Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-05512
04-07-2017
RUDOLPH AND LOIS JOHNSON v. SUNOCO, INC. (R&M), ET AL.
MEMORANDUM SURRICK, J.
Presently before the Court is Defendant American Overseas Marine Corporation ("AMSEA") and Defendant General Dynamics Corporation's ("GDC") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 17.) For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted.
AMSEA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of GDC.
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts of this case are set forth in our February 28, 2017 Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand. (See Feb. 28 Mem., ECF No. 36; Feb. 28 Order, ECF No. 37.)
A. Factual Background
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that, from 1992 to 2005, Plaintiff Rudolph Johnson worked as a mechanic and seaman on the USNS STOCKHAM and the USNS ALGOL United States navigation vessels. (Compl. ¶ 4, AMSEA and GDC Mot. Ex. 2, ECF No. 17.) In this role, Johnson repaired engines, cleaned tanks, and performed other miscellaneous tasks. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that during the course of his employment, Johnson, on almost a daily basis, was exposed to a variety of benzene-containing solvents, and "manufactured, refined, designed, produced, processed, compounded, converted, packaged, sold, distributed, marketed, re-labeled, supplied and/or otherwise placed into the stream of commerce by Defendants." (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs further contend that while working on the vessels, Johnson was also exposed to the benzene-containing solvents by means of inhalation, ingestion, and dermal absorption. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 27.) This exposure was a result of both the contamination to his clothing, as well as his dermal contact with air vapors. (Id.)
On September 23, 2013, Johnson was diagnosed with myelodysplastic syndrome ("MDS"). (Id. ¶ 7.) In 2014, Johnson's MDS mutated into acute myeloid leukemia ("AML"). (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Johnson contracted MDS and AML as a result of his exposure to benzene. Plaintiffs also contend that as a result of the MDS/AML that Johnson contracted, he suffered various adverse side effects and illnesses, forcing him to undergo extensive medical treatment, thereby causing him "pain, suffering, disability, disfigurement, deformity, impairment, mental anguish, anxiety, humiliation, and increased susceptibility to infection." (Id. ¶ 28.) In addition, Plaintiffs claim that Johnson has suffered substantial financial damages as a result of his condition. (Id. ¶ 30.)
In asserting their claims against Defendants, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that:
Defendants knew and foresaw that their benzene-containing solvent products were used in the manner in which Rudolph Johnson use[d] them, that benzene and benzene-containing solvents would be released into the atmosphere while using their benzene-containing solvent products, and . . . Johnson and others similarly situated would work with, inhale, ingest, dermally absorb, handle or directly and indirectly come into contact with, and/or otherwise be exposed to benzene, which created a hazardous and unsafe condition and risk to the health of Rudolph Johnson and others similarly situated.(Id. ¶ 39.)
Defendants contend that AMSEA operated the USNS STOCKHAM and the USNS ALGOL pursuant to instructions contained within federal government contracts. (Defs.' Remand Resp. 5, ECF No. 24.) Defendants aver that AMSEA was conducting its activity pursuant to orders from a federal officer, and therefore the claims and defenses are properly evaluated in federal court. (Id. at 2.)
B. Procedural History
On September 23, 2016, Plaintiffs Rudolph and Lois Johnson filed a complaint in this products liability action against CRC Industries, Inc. ("CRC"), and other defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. On October 20, 2016, Defendants removed the case to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442(a)(1) and 1446. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) On November 21, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 20.) On December 9, 2016 CRC filed a Motion to Transfer Venue to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. (ECF No. 30.) Pursuant to Plaintiffs' request in its Motion in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue (ECF No. 32), we stayed this ruling pending the ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand. On February, 28, 2017, a Memorandum and Order were entered denying Defendants' Motion to Remand. (Feb. 28 Mem.; Feb. 28 Order.) On March 6, 2017, CRC's Motion to Transfer Venue was denied. (ECF No. 38.) On November 9, 2016, AMSEA and GDC filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 17.) On November 23, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 21.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion under Rule 12(b)(6), therefore, tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is plausible "when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). Courts need not accept "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . ." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. This '"does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In determining whether dismissal of the complaint is appropriate, courts use a two-part analysis. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, courts separate the factual and legal elements of the claim and accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true. Id. at 210-11. Next, courts determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the Plaintiffs have a "'plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Given the nature of the two-part analysis, "'[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 530 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be denied, since all necessary relevant factual material has yet to be developed, and because the record does not clearly detail the extent to which AMSEA and GDC intended to pass liability to the United States. (Pls.' Resp. 5.) Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that it is unclear at this juncture whether the United States reimbursed AMSEA for Johnson's services, and whether the government's contractual rights included the ability to terminate crew members. (Id. at 6.)
In denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand, we concluded that through GDC and AMSEA's relationships with the USNS STOCKHAM and the USNS ALGOL, they "were clearly Government agents 'acting under' the direction of the United States." (Feb. 28 Mem. 6.) We determined that the case was properly removed to this Court pursuant to the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
Moreover, the record includes an affidavit from AMSEA's Chief of Insurance and Claims, James Campbell, stating that the USNS STOCKHAM and the USNS ALGOL are public vessels. (Affidavit of James Campbell, Defs.' Mot. Ex. B.) Specifically, Campbell explained that the USNS STOCKHAM is deemed a public vessel, since it is "owned by the United States of America, represented by the Navy Department, and is . . . engaged solely in the public service of the United States." (Id. ¶ 5.) Campbell also detailed that "[t]he USNS ALGOL was at all relevant times maintained as part of the Military Sealift Command's Ready Reserve Force, and was/is owned by the United States of America." (Id. ¶ 6.) As such, GDC and AMSEA's contracts controlling their operation of the USNS STOCKHAM and the USNS ALGOL created a principal-agent relationship with the United States Government.
In addition, Defendants attach as exhibits to their Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand, a series of documents further demonstrating the principal-agent nature of AMSEA and GDC's relationship with the United States Government. For example, Defendants included the executed May 22, 2000 contract entered into between AMSEA and the Department of the Navy, Military Sealift Command (see Defs.' Remand Resp. Ex. A at 2-11), and the March 9, 2000 AMSEA and Sealift Command Solicitation, Offer, and Award, which details, inter alia, the supplies and services to be provided by AMSEA to the federal government. (See Defs.' Remand Resp. Ex. B at 1-10.) AMSEA's contract with the government also details the scope of work that AMSEA will provide to the government (id. at 11, ¶ 1.1); the AMSEA phase-in requirements as a government contractor (id. at 12, ¶ 1.5.1); and also explicates in Section C-2: "Government Furnished Property and Services" that "[t]he Government will provide, at Government expense, the facilities, materials, equipment, and/or services necessary for the operation of the MPF(E) vessel." (Id. at 19, ¶ 2.0.)
GDC and AMSEA's principal-agent relationship with the Government provides GDC and AMSEA with a colorable federal immunity defense under the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 31101, et seq. ("PVA"), and the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901, et seq. ("SIAA"). Under the PVA and SIAA, a federal action against the United States is the exclusive remedy for harm endured on public vessels. 46 U.S.C. § 30904; Petition of U.S., 367 F.2d 505, 511 (3d Cir. 1966) ("[A]ny right to recovery against the United States . . . for injury caused by its public vessel precludes recovery for the same injury against the contract operator whose conduct was the immediate cause of the accident."); Beeler v. United States, 338 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir. 1964) (maintaining that sole remedy of a passenger, who sought to recover from United States for injuries sustained when boat in which she was a passenger was swept over a dam in river, on ground that accident was due to negligent failure of Corps of Engineers to post properly located signs warning water craft of dam, was under Suits in Admiralty Act); Dearborn v. Mar Ship Operations, Inc., 113 F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that "where a remedy lies against the United States, a suit against an agent of the United States 'by reason of the same subject matter' is precluded"); Tucker v. Chas, Kurz & Co., No. 14-4893, 2014 WL 12573518, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2014) (holding that the injured plaintiff's exclusive remedy was against the United States when the defendants were found to be acting as agents of the United States (citing Cruz v. Marine Transport Lines, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 107, 109-12 (D.N.J. 1986), aff'd 806 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986))); Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Fujifilm Smart Surfaces, LLC, No. 11-3435, 2011 WL 6001839, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2011); Thomson v. Alcoa S S Co., 90 F. Supp. 572, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (maintaining that exclusive recourse for injured respondent, who was handling certain phases of the ship's husbandry under a standard general agency agreement with the War Shipping Administration, was a non-jury action against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act, since the vessel on which the respondent served was owned by the United States).
Clearly, Plaintiffs have no recourse against AMSEA and GDC in their individual capacities, and may only seek damages from the United States Government. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 30904, 31101-02.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ _________
R. BARCLAY SURRICK, J.