Opinion
353038
09-16-2021
ROGELIO RUIZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENTELER AUTOMOTIVE CORP, JENNIFER PIOTROWICZ, and JOAN TALBOT, Defendants-Appellants.
UNPUBLISHED
Kalamazoo Circuit Court LC No. 2018-000387-NP
Before: Murray, C.J., and M. J. Kelly and O'Brien, JJ.PER CURIAM.
Defendants, Benteler Automotive Corporation, Jennifer Piotrowicz, and Joan Talbot, appeal by leave granted the trial court's order denying their motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). For the reasons in this opinion, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Ruiz v Benteler Auto Corp, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 14, 2020 (Docket No. 353038).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff worked for Benteler as a contract employee before Benteler officially hired plaintiff on June 19, 2017. Three days later, plaintiff was involved in an accident in which a heavy bin fell on his foot, causing severe injury. Christy Elmer, a team leader and machine operator, attempted to assist plaintiff and then requested the help of Joan Talbot, a production unit leader whom Benteler identified as a first responder. Talbot moved plaintiff from the production floor using a wheelchair to the "tool crib"-an enclosed area that kept tools and first-aid materials. The amount of time that plaintiff spent in the tool crib is disputed along with what occurred in the tool crib. However, it is undisputed that someone eventually called plaintiff a taxi, and Elmer and Talbot moved plaintiff to the plant's front lobby where he waited for the taxi.
The taxi eventually arrived and took plaintiff to Borgess clinic where he had to wait for assistance. After a doctor finally looked at plaintiffs foot, the doctor realized that plaintiff was in the wrong place and needed care in the emergency room. Plaintiffs bones were sticking out of his left, crushed foot, which was bleeding heavily. Hospital staff cut off plaintiff s boot, wrapped his foot, and sent him to the emergency room for x-rays. Some days later, plaintiff had surgery on his foot, and following recovery from the surgery, he was sent to Borgess Rehab Center where he stayed until September. In October, he was approved for light-duty work, and Benteler continued to employ him through its Off-Site Light Duty Program at a nonprofit. While plaintiff was working at the nonprofit, Benteler had to layoff over 30 employees on May 4, 2018, due to workforce reduction cuts. On May 15, 2018, plaintiff signed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge of discrimination against Benteler. Plaintiff was cleared to return to full-duty work on June 15, 2018, but plaintiff never returned to his position at Benteler because Benteler laid him off on the day that he was permitted to return.
In his complaint, plaintiff alleged three intentional torts-battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)-as well as violation of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq., and employment discrimination under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2201 et seq.
Defendants eventually moved for summary disposition, contending that (1) the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., prohibited plaintiffs intentional-tort claims; (2) plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination; and (3) plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the WPA. The trial court held a motion hearing and denied defendants' motion. Defendants filed an application for leave to appeal, which this Court granted.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Henderson v State Farm Fire and Cas Co, 460 Mich. 348, 353; 596 N.W.2d 190 (1999). A party moves for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when "[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law." MCR 2.116(C)(10). Motions under MCR 2.116(C)(10) test the factual sufficiency of a claim. Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass 'n, 491 Mich. 200, 206; 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012). The initial burden rests on the moving party, and "[t]he burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists." Quinto v Cross and Peters Co, 451 Mich. 358, 362; 547N.W.2d 314 (1996). "If the moving party fails to properly support its motion for summary disposition, the nonmoving party has no duty to respond and the trial court should deny the motion." Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich.App. 362, 370; 775 N.W.2d 618 (2009). When determining whether to grant a motion for summary disposition, "a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Quinto, 451 Mich. at 362. This Court limits its "review to the evidence presented to the trial court at the time defendant's motion was decided." Pena v Ingham Co Rd Comm, 255 Mich.App. 299, 313 n 4; 660 N.W.2d 351 (2003).
There was a video of the relevant events that Benteler recorded, but that recording was lost when Benteler's computer automatically recorded over it. On appeal, plaintiff argues that this Court must take into account "adverse inferences . . . due to defendant's [sic] failure to preserve the video evidence." However, plaintiff does not specify what these "adverse inferences" are, and it is otherwise unclear what plaintiff means. The video would have depicted the accident and the events following the accident. Plaintiff provided testimony about these events, and that testimony differed from the testimony of others. Yet plaintiff, as the nonmoving party, is entitled to have the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to him, meaning any conflict between his version of the events that would have been depicted in the video and others' version of those same events will be resolved in plaintiff's favor. At this stage, and with the case in this posture, it is unclear what other "adverse inferences" this Court could draw against defendants.
III. INTENTIONAL-TORT CLAIMS
The benefits that the WDCA provides are an employee's exclusive remedy against an employer or coworker for work-related personal injuries. MCL 418.131(1); Johnson v Detroit Edison Co, 288 Mich.App. 688, 695-696; 795 N.W.2d 1612010). "The only exception to this exclusive remedy is an intentional tort," which "shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury." MCL 418.131(1). "Thus, a plaintiff may recover from his employer where he establishes what is generally regarded as a 'true intentional tort,' that is, one in which the employer 'specifically intended an injury.'" Graham v Ford, 237 Mich.App. 670, 673; 604 N.W.2d 713 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This also applies to alleged intentional torts committed by coworkers. Id. To establish a true intentional tort, "the employer must deliberately act or fail to act with the purpose of inflicting an injury upon the employee." Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich. 149, 172; 551 N.W.2d 132 (1996) (opinion by Boyle, J.). "[W]hen the employer is a corporation, a particular employee must possess the requisite state of mind in order to prove an intentional tort." Id. at 171-172. Courts must "determine as a matter of law whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to sustain the intentional tort claim." Johnson, 288 Mich.App. at 696.
We note that in Bagby v Detroit Edison Co, 308 Mich.App. 488, 491; 865 N.W.2d 59 (2014), this Court said, "For purposes of the WDCA, an 'intentional tort' is not a true intentional tort." Bagby attributed this assertion to Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich. 149, 168; 551 N.W.2d 132 (1996) (opinion by Boyle, J.), where our Supreme Court stated that MCL 418.131(1) "did not restrict recovery to 'true' intentional torts." Plainly, the quote from Travis does not support that an "intentional tort" for purposes of the WDCA is "not a true intentional tort," but that it is not restricted to a true intentional tort. See also id. at 173 (explaining that the second sentence of MCL 418.131(1) "is strong evidence that the Legislature did not confine liability to those situations that are true intentional torts) (emphasis added). In Bagby, it was irrelevant whether the plaintiff asserted a true intentional tort because the plaintiff was proceeding under a theory of recovery provided by MCL 418.131(1) "in which liability is possible despite the absence of a classic intentional tort and as a means of inferring an employer's intent to injure from the surrounding circumstances . . . ." Id. at 173. Thus, Bagby's statement was not relevant to the case's disposition, and to any extent that its statement can be construed as asserting that an "intentional tort" under the WDCA cannot be a "true intentional tort," it is plainly a misstatement of Travis-the authority on which Bagby relied for the assertion-and contradicts Graham, which was decided 15 years earlier and was binding precedent. MCR 7.215(C)(2).
A. BATTERY
Defendants first argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary disposition with respect to plaintiffs battery claim. We disagree.
According to plaintiff, after the bin shattered his foot, Talbot repeatedly tried to force plaintiff to stand and walk using his shattered foot. She eventually got plaintiff a wheelchair and wheeled him into the tool crib. Plaintiff testified that in the tool crib, Talbot wanted to assess plaintiff s injury, but he told her not to touch his foot because it hurt. According to plaintiff, Talbot nevertheless tried to take his boot off, and the pain made plaintiff scream. Plaintiff testified that Talbot tried to take his boot off several more times-possibly up to 10 times-while plaintiff screamed and told her to stop.
Talbot's testimony differed vastly from plaintiff's, but her testimony is largely not relevant to this appeal because, to the extent that her testimony contradicts plaintiff's, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Quinto, 451 Mich. at 362.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable juror could conclude that Talbot committed a battery and specifically intended an injury. According to plaintiff, he told Talbot not to touch his boot, but she did it anyway, and he screamed. Then she did it up to 10 more times, all while plaintiff was screaming and asking her to not grab his boot. From this-the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff-a reasonable juror could conclude that Talbot committed a battery and specifically intended an injury as required by MCL 418.131(1).
Talbot's alleged boot pulling is the most clear-cut claim of battery, which is why it is addressed in this opinion. This opinion should not be read as foreclosing plaintiff from presenting other theories of battery.
B. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
Before addressing defendant's argument with respect to plaintiffs false-imprisonment claim, we note plaintiffs argument on appeal that his false-imprisonment and IIED claims "need not be established to successfully proceed against the defendants under § 131(1)" because plaintiff has already "stated a viable intentional tort claim against the defendants." In support of his argument, plaintiff points to language in Travis, 453 Mich. at 173 (opinion by Boyle, J.), where our Supreme Court explained that the Legislature in MCL 418.131(1) recognized "a limited class of cases in which liability is possible despite the absence of a classic intentional tort," as well as language in Johnson, 288 Mich.App. at 696, where this Court explained that MCL 418.131(1) sets "sets forth the burden of proof a plaintiff must meet."
This argument ignores the way that plaintiff chose to structure his complaint and all of the arguments he has made up to this point. While a plaintiff can allege a theory of liability against an employer that falls under the exception in the WDCA that is not "a classic intentional tort," Travis, 453 Mich. at 173 (opinion by Boyle, J.), a plaintiff can also bring a theory of liability for a" 'true intentional tort,' . . . in which the employer 'specifically intended an injury, '" and such a theory also falls under the exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA, Graham, 237 Mich.App. at 673. Plaintiff here chose the latter option-he identified three intentional torts in his complaint, and has argued throughout the case that defendants are liable under a true-intentional-tort theory. Accordingly, plaintiff must indeed establish his claims for false imprisonment and IIED if he desires relief on them.
Turning to the issue, defendants argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary disposition with respect to plaintiffs false-imprisonment claim. We agree.
"False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of an individual's personal liberty or freedom of locomotion." Clarke v K Mart Corp, 197 Mich.App. 541, 546; 495 N.W.2d 820 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The elements of false imprisonment are "[1] an act committed with the intention of confining another, [2] the act directly or indirectly results in such confinement, and [3] the person confined is conscious of his confinement." Moore v Detroit, 252 Mich.App. 384, 387; 652 N.W.2d 688 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The injury a person subject to a false imprisonment suffers is the unlawful detention-an "interference with the liberty interest." Adams v Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 444 Mich. 329, 336; 508 N.W.2d 464 (1993) (opinion by Levin, J.). See also Moore v Fed Dep 't Stores, Inc, 33 Mich.App. 556, 559; 190 N.W.2d 262 (1971) ("However, the gist of an action for false imprisonment is unlawful detention irrespective of any physical or mental harm.").
After plaintiff was injured and placed in a wheelchair, he was wheeled into a tool crib so that Talbot could assess his injury. According to Talbot, she wheeled plaintiff to the tool crib for approximately 30 minutes, and during this time, she unsuccessfully attempted to assess plaintiffs injury. Plaintiff contended that he was in the tool crib for an hour, but he agreed that he was in the tool crib so Talbot could examine him. Plaintiff testified that he asked Talbot before she took him into the tool crib and while he was in the tool crib to call an ambulance and to go to the hospital, but Talbot declined to do so or to allow anyone else to do so. According to plaintiff, when he asked Talbot to call an ambulance and take him to the hospital, she said, "We'll do that later." Plaintiff was uncertain whether the room was locked, but he believed it was, and he did not have his cellphone at the time due to workplace policies.
We agree with defendants that these facts are insufficient to establish that Talbot-and by extension the other defendants-specifically intended to unlawfully detain plaintiff. It is undisputed that Talbot put plaintiff in the tool crib to assess or examine his injury. Even if the evidence were sufficient to establish that Talbot acted with the intent to confine plaintiff-which is dubious-the evidence is insufficient to establish that Talbot "specifically intended" an injury. See Graham, 237 Mich.App. at 673. An intentional tort under the WDCA can "exist only when . . . the employer specifically intended an injury," MCL 418.131(1), which our Supreme Court has explained means a "deliberate act . . . with the purpose of inflicting an injury upon" the plaintiff. Travis, 453 Mich. at 172 (opinion by Boyle, J.). When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, nothing tends to establish that Talbot deliberately acted with the purpose of inflicting an injury upon plaintiff when plaintiff was confined to the tool crib, so the trial court should have granted summary disposition in favor of defendants on this claim.
