Opinion
Civil Action No. 5:03-CV-060-C
March 19, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On this day the Court considered Dawson County, Texas' ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in Support, and Appendix, filed with this Court on February 17, 2004. The deadline for Plaintiff to file a Response expired on March 8, 2004, and Plaintiff has not filed a Response as of the date of this Order. After considering all relevant arguments and evidence, and the papers and pleadings filed in this case, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, for the following reasons:
I. BACKGROUND
Jacob Russell filed suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dawson County, Texas, and various unknown defendants on March 12, 2003, alleging liability for various violations of his constitutional rights. In particular, Plaintiff alleged that his constitutional rights were violated by the unknown county officials through his unlawful arrest and, further, that their use of excessive force during his arrest and detention for violation of his probation, and their deliberate indifference to his medical needs during his incarceration in the Dawson County jail, caused him to suffer injury to his hands, arms, mid-section, back, and body as a whole. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that these constitutional violations were caused by the policy or custom of Dawson County and its county-wide elected Sheriff to illegally arrest individuals, to utilize unnecessary and excessive force, and to deny necessary medical treatment, and the failure to train or the inadequate training and supervision of its employees in the detection of detainees' injuries and medical needs.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255. Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986), the non-movant must come forward, after adequate time for discovery, with significant probative evidence showing a triable issue of fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). This evidence must be sufficient to support the elements of the non-movant's prima facie case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321-23. Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993).
To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Rather, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find in the non-movant's favor. Id. The pleadings are not summary judgment evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Giles v. General Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Absent a showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, a properly supported motion for summary judgment should be granted. See Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1988); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Starkey, 41 F.3d 1018, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1995). However, the mere fact that no opposition is filed does not excuse the moving party from meeting its burden on the summary judgment motion. Anchorage Assocs, v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990). If no factual showing is made in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court is not required to search the record sua sponte for some genuine issue of material fact. It may rely entirely on the evidence designated by the moving party showing no such triable issue. Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1992).
A party moving for summary judgment may support that motion with appropriate evidence in an attempt to negate an essential element of the non-movant's claim or defense, but summary judgment is also appropriate when the movant shows that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the non-movant's claim or defense. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (1986). In order to withstand a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must present evidence sufficient to establish the existence of each element of his claim as to which he will have the burden of proof at trial. Id. The purpose of summary judgment, as the Supreme Court has instructed, is to "enable a party who believes there is no genuine dispute as to a specific fact essential to the other side's case to demand at least one sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of litigation continues." Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3189, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990); Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d at 1075. A court is to resolve all factual controversies in favor of the non-movant, who is the Plaintiff here, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. We do not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Liquid Air, 37 F.3d at 1075. Summary judgment is appropriate when a party fails to establish the existence of an essential element of its case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (1986).
III. DISCUSSION
Claims Against Dawson County, TexasTo prevail on a claim for municipal (or county) liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish 1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom that was executed with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights, and 2) the existence of a direct causal link between the municipality's policy or custom and the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). Defendant's summary judgment motion asserts that there is no evidence to support an essential element of Plaintiff's claim. Specifically, Defendant points out that there is no evidence to support the existence of a policy or custom of Dawson County that is the moving force behind Plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivations and that there is no evidence that Defendant's acts or omissions caused Plaintiff's alleged injuries. By presenting no evidence, significant and probative or otherwise, in support of either essential element of his claim, Plaintiff fails to withstand Defendant's motion. Plaintiff has not alleged anything more than this isolated incident as proof of a policy or custom. Isolated incidents, however, are not sufficient to establish a policy or custom under § 1983. See McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989). Further, Plaintiff has not produced even one sworn averment, much less any record evidence of specific facts to show causation. Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to establish a genuine issue for trial on Plaintiff's claim of municipal liability even though there has been adequate time for discovery.
Defendant further argues that summary judgment is appropriate because it has presented evidence that negates an essential element of the non-movant's claim or defense. Specifically, Defendant offers evidence, in the form of an affidavit from Dawson County Sheriff Johnny Garcia, to establish that Dawson County does not have a policy or custom that instructs or encourages its law enforcement officers to use excessive force on suspects or detainees, to wrongfully arrest persons, or to act with deliberate indifference to a detainee's medical needs. [App. to Def's. Mot. for Summ. J., Dep. of Sheriff J. Garcia at 1-2, ¶¶ 7-11]. Because Defendant's evidence is uncontroverted by Plaintiff, the Court may rely on Defendant's evidence to show that no triable issue exists on this element of Plaintiff's claim.
Defendant further argues that summary judgment is appropriate because it has presented evidence that negates the element of causation necessary to establish municipal liability. Specifically, with regard to the excessive-force claim, Defendant offers evidence in the form of deposition testimony of the Plaintiff and Deputy Matt Hogg, who arrested Plaintiff, and also the affidavit of Sheriff Garcia, as proof that the persons who allegedly used excessive force were in fact probation and parole officers of the 106th Judicial District and not officers or employees of Dawson County, Texas. [App. to Def's. Mot. for Summ. J., Dep. of J. Russell at 56-61, Dep. of Deputy M. Hogg at 47-48, Aff. of Sheriff J. Garcia at 1, ¶¶ 5-6]. With regard to Plaintiff's unlawful-arrest claim, Defendant offers proof in the form of the arrest warrant relied on by Deputy Hogg to arrest Plaintiff, and the deposition testimony of Deputy Hogg, to show that the warrant was facially valid. [App. to Def's. Mot. for Summ. J., at 7-10, Dep. of Deputy M. Hogg at 43-46]. Again, because Defendant's evidence is uncontroverted by Plaintiff, the Court may rely on Defendant's evidence to show that no triable issue exists on this element of Plaintiff's claim.
Lastly, with regard to Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to necessary medical needs, while it is true that a detainee or inmate has a constitutional right to necessary medical care, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-91, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1967), a claim of deliberate indifference can be rebutted by evidence of sick call requests, examinations, and medical treatment offered. See Palm v. Marr, 174 F. Supp.2d 484, 488 (N.D. Tex. 2001); see also Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that deliberate indifference not shown where the record demonstrated extensive evidence of medical care and attention). Defendant offers evidence that Plaintiff properly requested medical treatment using a written form only once, for treatment of complications from a problem unrelated to any injuries allegedly inflicted during his arrest, and that he was provided treatment for this medical problem. [App. to Def's. Mot. for Summ. J., Dep. of Sheriff J. Garcia at 76-77, Dep. of J. Russell at 65-68, Dawson County Jail Inmate Medical Log at 73]. Further, Defendant offers evidence that Plaintiff showed no visible signs of injury nor did he request medical care or mention any injuries when he was arrested and jailed. [App. to Def's. Mot. for Summ. J., Dep. of J. Russell at 63-64, Dep. of Deputy M. Hogg at 49, Dawson County Sheriff's Office Medical Condition/Health History Profile at 72]. Defendant's evidence is again uncontroverted by Plaintiff, and the Court may rely on Defendant's evidence to show that no triable issue exists on this element of Plaintiff's claim.
Claims Against Defendants John Doe Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
With regard to Plaintiff's claims against the unnamed individual defendants herein, the deadline for filings motions for leave to amend pleadings and join parties passed on September 15, 2003. Plaintiff failed to seek leave to amend or join parties; therefore, Plaintiffs claims against Defendants John Doe Nos. 1-5 should be dismissed without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having considered all the relevant arguments and evidence, and for the reasons stated above, the Court finds there is no triable issue of fact, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on all claims asserted by Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. Further, for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants John Doe Nos. 1-5 are DISMISSED without prejudice. Costs of court shall be taxed against Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.