Opinion
C/A 2:20-cv-03846-DCN-MGB
08-06-2021
HEIDI RUEHL, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GURDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Heidi Ruehl (“Plaintiff”), brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, (42 U.S.C. Section 405(g)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration regarding her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends the Court affirm the Commissioner's decision.
RELEVANT FACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff initially filed an application for DIB on March 22, 2018, alleging a disability onset date of September 11, 2017. (R. at 15.) She was 43 years old on her alleged disability onset date. (R. at 26.) Plaintiff claimed disability due to brain injury, depression, headaches, short term loss (sic), fatigue, problems processing information/sensory, executive function disorder, and balance problems. (R. at 213.) Plaintiff has at least a high school education and has past relevant work as a lay out artist. (R. at 25-26.) Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (R. at 18.) A hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was held on October 23, 2019, and the ALJ issued a decision on November 14, 2019, in which she found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 15-27.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, (R. at 1-5), making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In making the determination that the Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits, the Commissioner has adopted the following findings of the ALJ:
(1) The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2022.
(2) The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 11, 2017, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
(3) The claimant has the following severe impairments: status post-traumatic brain injury (TBI) with migraine headaches, neurocognitive disorder, and depression (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
(4) The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526).
(5) After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). In particular, the claimant can lift or carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She can stand or walk for approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday and sit for approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday with normal breaks. The claimant is limited to work with no ladders, occasional balancing, climbing stairs, stooping, and crawling, frequent crouching and kneeling, and no exposure to unprotected heights or dangerous moving machinery. The claimant can have occasional exposure to vibration and to noise-defined as factory environments where hearing protection would normally be required and busy customer service environments such as department stores and restaurants. This individual can comprehend and perform simple routine tasks and instructions. She can perform low stress work, with low stress being defined as jobs having no team dependent or fast-paced production requirements and involving only simple work-related decisions. She can have occasional interaction with the public and tolerate occasional changes in work place and/or work methods. She can concentrate on, focus and attend to work tasks for at least two hours
at a time before needing a normal break of 15 minutes, or once per day, a 30-minute meal break.
(6) The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).
(7) The claimant was born on January 2, 1974 and was 43 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563).
(8) Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because under the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled, ” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
(9) Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)).
(10) The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 11, 2017, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).(R. at 15-27.)
APPLICABLE LAW
The Act provides that disability benefits shall be available to those persons insured for benefits, who are not of retirement age, who properly apply, and who are under a “disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). “Disability” is defined in the Act as the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, the Act has by regulation reduced the statutory definition of “disability” to a series of five sequential questions. An examiner must consider whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment which equals an illness contained in the Social Security Administration's official Listing of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) has an impairment which prevents past relevant work, and (5) has an impairment which prevents him from doing substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If an individual is found not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
The claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first four steps of the analysis. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995); Patterson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 846 F.3d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 2017). Once the claimant has established an inability to return to his past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant-considering his age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity-can perform alternative jobs and that such jobs exist in the national economy. SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3; Grant, 699 F.2d at 191; Pass, 65 F.3d at 1203; Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2016).
The scope of judicial review by the federal courts in disability cases is narrowly tailored to determine whether the Commissioner supported his findings with substantial evidence and applied the correct law. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015); Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 2018); Arakas v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 94 (4th Cir. 2020); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Consequently, the Act precludes a de novo review of the evidence and requires that the court uphold the Commissioner's decision as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Pyles v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 846, 848 (4th Cir. 1988); Bird v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Mascio, 780 F.3d at 640; Dowling v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2021); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015)). It is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Pearson, 810 F.3d at 207 (citing Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)). In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court does not undertake to “reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472; Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95; Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383. “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, ” the reviewing court must defer to the ALJ's decision. Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472).
