Opinion
No. 05-07-01025-CV
Opinion issued January 30, 2009.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. CC-07-10086-E.
Before Justices MORRIS, FRANCIS, and MURPHY.
Opinion By Justice FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Katrina Runnels appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. for the benefit of Viewpoint Bank. In a single issue, Runnels contends the trial court erred in granting judgment because the original petition for forcible detainer failed to adequately describe the property that is the subject of this lawsuit. We affirm.
Countrywide filed its original petition for forcible detainer in justice of the peace court, alleging Runnels was in possession of
LOT 1240R, OF LAKE RIDGE SECTION 16, AN ADDITION TO THE CITY OF CEDAR HILL, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE AMENDING PLAT THEREOF RECORDED IN VOLUME 2002139, PAGE 28, OF THE MAP RECORDS OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS.
Hereinafter referred to as the "Property" and more commonly referred to as
2514 WATERSTONE DRIVE
CEDAR HILL, TEXAS 75104
Thereafter, the justice of the peace court found in favor of Countrywide and ordered Countrywide was entitled to possession of the premises located at 2514 Waterstone Drive, Cedar Hill, Texas. When Runnels appealed to County Court at Law No. 5, the trial court likewise found in favor of Countrywide and ordered that Countrywide was entitled to possession of the Waterstone Drive premises. This appeal ensued.
In her sole issue, Runnels contends the trial court erred in granting possession to Countrywide because Countrywide "failed to adequately described [sic] the property subject of the lawsuit." Relying on Granberry v. Storey, 127 S.W.1122 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1910, no writ), Runnels claims this is not a defect that can be waived and may be brought for the first time on appeal. A review of that case, however, shows it stands for the proposition that "an objection to the judgment . . . that the description in appellee's complaint of the premises in controversy was insufficient" may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See Granberry, 127 S.W. at 1125 (op. on reh'g) (complaint should have been made "by an exception to complaint urged in the trial court, where, had it been found to be well taken, the complaint could have been amended."). Because Granberry does not support her contention, we conclude Runnels has waived this issue. Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (failure to cite applicable authority or provide substantive analysis waives issue on appeal).
Even if we were to address Runnels's issue, we would nevertheless reject her argument. In her brief, Runnels claims the correct legal description is contained in Exhibit 1, a copy of a warranty deed with vendor's lien, attached to her brief. Attachments to a brief are not evidence before this Court. See Elk River, Inc. v. Garrison Tool Die, Ltd., 222 S.W.3d 772, 788 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied). Because she does not support her contention with evidence from the record, we could not conclude the trial court erred.
Finally, we note that, even if we were to consider the copy of the warranty deed labeled as Exhibit 1 in Runnels's brief, Runnels would not be not entitled to relief. In Exhibit 1, the property is described as
LOT 1240R, OF LAKE RIDGE SECTION 16, AN ADDITION TO THE CITY OF CEDAR HILL, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS. ACCORDING TO THE AMENDING PLAT THEREFORE RECORDED IN VOLUME 2002139, PAGE 28, OF THE MAP RECORDS OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS.
At the bottom of the warranty deed is the handwritten notation "2514 Waterstone." Runnels does not explain how the property description in Countrywide's original petition for forcible detainer was lacking, nor does she contend she was misled or confused by the petition's description. Thus, the legal description set out in the original petition sufficiently identified the premises at issue in this case. See Mitchell v. Citifinancial Mortgage Co., 192 S.W.3d 882, 883 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). We overrule Runnels's sole issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.