Summary
reversing delinquency adjudication where there was no testimony that the juvenile intended to use the instrument as a deadly weapon
Summary of this case from T.S. v. StateOpinion
No. 83-533.
April 17, 1984.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County, Dixie H. Chastain, J.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Beth C. Weitzner, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., DANIEL S. PEARSON, J., and LESTER M. IGNATIUS, Associate Judge.
The juvenile appeals from an adjudication of delinquency for carrying a concealed weapon. We reverse.
Section 790.001(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) defines a concealed weapon as follows:
"Concealed weapon" means any dirk, metallic knuckles, slungshot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical weapon or device, or any other deadly weapon carried on or about a person in such a manner as to conceal said weapon from the ordinary sight of another person.
Under the statute, the instrument carried by the juvenile may only be construed as a concealed weapon if it is either a "dirk" or "any other deadly weapon." There was no proof adduced at trial that the instrument was a "straight stabbing weapon" so as to constitute a dirk, see Miller v. State, 421 So.2d 746, 747, n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), nor was there testimony that the juvenile intended to use the instrument as a deadly weapon. See McCray v. State, 358 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
Reversed.