Opinion
C.A.# 00C-05-148-SDP
Submitted: January 16, 2002
Decided: May 15, 2002
Upon Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law — DENIED.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On October 10, 1998, Defendants, James Heeren and Lisa Ruderman, collided at an intersection on Old Chestnut Hill Road. As discussed below, a third, unidentified or "phantom" motorist played a part in the accident. Plaintiff is Ruderman's husband, Michael. On behalf of his daughter, Paige, he sued everyone, including his wife's uninsured motorist carrier, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. Trial on liability only was held December 5-6, 2001. Through a special verdict form, the jury found that Ruderman, Heeren and the phantom driver, all were negligent and that their negligence proximately caused the collision. The jury apportioned liability:
40% James Heeren
30% Unidentified driver of the pick-up truck with attached trailer
30% Lisa Ruderman.
Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 50, State Farm filed a post-trial motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. State Farm contends that under any reasonable view of the evidence, the "phantom" driver cannot be called a proximate cause of the accident. Thus, Paige has no claim against her mother's UM carrier.
I.
Specifically, State Farm contends that "no reasonable jury could have found that [the phantom driver] was a proximate cause of the collision." It argues that the colliding drivers testified that the phantom vehicle did not "obstruct . . . their respective ability to clearly see the roadway ahead of them." Further, State Farm argues that Ruderman testified that the phantom vehicle barely entered her lane, and that she "probably" turned her head to deal with her children in the rear seats. Finally, State Farm argues that because the phantom vehicle did not cause either defendant to not see the other, a reasonable jury could not conclude that the phantom vehicle proximately caused the accident.
In its entirety, Michael and Paige Ruderman's response to State Farm's explicit discussion of the evidence, is:
This is preposterous. There was substantial evidence that the location of the trailer stopped in the eastbound lane caused Heeren not to be able to see Lisa's vehicle approaching in the eastbound lane, and caused Lisa not to be able to see Heeren's vehicle as it crossed into her lane of travel; thus explaining why neither driver saw the other vehicle prior to the collision. There was also substantial evidence that the stopped truck and trailer in the intersection made Heeren feel uncomfortable and unsafe, and caused Heeren to make his turn before he had assurance that the eastbound lane was clear in order to extricate himself from an unsafe situation in the middle of the intersection caused by the stopped truck and trailer.
II. A. Ruderman's Testimony
The colliding motorists, Lisa Ruderman and James Heeren, testified at trial. On direct examination, Ruderman stated:
Q: Did you see any other vehicles in your path of travel?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you see?
A: There was a landscaping equipment trucking company.
It's a truck with like your landscaping trailer, is that what it's called, with your landscaping gear trailing behind . . . .
Q: Did you have to alter your path of travel at all due to the presence of this truck, trailer, you've described?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you have to do?
A: I had to go around him because he was blocking — his truck was not blocking my lane. His trailer portion was blocking my lane with his equipment. I had to bear right to go around the trailer to proceed . . . .
During cross-examination, focused specifically on the truck and trailer's involvement in the collision, Ruderman was asked:
Q: [I]s it your opinion that the pickup truck with the trailer, the utility trailer that we've discussed, had anything at all to do with the causing of this accident?
A: It didn't cause the accident. It was a contribute — contributing factor.
She further testified:
Q: Yes. You're telling us now that a portion of the trailer was into your lane.
A: Mm-hmm.
Q: And what I'm trying to find out, was it blocking your view of the road ahead?
A: It was not blocking the view of my lane.
Q: You had — you had an unrestricted view, didn't you?
A: I don't remember.
Ruderman was then asked about discrepancies between her trial and deposition testimony:
Q: The question is [referring to her deposition], "if you can tell me, when did you first notice the trailer partially sticking out as you described it in that lane?" Do you see the question?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you understand the question?
A: Yes.
Q: What was your answer?
A: "After the accident."
Q: Well, how would you have moved around it if you didn't even see it until after the accident?
A: Well, if I didn't go around it, I probably would have hit it; right?
* * * * *
Q: This sworn statement indicates you didn't even see the trailer until after the accident; isn't that what you said?
A: That's what I said in here.
Q: All right. Well, then, would you agree with me that it would probably have not been something you would have to swing around if you hadn't even seen it?
A: What was that?
Q: How would you have swung around it, like you told us about on your testimony this morning, if you never even saw it?
A: I did see it. I obviously didn't answer the question correctly.
She testified, referring to a diagram:
Q: Okay. So what you saw was the truck, the pick-up truck and the trailer in this area; right?
A: Mm-hmm.
Q: And you're coming around here. He's not blocking your view; correct?
A: No.
Q: No, it's not correct or, no, he was not blocking your view?
A: He wasn't blocking my view.
Ruderman further testified:
Q: Okay. So, he really wasn't presenting much of problem to you, was he?
A: Was he presenting a problem to me?
Q: To you.
A: No.
Then she stated:
Q: Well, when he comes across your lane with this red car, what's your explanation for why you didn't see him?
A: Never saw him.