Under this count in plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff also mentions that he was confined in the "mud room," which is essentially a lobby. Plaintiff never argued later-either in response to defendants' motion for summary disposition or at any point on appeal-that he was falsely imprisoned in the mud room, so it is unclear whether he is still pursuing the claim. Assuming he is, the record evinces that plaintiff's movement in the "mud room" was only restricted by a wheelchair, which he was in because he could not stand or walk. That is, there is no question of material fact that plaintiff was not confined in the "mud room."
C. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Defendants argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary disposition with respect to plaintiffs IIED claim. We agree.
"To establish a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must present evidence of (1) the defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) the defendant's intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) the severe emotional distress of the plaintiff." Dalley v Dykema Gossett, 287 Mich.App. 296, 321; 788 N.W.2d 679 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress has been found only where the conduct complained of has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Graham, 237 Mich.App. at 674. To fall under the intentional-tort exception to the exclusive remedy in the WDCA, a plaintiff alleging IIED against his or her employer must establish "a specific intent" on the defendant's "part to inflict the alleged injury of emotional distress on" the plaintiff. Id. at 675.
In plaintiffs version of the events after his injury, he told Talbot that he could not get up and that his head, shoulder, foot, and leg hurt, and in return, she told him that his injuries were "not that bad" and to "get up." She then pulled him away from the machine near which he was injured, pulled him up, and dragged him. It was only after Talbot realized that she could not drag plaintiff that she decided to get him a wheelchair. During this time, plaintiff asked for an ambulance and to go to the hospital, and Elmer was ready to call an ambulance for him. However, Talbot told Elmer to put away the phone.
After plaintiff was in the wheelchair in the tool crib, Talbot grabbed and moved his foot without permission. Even though plaintiff screamed because Talbot grabbed his foot, and even though he asked her not to touch his foot because it hurt, Talbot insisted on seeing his foot and attempted to take his boot off up to 10 times. When he asked again to go to the hospital and for an ambulance, she ignored his request and told him that he would go later because she needed to make a report for the accident and take him for a drug test first. She did not mention getting plaintiff treatment for his injury, and she left him alone in the tool crib to get the form for the drug test. Plaintiff estimated that he stayed in the tool crib for an hour. Talbot then left him alone in the lobby for a taxi for 30 to 45 minutes. When the taxi arrived, Talbot ignored plaintiff, and he had to enter the taxi himself.
We agree with defendants that Talbot's conduct did not rise to the level necessary to sustain an IIED claim. Talbot made highly questionable decisions that may have been medically wrong and socially insensitive, but her conduct was not so extreme and outrageous as to make it intolerable in a civilized community. Moreover, even in plaintiffs telling of the events, all of Talbot's questionable actions were in furtherance of her duties with Benteler. As such, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, nothing suggests that Talbot specifically intended to inflict the alleged injury of emotional distress on plaintiff. See id. at 675. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying defendants' motion for summary disposition with respect to plaintiffs IIED claim.
IV. DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
Defendants argue next that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, contending plaintiff failed to allege that he suffered an adverse employment action. We agree.
MCL 37.2202 of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act provides in relevant part:
(1) An employer shall not do any of the following:
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status.
To avoid summary disposition when there is no direct evidence of impermissible bias and establish a prima facie case of a "disparate treatment" discrimination, a plaintiff must establish the following by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified for the position; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances that gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Lytle v Malady, 458 Mich. 153, 172-173; 579 N.W.2d 906 (1998). "There is no exhaustive list of what constitutes adverse employment actions." Chen v Wayne State Univ, 284 Mich.App. 172, 201; 771 N.W.2d 820 (2009). However, "an employment action must be materially adverse to the employee-that is, it must be more than a mere inconvenience or minor alteration of job responsibilities." Id. Additionally, "there must be an objective basis for demonstrating that the employment action is adverse because a plaintiffs subjective impressions are not controlling." Id. at 201 -202. Materially adverse actions are akin to employment termination, a decrease in wage or salary, benefits loss, and diminishment of material responsibilities. Id. at 202.
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the presumption of discrimination arises. Lytle, 458 Mich. at 173. The defendant then has the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his action to overcome and dispose of the presumption of discrimination. Id. Once the defendant produces evidence for its reason, the burden of proof returns to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff must "show, by a preponderance of admissible direct or circumstantial evidence, that there was a triable issue that the employer's proffered reasons were not true reasons, but were a mere pretext for discrimination." Id. at 174. The plaintiff may not simply raise a triable issue that the employer's proffered reason was pretextual. Id. at 176. The plaintiff must actually show that the employer's proffered reason was pretextual for discrimination. Id.