However, the court does not “reflexively rubber-stamp an ALJ's findings.” Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 870 (4th Cir. 2017)). An ALJ may not cherrypick, misstate, or mischaracterize material facts. Arakas, 983 F.3d at 99 (citing Lewis, 858 F.3d at 869). Rather, ALJs “must ‘build an accurate and logical bridge' from the evidence to their conclusions.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95 (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff's migraine headaches. (Dkt. No. 8 at 24-28.) Upon careful review, the undersigned finds that the ALJ's decision provides substantial support for the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's migraine headaches, both at step three and in his RFC findings. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed.
A. The ALJ's Decision
The ALJ's decision considers whether Plaintiff was disabled from September 11, 2017, the alleged onset date, through the date of the ALJ's decision. The ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: status post-traumatic brain injury (“TBI”) with migraine headaches, neurocognitive disorder, and depression. (R. at 17.) As recounted by the ALJ, Plaintiff “has a history of mild to moderate TBI following an accident at work in May 2011, with reported residual change in cognition and pace following same and with reports of headaches.” (R. at 20.)
At the third step in the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled any of the impairments contained in the Listing. (R. at 17.)
More specifically, the ALJ found that
The claimant's traumatic brain injury does not meet 11.18 [traumatic brain injury] as the claimant does not have disorganization of motor function in two extremities, resulting in an extreme limitation in the ability to stand up from a seated position, balance while standing or walking, or use the upper extremities, persisting for at least 3 consecutive months after the injury; OR marked limitation in physical functioning, and in one of the following areas of mental functioning, persisting for at least 3 consecutive months after the injury: Understanding, remembering, or applying information; or Interacting with others; or Concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or Adapting or managing oneself.(R. at 18.)
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff's “mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, do not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.02 [neurocognitive disorders] and 12.04 [depressive, bipolar and related disorders].” (R. at 18.) As the ALJ noted above, the alternate criteria for Listing 11.18 require a marked limitation in one of the four areas of mental functioning which are identical to the “Paragraph B” criteria included in Listing 12.02. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §§ 11.18(B), 12.02(B). A marked limitation means that the claimant's ability to function in a particular mental functioning area is “seriously limited.” (Id.) In the instant case, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff suffered only moderate limitations in the four areas of mental functioning.
The first functional area, understanding, remembering, or applying information, refers to an individual's “abilities to learn, recall, and use information to perform work activities.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x 1, § 12.00E. Examples include “following one- or two-step oral instructions to carry out a task, ” “asking and answering questions and providing explanations, ” “identifying and solving problems, ” and “using reason and judgment to make work-related decisions.” Id. In finding that Plaintiff had only moderate limitations in the ability to understand, remember, and apply information, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff stated she could perform simple maintenance, prepare meals, go to doctor's appointments, take medications, shop, drive, and read; and that Plaintiff was able to provide information about her health, describe her prior work history, follow instructions from healthcare providers, comply with treatment outside of a doctor's office or hospital, and respond to questions from medical providers. (R. at 18.) The ALJ also recognized here that Plaintiff alleged she has some difficulty remembering generally, following instructions, and paying bills, and she had some impairment of memory noted on exams.
The second functional area, interacting with others, “refers to the abilities to relate to and work with supervisors, co-workers, and the public.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App'x 1, § 12.00E. Examples include “cooperating with others, ” “initiating or sustaining conversation, ” “responding to requests, suggestions, criticism, correction, and challenges, ” and “keeping social interactions free of excessive irritability, sensitivity, argumentativeness, or suspiciousness.” Id. In concluding that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in interacting with others, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's conflicting testimony about her ability to get along with others. (R. at 18.) She noted, inter alia, that Plaintiff's statements indicate she is able to get along with others, shop, spend time with friends and family, attend church, deal appropriately with authority, and live with others.
