Opinion
NUMBER 2015 CA 0282
12-23-2015
RONNIE RUMORE v. KEVIN AND MELINDA RODRIGUE
J. William Starr Destrehan, LA Attorney for Appellee Plaintiff - Ronnie Rumore Rebecca N. Robichaux Raceland, LA Attorney for Appellant Defendant - Kevin Rodrigue
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the 17th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Lafourche, Louisiana
Trial Court Number 112313 "E" Honorable F. Hugh Larose, Judge J. William Starr
Destrehan, LA Attorney for Appellee
Plaintiff - Ronnie Rumore Rebecca N. Robichaux
Raceland, LA Attorney for Appellant
Defendant - Kevin Rodrigue BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, AND DRAKE, JJ. WELCH, J.
Kevin Rodrigue appeals a judgment awarding Ronnie Rumore the sum of $27,635.00 for improvements Mr. Rumore made to a house, which was co-owned by Mr. Rodrigue and his then wife, Melinda Rodrigue. For reasons that follow, we amend the judgment of the trial court, and as amended, the judgment is affirmed.
The record reveals that Melinda Rodrigue has remarried and is now Melinda Duncan Nolan, but she goes by Melinda Duncan, her maiden name. However, for clarity throughout this opinion, she will be referred to as "Ms. Rodrigue" or collectively with Mr. Rodrigue as "the Rodrigues."
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying facts in this case are generally undisputed. On December 2, 1999, the Rodrigues executed a marriage contract establishing a separate property regime for their marriage, which occurred two days later on December 4, 1999. The contract specifically provided that "[n]either of them shall be personally liable for the debts contracted by the other, either before or during the marriage." In 2001, the Rodrigues purchased a piece of immovable property located at 1274 Highway 20 in Thibodaux, Louisiana, which included several acres of land and a house. The Rodrigues purchased the property jointly, as co-owners.
From sometime in 2003 until January 2006, the Rodrigues rented the house to Mr. Rumore, a carpenter who worked in residential construction, for the sum of $500.00 per month. The lease was an oral lease and had no term. After Hurricane Katrina, in early 2006, Mr. Rumore was asked to move out so that Ms. Rodrigue's brother, Justin Telaferno, could move into the home. Mr. Telaferno did not pay rent, but lived in the house rent free as part of his salary with McDonald Sanitation, Ms. Rodrigue's separately owned business. While Mr. Telaferno lived in the house, he began renovating/updating the house, and the materials for the project were paid for by McDonald Sanitation. In early 2007, Mr. Telaferno was terminated; however, the renovations were not complete.
After the Rodrigues discussed the situation and the condition of the house, Ms. Rodrigue contacted Mr. Rumore to see if he was interested in moving back into the house and completing the renovations. The Rodrigues agreed that Mr. Rumore would live in the house rent free for six months and in exchange, Mr. Rumore would finish the renovations to the house. After six months, Mr. Rumore would commence paying $500.00 in rent. The parties also discussed the possibility that once the renovations were complete, Mr. Rumore would be able to purchase the house for its appraised value, less the value of the improvements made by him. However, this agreement was never put in writing.
At trial, Mr. Rodrigue adamantly denied ever discussing that Mr. Rumore could purchase the house for its appraised value less the value of Mr. Rumore's improvements. However, the trial court made a factual determination that the parties had agreed to such an arrangement, and its factual determination in this regard is reasonably supported by the testimony of Ms. Rodrigue, Mr. Rumore, and Ms. Blalock and was not manifestly erroneous. See Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). In addition, we note that Mr. Rodrigue, in his memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment, specifically "admit[ted] that he and [Mr. Rumore] did agree that [Mr. Rumore] would buy the renovated property at issue at a later date" and that "both parties agree that there was an oral agreement whereby [the Rodrigues] would transfer the property to [Mr.] Rumore at a future date. See La. C.C. art. 1853.