Q: I appreciate this.
A: Because the trailer was blocking my view and I guess I didn't see him.
When questioned about her deposition testimony, again, Ruderman stated:
Q: And then you say this: "It really wasn't an issue, the trailer, for me." Do you remember saying that?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you agree with that as you sit here today?
A: What wasn't an issue?
Q: The trailer. That's what you said.
A: But —
Q: "It wasn't really an issue, the trailer, for me."
A: What are we talking about?
Q: The trailer.
A: An issue for me for what?
Q: Anything. You're being asked questions on —
A: No, it wasn't an issue for me.
When asked about why she had not mentioned the truck and trailer prior to trial, Ruderman testified:
Q: Can we agree, on all occasions, you said Mr. Heeren, and on no occasions did you say anything about the trailer?
A: Right. Do you remember the very first question you asked me when I got up here?
Q: Yes.
A: What was the very first question?
Q: The very first question was —
A: In your opinion —
Q: Is it your position today as you sit here, did the trailer have anything to do with causing the accident?
A: What was my answer?
Q: Your answer, I thought, was that you —
A: Did not cause the accident but it had something to do with it.
Q: Okay. Did you say that anywhere before?
A: No. Nobody's ever asked me that question like you just worded it.
When pressed further, she stated:
Q: And nowhere did you say the fault was the phantom, correct?
A: Right. I do not believe, in my opinion, that the [truck and trailer] was fully responsible for the accident. I believe it's partly responsible.
Q: Okay. Can we agree that you never said anything about it being partly responsible until —
* * * * *
Q: Until today, until you got on the stand today —
A: Right.
Q: — have you ever taken the position that the trailer caused any part of this accident?
A: Yes. I think so. It didn't — it didn't cause the accident. It was just — I think I personally think it blocked Mr. Heeren's view of me. He could not see me because it was blocking his view. He said that, I said that. That's my opinion. Let the jury decide if they believe him. None of us are experts.
* * * * *
Q: And now your position is that somebody else is at fault; right?
A: No, I didn't say fault. They were — I believe they didn't cause the accident. They — that [truck and trailer] didn't make Mr. Heeren drive into me. They were a contributing factor. They — they — the [truck and trailer] blocked Mr. Heeren's view, he could not see me, and it was a factor of the accident. It didn't cause the accident. He caused the accident by driving into me. I'm just saying it's — it's part of the accident. That's my opinion.
Ruderman was also asked about her statement to State Farm about whether she saw Heeren's car. She testified:
Q: Okay, let's go back. Let's start again with, "Where was [Heeren's car] when you first saw him?" You see that?
A: Yes.
Q: Your answer was? Can you read your answer to the jury?
A: "I never saw him."
Q: And, then, the next question was, "Never saw him?" And your answer was?
A: "Probably because of that truck."
Q: Then the next question was again, "Never saw him?" And your answer?
A: "If I would have saw him even attempting to make a left-hand turn in front of me."
Q: And then the questioner said "Uh-huh." and you said?
A: "I was going slow enough that I could have stopped."
Q: Okay. So, you agree that, if you would have seen him, you would have put your brakes on and this accident would not have happened?
A: Hopefully, yes.
Ruderman also testified about her children in the car with her at the time of the accident:
Q: Now right about the time that you made the turn, a lot of chaos occurred in your car, didn't it?
A: Not a lot of chaos.
Q: All right. Well, there were at least two chaotic things going on weren't there?
A: What were they?
Q: One was that the two kids in the back were fighting; right?
A: Yes.
Q: And, two, is that Paige, in the front seat, took off her seat belt.
A: Yes.
Q: And do you agree that you never saw Mr. Heeren's vehicle?
A: Correct.
B. Heeren's Testimony
On direct examination, regarding whether he could see in order to proceed with his turn, Heeren testified:
Q: Now, as you sat there and wanting to make the left-hand turn, you were certainly aware that you had to satisfy yourself that the traffic was clear in the opposite direction in the eastbound lane; is that correct?
A: You're saying that I had to satisfy —
Q: Well —
A: — folks coming this way.
Q: Yeah, you had to satisfy yourself because —
A: For sure. I wouldn't have turned otherwise.
Q: Right. You knew that you had to satisfy yourself and you — and how did you — what did you do? In other words, were you able to look through the truck and trailer in some manner to see the eastbound lane?
A: No sir, I could not see through it. I could not see over it. I could not see through it. I could see in between as he went around there, I could see he was still clear.
Q: So you could see — could you see some portion of the eastbound lane between the truck and the trailer?
A: I don't — I don't recall.
Q: You don't recall that?
A: I don't recall seeing — no, I don't recall that. I wouldn't have went hadn't I known it was clear.
Q: What did you do to conclude in your own mind that it was clear?
A: Well, I guess my logic was that I looked between it when he was there, when he went by me, I could see between it.
And I didn't see anybody coming around, so I — I turned. . . .
When asked about his deposition testimony, Heeren stated:
Q: Didn't you testify previously at deposition that you could see between the truck and trailer, the eastbound lane, and it was clear and that's the reason you made your turn?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: You did testify that way?