The third functional area, concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, “refers to the abilities to focus attention on work activities and stay on task at a sustained rate.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App'x 1, § 12.00E. Examples include “initiating and performing a task that you understand and know how to do, ” “working at an appropriate and consistent pace, ” “completing tasks in a timely manner, ” “ignoring or avoiding distractions while working, ” and “working a full day without needing more than the allotted number or length of rest periods during the day.” Id. Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace. (R. at 18.) In reaching this determination, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff's statements that she has limitations in concentrating generally, focusing generally, completing tasks, and maintaining a regular work schedule. She noted that Plaintiff stated she is able to drive, prepare meals, watch TV, read, use the internet, handle her own medical care, and attend church. She also noted the record showed Plaintiff could complete tasks accurately, and there was no evidence of an inability to complete testing that assesses concentration and attention. (R. at 1819.)
The fourth and final functional area, adapting or managing oneself, “refers to the abilities to regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being in a work setting.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App'x 1, § 12.00E. Examples include “responding to demands, ” “adapting to changes, ” “distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable work performance, ” “setting realistic goals, ” and “maintaining personal hygiene and attire appropriate to a work setting.” Id. In determining that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in adapting and managing himself, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff asserted she has difficulties handling change and managing her mood.
The ALJ noted that Plaintiff also stated she is able to handle self-care and personal hygiene and that the objective evidence showed Plaintiff to have appropriate grooming and hygiene, no problem getting along well with providers and staff, and no problems with temper control. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's judgment “remained intact and she is able to function independently outside the home.” (R. at 19.)
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work in a limited capacity, including a restriction to “occasional exposure to vibration and to noise-defined as factory environments such as department stores and restaurants.” (R. at 19.) She detailed Plaintiff's subjective statements to medical providers and Plaintiff's hearing testimony, the opinion evidence, and the medical evidence, finding the record ultimately supported her RFC assessment. (R. at 2026.)
The ALJ discussed the evidence pertaining to Plaintiff's headaches throughout her decision. He noted Plaintiff's testimony that “she had a head injury in 2011 and continued to have headaches several times per week.” (R. at 20.) She discussed a consultative examination on August 7, 2018, wherein Plaintiff presented “with reports of residual effects of her brain injury of headaches and cognitive disfunction ....” (R. at 21.) At this examination, Plaintiff “was assessed with closed head trauma with persistent cognitive defect and ataxia.” (R. at 21.) In an August 28, 2018 psychological consultative evaluation, a mental status exam revealed, inter alia,
[S]he had some problems with short-term memory and processing information timely, she struggled with some tasks but could eventually complete them correctly, her speech was normal . . . [s]he was fully oriented, her thought process and content were normal, her recall was generally intact, and she scored a 30/30 on a mini mental status exam, which was consistent with normal mental status functioning.(R. at 21.)
In another psychological consultative evaluation on January 29, 2019, Plaintiff “reported that she was able to care for her personal needs, she drove, she attended church, she could go shopping in stores and use a credit card, she had friends, she could go out to eat, she could use a phone and computer, and she could prepare meals, clean and do laundry.” (R. at 22.) On exam, Plaintiff “was fully oriented and her thought process and content were normal. She was slow at times in responding and processing and asked for directions to be repeated; however, her recall was intact.” (R. at 22.)
After considering the evidence, the ALJ found Plaintiff's RFC “is consistent with the limitations indicated by the other evidence in this case.” (R. at 22.) She continued,
While the medical evidence of record reveals that the claimant has a history of TBI with migraine headaches, the record does not support the severity, as alleged. A CT of the claimant's head in May 2011 was negative (Exhibit 14F, p.1). A MRI of the cervical spine in December 2014 was negative (Exhibit 3F, p.22). A nerve conduction study of the upper extremities in January 2106 was normal (Exhibit 3F, p. 23). Moreover, objective examinations, as fully discussed above, revealed the claimant was in no distress, she had some mild impairment with balance and ataxia in on tandem and Romberg testing but she could perform tiptoe and heel gait walking, her strength was intact in the upper and lower extremities, she had good range of motion in the upper and lower extremities, she had no neurological deficits, her reflexes were symmetrical and she did not require any assistance device for ambulation (Exhibits 3F, 9F, 12F). These objective and diagnostic test findings are not consistent with the alleged incapacitating impairments and indicate the claimant's impairments may not be as severe or debilitating as alleged. Rather, they are consistent with the claimant's ability to perform light work with postural and environmental limitations.