Mr. Rumore, his girlfriend, Kelly Blalock, and her children then moved back into the house. According to Mr. Rumore, the house had been "gutted." The only renovation that had been completed was the kitchen and one bedroom and bathroom, which were both upstairs. There were no stairs, rails, doors, door frames, cabinets, window frames, or sheetrock on the walls. Therefore, upon moving into the house, Mr. Rumore immediately commenced working on the house.
The Rodrigues' personal home and the house leased to Mr. Rumore shared a backyard. Due to the close proximity of the house, the Rodrigues and Mr. Rumore and his girlfriend became friends and they often socialized at both houses. The Rodrigues were in the rent house numerous times and witnessed all of the ongoing renovations and other work being performed by Mr. Rumore on the house. At the expiration of six months and although the renovations had not been completed, Mr. Rumore commenced paying rent in the amount of $500.00 per month. He also continued working on the house and purchasing supplies for the renovations.
On January 28, 2008, Ms. Rodrigue filed a petition for divorce and the Rodrigues physically separated on February 9, 2008. Thereafter, on March 31, 2008, the Rodrigues entered into a consent judgment on matters ancillary to their divorce, including a mutual injunction prohibiting the parties from alienating, encumbering, or disposing of property jointly owned by them.
In early April 2008 Mr. Rodrigue evicted both Mr. Rumore and Ms. Blalock from the house, and therefore, Mr. Rumore ceased all work on the property. Upon moving out, Mr. Rumore demanded payment from Mr. Rodrigue for the value of the improvements made to the house; however, Mr. Rumore was never paid. Therefore, on June 29, 2009, Mr. Rumore filed a petition for damages for breach of contract, or in the alternative for unjust enrichment, against the Rodrigues. Therein, Mr. Rumore sought compensation in the amount of $38,060.00 for labor and materials in renovating the Rodrigues' rental house.
Mr. Rodrigue denied that Mr. Rumore demanded payment; however, Mr. Rumore claimed that he demanded payment, but Mr. Rodrigue responded, "I'll see you in court." Nevertheless, Mr. Rumore was never paid by the Rodrigues for the improvements he made to their house.
Prior to filing suit, on February 17, 2009, Mr. Rumore recorded a labor and materialman's lien with regard to these supplies and services in the mortgage records for the Parish of Lafourche.
Thereafter, on February 25, 2010, the Rodrigues entered into a consent judgment partitioning their jointly owned property. Therein, the jointly owned house previously rented by Mr. Rumore was transferred to Mr. Rodrigue, and Mr. Rodrigue agreed to hold Ms. Rodrigue harmless from all indebtedness on the property transferred to him and agreed to indemnify her from any monies that she might have to pay on the indebtedness on the property.
This consent judgment was not signed by the district court judge presiding over the Rodrigues' divorce until April 5, 2010.
In response to Mr. Rumore's suit, on April 25, 2011, Mr. Rodrigue filed a peremptory exception raising the objections of no cause of action and no right of action. However, the trial court deferred ruling on the exception until trial on the merits. Thereafter, on June 28, 2012, Mr. Rodrigue filed a cross-claim against Ms. Rodrigue seeking reimbursement for any judgment, attorney's fees for the cost of defending the lawsuit, lost rental value, missing items, and reimbursement for minor repairs to the property. Therein, Mr. Rodrigue asserted that if judgment was rendered in favor of Mr. Rumore, such judgment should be rendered solely against Ms. Rodrigue because he was not a party to the contract regarding the work to be performed to the house and because their marriage contract provided that Mr. Rodrigue would not be liable for any debts contracted by Ms. Rodrigue. Ms. Rodrigue responded by filing a cross-claim against Mr. Rodrigue seeking reimbursement for any judgment rendered against her pursuant to the hold harmless and indemnity provision of the consent judgment partitioning their jointly owned property. Ms. Rodrigue also joined Mr. Rodrigue in his previously filed, but deferred, peremptory exception raising the objections of no right of action and no cause of action.
