Rowe v. Google LLC

Full title: ULKU ROWE, Plaintiff, v. GOOGLE LLC, Defendant. Exhibit No. Description…

Court: United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Oct 30, 2023

19 Civ. 08655 (JHR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2023)

Opinion

19 Civ. 08655 (JHR)

10-30-2023

ULKU ROWE, Plaintiff, v. GOOGLE LLC, Defendant. Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Exhibit No. Description Description Exhibit No. Description

Cara E. Greene Gregory S. Chiarello Shira Z. Gelfand OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff Ulku Rowe Kenneth W. Gage Sara B. Tomezsko Kaveh Dabashi PAUL HASTINGS LLP Attorneys for Defendant Google LLC

JENNIFER H. REARDEN, DISTRICT JUDGE

Cara E. Greene

Gregory S. Chiarello

Shira Z. Gelfand

OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiff Ulku Rowe

Kenneth W. Gage

Sara B. Tomezsko

Kaveh Dabashi

PAUL HASTINGS LLP

Attorneys for Defendant Google LLC

ORDER

JENNIFER H. REARDEN, DISTRICT JUDGE

Attached to this Order are the following Court exhibits:

• Court Exhibit A: The voir dire questionnaire.

• Court Exhibit B: The Stipulation of Uncontested Fact entered into by the parties.

• Court Exhibit C: The draft jury charge discussed at the charge conference.

• Court Exhibit D: The jury charge read in open court.

• Court Exhibit E: The jury charge distributed to the jury during deliberations, incorporating an additional change following an application by counsel.

• Court Exhibit F: The exhibit list.

• Court Exhibit G: The witness list.

• Court Exhibit H: The verdict form.

SO ORDERED.

PLEASE DO NOT READ FURTHER OR WRITE ANYTHING ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE UNTIL THE JUDGE TELLS YOU TO DO SO

Please indicate if your answer to any of the following questions is “yes” by circling the number of that question. If your answer to a question is “no,” you need not do anything. Do not write your name or make any other marks on the questionnaire; the only marks you should make are circles around the questions for which the answer is “yes.” If, when asked about a “yes” answer, you prefer not to explain your answer in open court, please say so and we will speak at the bench.

A. General Questions

1. This trial is expected to last approximately five days, beginning today (October 10) and continuing through this Friday (October 13), and then resuming next Wednesday (October 18). (Trial will not be held next Monday, October 16 or Tuesday, October 17.) The jury will typically sit from 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. each day. Do you have any commitments that would interfere with your serving as a juror at a trial that is expected to end on or about Wednesday, October 18?

2. Do you have any ideas or prejudices that would prevent or hinder you from following my instructions as to the law?

3. Do you have any doubt that you will be able to apply the law as I explain it even if you disagree with it?

4. Do you have any problem accepting any of the following instructions: (a) that this is a civil case, and not a criminal case; (b) that your decision must be based solely on the evidence presented at trial and my instructions to you concerning that evidence; (c) that you are to consider the quality, and not the quantity, of the evidence presented; and (d) that your personal feelings towards the parties or their counsel may not enter into your deliberations?

5. Do you have any religious, moral, or ethical beliefs that would prevent you from passing judgment on another person or entity?

6. If you are chosen as a juror, do you know of any reason why you could not be fair and impartial?

B. Case-Specific Questions

7. Do you have any personal knowledge of this case between Ulku Rowe and Google?

8. Have you read or heard anything about this case through the media, the Internet, or any other source?

9. Can you treat Google, a corporation, and Ms. Rowe as equals under the law, giving both of them equal treatment during the trial?

10. Is there anything about the nature of this case that would cause you to be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict?

11. In general, have you formed any opinions-positive or negative-about Silicon Valley (or “Big Tech”) companies?

12. Do you now, or have you ever, owned your own business or been a manager within a business?

13. Are you now, or have you ever been, a supervisor of employees?

14. Have you, or has any member of your family or anyone in your household, ever had responsibility for hiring employees?

15. Have you, or has any member of your family or anyone in your household, had responsibility for determining the salary or wages of other employees?

16. Have you or anyone close to you (including family members) been employed in a human resources position or other position that involved the administration or application of equal pay laws, anti-discrimination laws, or anti-retaliation laws?

17. Have you, or has anyone in your household, ever had responsibility for promoting employees?

18. Do you or does anyone in your household work for a technology company?

19. Do you or does anyone in your household have any training in the area of computer engineering?

20. Have you, any member of your family, or any of your friends ever been denied a position or promotion, demoted, transferred, discharged, or laid off from any job for any reason?

21. Have you ever felt like a manager, supervisor or coworker or a potential employer discriminated against you?

22. Have you ever had an experience with an employer that was so bad it made you want to leave the company?

23. Has a coworker or other employee ever accused you or a member of your family or household of discrimination or retaliation?

24. Have you, or has any member of your family or household, ever complained of discrimination, either internally with your/their employer, or externally with a government agency or a court?

C. Knowledge of Parties, Lawyers, and Witnesses

25. The Plaintiff in this case is Ulku Rowe, and she is represented by attorneys Cara Greene, Gregory Chiarello, and Shira Gelfand of the law firm Outten & Golden LLP. Do you know, or have you had any personal or business dealings with, the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff's counsel, or her counsel's law firm?

26. The Defendant in this case is Google, and it is represented by attorneys Kenneth Gage, Sara Tomezsko, and Kaveh Dabashi of the law firm Paul Hastings LLP. Do you know, or have you had any personal or business dealings with, the Defendant, the Defendant's counsel, or its counsel's law firm?

27. Have you had any dealings with Google as a customer, stockholder, or in any other way, that has caused you to have particularly positive or negative feelings about the company?

28. Have you had any business dealings of any kind with Google, beyond simply using Google's search engine or any Google products like Gmail?

29. Do you have any relatives, friends, associates, or employers who have had any dealings with, visited the offices of, or been employed by, the parties or any of their attorneys?

30. Do you know, or have you heard of, any of the following people who may testify or whose names may be mentioned during the course of the trial?

a. April Beaupain

b. Stuart Breslow

c. Jennifer Burdis

d. Krista Callaghan

e. Evren Eryurek

f. Patricia Florissi

g. William Grannis

h. Diane Greene

i. Nicholas Harteau

j. Christopher Humez

k. Kirsten Kliphouse

l. Melissa Lawrence

m. Kevin Lucas

n. Nora Ostrofe

o. David Rensin

p. Tariq Shaukat

q. Brian Stevens

r. Ashley Tessier

s. Stuart Vardaman

t. Benjamin Wilson

31. Are you familiar with anyone else present in the courtroom, including your fellow jurors, all Court personnel, and myself?

D. Experience with, and Opinions of, Lawsuits

32. Have you, or has anyone close to you, ever studied or practiced law or worked in any capacity for a law office?

33. Have you, or has any member of your immediate family, ever brought a lawsuit against anyone?

34. Have you, or has any member of your immediate family, ever been sued?

35. Have you, or has any member of your immediate family, ever appeared as a witness either at a trial or at another legal proceeding?

36. Do you believe that it is wrong or improper for a person to bring a lawsuit?

37. Do you believe that simply because someone brings a lawsuit, there must be merit to the allegations in the lawsuit?

38. Do you believe that simply because someone brings a lawsuit, that must mean the person deserves to get money?

E. Difficulties in Understanding or Serving

39. Do you have a problem with your hearing or vision that that could affect your perception of the proceedings?

40. Do you have any physical or medical issues (including any medication that you might be taking) that might interfere with your service as a juror in this case?

41. Do you have any difficulty in reading or understanding English?

42. In these questions, I have tried to direct your attention to possible reasons why you might not be able to sit as a fair and impartial juror. Apart from any prior question I have asked you, is there any reason that you could not be a conscientious, fair, and impartial juror in this case, and render a true and just verdict without fear, favor, sympathy, or prejudice, according to the law as I will explain it to you?

Questions for Individual Prospective Jurors

1. Please state your name and county of residence. Please list each county of residence during the past 5 years.

2. How old are you?

3. How far did you go in school?

4. Who is your employer? (If retired or unemployed, who was your last employer before retiring?)

5. What do you do? (If retired or unemployed, what was your occupation before retiring?)

6. How long have you worked at your current employer?

7. How long have you been employed in your current position? If fewer than five years, where else did you work in the last five years?

8. Are you married or do you live with someone? If so, what is that person's occupation and employer? (If that person is retired or currently not working outside the home, what was their most recent occupation?)

9. Do you have children? How old are they? If you have grown children, what are their occupations and employers? (If your children are retired, what kind of work did they do prior to retirement?)

10. Where do you typically get your news? For example, what print newspapers, magazines, television shows, radio shows, podcasts, Internet news site(s), or apps do you read, watch, or listen to on a regular basis?

11. Do you belong to or volunteer your time to any associations, organizations, clubs, or unions?

12. What do you like to do in your spare time?

13. Have you ever served as a juror? If so, when did you serve and was it a civil or criminal case? Were you the foreperson? Did you reach a verdict? (Do not state what the verdict was.)

STIPULATION OF UNCONTESTED FACT

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between Plaintiff Ulku Rowe and Defendant Google LLC (“the Parties”), as follows:

As of September 19, 2019, Google Cloud's senior leadership was aware of Plaintiff s filed complaint and the allegations contained therein.

[DRAFT] Jury Charge

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. General Instructions

A. Introductory Remarks ....................................... 1

B. The Parties ....................................... 1

C. Role of the Court....................................... 1

D. Role of the Jury ....................................... 2

E. Court Rulings on Evidence and Objections ....................................... 2

F. Sympathy or Bias ....................................... 3

II. Evaluation of the evidence ....................................... 3

A. What Is and Is Not Evidence ....................................... 3

B. Stipulated Facts ....................................... 5

C. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence ....................................... 5

D. Redactions....................................... 6

E. Credibility of Witnesses....................................... 6

F. Interested Witnesses / Employee Witnesses ....................................... 8

G. Expert Witnesses....................................... 9

H. Preparation of Witnesses....................................... 10

I. All Available Evidence Need Not Be Produced ....................................... 10

J. Burden of Proof....................................... 11

III. Substantive Charges....................................... 12

A. Overview of Plaintiff's Claims ....................................... 12

B. New York Labor Law § 194 Claim ....................................... 13

C. Discrimination Claim Under City Law....................................... 17

D. Retaliation Claims Under City Law & New York Labor Law ....................................... 19

IV. Damages....................................... 22

A. Back Pay ....................................... 23

B. Statutory Damages Under New York Labor Law...................................... 24

C. Compensatory Damages ...................................... 25

D. Punitive Damages ...................................... 26

E. Nominal Damages...................................... 28

V. Deliberations of the Jury ...................................... 28

A. Right to See Exhibits and Hear Testimony...................................... 28

B. Communications with the Court ...................................... 29

C. Notes ...................................... 29

D. Duty to Deliberate / Unanimous Verdict ...................................... 30

E. Duties of Foreperson...................................... 30

F. Verdict Form and Return of Verdict ...................................... 31

VI. Conclusion ...................................... 31

I. General Instructions

A. Introductory Remarks

Members of the jury, you have now heard all of the evidence in the case, as well as the final arguments of the parties. We have reached the point where you are about to undertake your final function as jurors. You have paid careful attention to the evidence, and I am confident that you will act together with fairness and impartiality to reach a just verdict in the case.

My instructions to you today will be in four parts. First, I will give you general instructions, including instructions about your role as the jury. Second, I will give you instructions concerning evaluation of the evidence. Third, I will describe the law to be applied to the facts that you find to be established by the proof. The fourth and final section of these instructions will relate to your deliberations.

Because my instructions cover many points, I have given you a copy so that you may follow along. In addition, you may take your copy of the instructions with you for reference during your deliberations. You should not single out any instruction as alone stating the law. Instead, you should consider my instructions as a whole when you retire to deliberate in the jury room.

B. The Parties

The Plaintiff in this case is Ulku Rowe. The Defendant is Google LLC (or “Google” for short). All litigants, including corporations, are equal under the law and are entitled to a just verdict. It would be improper for you to allow any personal feelings that you might have about the Plaintiff, the Defendant, or the nature of the claims to influence you in any way.

C. Role of the Court

My role, as the judge presiding over this trial, is to instruct you as to the law. It is your duty to accept these instructions of law and to apply them to the facts as you determine them. With respect to legal matters, you must take the law as I give it to you. If any attorney has stated, or states, a legal principle different from any that I state to you in my instructions, it is my instructions that you must follow. You must not substitute your own notions or opinions of what the law is or ought to be.

D. Role of the Jury

As members of the jury, you are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. You pass upon the evidence. You determine the credibility of the witnesses. You resolve such conflicts as there may be in the testimony. You draw whatever reasonable inferences you decide to draw from the facts as you have determined them, and you determine the weight of the evidence.

Although you are encouraged to use all of your life experiences in analyzing testimony and reaching a fair verdict, you may not communicate any personal or professional expertise you might have or other facts not in evidence to the other jurors during deliberations. You must base your discussions and decisions solely on the evidence presented to you during the trial and that evidence alone. You may not consider or speculate on matters not in evidence or matters outside the case.

E. Court Rulings on Evidence and Objections

At trial, it is the duty of an attorney to object when the other side offers testimony or other evidence that the attorney believes is not properly admissible. You should draw no inference from the fact that an attorney objected to any evidence.

Nor should you draw any inference from the fact that I might have sustained or overruled an objection. Simply because I have permitted certain evidence to be introduced does not mean that I have decided on its significance. That is for you to decide.

More generally, do not draw any inference from any of my rulings. The rulings I made during trial are no indication of any view on my part. You should not seek to find any such view or opinion on my part, nor should you otherwise speculate as to what I may think.

From time to time, the lawyers and I had conferences out of your hearing, known as “sidebars.” These sidebars involved procedural and other matters, and none of the events relating to these conferences should enter into your deliberations at all.

Finally, the personalities and the conduct of counsel in the Courtroom are not in any way at issue. If you formed opinions of any kind regarding any of the lawyers in the case, favorable or unfavorable, whether you approved or disapproved of their behavior as advocates, those opinions should not enter into your deliberations.

F. Sympathy or Bias

You are to evaluate the evidence calmly and objectively, without prejudice or sympathy. You are to be completely fair and impartial. Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence developed at this trial, or the lack of evidence. The parties in this case are entitled to a trial free from prejudice and bias. Our judicial system cannot work unless you reach your verdict through a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence.

It would be improper for you to consider, in deciding the facts of the case, any personal feelings you may have about the race, national origin, sex, or age of any party or any witness, or any other such irrelevant factor. This case should be decided by you as an action between parties of equal standing in the community, and of equal worth. As I previously noted, all parties are entitled to the same fair trial at your hands. All parties stand equal before the law, and are to be dealt with as equals in this Court.

II. Evaluation of the evidence

A. What Is and Is Not Evidence

You may rely only on the evidence that has been introduced throughout the trial. What is evidence? The evidence in this case consists only of the sworn testimony of the witnesses, and the exhibits that have been received in evidence.

I will describe a list of examples of things that are not evidence:

1. A question by a lawyer is not to be considered by you as evidence. It is the witnesses' answers that are evidence, not the questions. At times, a lawyer may have incorporated into a question a statement which assumed certain facts to be true, and asked the witness if the statement was true. If the witness denied the truth of a statement, and if there is no direct evidence in the record proving that assumed fact to be true, then you may not consider it to be true simply because it was contained in the lawyer's question.

2. Similarly, arguments by lawyers are not evidence, because the lawyers are not witnesses. What they have said in their opening and closing statements was intended to help you understand the evidence and to reach your verdict. However, if your recollection of the facts differs from the lawyers' statements, it is your recollection which controls.

3. Statements that I may have made concerning the evidence do not constitute evidence. Similarly, at times, I may have admonished a witness or directed a witness to be responsive to questions or to keep his or her voice up. At times, I may have asked a question myself. Any questions that I asked, or instructions that I gave, were intended only to clarify the presentation of evidence and to bring out something that I thought might be unclear. You should draw no inference or conclusion of any kind, favorable or unfavorable, with respect to any witness or any party in the case, by reason of any comment, question, or instruction of mine. Nor should you infer that I have any views as to the credibility of any witness, as to the weight of the evidence, or as to how you should decide any issue that is before you. That is entirely your role.

4. Testimony that has been stricken or excluded is not evidence, and it may not be considered by you in rendering your verdict.

5. Anything you may have seen or heard outside the Courtroom is not evidence.

Now, I will provide you with a list of some things that you may consider as evidence. As

I have said, evidence may come in several forms:

1. The sworn testimony of witnesses, regardless of who called them, is evidence. This is true of the witnesses' answers on both direct and cross examination. However, if certain testimony was received for a limited purpose, you must follow the limiting instructions I have given.

2. The exhibits that were admitted during the trial are evidence. Exhibits marked for identification but not admitted are not evidence, nor are materials brought forth only to refresh a witness's recollection.

3. Prior testimony is evidence. Such testimony, known as depositions (as previously described), is produced through a procedure where, prior to trial, the attorneys for one side may question a witness or an adversary under oath. This is part of what is called pretrial discovery, and each side is entitled to take depositions. To the extent I admitted excerpts of prior testimony at trial, you may consider the prior testimony of a witness according to the same standards you would use to evaluate the testimony of a witness given at trial.

B. Stipulated Facts

The attorneys in this case entered into a stipulation agreeing to certain facts. This means that there is no dispute as to these facts, and these facts are established for the purposes of this case. You must consider the agreed facts along with all of the other evidence presented and give the agreed facts such weight as you find appropriate.

C. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence

Generally, as I told you in my initial instructions, there are two types of evidence that you may consider in reaching your verdict. One type of evidence is direct evidence. Direct evidence is testimony by a witness about something he or she knows by virtue of his or her own senses- something he or she has seen, felt, touched, or heard. For example, if a witness testified that when she left her house this morning, it was raining, that would be direct evidence about the weather.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence from which you may infer the existence of certain facts. To use the same example I gave you at the start of trial: Assume that when you came into the Courthouse this morning, the sun was shining and it was a nice day. Assume that the Courtroom blinds were drawn and you could not look outside. As you were sitting here, someone walked in with an umbrella, which was dripping wet. Then a few minutes later another person entered with a wet raincoat. You are not able to look outside of the Courtroom, you cannot see whether or not it is raining, and no one has testified that it is raining. So you have no direct evidence of that fact. But on the combination of facts that I have asked you to assume, it would be reasonable and logical for you to conclude that it had been raining.

That is all there is to circumstantial evidence. You infer on the basis of reason and experience and common sense from one established fact the existence or non-existence of some other fact. Many facts, such as a person's state of mind or intentions, are rarely susceptible of proof by direct evidence. Usually, such facts are established by circumstantial evidence. Where circumstantial evidence is presented, it is of no less value than direct evidence, for it is a general rule that the law makes no distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence.

D. Redactions

Portions of certain of the exhibits received in evidence have been redacted. “Redacted” means that part of the document was blacked out or removed. The redactions have been made at the Court's direction. You are to concern yourself only with the portions of the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence, that is, the non-redacted portions. You should draw no adverse inference against either party as a result of these redactions, nor should you speculate on what may have been redacted.

E. Credibility of Witnesses

You have had the opportunity to observe the witnesses. It is now your job to decide how believable each witness was in his or her testimony. You are the sole judge of the credibility of each witness and of the importance of his or her testimony.

In making these judgments, you should carefully scrutinize all of the testimony of each witness, the circumstances under which each witness testified, the impression the witness made when testifying, and any other matter in evidence that may help you decide the truth and the importance of each witness's testimony.

How do you determine where the truth lies? Everything a witness said or did on the witness stand counts in your determination. How did the witness impress you? Did he or she appear to be frank, forthright, and candid? Or was the witness evasive and edgy, as if hiding something? What was his or her demeanor-that is, his or her carriage, behavior, bearing, manner, and appearance while testifying? Sometimes, it is not what a person says but how he or she says it that moves us.

You should use all the tests for truthfulness that you would use in determining matters of importance to you in your everyday life. You should consider any bias or hostility the witness may have shown for or against any party as well as any interest the witness has in the outcome of the case. You should consider the opportunity the witness had to see, hear, and know the things about which he or she testified, the accuracy of his or her memory, his or her candor or lack of candor, his or her intelligence, the reasonableness and probability of his or her testimony and its consistency or lack of consistency and its corroboration or lack of corroboration with other credible testimony.

In other words, what you must try to do in deciding credibility is to size a witness up in light of his or her demeanor, the explanations given, and all of the other evidence in the case. Always remember that you should use your common sense, your good judgment, and your everyday experiences in life to make your credibility determinations.

If you find that any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material fact-that is, as to an important matter-the law permits you to disregard the entire testimony of that witness upon the principle that one who testifies falsely about one material fact is likely to testify falsely about everything. However, you are not required to consider such a witness as totally “unbelievable.” You may accept so much of the witness's testimony as you deem true and disregard what you feel is false. By the processes which I have just described, you, as the sole judges of the facts, decide which of the witnesses you will believe, what portion of each witness's testimony you accept, and what weight you will give to it.

On some occasions during this trial, witnesses were asked to explain an apparent inconsistency between testimony offered at this trial and previous statements made by the witness. It is for you to determine whether a prior statement was inconsistent, and if so, how much (if any) weight to give to an inconsistent statement in assessing the witness's credibility at trial.

F. Interested Witnesses / Employee Witnesses

In deciding whether to believe a witness, you should take into account any evidence that shows that a witness may benefit in some way from the outcome of the case, such as a financial interest. Likewise, you should specifically note any evidence of hostility or affection that the witness may have towards one of the parties. You should also consider any other interest or motive that the witness may have in cooperating with a particular party.

In this case, the Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, testified before you. As a party to this action, she is, by definition, an interested witness.

An interested witness is not necessarily less believable than a disinterested witness. The mere fact that a witness is interested in the outcome of the case does not mean he or she has not told the truth. It is for you to decide from your observations and applying your common sense and experience and all the other considerations mentioned, whether the possible interest of any witness, or of any party, has intentionally or otherwise colored or distorted his or her testimony. You are not required to believe an interested witness; you may accept as much of his or her testimony as you deem reliable and reject as much as you deem unworthy of acceptance.

Similarly, several non-party witnesses who were or are presently employed by the Defendant, Google, have testified. In the order in which they testified, these are: Tariq Shaukat, Kevin Lucas, Stuart Vardaman, Stuart Breslow, William Grannis, Nicholas Harteau, April Beaupain, Ashley Elizabeth Tessier, Chris Humez, Krista Callaghan, Brian Stevens, Melissa Lawrence, Kirsten Marie Kliphouse, and Patricia Florissi.

You may consider whether the testimony of these witnesses was in any way influenced by the fact that they are now, or were previously, employed by Google.

It is your duty to consider whether the witness has permitted any such bias or interest to color his or her testimony. In short, if you find that a witness is biased, you should view his or her testimony with caution, weigh it with care, and subject it to close and searching scrutiny.

G. Expert Witnesses

In this case, I have permitted an expert witness to express her opinion about matters that are in issue. That witness is Nora Ostrofe, called by the Plaintiff to offer an opinion on Ms. Rowe's claimed economic damages.

A witness may be permitted to testify to an opinion on those matters about which she has special knowledge, skill, experience, and training. Such testimony is presented to you on the theory that someone who is experienced and knowledgeable in the field can assist you in understanding the evidence or in reaching an independent decision on the facts.

In weighing this opinion testimony, you may consider the witness's qualifications, her opinions, the reasons for testifying, as well as all of the other considerations that ordinarily apply when you are deciding whether or not to believe a witness's testimony. You may give the opinion testimony whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves in light of all the evidence in this case. You should not, however, accept opinion testimony merely because I allowed the witness to testify concerning her opinion. Nor should you substitute it for your own reason, judgment, and common sense. The determination of the facts in this case rests solely with you.

H. Preparation of Witnesses

You have heard evidence during the trial that witnesses had discussed the facts of the case and their testimony with the lawyers before the witnesses appeared in court. Although you may consider that fact when you are evaluating a witness's credibility, there is nothing either unusual or improper about a witness meeting with lawyers before testifying, so that the witness can be made aware of the subjects that he or she will be questioned about, focus on those subjects, and have the opportunity to review relevant exhibits before being questioned about them. In fact, it would be unusual for a lawyer to call a witness without such consultation. Again, the weight you give to the fact or the nature of the witness's preparation for his or her testimony and what inferences you draw from such preparation are matters completely within your discretion.

I. All Available Evidence Need Not Be Produced

The law does not require any party to call as witnesses all persons who may have been present at any time or place involved in the case, or who may appear to have some knowledge of the matters in issue at this trial. Nor does the law require any party to produce as exhibits all papers and things mentioned in the evidence in this case.

Each party has had an equal opportunity or lack of opportunity to call any witnesses. Therefore, you should not draw any inferences or reach any conclusions as to what any uncalled witnesses would have testified to had they been called. The absence of any witnesses should not affect your judgment in any way.

J. Burden of Proof

Before I instruct you on the issues you must decide, I want to define for you the standard under which you will decide whether a particular party has met its burden of proof on a particular issue. The standard that applies in this case is preponderance of the evidence. The Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, has the burden of proving all the elements of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

What does a “preponderance of the evidence” mean? To establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove that the fact is more likely true than not. A preponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of the evidence. It refers to the quality and persuasiveness of the evidence, not the number of witnesses or documents. In determining whether a claim has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, you may consider the relevant testimony of all witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all the relevant exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them.

If, after considering all of the testimony, you are satisfied that the Plaintiff, the party with the burden of proof, has carried her burden on each essential point of her claim, then you must find in her favor. If, after such consideration, you find that the evidence produced by the Plaintiff is outweighed by the evidence against the Plaintiff's position, or that the credible evidence on a given issue is evenly divided between the parties-that it is as equally probable that one side is right as it is that the other side is right-then you must decide that issue against the Plaintiff. The reason for this is that the Plaintiff, because she bears the burden of proof, must prove more than simple equality of evidence-she must prove the element by a preponderance of the evidence. On the other hand, the Plaintiff need prove no more than a preponderance. So long as you find that the scales tip, however slightly, in favor of the Plaintiff-that what she claims is more likely true than not-then that element will have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Some of you may have heard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the proper standard of proof only in a criminal trial. That requirement does not apply to a civil case such as this one, and you should put it out of your mind.

III. Substantive Charges

A. Overview of Plaintiff's Claims

I am now going to instruct you on the substantive law to be applied to the claims in this lawsuit. I want to emphasize here that you should consider each claim separately.

This case involves four claims made by Ms. Rowe against Google.

First, Ms. Rowe claims that Google violated Section 194 of the New York Labor Law by failing to pay her the same as men-specifically, Nicholas Harteau and Stewart Breslow-who she argues performed equal or substantially similar work to her.

Second, Ms. Rowe claims that Google discriminated against her on account of her gender by under-leveling her at hire, paying her less than comparable men, refusing to consider her for the role of Financial Services Vertical Lead, and generally treating her less well because of her gender, in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law.

Finally, Ms. Rowe brings two claims of retaliation, one under the New York State Human Rights Law and one under the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleges that, in response to concerns she raised about discrimination and unequal pay practices, Google retaliated against her by refusing to consider her for two positions, the Financial Services Vertical Lead position in 2018 and the Vice President - Financial Services, Sales position in 2020, and/or otherwise engaged in retaliatory conduct against her.

Google denies these claims. It contends that at all times, it treated Ms. Rowe in accordance with the law. Specifically, Google asserts that under Section 194 of the New York Labor Law, Ms. Rowe was paid what she was lawfully owed, and that any difference in compensation between her and male employees performing equal work was based on lawful job-related factors other than gender. Google asserts that under the New York City Human Rights Law, it treated Ms. Rowe no differently than similarly situated male employees, and that all of its actions towards Ms. Rowe were motivated only by legitimate business reasons.

I will now give further instructions on each of these claims.

B. New York Labor Law § 194 Claim

Ms. Rowe brings a claim under Section 194 of the New York Labor Law. I will refer to this law as “Labor Law Section 194.” As applicable here, Labor Law Section 194 prohibits employers from paying men and women in the same establishment different wages, except under certain circumstances, as I will explain in more detail momentarily. Labor Law Section 194 is a strict liability statute, meaning that a plaintiff need not show that her employer intentionally paid her less because she is a woman. Both parties bear a burden of proof on this claim: first, Ms. Rowe bears a burden, and if she satisfies that burden, Google bears a burden of proof to avoid liability.

To prevail on this claim, Ms. Rowe must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Google paid her lower wages than a man in the same geographic area for work which required equal or substantially similar skill, effort, and responsibility, and which was performed under similar working conditions.¹ For purposes of this claim, Ms. Rowe alleges that Google paid her less than Nicholas Harteau and Stuart Breslow.

1 Talwar v. State Island Univ. Hosp., 610 Fed. App'x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2015); N.Y.L.L. § 194.

For Ms. Rowe to prevail on her claim against Google, she must prove each of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

First, Google paid Ms. Rowe lower wages than Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow;

Second, Ms. Rowe performed equal or substantially similar work to Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and

Third, those jobs were performed under similar working conditions.

1. First Element: Lower Wages

The first element that Ms. Rowe must prove is that Google paid her lower wages than Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow. For these purposes, the term “wages” includes all forms of compensation, including salary, bonuses, stock, profit sharing, commissions, and expense accounts.² Fringe benefits are also included in the comparison of wages, as are vacation and holiday pay and overtime pay.³

2 Jury Instr., Cohen v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 11 Civ. 0456 (RA); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.10; Talwar, 610 Fed. App'x at 30 n.2.

3 Jury Instr., Cohen.

2. Second Element: Equal or Substantially Similar Work

The second element that Ms. Rowe must prove is that her work was equal or substantially similar to the work of Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow. The word “equal” does not mean identical. It means that the work Ms. Rowe performed must have been “substantially equal” to the work performed by the male employees to whom she asserts she should be compared.

In determining whether work was “substantially equal,” you must compare the skill, effort, and responsibility required of Ms. Rowe's job with the skill, effort, and responsibility required of Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow. Insignificant, insubstantial or trivial differences in work performed do not matter and may be disregarded. On the other hand, work is not considered “substantially equal” if material differences in skill, effort or responsibility exist. Further, job classifications, descriptions, or titles are not controlling. It is the actual work or performance requirements of the two jobs that is important.⁴

4 Id.

As I just noted, in evaluating whether the performance requirements of the two jobs are substantially equal, you must consider the “skill,” “effort,” and “responsibility” required for these jobs. I will now tell you what is meant by the terms, “skill,” “effort” and “responsibility.”

i Skill

In deciding whether the jobs require substantially equal “skill,” you should consider such factors as the level of education, experience, training, and ability necessary to meet the performance requirements of the respective jobs.⁵ You are to compare the jobs, not the employees. Accordingly, the fact that a male employee has a qualification that Ms. Rowe does not have is relevant only if the particular qualification is necessary or useful for performing the job.⁶

5 N.Y.L.L. § 194; Jury Instr., Edelman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 21 Civ. 0502 (LJL).

6 Jury Instr., Cohen.

ii Effort

In deciding whether the jobs require substantially equal “effort,” you should consider the mental exertion needed to perform the job.⁷ “Equal effort” does not require people to use effort in exactly the same way.⁸ If there is no substantial difference in the amount or degree of effort to do the jobs, they require “equal effort.” However, if the jobs of Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow require additional tasks that consume a significant amount of extra time and effort that would not be expected of Ms. Rowe, then the jobs do not require substantially equal effort.⁹

7 Id.

8 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a).

9 Jury Instr., Cohen.

iii Responsibility

In deciding whether the jobs involve substantially equal “responsibility,” you should consider the degree of accountability expected by Google for a person filling the jobs, as well as the amount of preparation required to perform the job duties. You should also take into account such things as the level of authority delegated to Ms. Rowe as compared to Nicholas Harteau and Stuart Breslow, including whether Ms. Rowe and Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow were equally expected to direct the work of others, or to represent Google in dealing with clients or others. Finally, you should consider the consequences to Google of effective performance in the respective jobs.¹⁰

10 Jury Instr., Cohen.

Remain mindful that “skill,” “effort” and “responsibility” constitute separate tests, each of which must be met in order for the equal pay requirement to apply.¹¹

11 Id.

3. Third Element: Similar Working Conditions

With respect to the third element of Ms. Rowe's claim, you must find that the jobs are performed under similar working conditions. The conditions need only be similar; they need not be identical or in the same location. In deciding whether the working conditions of the two jobs are similar, you should consider the surroundings or the environment in which the work is performed to which the respective employees may be exposed.¹²

12 Id.

4. Affirmative Defense

If Ms. Rowe proves all three elements of her Labor Law Section 194 claim, then she is entitled to recover on her claim unless Google meets its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Rowe was paid less based on a bona fide factor other than sex, and that the factor was both job-related and consistent with business necessity.¹³ To meet its burden of establishing business necessity, Google must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the factor is based on a genuine business need and bears a manifest relationship to the job, or a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs.¹⁴

13 N.Y.L.L. § 194(1)(iv).

14 N.Y.L.L. § 194(2); see also Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1015 (2d Cir. 1980).

C. Discrimination Claim Under City Law

Separate from her Labor Law Section 194 claim, Ms. Rowe brings a gender discrimination claim under the New York City Human Rights Law, which I will refer to as the City Law. Under the City Law, it is against the law for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of gender, including by paying an employee less on that basis or by refusing to hire or promote that individual.¹⁵ Stated more broadly, the City Law makes it unlawful for an employer to treat an employee “less well”-in any way-at least in part because of that person's gender.¹⁶ The question of whether Google is liable under the City Law is separate and distinct from the question of whether Google is liable under the Labor Law described a moment ago, even though some conduct may be actionable under both laws.

15 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a).

16 Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013).

The City Law has been violated if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that gender played some role in Google's treatment of Ms. Rowe.¹⁷ Ms. Rowe need not establish that her gender was the sole consideration or even the most important consideration motivating Google in any of those circumstances-indeed, a number of factors may have contributed to the company's actions. If you find that Google treated Ms. Rowe less well-at least in part-because of her gender, then she may succeed on this claim, even if you find that Google's conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason.¹⁸

17 Lefort v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 164 N.Y.S.3d 183, 188 (2d Dep't 2022).

18 Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 98 A.D.3d 107, 127 (1st Dep't 2012).

Keep in mind, however, that the City Law is not a general civility code. Thus, Google can still avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the complained-of conduct at issue is nothing more than what a reasonable person would consider “petty slights or trivial inconveniences.”¹⁹

19 Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 111, 113.

In determining whether Google discriminated against Ms. Rowe because of her gender, you may consider a variety of factors, including whether the language or conduct of Google managers reveals a bias against women or preference for men²⁰; whether Google treated Ms. Rowe less well than similarly situated men²¹; whether Google's explanations for its actions were credible or whether they are contradicted by fact or changed over time²²; or whether any of Google's witnesses were untruthful, either at trial or when speaking to Ms. Rowe.²³ In making this determination, however, you may not second-guess Google's business judgment. In other words, you may not find discrimination simply because you think that a business decision that Google made was incorrect or unwise, or because you disagree with the decision.²⁴

20 Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 80 n.30.

21 Day v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 4399 (GBD) (HBP), 2015 WL 10530081, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15 Civ. 4399, 2016 WL 1171584 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2016).

22 Collins v. Cohen Pontani Lieberman & Pavane, No. 04 Civ. 8983 (KMW) (MHD), 2008 WL 2971668, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008).

23 Kellman v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 8 F.Supp.3d 351, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

24 Hamburg v. N.Y. U.Sch. of Med., 155 A.D.3d 66, 77 (1st Dep't 2017); Bailey v. N.Y. Westchester Square Med. Ctr., 38 A.D.3d 119, 124 (1st Dep't 2007).

One note on similarly situated men. While comparisons may offer some evidence of discrimination, comparisons are not the only way to prove discrimination; I noted for you just now a number of ways on which the parties agree that discrimination may be proven. However, to the extent you consider whether Google treated similarly situated men differently than Ms. Rowe, I will give you some guidelines. Under the City Law, for a plaintiff and a comparator to be similarly situated, the plaintiff is not required to show that both individuals' circumstances were identical. Rather, the fact finder must examine the acts, context, and surrounding circumstances of the plaintiff and her comparator to determine whether the comparator is similarly-situated, such that you believe a difference in their treatment could reasonably lead to the conclusion that it was because of gender.²⁵ This is different from the standard I explained for comparators under the Labor Law.

25 Shah v. Wilco Sys., Inc., 27 A.D.3d 169, 177-78 (1st Dep't 2005).

D. Retaliation Claims Under City Law & New York Labor Law

Ms. Rowe also claims that Google retaliated against her for complaining about discrimination in the workplace. Such retaliation is unlawful under the New York City Human Rights Law (which I will again refer to as the “City Law”) as well as the New York Labor Law (which I will refer to as the “Labor Law”). Specifically, under the City Law, it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any person because such person has raised, reasonably and in good faith, concerns about discrimination. Similarly, under the Labor Law, it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any person because such person has made a complaint to her employer that she reasonably and in good faith believes the employer has violated the Labor Law regarding unequal pay between women and men.

In order to find for Ms. Rowe on these claims under either of these statutes, you must find that she proved each of the following four elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

First, Ms. Rowe engaged in a protected activity;

Second, her employer, Google, was aware of the protected activity;

Third, Google engaged in what is commonly referred to as an “adverse action”-that is, conduct that could be reasonably expected to “chill” or deter someone from engaging in protected activity; and

Fourth, there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action-that is, the complaints that were made were at least in part the reason why the adverse employment action took place.

This framework is common to retaliation claims under both the City Law and the Labor Law.²⁶ I will now address each of these elements in further detail.

26 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7); N.Y.L.L. § 215(1)(a).

1. First Element: Protected Activity

The first element that Ms. Rowe must prove is that she engaged in a protected activity. A plaintiff engages in a protected activity when she complains about what she reasonably and in good faith believes to be unlawful, discriminatory employment practices. To prove that her activities were protected, Ms. Rowe need not establish that her claims of discrimination were valid. However, she must show that she expressed clear disapproval of Google's allegedly unlawful conduct by communicating, in substance, that she thought the conduct was wrong.²⁷

27 Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 479 (2011); Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Engineers, P.C., 716 F.3d 10, 17 (2d Cir. 2013).

Ms. Rowe must also establish that she had a good faith, reasonable belief at the time she complained of Google's actions that those actions violated the anti-discrimination laws.²⁸ If Ms. Rowe's concern was not raised in good faith, but rather was raised in order to, for example, protect her job or attempt to extract a benefit from Google, she has not satisfied the “good faith” requirement.²⁹

28 Tang v. Glocap Search LLC, No. 14 Civ. 1108 (JMF), 2015 WL 5472929, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2015).

29 Id; Robinson v. De Niro, No. 19 Civ. 09156 (LJL), 2023 WL 4862772, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2023).

2. Second Element: Knowledge of Protected Activity

Ms. Rowe is also required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Google was aware that she had engaged in protected activity. After all, if Google did not know that she had complained about discrimination, then logically it could not have taken any adverse actions against her on account of any protected activity she may have engaged in.³⁰

30 Jury Instr., Springs v. City of New York, 17 Civ. 0451 (CM).

To satisfy this element, it is not necessary for Ms. Rowe to prove that any specific actors or individuals knew that she had complained.³¹ She need only demonstrate general corporate knowledge by Google.³²

31 Id.

32 Id.

3. Third Element: Adverse Action

The third element that Ms. Rowe must prove by a preponderance of the evidence is that Google engaged in an “adverse action”-that is, conduct that would be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity. The retaliation complained of need not result in a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of the plaintiff's employment.³³ In determining whether Ms. Rowe was subject to retaliation, keep in mind your sense of workplace realities, and the fact that the “chilling effect” of particular conduct depends on the context.³⁴ The totality of the circumstances must be considered because the overall context in which the challenged conduct occurs cannot be ignored.³⁵

33 Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 70 (1st Dept't 2009); Fincher v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 723 (2d Cir. 2010).

34 Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 71.

35 Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux, 715 F.3d 102, 113 (2d Cir. 2013).

It is of no consequence that the challenged conduct may not have been severe or pervasive, because the challenged conduct's severity and pervasiveness are only relevant to the issue of damages, not liability.³⁶ However, the defendant is not liable if the plaintiff fails to prove that the challenged conduct was caused at least in part by a retaliatory motive, or if the defendant proves that the conduct was nothing more than petty slights or trivial inconveniences.³⁷

36 Id.

37 Id.

4. Fourth Element: Causal Connection

Finally, Ms. Rowe must establish that the adverse action or actions taken by Google was or were taken, at least in part, because of Ms. Rowe's protected activity; in other words, she must establish that there was a “causal connection” between the protected activity and the adverse action(s).

To establish a causal connection, Ms. Rowe bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Google intentionally retaliated against her by taking one or more adverse actions against her, and that retaliation was a motivating factor in Google's decision to take the action or actions that it did. A motivating factor is a factor that made a difference or played a part in a decision. To be clear, that factor need not be the sole consideration or even the most important consideration motivating the adverse action or actions.

To satisfy this element, Ms. Rowe can use indirect, or circumstantial evidence, or she can introduce direct evidence of retaliatory motive.

IV. Damages

If you conclude that Ms. Rowe has met her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence with respect to her claims for unequal pay, gender discrimination, and/or retaliation, then you must determine the damages, if any, to which Ms. Rowe is entitled. On the other hand, if you find for Google on all claims, you will not consider the issue of damages at all-you will simply report a verdict for Google on all claims.

You should not infer that Ms. Rowe is entitled to recover damages merely because I am instructing you on how to calculate damages. It is exclusively your function to determine liability, and I am instructing you on damages only so that you will have guidance should you decide that Ms. Rowe prevails on any of her claims.

Damages must be based on evidence, not on speculation or sympathy, and you may only award damages for those injuries that Ms. Rowe actually suffered as a result of Google's conduct. It is the Plaintiff-that is, Ms. Rowe-who bears the burden of proving her damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

In this case, you may consider awarding several different types of damages: back pay, statutory damages under New York Law Labor Section 194, compensatory damages, nominal damages, and punitive damages. Whether such damages are actually to be awarded in this case, and if so, in what amount, are for you, the jury, to decide in accordance with my instructions.

If you make any award of damages, such award is not subject to federal income taxes and you should not consider such taxes in determining the amount of damages, if any.

The verdict form I will give you will assist you in recording the determination, if any, that you make as to damages.

A. Back Pay

The economic loss plaintiff has suffered as a result of any of claims she has put forth is called “back pay.” Back pay consists of the value not only of salary, but also of bonuses, stock awards, and other forms of compensation and benefits that Ms. Rowe would have received if not for Google's unlawful conduct, if that is what you find.

Specifically, Ms. Rowe asserts that she was paid less than men performing equal work under Labor Law Section 194. She also asserts that, because she is a woman, Google paid her less and denied her positions that would have entitled her to greater compensation, in violation of the City Law. She further asserts that, because she made protected complaints, Google denied her positions that would have entitled her to greater compensation.

Your job as the jury is to determine what damages, if any, Ms. Rowe has proved by a preponderance of the evidence for each claim. Ms. Rowe is entitled to lost wages and benefits even if they are difficult to calculate. Any uncertainty about the amount of lost compensation to be awarded to Ms. Rowe should be resolved in her favor. That said, Ms. Rowe has the burden of proving that she actually incurred a loss of back pay.

B. Statutory Damages Under New York Labor Law

If you find that Google violated Section 194 of the Labor Law, Ms. Rowe is also entitled to certain statutory damages, unless you find that Google acted in good faith. Under the law, if you find for Ms. Rowe on liability, it is Google's burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it acted in good faith.³⁸

38 N.Y.L.L. § 198(1-a).

Good faith has two requirements. First, Google must produce plain and substantial evidence of at least an honest intention to ascertain what the Labor Law requires and to comply with it. Second, Google must demonstrate objectively reasonable grounds for believing it was in compliance with the law.³⁹

39 Knox v. John Varvatos Enters. Inc., 512 F.Supp.3d 470, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Good faith requires more than ignorance of the prevailing law or uncertainty about its development. It requires an employer to take active steps to ascertain the dictates of the statute and then move to comply with the law. That a defendant did not purposefully violate the statute is not sufficient to establish that it acted in good faith. Nor is good faith demonstrated by conformity with industry-wide practice.⁴⁰

40 Id.

If you find that Google violated the Labor Law, you must also consider whether Google's actions were willful. Willfulness is established if Google knew or showed a reckless disregard for whether its unequal compensation of Rowe was prohibited by law.⁴¹ It is Ms. Rowe's burden to establish Google's willfulness by a preponderance of the evidence.

41 N.Y. Pattern Jury Instrs. § 2:10A.

If you find that Ms. Rowe has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Google knew or showed a reckless disregard for whether or not its payment of her complied with the law, you will find that it acted willfully. You may find that Google acted willfully even if you find that Google did not act with an intent to violate the law. This is because willfulness can be shown where a defendant acts with reckless disregard for the law. However, if you find that Google acted unreasonably but not recklessly in determining its obligations as to how to pay Ms. Rowe, you must find that its actions were not willful.⁴²

42 Adapted from the Knox jury instructions.

As you will see on the verdict sheet (which I will discuss more fully in a few moments), if you find that Google violated Section 194 of the Labor Law, you must determine both whether it acted in good faith and whether its violation of the law was willful. If you find that Google's conduct was willful, you must also find that its conduct was not taken in good faith. By the same token, though, if you find that Google's conduct was in good faith, you cannot find that its conduct was willful.

C. Compensatory Damages

If you find that Ms. Rowe has established any of her claims of gender discrimination or retaliation under the City Law, you may award her compensatory damages for injuries such as emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life. Compensatory damages are an amount that will fairly compensate the plaintiff for any injury she actually sustained as a result of the defendant's conduct. There is no requirement that a claim of emotional distress be supported by proof of expenses, lost earnings, or specifically measurable damages. No expert testimony is necessary to prove such harm, and you may rest your findings solely on Ms. Rowe's testimony.

No evidence of the monetary value of such intangible things as pain and suffering has been, or need be, introduced into evidence. There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be awarded for these elements of damage. Rather, you may issue an award of monetary damages based on the emotional harm you determine the plaintiff to have suffered, based on the evidence presented, and based on your best judgment. Any award you make should be fair in light of the evidence presented at the trial.

D. Punitive Damages

If you find that Ms. Rowe prevails on either of her claims of gender discrimination or retaliation, you may, but are not required to, award her punitive damages.⁴³ Punitive damages are intended to protect the community and to be an expression of the jury's indignation at a defendant's misconduct.⁴⁴ There is no exact rule by which to determine the amount of punitive damages. It is up to the jury to decide what amount is sufficient to punish the defendant. The fact that I am instructing you on punitive damages is not any indication of my view as to what your verdict should be, or on whether punitive damages should be awarded.

43 N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(13), 8-502.

44 Jury Instr., Duarte v. St. Barnabas Hosp., No. 15 Civ. 6824 (PGG).

Punitive damages may be awarded where a plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's actions amounted to willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or where there is a conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard.⁴⁵ Under this standard, a defendant need not know that it was violating the law, and the plaintiff is not required to prove intentional or malicious conduct.⁴⁶

45 Chauca v. Abraham, 30 N.Y.3d 325, 334 (2017).

46 Id. at 334 n.3.

Where an employee engages in discrimination with willful or wanton negligence, recklessness, or a conscious disregard of her rights under City Law, the employer may be held liable for punitive damages where: (1) the offending employee exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility; (2) the employer knew of the offending employee's discriminatory conduct and acquiesced in it or failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action; or (3) the employer should have known of the offending employee's unlawful discriminatory conduct but failed to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent it.⁴⁷

47 Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 14 N.Y.3d 469, 479 (2010).

In calculating a punitive damages award, you should consider, among other things, the (1) nature and reprehensibility of Google's conduct, including the character of the wrongdoing and Google's awareness of what harm the conduct caused or was likely to cause; (2) the amount of time Google engaged in the conduct; and (3) Google's financial condition and the impact your punitive damages award will have on Google.⁴⁸ If you award punitive damages, you may consider Google's net worth and the impact of paying that award.⁴⁹ Keep in mind that punitive damages are not intended to, and may not be used to, compensate a plaintiff for her injuries. Instead, the purpose of punitive damages is to punish a defendant and to deter similar conduct in the future. Any punitive damages award should be limited to the amount reasonably necessary to achieve the goals of punishment and deterrence.⁵⁰

48 N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr. § 2:278; Jury Instr., Duarte.

49 TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Grp., 257 F.Supp.2d 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

50 Jury Instr., Duarte.

You may also consider whether Google has (1) established and complied with policies, programs and procedures for the prevention and detection of discrimination by employees; and (2) a record of no, or relatively few, prior incidents of discriminatory conduct by the specific, offending employee. These factors may mitigate a punitive damages award, should you choose to impose one.⁵¹

51 Chauca v. Abraham, 841 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2016).

E. Nominal Damages

If you find in favor of Ms. Rowe but you find that she has not shown any injury or any actual damages to warrant an award of back pay, compensatory damages, or punitive damages, then you must return an award of nominal damages of no more than one dollar ($1.00). Nominal damages must be awarded when a defendant has deprived a plaintiff of a right but the plaintiff has suffered no actual damages of monetary value as a natural consequence of that deprivation. The mere fact that a deprivation occurred is an injury to the person entitled to enjoy that right, even when no actual damages flow from the deprivation.

Therefore, if you find that Google violated the law but that Ms. Rowe has suffered no injury as a result of Google's conduct other than the fact of a violation, you must award her nominal damages of no more than one dollar ($1.00).

V. Deliberations of the Jury

A. Right to See Exhibits and Hear Testimony

Members of the jury, that almost completes my instructions to you. You are about to go into the jury room to begin your deliberations.

The exhibits received in evidence will be accessible to you upon request. If during your deliberations you want to see a hard copy of any of the exhibits, you may request that they be brought into the jury room. If you want any of the testimony provided to you, you may also request that. Please remember that it is not always easy to locate what you might want, so be as specific as you possibly can in requesting exhibits or portions of the testimony. If you want any further explanation of the law as I have explained it to you, you may also request that.

You can take your copy of these instructions back with you to the jury room when you deliberate. To assist you in your deliberations, I will be providing you a list of the exhibits; a list of the witnesses who testified; a verdict form, which I have referred to and which I will discuss further in a moment; and a copy of these instructions. There is one of each of these items for each juror.

B. Communications with the Court

It is very important that you not communicate with anyone outside the jury room about your deliberations or about anything regarding this case. There is only one exception to this rule. If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me me-to request exhibits or testimony, or to request clarification on the law-you should send a note to me, in writing, signed by your foreperson, and given to one of the marshals or my deputy, Ms. Williams. No member of the jury should ever attempt to communicate with me except by a signed writing, and I will never communicate with a member of the jury on any subject touching on the merits of the case other than in writing, or orally here in open court. If you send any notes to me, do not disclose how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise, on any issue until after a unanimous verdict is reached.

C.

Some of you have taken notes periodically throughout this trial. I want to emphasize to you, as you are about to begin your deliberations, that notes are simply an aid to memory. Notes that any of you may have made may not be given any greater weight or influence than the recollections or impressions of other jurors, whether from notes or memory, with respect to the evidence presented or what conclusions, if any, should be drawn from such evidence. All jurors' recollections are equal. Any difference between a juror's recollection and another juror's notes should be settled by asking to have the transcript read back, for it is the court record rather than any juror's notes upon which the jury must base its determination of the facts and its verdict.

D. Duty to Deliberate / Unanimous Verdict

For Ms. Rowe to prevail on the questions that you must answer, she must sustain her burden of proof as I have explained it to you. If you find Ms. Rowe has succeeded as to any of her claims against Google, you must return a verdict in her favor on that claim. If you find that she has not succeeded on a particular claim, then your verdict must be for Google on that claim.

Your verdict on each question must be unanimous. Each juror is entitled to his or her opinion, but you are required to exchange views with your fellow jurors. This is the very essence of jury deliberation. It is your duty to discuss the evidence. If you have a point of view and after reasoning with other jurors it appears that your own judgment is open to question, then of course you should not hesitate in yielding your original point of view if you are convinced that the opposite point of view is really one that satisfies your judgment and conscience. You are not to give up a point of view, however, that you conscientiously believe in simply because you are outnumbered or outweighed. You should vote with the others only if you are convinced on the evidence, the facts, and the law that it is the correct way to decide the case.

You are not to discuss the case until all jurors are present. Five or six jurors together is only a gathering of individuals. Only when all eight jurors are present do you constitute a jury, and only then may you deliberate.

E. Duties of Foreperson

The first thing you should do when you retire to deliberate is take a vote to select one of you to sit as your foreperson, and then send out a note indicating whom you have chosen.

The foreperson does not have any more power or authority than any other juror, and his or her vote or opinion does not count for any more than any other juror's vote or opinion. The foreperson is merely your spokesperson to the Court. The foreperson will send out any notes, and when the jury has reached a verdict, he or she will notify the marshal that the jury has reached a verdict. Then, when you come into open court, the foreperson will be asked to state what the verdict is.

F. Verdict Form and Return of Verdict

I have prepared a special verdict form for you to use in recording your decision as to each of Ms. Rowe's claims. Please use that form to report your verdict.

You should answer every question except where the verdict form indicates otherwise. After you have reached a verdict, the foreperson should fill in the verdict sheet, the jurors should sign and date it, and then the foreperson should give a note to the marshal outside your door stating that you have reached a verdict. Do not specify what the verdict is in your note.

I will stress that each of you must be in agreement with the verdict that is announced in Court. Once your verdict is announced by your foreperson in open court and officially recorded, it cannot ordinarily be revoked.

VI. Conclusion

Members of the jury, that concludes my instructions to you. I will ask you to remain seated while I confer with the attorneys to see if there are any additional instructions that they would like me to give to you or if there is anything I may not have covered in my previous instructions to you.

In this regard, I ask you not to discuss the case while seated in the jury box because the case has not yet been formally submitted to you.

Jury Charge

I. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS ....................................................................................................... 1

A. Introductory Remarks ......................................................................................................... 1

B. The Parties .......................................................................................................................... 1

C. Role of the Court ................................................................................................................. 1

D. Role of the Jury ................................................................................................................... 2

E. Court Rulings on Evidence and Objections ........................................................................ 2

F. Sympathy or Bias ................................................................................................................ 3

II. EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE ............................................................................................ 3

A. What Is and Is Not Evidence .............................................................................................. 3

B. Stipulated Facts ................................................................................................................... 5

C. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence ................................................................................... 5

D. Redactions ........................................................................................................................... 6

E. Credibility of Witnesses ...................................................................................................... 6

F. Interested Witnesses / Employee Witnesses ....................................................................... 8

G. Expert Witnesses ................................................................................................................. 9

H. Preparation of Witnesses................................................................................................... 10

I. All Available Evidence Need Not Be Produced ............................................................... 10

J. Burden of Proof................................................................................................................. 11

III. SUBSTANTIVE CHARGES ....................................................................................................... 12

A. Overview of Plaintiff's Claims ......................................................................................... 12

B. New York Labor Law § 194 Claim .................................................................................. 13

C. Discrimination Claim Under City Law ............................................................................. 17

D. Retaliation Claims Under City Law & New York Labor Law ......................................... 18

IV. DAMAGES .............................................................................................................................. 21

A. Back Pay ........................................................................................................................... 22

B. Statutory Damages Under New York Labor Law ............................................................. 23

C. Compensatory Damages ................................................................................................... 24

D. Punitive Damages ............................................................................................................. 25

E. Nominal Damages ............................................................................................................. 27

V. DELIBERATIONS OF THE JURY .............................................................................................. 27

A. Right to See Exhibits and Hear Testimony ....................................................................... 27

B. Communications with the Court ....................................................................................... 28

C. Notes ................................................................................................................................. 28

D. Duty to Deliberate / Unanimous Verdict .......................................................................... 29

E. Duties of Foreperson ......................................................................................................... 29

F. Verdict Form and Return of Verdict ................................................................................. 30

VI. CONCLSUION ........................................................................................................................ 30

I. General Instructions

A. Introductory Remarks

Members of the jury, you have now heard all of the evidence in the case, as well as the final arguments of the parties. We have reached the point where you are about to undertake your final function as jurors. You have paid careful attention to the evidence, and I am confident that you will act together with fairness and impartiality to reach a just verdict in the case.

My instructions to you today will be in four parts. First, I will give you general instructions, including instructions about your role as the jury. Second, I will give you instructions concerning evaluation of the evidence. Third, I will describe the law to be applied to the facts that you find to be established by the proof. The fourth and final section of these instructions will relate to your deliberations.

Because my instructions cover many points, I have given you a copy so that you may follow along. In addition, you may take your copy of the instructions with you for reference during your deliberations. You should not single out any instruction as alone stating the law. Instead, you should consider my instructions as a whole when you retire to deliberate in the jury room.

B. The Parties

The Plaintiff in this case is Ulku Rowe. The Defendant is Google LLC (or “Google” for short). All litigants, including corporations, are equal under the law and are entitled to a just verdict. It would be improper for you to allow any personal feelings that you might have about the Plaintiff, the Defendant, or the nature of the claims to influence you in any way.

C. Role of the Court

My role, as the judge presiding over this trial, is to instruct you as to the law. It is your duty to accept these instructions of law and to apply them to the facts as you determine them. With respect to legal matters, you must take the law as I give it to you. If any attorney has stated, or states, a legal principle different from any that I state to you in my instructions, it is my instructions that you must follow. You must not substitute your own notions or opinions of what the law is or ought to be.

D. Role of the Jury

As members of the jury, you are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. You pass upon the evidence. You determine the credibility of the witnesses. You resolve such conflicts as there may be in the testimony. You draw whatever reasonable inferences you decide to draw from the facts as you have determined them, and you determine the weight of the evidence.

Although you are encouraged to use all of your life experiences in analyzing testimony and reaching a fair verdict, you may not communicate any personal or professional expertise you might have or other facts not in evidence to the other jurors during deliberations. You must base your discussions and decisions solely on the evidence presented to you during the trial and that evidence alone. You may not consider or speculate on matters not in evidence or matters outside the case.

E. Court Rulings on Evidence and Objections

At trial, it is the duty of an attorney to object when the other side offers testimony or other evidence that the attorney believes is not properly admissible. You should draw no inference from the fact that an attorney objected to any evidence.

Nor should you draw any inference from the fact that I might have sustained or overruled an objection. Simply because I have permitted certain evidence to be introduced does not mean that I have decided on its significance. That is for you to decide.

More generally, do not draw any inference from any of my rulings. The rulings I made during trial are no indication of any view on my part. You should not seek to find any such view or opinion on my part, nor should you otherwise speculate as to what I may think.

From time to time, the lawyers and I had conferences out of your hearing, known as “sidebars.” These sidebars involved procedural and other matters, and none of the events relating to these conferences should enter into your deliberations at all.

Finally, the personalities and the conduct of counsel in the Courtroom are not in any way at issue. If you formed opinions of any kind regarding any of the lawyers in the case, favorable or unfavorable, whether you approved or disapproved of their behavior as advocates, those opinions should not enter into your deliberations.

F. Sympathy or Bias

You are to evaluate the evidence calmly and objectively, without prejudice or sympathy. You are to be completely fair and impartial. Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence developed at this trial, or the lack of evidence. The parties in this case are entitled to a trial free from prejudice and bias. Our judicial system cannot work unless you reach your verdict through a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence.

It would be improper for you to consider, in deciding the facts of the case, any personal feelings you may have about the race, national origin, sex, or age of any party or any witness, or any other such irrelevant factor. This case should be decided by you as an action between parties of equal standing in the community, and of equal worth. As I previously noted, all parties are entitled to the same fair trial at your hands. All parties stand equal before the law, and are to be dealt with as equals in this Court.

II. Evaluation of the evidence

A. What Is and Is Not Evidence

You may rely only on the evidence that has been introduced throughout the trial. What is evidence? The evidence in this case consists only of the sworn testimony of the witnesses, and the exhibits that have been received in evidence.

I will describe a list of examples of things that are not evidence:

1. A question by a lawyer is not to be considered by you as evidence. It is the witnesses' answers that are evidence, not the questions. At times, a lawyer may have incorporated into a question a statement which assumed certain facts to be true, and asked the witness if the statement was true. If the witness denied the truth of a statement, and if there is no direct evidence in the record proving that assumed fact to be true, then you may not consider it to be true simply because it was contained in the lawyer's question.

2. Similarly, arguments by lawyers are not evidence, because the lawyers are not witnesses. What they have said in their opening and closing statements was intended to help you understand the evidence and to reach your verdict. However, if your recollection of the facts differs from the lawyers' statements, it is your recollection which controls.

3. Statements that I may have made concerning the evidence do not constitute evidence. Similarly, at times, I may have admonished a witness or directed a witness to be responsive to questions or to keep his or her voice up. At times, I may have asked a question myself. Any questions that I asked, or instructions that I gave, were intended only to clarify the presentation of evidence and to bring out something that I thought might be unclear. You should draw no inference or conclusion of any kind, favorable or unfavorable, with respect to any witness or any party in the case, by reason of any comment, question, or instruction of mine. Nor should you infer that I have any views as to the credibility of any witness, as to the weight of the evidence, or as to how you should decide any issue that is before you. That is entirely your role.

4. Testimony that has been stricken or excluded is not evidence, and it may not be considered by you in rendering your verdict.

5. Anything you may have seen or heard outside the Courtroom is not evidence.

Now, I will provide you with a list of some things that you may consider as evidence. As I have said, evidence may come in several forms:

1. The sworn testimony of witnesses, regardless of who called them, is evidence. This is true of the witnesses' answers on both direct and cross examination. However, if certain testimony was received for a limited purpose, you must follow the limiting instructions I have given.

2. The exhibits that were admitted during the trial are evidence. Exhibits marked for identification but not admitted are not evidence, nor are materials brought forth only to refresh a witness's recollection.

3. Prior testimony is evidence. Such testimony, known as depositions (as previously described), is produced through a procedure where, prior to trial, the attorneys for one side may question a witness or an adversary under oath. This is part of what is called pretrial discovery, and each side is entitled to take depositions. To the extent I admitted excerpts of prior testimony at trial, you may consider the prior testimony of a witness according to the same standards you would use to evaluate the testimony of a witness given at trial.

B. Stipulated Facts

The attorneys in this case entered into a stipulation agreeing to certain facts. This means that there is no dispute as to these facts, and these facts are established for the purposes of this case. You must consider the agreed facts along with all of the other evidence presented and give the agreed facts such weight as you find appropriate.

C. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence

Generally, as I told you in my initial instructions, there are two types of evidence that you may consider in reaching your verdict. One type of evidence is direct evidence. Direct evidence is testimony by a witness about something he or she knows by virtue of his or her own senses- something he or she has seen, felt, touched, or heard. For example, if a witness testified that when she left her house this morning, it was raining, that would be direct evidence about the weather.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence from which you may infer the existence of certain facts. To use the same example I gave you at the start of trial: Assume that when you came into the Courthouse this morning, the sun was shining and it was a nice day. Assume that the Courtroom blinds were drawn and you could not look outside. As you were sitting here, someone walked in with an umbrella, which was dripping wet. Then a few minutes later another person entered with a wet raincoat. You are not able to look outside of the Courtroom, you cannot see whether or not it is raining, and no one has testified that it is raining. So you have no direct evidence of that fact. But on the combination of facts that I have asked you to assume, it would be reasonable and logical for you to conclude that it had been raining.

That is all there is to circumstantial evidence. You infer on the basis of reason and experience and common sense from one established fact the existence or non-existence of some other fact. Many facts, such as a person's state of mind or intentions, are rarely susceptible of proof by direct evidence. Usually, such facts are established by circumstantial evidence. Where circumstantial evidence is presented, it is of no less value than direct evidence, for it is a general rule that the law makes no distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence.

D. Redactions

Portions of certain of the exhibits received in evidence have been redacted. “Redacted” means that part of the document was blacked out or removed. The redactions have been made at the Court's direction. You are to concern yourself only with the portions of the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence, that is, the non-redacted portions. You should draw no adverse inference against either party as a result of these redactions, nor should you speculate on what may have been redacted.

E. Credibility of Witnesses

You have had the opportunity to observe the witnesses. It is now your job to decide how believable each witness was in his or her testimony. You are the sole judge of the credibility of each witness and of the importance of his or her testimony.

In making these judgments, you should carefully scrutinize all of the testimony of each witness, the circumstances under which each witness testified, the impression the witness made when testifying, and any other matter in evidence that may help you decide the truth and the importance of each witness's testimony.

How do you determine where the truth lies? Everything a witness said or did on the witness stand counts in your determination. How did the witness impress you? Did he or she appear to be frank, forthright, and candid? Or was the witness evasive and edgy, as if hiding something? What was his or her demeanor-that is, his or her carriage, behavior, bearing, manner, and appearance while testifying? Sometimes, it is not what a person says but how he or she says it that moves us.

You should use all the tests for truthfulness that you would use in determining matters of importance to you in your everyday life. You should consider any bias or hostility the witness may have shown for or against any party as well as any interest the witness has in the outcome of the case. You should consider the opportunity the witness had to see, hear, and know the things about which he or she testified, the accuracy of his or her memory, his or her candor or lack of candor, his or her intelligence, the reasonableness and probability of his or her testimony and its consistency or lack of consistency and its corroboration or lack of corroboration with other credible testimony.

In other words, what you must try to do in deciding credibility is to size a witness up in light of his or her demeanor, the explanations given, and all of the other evidence in the case. Always remember that you should use your common sense, your good judgment, and your everyday experiences in life to make your credibility determinations.

If you find that any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material fact-that is, as to an important matter-the law permits you to disregard the entire testimony of that witness upon the principle that one who testifies falsely about one material fact is likely to testify falsely about everything. However, you are not required to consider such a witness as totally “unbelievable.” You may accept so much of the witness's testimony as you deem true and disregard what you feel is false. By the processes which I have just described, you, as the sole judges of the facts, decide which of the witnesses you will believe, what portion of each witness's testimony you accept, and what weight you will give to it.

On some occasions during this trial, witnesses were asked to explain an apparent inconsistency between testimony offered at this trial and previous statements made by the witness. It is for you to determine whether a prior statement was inconsistent, and if so, how much (if any) weight to give to an inconsistent statement in assessing the witness's credibility at trial.

F. Interested Witnesses / Employee Witnesses

In deciding whether to believe a witness, you should take into account any evidence that shows that a witness may benefit in some way from the outcome of the case, such as a financial interest. Likewise, you should specifically note any evidence of hostility or affection that the witness may have towards one of the parties. You should also consider any other interest or motive that the witness may have in cooperating with a particular party.

In this case, the Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, testified before you. As a party to this action, she is, by definition, an interested witness.

An interested witness is not necessarily less believable than a disinterested witness. The mere fact that a witness is interested in the outcome of the case does not mean he or she has not told the truth. It is for you to decide from your observations and applying your common sense and experience and all the other considerations mentioned, whether the possible interest of any witness, or of any party, has intentionally or otherwise colored or distorted his or her testimony. You are not required to believe an interested witness; you may accept as much of his or her testimony as you deem reliable and reject as much as you deem unworthy of acceptance.

Similarly, several non-party witnesses who were or are presently employed by the Defendant, Google, have testified. In the order in which they testified, these are: Tariq Shaukat, Kevin Lucas, Stuart Vardaman, Stuart Breslow, William Grannis, Nicholas Harteau, April Beaupain, Ashley Elizabeth Tessier, Chris Humez, Krista Callaghan, Brian Stevens, Melissa Lawrence, Kirsten Marie Kliphouse, and Patricia Florissi.

You may consider whether the testimony of these witnesses was in any way influenced by the fact that they are now, or were previously, employed by Google.

It is your duty to consider whether the witness has permitted any such bias or interest to color his or her testimony. In short, if you find that a witness is biased, you should view his or her testimony with caution, weigh it with care, and subject it to close and searching scrutiny.

G. Expert Witnesses

In this case, I have permitted an expert witness to express her opinion about matters that are in issue. That witness is Nora Ostrofe, called by the Plaintiff to offer an opinion on Ms. Rowe's claimed economic damages.

A witness may be permitted to testify to an opinion on those matters about which she has special knowledge, skill, experience, and training. Such testimony is presented to you on the theory that someone who is experienced and knowledgeable in the field can assist you in understanding the evidence or in reaching an independent decision on the facts.

In weighing this opinion testimony, you may consider the witness's qualifications, her opinions, the reasons for testifying, as well as all of the other considerations that ordinarily apply when you are deciding whether or not to believe a witness's testimony. You may give the opinion testimony whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves in light of all the evidence in this case. You should not, however, accept opinion testimony merely because I allowed the witness to testify concerning her opinion. Nor should you substitute it for your own reason, judgment, and common sense. The determination of the facts in this case rests solely with you.

H. Preparation of Witnesses

You have heard evidence during the trial that witnesses had discussed the facts of the case and their testimony with the lawyers before the witnesses appeared in court. Although you may consider that fact when you are evaluating a witness's credibility, there is nothing either unusual or improper about a witness meeting with lawyers before testifying, so that the witness can be made aware of the subjects that he or she will be questioned about, focus on those subjects, and have the opportunity to review relevant exhibits before being questioned about them. In fact, it would be unusual for a lawyer to call a witness without such consultation. Again, the weight you give to the fact or the nature of the witness's preparation for his or her testimony and what inferences you draw from such preparation are matters completely within your discretion.

I. All Available Evidence Need Not Be Produced

The law does not require any party to call as witnesses all persons who may have been present at any time or place involved in the case, or who may appear to have some knowledge of the matters in issue at this trial. Nor does the law require any party to produce as exhibits all papers and things mentioned in the evidence in this case.

Each party has had an equal opportunity or lack of opportunity to call any witnesses. Therefore, you should not draw any inferences or reach any conclusions as to what any uncalled witnesses would have testified to had they been called. The absence of any witnesses should not affect your judgment in any way.

J. Burden of Proof

Before I instruct you on the issues you must decide, I want to define for you the standard under which you will decide whether a particular party has met its burden of proof on a particular issue. The standard that applies in this case is preponderance of the evidence. The Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, has the burden of proving all the elements of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

What does a “preponderance of the evidence” mean? To establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove that the fact is more likely true than not. A preponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of the evidence. It refers to the quality and persuasiveness of the evidence, not the number of witnesses or documents. In determining whether a claim has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, you may consider the relevant testimony of all witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all the relevant exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them.