A: Yeah.
Q: And that's your testimony today?
A: Yeah, because I'm telling you, it correlated, connected in a systematic way.
Q: But it was?
A: Fast.
Q: And it was a misjudgment on your part?
A: Well, no, I thought it was clear. Otherwise, I wouldn't have went.
On cross-examination, Heeren testified:
Q: All right. Now, you said yesterday that you could see behind the trailer that it was clear —
A: Yes, sir.
Q: — before you turned in; is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
He also stated:
Q: . . . All right. You said a couple of other things in your deposition that I want to ask you about . . . . You remember saying when the lawyers were questioning you back in January, that you did not believe that the trailer blocked your vision of oncoming traffic, or else you would not have turned?
A: Yes, I remember saying that, and I believe it to be true.
* * * * *
Q: All right. But your position is it didn't block your view?
A: Didn't block my view. I thought I had the strategic view.
Heeren further testified:
A: As best as I can remember, [the truck] started out before I had stopped, and then I stopped.
Q: Okay.
A: And he — you know, I could see — it was clear when I was coming up to it and I could see between his trailer when he passed by me, I came to the stop and the cars started filling up fast. Once I committed myself, I —
Q: And this is probably pretty obvious. But when you went in, you went in behind the trailer?
A: I had to, yeah, I had to go behind the trailer.
Q: And in your view, was it clear to do that?
A: Yeah.
Finally, on recross-examination, Heeren testified about his deposition:
Q: All right. And then you're asked the question on Line 14. Question: "Well, you deliberately made a left turn?"
Do you see that?
A: Yes sir, I do.
Q: And was your answer to that, "I made a left turn when it was clear."?
A: Yes sir, it is.
Q: And that's still your position today, isn't it?
A: Yes, sir.
No one else testified about the phantom. In summary, the drivers' testimony about whether the trailer blocked their view is all over the place. Nonetheless, both drivers agreed that the trailer was in the intersection when they collided.
III.
Under Delaware law, when deciding a motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, the Court does not weigh the evidence. It does not determine witness credibility. The Court considers the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. It must determine "whether or not under any reasonable view of the evidence the jury could justifiably find in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant." The Court grants a defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law when it "clearly appears that, under the law, a verdict for the plaintiff would not be justified." The sole issue is whether the case's "facts and inferences would permit reasonable persons to reach but one conclusion."
Burgos v. Hickok, 695 A.2d 1141, 1145 (Del. 1997).
Trievel v. Sabo, 714 A.2d 742, 745 (Del. 1998) (citing Burgos).
Burgos, 695 A.2d at 1145.
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 208 A.2d 495,498 (Del. 1965).
McCarthy v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 100 A.2d 739, 740 (Del.Super. 1953).
Gannett Co., Inc. v. Re, 496 A.2d 553, 557 (Del. 1985).
IV.
If the jury's partially blaming the phantom driver for the collision is supported by the evidence, then Lisa Ruderman's UM coverage must respond. So, the question is: viewed in the light most favorable to Michael and Paige Ruderman, does the evidence support the jury's finding that the phantom driver was partly liable?If the answer simply turned on whether the trailer blocked Ruderman's or Heeren's view, as State Farm argues, the record on that point is so muddled it hardly could support a plaintiff's verdict. The verdict, however, does not merely reflect what the drivers could, or could not, see. Ruderman easily proved that the phantom driver stopped the truck in such a way that the trailer it was towing partly obstructed a traffic intersection. State Farm left the record on that point in the condition that Ruderman made it. Thus, Ruderman established the first prong of the phantom's liability, negligence. It is negligence per se to enter or stop in an intersection in a way that obstructs the free or unobstructed passage of other vehicles. State Farm never attempted to justify the phantom driver's decision to leave the intersection partly blocked.
Ruderman further proved that the collision happened as the colliding vehicles tried to maneuver around the phantom vehicle partly in the intersection. Thus, Ruderman offered evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that but for the phantom driver's negligence, Lisa Ruderman and Heeren would have negotiated the intersection safely. They would not have collided and Paige Ruderman would not have been hurt. In other words, Ruderman proved not only that the phantom driver was negligent, but also that the phantom driver's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
Virtually nothing was offered about the phantom driver's decision to make a turn when he did, or how it came to be that part of the trailer wound up stopped in the intersection. The mere fact that the truck's driver ended up in that predicament, however, is enough to establish, prima facie, the phantom driver's negligence as a matter of law. The undisputed evidence was that Heeren and Ruderman each decided to proceed through the partially obstructed intersection. It was no stretch for the jury to conclude that if any of the drivers had been more careful there would not have been an accident. And, therefore, all three drivers were at fault: the phantom for partly blocking the intersection, either visually or physically, or both, and the other drivers for not being careful enough in maneuvering around the obstruction posed by the phantom. The court instructed the jury to use common sense. The verdict reflects that view of the conflicting evidence.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Verdict is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.