The claimant has received only conservative treatment for her allegedly incapacitating symptoms. She has a remote TBI, but she has not required any surgical intervention, she has not required any recent hospital admissions and she has not required frequent emergency treatment for stabilization of headaches. Such moderate treatment for a condition alleged to be incapacitating does not support the claimant's allegations as to the intensity and persistence of the symptoms limiting the claimant's ability to perform work-related activities.(R. at 22-23.) The ALJ then discussed in detail her reasons for finding Plaintiff had only moderate limitations in the areas of mental functioning. (R. at 23.)
After considering Plaintiff's RFC and the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. at 26.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 27.)
B. Step Three in Sequential Evaluation Process
In order to establish disability, the claimant must present evidence that his impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). To determine whether a claimant's impairments meet or equal a listed impairment at step three of the sequential analysis, the ALJ must identify the relevant listed impairments and compare the listing criteria with the evidence of the claimant's symptoms. Peck v. Colvin, No. 8:12-CV-02594-DCN, 2014 WL 994925, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2014). Because the Listings define impairments that would entirely preclude an adult from performing any gainful activity, the medical criteria are set at a higher level than the statutory standard for disability. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990).
While an “ALJ is not required to explicitly identify and discuss every possible listing, ” the ALJ “is compelled to provide a coherent basis for [the] Step Three determination.” Ezzell v. Berryhill, 688 F. App'x. 199, 200 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Thus, “[i]n cases where there is ‘ample factual support in the record' for a particular listing, the ALJ must provide a full analysis to determine whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals the listing.” See Peck, 2014 WL 994925, at *12 (citing Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1172 (4th Cir. 1986)). Nevertheless, “if the ALJ's opinion read as a whole provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision at step three, such evidence may provide a basis for upholding the ALJ's determination.” See McDaniel v. Colvin, No. 2:14-CV-28157, 2016 WL 1271509, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 31, 2016) (referencing Smith v. Astrue, 457 F. App'x. 326, 328 (4th Cir. 2011)) (“Reading the ALJ's decision as a whole, substantial evidence supports the finding at step three of the sequential evaluation process as the ALJ's analysis at subsequent steps of the evaluation are inconsistent with meeting [the listing].”) Ultimately, “[a] cursory explanation in step three is satisfactory so long as the decision as a whole demonstrates that the ALJ considered the relevant evidence of record and there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion.” See id. (referencing Smith, 457 F. App'x. at 328).
C. Analysis
In her brief, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to evaluate Plaintiff's migraine headaches under listing 11.02, and that this error warrants remand. (Dkt. No. 8 at 26-30.) The Commissioner responds that “the ALJ's discussion of the evidence, including listing 11.18, wherein the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's traumatic brain injury, makes clear that the Plaintiff did not meet her burden to show that her migraines met or medically equaled all of the criteria of listing 11.02.” (Dkt. No. 9 at 7.)
As Plaintiff recognizes, listing 11.02 requires a marked limitation in physical functioning; understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or adapting or managing oneself. (Dkt. No. 8 at 27); see SSR 194p; 2019 WL 4169635, at *7 (August 26, 2019). In her decision, the ALJ discussed the evidence pertaining to Plaintiff's alleged physical and mental impairments in detail, including those allegedly stemming from Plaintiff's headaches, and found they resulted in only moderate mental limitations and supported an RFC finding of a reduced range of light work. (R. at 18-19, 20-23.)