In this case, plaintiff filed a cause of action against defendants under MCL 37.2202(1)(a) of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, claiming that he, a Hispanic Mexican, suffered an adverse employment action. Plaintiff noted that MCL 418.315 of the WDCA requires employers to furnish employees with "reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services and medicines or other attendance or treatment" when needed, and he explained that the adverse action was the deprivation of medical care. In his answer to defendants' motion for summary disposition, plaintiff reiterated that the adverse action in this case was the deprivation of proper medical care.
Although there is not an exhaustive list of adverse employment actions and what constitutes an adverse employment action may vary depending on the employee's profession, Chen, 284 Mich.App. at 201, plaintiff has failed to establish a question of material fact regarding whether an employer-caused delay in receiving medical treatment constitutes an adverse employment action. The action that plaintiff alleges does not fall or fit within the examples that this Court has previously endorsed, which are each provable on an objective basis. See id. at 202. Additionally, it is unclear how denial of proper medical services and treatment after suffering an injury constitutes a material impact on plaintiffs employment or employment responsibilities. See id. at 201. Because plaintiff failed to establish a question of fact whether the denial of prompt medical treatment by defendants following plaintiff sustaining a workplace injury caused a material or significant change in plaintiffs employment status or responsibilities, the denial of prompt treatment cannot establish that plaintiff suffered the requisite adverse employment action to sustain a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial court erred by denying defendants' motion for summary disposition as to plaintiffs discrimination claim.
Defendants also argue that the circumstances under which the adverse action occurred did not give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination and that even if plaintiff established a prima facie case, he failed to prove that defendants' reason for the care that they provided him was pretextual. However, because the resolution of those issues is not dispositive, we decline to address them.
V. WPA CLAIM
Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the WPA, contending that there was no causal connection between plaintiff filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and plaintiffs termination. We agree.
"The WPA provides a remedy for an employee who suffers retaliation for reporting or planning to report a suspected violation of a law, regulation, or rule to a public body." Anzaldua v Neogen Corp, 292 Mich.App. 626, 630; 808 N.W.2d 804 (2011). MCL 15.362 provides as follows:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action.
"A prima facie case under the WPA arises when (1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the plaintiff was discharged or discriminated against, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision." Anzaldua, 292 Mich.App. at 630-631. If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, the defendant then has the burden of articulating "a legitimate business reason for the plaintiff's discharge." Taylor v Modern Engineering, Inc, 252 Mich.App. 655, 659; 653 N.W.2d 625 (2002). "If the defendant produces evidence establishing the existence of a legitimate reason for the discharge, the plaintiff then has the opportunity to prove that the legitimate reason offered by the defendant was not the true reason, but was only a pretext for the discharge." Id. "A plaintiff can prove pretext either directly by persuading the court that a retaliatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Roulston v Tendercare (Mich), 239 Mich.App. 270, 281; 608 N.W.2d 525 (2000).
Following his accident, plaintiff spoke to the EEOC and filed a charge of discrimination against defendants with the EEOC. In plaintiff's initial complaint, he alleged that defendants terminated his employment, contrary to the WPA, because he engaged in protected activities with the EEOC. Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that there was no causal connection between defendants' treatment of plaintiff after his accident and the EEOC charge. In response, plaintiff contended that after defendants learned of his EEOC charge of discrimination (a protected activity under the WPA), he was fired.
On appeal, defendants argue that there was no connection between plaintiff's EEOC charge of discrimination and his termination. We agree that plaintiff has failed to establish a causal connection between the charge and his termination. Plaintiff's contention that his EEOC charge resulted in his termination appears solely rested in the fact that he filed a charge, defendants learned about it, and then he was fired a month later. That is, plaintiff's prima facie case is premised simply on the temporal proximity of events, which is insufficient to establish a causal connection. See West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich. 177, 186; 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that truly shows a connection between the EEOC charge and his termination. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying defendants' motion for summary disposition with respect to this claim.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Christopher M. Murray, Michael J. Kelly, Colleen A. O'Brien