In response to the cross-claim, Ms. Rodrigue also filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata, which the trial court overruled, and this court denied supervisory writs. See Ronnie Rumore v. Kevin Rodrigue and Melinda Rodrigue, 2013-0181 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/13)(unpublished writ action).
A trial on the merits was held on June 30 and July 1, 2014. Thereafter, on October 16, 2014, for written reasons assigned, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Mr. Rumore against Mr. Rodrigue and Ms. Rodrigue, in solido, in the amount of $27,635.00, plus legal interest from the date of judicial demand and costs. The trial court also dismissed with prejudice all other pending claims, i.e., the cross claims of both Mr. Rodrigue and Ms. Rodrigue. From this judgment, Mr. Rodrigue appeals.
Specifically, the trial court's judgment awarded Mr. Rumore the following sums: $2,100.00 for the installation of 400 feet of wood floors; $325.00 for 100 feet of crown molding; $300.00 for 120 feet of baseboards; $4,900.00 for wooden staircase finishing work; $850.00 for installation of closet shelving, shoe racks, hanging rods, and paint; $80.00 for sheet rock installation; $300.00 for installation of two window frames in master bedroom plus trim; $650.00 for installation of two almond windows; $17,980.00 for the value of the handmade 58-foot stair and balcony rail; and $150.00 for storage costs for cabinets and windows for ninety days.
Although the trial court's written reasons for judgment reflect that it overruled the peremptory exception raising the objections of no cause of action and no right of action urged by the Rodrigues, the trial court's judgment is silent with respect to its ruling on those issues. Generally, silence in a judgment of the trial court as to any issue, claim or demand placed before the court is deemed a rejection of the claim and the relief sought is presumed to be denied. Schoolhouse, Inc. v. Fanguy, 2010-2238 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/10/11), 69 So.3d 658, 664. Accordingly, the silence in the trial court's judgment is deemed as a rejection (or overruling) of the exception. To the extent that Mr. Rodrigue challenges this ruling on appeal, we find no error in the trial court's decision. Based on our review of Mr. Rumore's petition and the record herein, we find Mr. Rumore has a right of action and has stated a cause of action against the Rodrigues under the provisions of La. C.C. art. 2695.
On appeal, Mr. Rodrigue does not challenge the value of the individual improvements made by Mr. Rumore and awarded by the trial court. Instead, Mr. Rodrigue only challenges his liability to Mr. Rumore for the value of any improvements made.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Herein, the trial court found, and the parties do not dispute, that there was an oral lease agreement between the Rodrigues and Mr. Rumore and that it provided Mr. Rumore would live in the Rodrigues' jointly owned house rent free for six months, during which he would work on the renovations to the house, and that after the expiration of six months, he would pay rent in the amount of $500.00 per month. However, at issue in this case are the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the improvements to the house made by Mr. Rumore. In that regard, La. C.C. art. 2695 provides:
"Lease is a synallagmatic contract by which one party, the lessor, binds himself to give to the other party, the lessee, the use and enjoyment of a thing for a term in exchange for a rent that the lessee binds himself to pay." La. C.C. art. 2668.
In the absence of contrary agreement, upon termination of the lease, the rights and obligations of the parties with regard to attachments, additions, or other improvements made to the leased thing by the lessee are as follows:
(1) The lessee may remove all improvements that he made to the leased thing, provided that he restore the thing to its former condition.
(2) If the lessee does not remove the improvements, the lessor may:
(a) Appropriate ownership of the improvements by reimbursing the lessee for their costs or for the enhanced value of the leased thing whichever is less; or
(b) Demand that the lessee remove the improvements within a reasonable time and restore the leased thing to its former condition. If the lessee fails to do so, the lessor may remove the improvements and restore the leased thing to its former condition at the expense of the lessee or appropriate ownership of the improvements without any obligation of reimbursement to the lessee. Appropriation of the improvement by the lessor may only be accomplished by providing additional notice by certified mail to the lessee after expiration of the time given the lessee to remove the improvements.
