Opinion
3:22-3784-MGL-SVH
12-07-2022
Felicia Ruff, Plaintiff, v. Donna Erickson, Defendant.
SHIVA V. HODGES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Felicia Ruff (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint against Donna Erickson (“Defendant”), alleging Defendant misrepresented information in a foreclosure action adjudicated in state court (“foreclosure action”) and destroyed personal property within the foreclosed property. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review the complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge.
On November 9, 2022, the undersigned issued an order and notice, advising Plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and permitting her until November 30, 2022, to file an amended complaint and bring the case into proper form. [ECF Nos. 10, 11]. Plaintiff has failed to respond to the orders. As such, it appears that she wishes to abandon this action. Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir. 1978); Fed.R.Civ.P. 41. In the alternative, the undersigned recommends the complaint be summarily dismissed as jurisdictionally barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On January 28, 2013, Defendant brought a foreclosure action against Plaintiff in Sumter County, South Carolina, alleging Plaintiff had defaulted on an installment contract of sale for property located at 1455 Hidden Oaks Drive, Wedgefield, South Carolina 29168, and owed a principal balance of $12,660.00. Donna Erickson v. Felicia Ruff, Case No. 2013-CP-43-00153. Plaintiff had previously entered into an installment contract to purchase the property from Defendant for $18,000 on November 2, 2010. Id.
The court takes judicial notice of filings in the foreclosure action. See Colonial Penn. Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1249 (4th Cir. 1989) (“The most frequent use of judicial notice of ascertainable facts is in noticing the content of court records.” (citation omitted).
The foreclosure action was subsequently stricken from the court's roster after Plaintiff filed under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Id. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the case on March 4, 2014, after Plaintiff failed to make required payments to the court. Id. However, Plaintiff continued to make the required payments under the bankruptcy plan to Defendant until April 1, 2016. Id.
Defendant's attorney was subsequently appointed Master-in-Equity for Clarendon County. Id. Because S.C. Code Ann. § 14-11-20 prohibits a Master-in- Equity of one county from appearing before a Master-in-Equity of another County, Sumter County Master-in-Equity Richard L. Booth ordered the Clerk of Court of Sumter County to appoint Thomas E. Player, Jr., Esq., as Special Referee to address the matter. Id.
Defendant moved to restore the foreclosure action to the active docket on March 20, 2017, noting she had not received any payments from Plaintiff since April 1, 2016. Id. The Special Referee held a hearing in the foreclosure action on May 22, 2018. Id. On May 29, 2018, he issued an order foreclosing on the property at 455 Hidden Oaks Drive, Wedgefield, South Carolina 29168. Id. After accounting for $7,335.40 in payments made during the bankruptcy action and adding real estate property taxes, allowable advances, attorney fees, and other costs to the principal due at the time the foreclosure action was initiated in 2013, the Special Referee concluded the total debt secured by the installment contract of sale was $13,321.04. Id. He rejected Plaintiff's allegation in her answer that she had equity in the property and noted no evidence was introduced at the hearing to support that contention. Id. He concluded Defendant had demonstrated entitlement to enforce the terms of the installment contract and to terminate it with all payments considered rent for the property, and foreclosed Plaintiff of all right, title, interest, and equity in the property. Id.
Plaintiff appealed the Special Referee's order to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. Id. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on May 27, 2021, denied Plaintiff's motion for rehearing, and remitted the case to the Special Referee on May 18, 2022. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari. Id.
In this action, Plaintiff alleges she failed to appear for the May 2018 hearing in the foreclosure action because she was out of state at the time. [ECF No. 1 at 5]. She asserts Defendant appeared for the hearing and failed to inform the Special Referee that Plaintiff had paid for the home and had equity in it. Id. She claims she paid $18,000 for the home and spent another $100,000 for property within it and restoration to it. Id. Plaintiff requests the court return the property to her or remand the case to the “lower” court and requests damages for property within the home that Defendant allegedly destroyed. Id.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp, v Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court may not review findings or rulings made by state courts. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (holding that a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts); Jordahl v. Democratic Party, 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine extends not only to issues actually decided by a state court, but also to those that are “inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.” Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997). A federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision if “success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 857-58 (4th Cir. 2001). This prohibition includes constitutional challenges. Curley v. Adams Creek Associates, 409 Fed.Appx. 678 (4th Cir. 2011).
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005):
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.Id. at 284; see also Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Exxon requires us to examine whether the state-court loser who files suit in federal district court seeks redress for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself. If he is not challenging the state-court decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.”).
Plaintiff's claims in this action are “inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court,” Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997), and are, consequently, unreviewable in this court. The record in the foreclosure action reveals that Plaintiff raised issues as to her equity in the foreclosed property on appeal, and the state appellate court declined to decide them in her favor. To the extent Plaintiff challenges Defendant's destruction of or removal of any personal property from the foreclosed property following the foreclosure action, it appears Defendant engaged in lawful action to remove Plaintiff's personal property pursuant to the state court's order. Because the claims in Plaintiff's complaint inherently challenge rulings made by the state court, the undersigned recommends summary dismissal.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be dismissed. Because Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to amend and failed to do so, the undersigned further recommends the dismissal be with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).