Opinion
20-1440
07-20-2023
LUCINDA S. RUH, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. METAL RECYCLING SERVICES, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
W. Hugh McAngus, Jr., Graham L. Newman, CHAPPELL, SMITH & ARDEN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Scott M. Tyler, William M. Butler, MOORE & VAN ALLEN PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina; Christopher A. Ogiba, Clinton T. Magill, MOORE & VAN ALLEN PLLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: July 14, 2023
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior District Judge. (0:19-cv-03229-CMC)
ON BRIEF:
W. Hugh McAngus, Jr., Graham L. Newman, CHAPPELL, SMITH & ARDEN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Scott M. Tyler, William M. Butler, MOORE & VAN ALLEN PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina; Christopher A. Ogiba, Clinton T. Magill, MOORE & VAN ALLEN PLLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lucinda S. Ruh appeals the district court's orders dismissing her civil complaint and denying her motion to amend her complaint. As relevant here, Ruh alleged in her complaint and proposed amended complaint that she was injured after a commercial truck crashed into her vehicle and that, at the time of the crash, the company that owned and operated the truck-Norris Trucking1, LLC-was performing work under a contract with Metal Recycling Services, LLC ("MRS"). Ruh further alleged that MRS contracted with Norris Trucking1 despite publicly available information showing that Norris Trucking1 was an incompetent and unsafe motor carrier. Ruh thus claimed that MRS was negligent in hiring Norris Trucking1 and that the negligence of MRS caused her injuries.
The district court dismissed Ruh's complaint and denied her motion to amend. The district court ruled that the complaint and proposed amended complaint failed to allege that Norris Trucking1 was anything but an independent contractor for MRS. And the district court explained that, under South Carolina law, a contracting party (MRS) is generally not liable for the torts of an independent contractor (Norris Trucking1) committed in the performance of the contracted work. While South Carolina has recognized some exceptions to that general rule, the district court determined that Ruh's allegations did not satisfy any of those exceptions. Importantly, the district court also reasoned that South Carolina had yet to recognize an exception for a claim like Ruh's-i.e., a claim for the negligent selection of an independent contractor-even though many other jurisdictions had done so. Ruh timely appealed.
Because the Supreme Court of South Carolina had yet to address the cognizability of a claim for the negligent selection of an independent contractor, we certified the following question to that court: "Under South Carolina law, can an employer be subject to liability for harm caused by the negligent selection of an independent contractor?" Ruh v. Metal Recycling Servs., LLC, No. 20-1440, 2022 WL 203744, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2022).
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has now answered that question as follows:
Yes, the [employer] in an independent contractor relationship may be subject to liability for physical harm proximately caused by the [employer's] own negligence in selecting the independent contractor.Ruh v. Metal Recycling Servs., LLC, ___S.E.2d ___, ___, No. 2022-94, 2023 WL 4096213, at *1 (S.C. June 21, 2023) (footnote omitted). Because the South Carolina high court's holding undermines the district court's reasoning in this case-in particular, the district court's determination that Ruh's negligent selection of an independent contractor claim is not cognizable under South Carolina law-we cannot sustain the district court's orders.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court's orders dismissing Ruh's complaint and denying Ruh's motion to amend and remand for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court of South Carolina's opinion and this opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED