Royal Mfg. Co. v. Denard Moore

6 Citing cases

  1. Turner Broadcasting System v. McDavid

    693 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 43 times
    Finding a jury question as to the parties' intent to be bound, despite non-binding language in a letter of intent, on the basis of oral statements that "we have a deal" and the "deal is done"

    Even complex or expensive contracts may be oral, as long as the evidence establishes the parties' mutual assent to all essential terms of the contract. See, e.g., Bibb Distrib. Co. v. Stewart, 238 Ga. App. 650, 653-654 (1) ( 519 SE2d 455) (1999) (affirming judgment on breach of an oral agreement pertaining to a $6.8 million insurance policy); Royal Mfg. Co. v. Denard Moore Constr. Co., 137 Ga. App. 650, 651 (2) ( 224 SE2d 770) (1976) (holding that a contract for the construction of a commercial building could be oral). See also APAC-Southeast v. Coastal Caisson Corp., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1381 (2) (N.D. Ga. 2007) (applying Georgia law and denying summary judgment on a breach of an oral contract claim relating to a construction project).

  2. Stone Mtn. Aviation v. Rollins Leasing Corp.

    174 Ga. App. 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 7 times
    In Stone Mtn. Aviation v. Rollins Leasing Corp., 174 Ga. App. 35 (2) (329 S.E.2d 247) (1985), the circumstances did not involve a waiver; nor did that case involve tacit acquiescence by the party in its role as direct defendant as the facts here, set out below, demonstrate.

    The act of one holding himself out as agent in consummating a [contract] for his principal may be ratified by the principal, even if the agent was unauthorized in the first place to make the [contract], and such ratification may be implied from the acts or silence of the principal.' [Cit.]" Royal Mfg. Co. v. Denard Moore Constr. Co., 137 Ga. App. 650, 652 ( 224 S.E.2d 770) (1976). After a careful review of the evidence, we find that there was at least some evidence to support a finding of SMA's ratification of the opening of the account in its name. Although SMA's president testified that he had objected to the account being in the name of that corporation "[w]hen we first received the first document, . . .

  3. B. G. Sanders Associates v. Castellow

    154 Ga. App. 433 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 12 times
    Finding no error in allowing complaint that contained withdrawn claims to go out with the jury because the judge did not instruct the jury on the withdrawn claims, "the verdict returned obviously did not include any recovery for such claims," and the jury was instructed that the parties’ claims were not evidence

    [Cit.]" Royal Mfg. Co. v. Denard Moore Const. Co., 137 Ga. App. 650, 651 (3) ( 224 S.E.2d 770) (1976). Under the evidence a finding that Moore lacked authority to enter into the agreement on behalf of CFW was authorized and a finding that Moore in fact had such authority was not demanded.

  4. Mouzin Bros. Farms, LLC v. Dowdy

    7:20-CV-197 (TQL) (M.D. Ga. Dec. 30, 2022)

    Although Dennis Mouzin signed the proposed contracts, there is no evidence that both parties assented to the essential terms. See Royal Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Denard & Moore Const. Co., Inc., 137 Ga.Ct.App. 650, 224 S.E.2d 770 (1976). “The consent of the parties being essential to a contract, until each has assented to all the terms the contract is incomplete .

  5. ZEP, INC. v. FIRST AID CORP.

    No. 09 CV 1973 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2010)   Cited 5 times
    Observing that suits against former employees for breach of restrictive covenants are typically filed in the employer's home state, "where continuing obligations are owed"

    But Zep has not alleged facts mirroring those of the opinions cited by Carlyon, which, in any event, assess the existence of mutual assent from evidence produced at trial. See, e.g., Royal Mfg. Co. v. Denard Moore Constr. Co., 224 S.E.2d 770, 770-71 (Ga. App. Ct. 1976); TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Rooks, 604 S.E.2d 562, 564-65 (Ga. App. Ct. 2004). To wit, Zep has not "pled itself out of court."

  6. Apac-Southeast, Inc. v. Coastal Caisson Corp.

    514 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2007)   Cited 14 times
    Holding a non-conforming acceptance was counteroffer even if the subcontractor “never expected [the general contractor] to accept the bid unconditionally”

    Furthermore, contrary to the five-part analytical framework Coastal presents, in Georgia even a complicated, expensive construction contract may be oral. See Royal Mfg. Co. v. Denard Moore Constr. Co., 137 Ga.App. 650, 650, 224 S.E.2d 770, 771 (1976) (holding that a contract to build an addition to a textile mill could be oral). Thus, under Georgia law, the evidence does not demand a finding that until the parties' alleged oral agreement was reduced to writing and signed, it could not be enforceable.