him on November 9, 2000, and his subsequent release six days later on November 15, 2000, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Russell further claims that the County's alleged policy of allowing processing delays is unreasonable and unconstitutional. Only if the delay in this case was unconstitutional should the Court proceed to analyze whether the County can be liable for that delay because of an unconstitutional policy or procedure. Thus, the Court must first determine whether the six day delay for Russell's release violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
If the government engages in conduct that "shocks the conscience" or interferes with "rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," then a plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights have been violated. See Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 643 (8th Cir. 2002). In this case, Russell appeared before Judge Hartigan on November 9, 2000. At this appearance, Russell pled guilty to making terrorist threats against his victim. The record reflects that Judge Hartigan ordered a presentence investigation and granted Russell a conditional release. (Beitz Aff. Ex. I.) However, the transcript of the sentencing reflects otherwise. (Chapman Aff. Ex. A.) At the time of Russell's detention, ADC only had the benefit of the written order, which indicated that Russell was to be conditionally released. (Beitz Aff. Ex. I.) Pursuant to procedure, ADC is not permitted to begin the discharge process until Russell met with probation. Thus, although Russell complained at least twice, ADC guards explained to him on both occasions that, based on their records, they could not release him until he met with probation. (See Johnson Aff. Exs. C-4, C-5, F; Beitz Aff. Ex. I.) On November 15, 2000, Judge Hartigan issued an amended order that granted Russell release "NBR" and no contact with the victim. (Johnson Aff. Ex. E.) Once ADC received this amended order, Russell was discharged three hours later. Judge Hartigan's original written order did not reflect his intent. When this error was discovered, Judge Hartigan amended the order to release Russell without conditions. The Court finds that although this incident was unfortunate, it does not shock the Court's conscience.
This case presents the unique situation involving a convicted felon and a court-ordered release. Although it is undisputed that the court intended to release Russell without conditions, the order of the court did not reflect that intent. The record supports that ADC staff referenced Russell's file and promptly responded to Russell's inquiries based on this information. Because the court's order required a conditional release, ADC staff strictly followed this court order and continued to detain Russell. Russell was almost immediately released as soon as Judge Hartigan's amended order was issued. This case is unlike Davis v. Hall, where prison officials detained the plaintiff for 53 days in the absence of any court order. See 375 F.3d 703, 708 (8th Cir. 2004). This case is likewise inapposite to Young v. City of Little Rock, where prison officials mistakenly detained an innocent individual, chained her to five or six other female inmates, and strip searched her in front of five or six other people, after the court ordered her released. 249 F.3d 730, 736 (8th Cir. 2001). Unlike Davis andYoung, the instant case involves the delayed release of a convicted felon pursuant to court order, and confusion between ADC and the court. As a matter of law, Russell's delayed release does not rise to a Fourteenth Amendment violation.
C. State law claims
Russell also claims that Defendants' actions also violated his rights under the Minnesota constitution, and that his delayed release constituted false imprisonment. Because Russell's federal claims fail, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 17) is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.