Here, Plaintiff argues that if the ALJ had evaluated Plaintiff's migraine headaches “through a proper lens, ” i.e., listing 11.02, “[s]he may have reevaluated the severity of Plaintiff's” mental impairments. (Dkt. No. 8 at 27.) In support, Plaintiff relies on Rose v. Berryhill, wherein the court found the ALJ's failure to evaluate the claimant's seizures under listing 11.02 warranted remand. No. 2:16-CV-12369, 2017 WL 6506465, at *9 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 18, 2017), adopted by, No. 2:16-CV-12369, 2017 WL 6503640 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 19, 2017). In Rose, the court emphasized that the ALJ did not consider any of the claimant's physical conditions at step three and that there was a “complete lack of discussion and support for the ALJ's step three analysis regarding” the claimant's seizure disorder, which “render[ed] the ALJ's decision incapable of meaningful review. Id. at *10.
The undersigned finds Rose in inapposite to the instant matter, where the ALJ's opinion as a whole provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision at step three concerning Plaintiff's traumatic brain injury with migraine headaches. See McDaniel, 2016 WL 1271509, at *4 (“[I]f the ALJ's opinion read as a whole provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision at step three, such evidence may provide a basis for upholding the ALJ's determination.”). Further, Plaintiff provides no argument for how the evidence would support a more severe limitation when evaluated under listing 11.02.
Plaintiff also argues here that the ALJ erred in discounting the severity of Plaintiff's migraine headaches based “on the absence of diagnostic findings and sporadic treatment for headaches in addition to select normal findings.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 30.) In support, Plaintiff relies on Cox v. Saul, wherein the court found the ALJ erred in finding the claimant's headaches non-severe “based on [the] allegedly sporadic nature of complaints and normal imaging/tests.” No. 4:19-CV-02717-TER, 2021 WL 973345, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2021). In Cox, however, the ALJ also failed both to find that Plaintiff's headaches were severe at step two and to “consider in the RFC determination the ‘non-severe' migraine impairment's effects on sustaining work.” Id. Here, as discussed above, the ALJ found Plaintiff's migraine headaches to be a severe impairment, and she considered the effects of this impairment when assessing Plaintiff's RFC.
Further, courts in this circuit have repeatedly found no error where the ALJ relied in part on normal diagnostic and exam findings to discount the severity of a claimant's headaches. See, e.g., Thomas v. Saul, No. 1:19CV290, 2020 WL 3318049, at *8 (M.D. N.C. June 18, 2020) (finding the “ALJ's decision as it relates to Plaintiff's migraine headaches is susceptible to judicial review and supported by substantial evidence; noting, inter alia, ALJ found claimant “regularly revealed normal sensory and neurological functioning”), adopted by, 2020 WL 5705925 (M.D. N.C. July 9, 2020); Lisa N. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 4:18-CV-00034, 2019 WL 9055823, at *12 (W.D. Va. Sept. 5, 2019) (finding no error where the ALJ “reasonably found that [claimant's] ‘reported limitations' from headaches were out of proportion to providers' normal exam findings throughout the relevant period”); Evans v. Saul, No. 7:18-CV-00138-D, 2019 WL 4309038, at *6 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 19, 2019) (finding the ALJ's “decision as a whole shows that her record lacked sufficient evidence that her headaches met or equaled a Listing impairment”; noting the ALJ “observed that [claimant's] examinations failed to reveal neurological abnormalities”), adopted by, 2019 WL 4309009 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 11, 2019).
In sum, the undersigned finds Plaintiff has failed to identify any reversible error in the ALJ's analysis or “point to any specific piece of evidence not considered by the [ALJ] that might have changed the outcome of [her] disability claim.” Reid v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2014) (emphasis omitted). While Plaintiff argues the record supports finding Plaintiff's migraine headaches render her disabled, such reweighing of the evidence is not within the province of this Court. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a reviewing court should not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ).
CONCLUSION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED, for the foregoing reasons, that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).