(c) Until such time as the lessor appropriates the improvement, the improvements shall remain the property of the lessee and the lessee shall be solely responsible for any harm caused by the improvements.
In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court specifically found that the parties had "an agreement dictating how [the] improvements would be compensated for. ... The parties agreed that [Mr. Rumore] would be compensated for the enhanced value of the property at the time of sale to [Mr. Rumore] of the property." Although the trial court found that there was an agreement between the parties providing for compensation to Mr. Rumore at the time of the sale of the property (i.e., a sales price reduced by the value of the improvements), the trial court also found, and we agree, that the agreement was part of an agreement to sell immovable property, was not in writing, and hence, was not enforceable by Mr. Rumore. See La. C.C. arts. 2623 (providing that an agreement whereby one party promises to sell and the other promises to buy at a later time, upon the happening of a condition, or upon performance of an obligation is a contract to sell and must meet the formal requirements of the sale it contemplates) and 1839 (providing that a transfer of immovable property must be made by authentic act or by act under private signature).
Therefore, in the absence of an enforceable agreement, the rights and the obligations of the parties herein are governed by the above set forth provisions of La. C.C. art. 2695. As to that issue, the trial court specifically found that Mr. Rumore was precluded from removing the improvements to the house because Mr. Rodrigue ordered him off the property and would not allow him to return. See La. C.C. art. 2695(1). The trial court also found that the Rodrigues had not reimbursed Mr. Rumore for the cost of the improvements and that there was no evidence that the Rodrigues notified or attempted to notify Mr. Rumore that he needed to remove the improvements he made to the house. See La. C.C. art. 2695(2). Based on our review of the entire record, we find the trial court's factual findings in this regard are reasonably supported by the record, specifically the trial testimony of Mr. Rumore, Ms. Blalock, Ms. Rodrigue, and Mr. Rodrigue, and those findings are not manifestly erroneous. See Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844.
Given the trial court's factual findings, the remedial options set forth in La. C.C. art. 2695(1) and (2)(b) are inapplicable to this dispute. Therefore, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2695(2)(a), the Rodrigues were entitled to appropriate ownership of the improvements, and Mr. Rumore was entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements or for the enhanced value of the house, whichever was less. The record before us contains no evidence with respect to the enhanced value of the house after Mr. Rumore made the improvements; however, the record does contain evidence (both testimonial and documentary) reasonably supporting the trial court's determination that the value of the improvements to the house made by Mr. Rumore was $27,635.00. Accordingly, the trial court's ultimate determination that Mr. Rumore was entitled to be reimbursed for the cost or value of the improvements he made to the house in the amount of $27,635.00 was not erroneous.
Given the nature of the improvements at issue (i.e., crown molding, flooring, baseboards, windows, sheet rock, closet shelving), Mr. Rodrigue's testimony at trial indicates that he, who is now the sole owner of the house, has appropriated ownership of the improvements as he has leased the entire house to other tenants and has otherwise exercised dominion over the improvements to the house (i.e., by precluding their removal from the house). See Black's Law Dictionary (5th edition), p. 93, defining "appropriate" as "[t]o make a thing one's own; ... to exercise dominion over an object to the extent, and for the purpose, of making it subserve one's own proper use or pleasure."
Since we have determined that Mr. Rumore has a remedy under the provisions of La. C.C. art. 2695, the principles of unjust enrichment, as set forth in La. C.C. art. 2298, are not applicable. See Davis v. Elmer, 2014-1298 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/12/15), 166 So.3d 1082, 1087-1088.
We recognize that the trial court's written reasons for judgment reflect that its monetary award to Mr. Rumore for the cost or value of the improvements to the house was based on the principles of detrimental reliance as set forth in La. C.C. art. 1967. On appeal, Mr. Rodrigue contends that the trial court erred in applying the principles of detrimental reliance because Mr. Rumore's reliance on an oral promise to sell immovable property, as a matter of law, was not reasonable. We agree that the principles of detrimental reliance are not applicable herein because the contract or promise to sell the house—immovable property—was not in writing. See John W. Stone Oil Distributor, L.L.C. v River Oaks Contractors & Developers, Inc., 2007-1001 (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/27/08), 986 So.2d 103, 107-108, writ denied, 2008-1397 (La. 9/26/08), 992 So.2d 992.
However, we do find merit to Mr. Rodrigue's argument that the trial court erred in failing to give a credit of $3,000.00 towards any sum owed to Mr. Rumore. The testimony at trial indicated that the parties agreed Mr. Rumore would live rent free in the house for a period of six months, during which time he would finish the renovations to the house. Thereafter, Mr. Rumore would pay $500.00 per month in rent. Mr. Rumore specifically testified that "[t]he six months free [rent] was supposed to be for [his] labor." There is no dispute that Mr. Rumore lived rent free in the house for six months; thus, during that six-month time frame, the Rodrigues were entitled to labor from Mr. Rumore in an amount that was at least equal to the rent, i.e., at least $3,000.00. See La. C.C. arts. 2668 and 2675. However, at trial, Mr. Rumore admitted that the invoices he submitted to the court with respect to the value of the materials and improvements he made to the house (which invoices the trial court actually used in calculating Mr. Rumore's monetary award), included both his "labor and material[s]." Since the Rodrigues were entitled to at least $3,000.00 in labor from Mr. Rumore in exchange for free rent, the Rodrigues should have been given a credit in that amount toward any sum owed to Mr. Rumore, since that sum included both labor and materials. Accordingly, we amend the judgment of the trial court as to Kevin Rodrigue to reflect a credit in the amount of $3,000.00 towards the judgment, or total sum owed to Mr. Rumore.
$500.00 per month x 6 months = $3,000.00.
To the extent that Mr. Rodrigue contends that the trial court erred in casting him in judgment because the debt was incurred by Ms. Rodrigue and his marriage contract with Ms. Rodrigue provided that he would not be liable for debts contracted by Ms. Rodrigue, we find no merit to this argument. It is undisputed that the Rodrigues purchased the house jointly, as co-owners. In addition, the evidence established, that they both agreed to lease the house to Mr. Rumore and that they were both aware of the improvements being made to the house by Mr. Rumore. Accordingly, as the lessors, both Mr. Rodrigue and Ms. Rodrigue are liable to Mr. Rumore for reimbursement. See La. C.C. arts. 797, et seq. and 2695.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the trial court's October 16, 2014 judgment awarding Ronnie Rumore the sum of $27,635.00 is amended to reflect a credit in the amount of $3,000.00 towards the sum owed to Ronnie Rumore, such that the total judgment in favor of Ronnie Rumore and against Kevin Rodrigue is the sum of $24,635.00, plus legal interest from the date of judicial demand and costs (and for which he is liable jointly and in solido with Melinda Rodrigue (now Melinda Duncan)). As amended, the judgment is affirmed.
The amount of the judgment as to Melinda Rodrigue/Melinda Duncan is not before us in this appeal since she did not appeal the final judgment of the trial court and the October 16, 2014 judgment is now final as to her. --------
All costs of this appeal are assessed equally between the plaintiff/appellee, Ronnie Rumore, and the defendant/appellant, Kevin Rodrigue.
AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.
However, it is well settled that appeals are.taken from the judgment of the trial court, not its written reasons for judgment, and if the trial court reached the proper result, the judgment should be affirmed. See Elliott v. Elliott, 2010-0755 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/10/10), 49 So.3d 407, 416 n.3, writ denied, 2010-2260 (La. 10/27/10), 48 So.3d 1088. Accordingly, although we have noted that the principles of detrimental reliance were not applicable to this case, we have determined that Mr. Rumore was entitled to reimbursement for the cost of the improvements pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2695(2). Therefore, since the trial court reached the proper result—that Mr. Rumore was entitled to compensation or reimbursement for the cost of the improvements he made to the house—the judgment is properly affirmed.