If, after considering all of the testimony, you are satisfied that the Plaintiff, the party with the burden of proof, has carried her burden on each essential point of her claim, then you must find in her favor. If, after such consideration, you find that the evidence produced by the Plaintiff is outweighed by the evidence against the Plaintiff's position, or that the credible evidence on a given issue is evenly divided between the parties-that it is as equally probable that one side is right as it is that the other side is right-then you must decide that issue against the Plaintiff. The reason for this is that the Plaintiff, because she bears the burden of proof, must prove more than simple equality of evidence-she must prove the element by a preponderance of the evidence. On the other hand, the Plaintiff need prove no more than a preponderance. So long as you find that the scales tip, however slightly, in favor of the Plaintiff-that what she claims is more likely true than not-then that element will have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Some of you may have heard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the proper standard of proof only in a criminal trial. That requirement does not apply to a civil case such as this one, and you should put it out of your mind.

III. Substantive Charges

A. Overview of Plaintiff's Claims

I am now going to instruct you on the substantive law to be applied to the claims in this lawsuit. I want to emphasize here that you should consider each claim separately.

This case involves four claims made by Ms. Rowe against Google.

First, Ms. Rowe claims that Google violated Section 194 of the New York Labor Law by failing to pay her the same as men-specifically, Nicholas Harteau and Stewart Breslow-who she argues performed equal or substantially equal work to her.

Second, Ms. Rowe claims that Google discriminated against her on account of her gender by under-leveling her at hire, paying her less than comparable men, refusing to consider her for the role of Financial Services Vertical Lead, and generally treating her less well because of her gender, in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law.

Finally, Ms. Rowe brings two claims of retaliation, one under the New York Labor Law and one under the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleges that, in response to concerns she raised about discrimination and unequal pay practices, Google retaliated against her by refusing to consider her for two positions, the Financial Services Vertical Lead position in 2018 and the Vice President - Financial Services, Sales position in 2020, and/or otherwise engaged in retaliatory conduct against her.

Google denies these claims. It contends that at all times, it treated Ms. Rowe in accordance with the law. Specifically, Google asserts that under Section 194 of the New York Labor Law, Ms. Rowe was paid what she was lawfully owed, and that any difference in compensation between her and male employees performing equal work was based on lawful job-related factors other than gender. Google asserts that under the New York City Human Rights Law, it treated Ms. Rowe no differently than similarly situated male employees, and that all of its actions towards Ms. Rowe were motivated only by legitimate business reasons.

I will now give further instructions on each of these claims.

B. New York Labor Law § 194 Claim

Ms. Rowe brings a claim under Section 194 of the New York Labor Law. I will refer to this law as “Labor Law Section 194.” As applicable here, Labor Law Section 194 prohibits employers from paying men and women in the same establishment different wages, except under certain circumstances, as I will explain in more detail momentarily. Labor Law Section 194 is a strict liability statute, meaning that a plaintiff need not show that her employer intentionally paid her less because she is a woman. Both parties bear a burden of proof on this claim: first, Ms. Rowe bears a burden, and if she satisfies that burden, Google bears a burden of proof to avoid liability.

To prevail on this claim, Ms. Rowe must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Google paid her lower wages than a man in the same geographic area for work which required equal or substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which was performed under similar working conditions. For purposes of this claim, Ms. Rowe alleges that Google paid her less than Nicholas Harteau and Stuart Breslow.

For Ms. Rowe to prevail on her claim against Google, she must prove each of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

First, Google paid Ms. Rowe lower wages than Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow;

Second, Ms. Rowe performed equal or substantially equal work to Nicholas Harteau and/or

Stuart Breslow on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and

Third, those jobs were performed under similar working conditions.

1. First Element: Lower Wages

The first element that Ms. Rowe must prove is that Google paid her lower wages than Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow. For these purposes, “wages” means earnings of an employee for labor or services rendered. Fringe benefits are also included in the comparison of wages, as are vacation and holiday pay and overtime pay.

2. Second Element: Equal or Substantially Equal Work

The second element that Ms. Rowe must prove is that her work was equal or substantially equal to the work of Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow. The word “equal” does not mean identical. It means that the work Ms. Rowe performed must have been “substantially equal” to the work performed by the male employees to whom she asserts she should be compared.

In determining whether work was “substantially equal,” you must compare the skill, effort, and responsibility required of Ms. Rowe's job with the skill, effort, and responsibility required of Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow. Insignificant, insubstantial or trivial differences in work performed do not matter and may be disregarded.

The occasional or sporadic performance of an activity which may require different skill, effort, or responsibility is not alone sufficient to justify a finding that two jobs are not substantially equal.

Work is not considered “substantially equal” if material differences in skill, effort or responsibility exist. Further, job classifications, descriptions, or titles are not controlling. It is the actual work or performance requirements of the two jobs that is important.

As I just noted, in evaluating whether the performance requirements of the two jobs are substantially equal, you must consider the “skill,” “effort,” and “responsibility” required for these jobs. I will now tell you what is meant by the terms, “skill,” “effort” and “responsibility.”

i Skill

In deciding whether the jobs require substantially equal “skill,” you should consider such factors as the level of education, experience, training, and ability necessary to meet the performance requirements of the respective jobs. You are to compare the jobs, not the employees. Accordingly, the fact that a male employee has a qualification that Ms. Rowe does not have is relevant only if the particular qualification is necessary or useful for performing the job.

ii Effort

In deciding whether the jobs require substantially equal “effort,” you should consider the mental exertion needed to perform the job. “Equal effort” does not require people to use effort in exactly the same way. If there is no substantial difference in the amount or degree of effort to do the jobs, they require “equal effort.” However, if the jobs of Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow require additional tasks that consume a significant amount of extra time and effort that would not be expected of Ms. Rowe, then the jobs do not require substantially equal effort.

iii Responsibility

In deciding whether the jobs involve substantially equal “responsibility,” you may consider the degree of accountability expected by Google for a person filling the jobs, as well as the amount of preparation required to perform the job duties. You may also take into account such things as the level of authority delegated to Ms. Rowe as compared to Nicholas Harteau and Stuart Breslow, including whether Ms. Rowe and Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow were equally expected to direct the work of others, or to represent Google in dealing with clients or others. Finally, you may consider the consequences to Google of effective performance in the respective jobs.

Remain mindful that “skill,” “effort” and “responsibility” constitute separate tests, each of which must be met in order for the equal pay requirement to apply.

For purposes of the second element of the New York Labor Law, it is enough for Ms. Rowe to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she performed work equal or substantially equally to that performed by Mr. Harteau and/or Mr. Breslow-at any time-for which Mr. Harteau and/or Mr. Breslow were paid more, even if the time period in which they were performing that work did not overlap.

3. Third Element: Similar Working Conditions

With respect to the third element of Ms. Rowe's claim, you must find that the jobs are performed under similar working conditions. The conditions need only be similar; they need not be identical or in the same location. In deciding whether the working conditions of the two jobs are similar, you should consider the surroundings or the environment in which the work is performed to which the respective employees may be exposed.

4. Affirmative Defense

If Ms. Rowe proves all three elements of her Labor Law Section 194 claim, then she is entitled to recover on her claim unless Google meets its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Rowe was paid less based on a bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, and experience, and that the factor was both job-related and consistent with business necessity. To meet its burden of establishing business necessity, Google must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the factor is based on a genuine business need and bears a manifest relationship to the job, or a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs.

C. Discrimination Claim Under City Law

Separate from her Labor Law Section 194 claim, Ms. Rowe brings a gender discrimination claim under the New York City Human Rights Law, which I will refer to as the City Law. Under the City Law, it is against the law for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of gender, including by paying an employee less on that basis or by refusing to hire or promote that individual. Stated more broadly, the City Law makes it unlawful for an employer to treat an employee “less well”-in any way-at least in part because of that person's gender. The question of whether Google is liable under the City Law is separate and distinct from the question of whether Google is liable under the Labor Law described a moment ago, even though some conduct may be actionable under both laws.

The City Law has been violated if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that gender played some role in Google's treatment of Ms. Rowe. Ms. Rowe need not establish that her gender was the sole consideration or even the most important consideration motivating Google in any of those circumstances-indeed, a number of factors may have contributed to the company's actions. If you find that Google treated Ms. Rowe less well-at least in part-because of her gender, then she may succeed on this claim, even if you find that Google's conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason.

Keep in mind, however, that the City Law is not a general civility code. Thus, Google can still avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the complained-of conduct at issue is nothing more than what a reasonable person would consider “petty slights or trivial inconveniences.”

In determining whether Google discriminated against Ms. Rowe because of her gender, you may consider a variety of factors, including whether the language or conduct of Google managers reveals a bias against women or preference for men; whether Google treated Ms. Rowe less well than similarly situated men; whether Google's explanations for its actions were credible or whether they are contradicted by fact or changed over time; or whether any of Google's witnesses were untruthful, either at trial or when speaking to Ms. Rowe. In making this determination, however, you may not second-guess Google's business judgment. In other words, you may not find discrimination simply because you think that a business decision that Google made was incorrect or unwise, or because you disagree with the decision.

One note on similarly situated men. While comparisons may offer some evidence of discrimination, comparisons are not the only way to prove discrimination; I noted for you just now a number of ways on which the parties agree that discrimination may be proven. However, to the extent you consider whether Google treated similarly situated men differently than Ms. Rowe, I will give you some guidelines. Under the City Law, for a plaintiff and a comparator to be similarly situated, the plaintiff is not required to show that both individuals' circumstances were identical. Rather, the fact finder must examine the acts, context, and surrounding circumstances of the plaintiff and her comparator to determine whether the comparator is similarly-situated, such that you believe a difference in their treatment could reasonably lead to the conclusion that it was because of gender. This is different from the standard I explained for comparators under the Labor Law.

D. Retaliation Claims Under City Law & New York Labor Law

Ms. Rowe also claims that Google retaliated against her for complaining about discrimination in the workplace. Such retaliation is unlawful under the New York City Human Rights Law (which I will again refer to as the “City Law”) as well as the New York Labor Law (which I will refer to as the “Labor Law”). Specifically, under the City Law, it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any person because such person has raised, reasonably and in good faith, concerns about discrimination. Similarly, under the Labor Law, it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any person because such person has made a complaint to her employer that she reasonably and in good faith believes the employer has violated the Labor Law regarding unequal pay between women and men.

In order to find for Ms. Rowe on these claims under either of these statutes, you must find that she proved each of the following four elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

First, Ms. Rowe engaged in a protected activity;

Second, her employer, Google, was aware of the protected activity;

Third, Google engaged in what is commonly referred to as an “adverse action”-that is, conduct that could be reasonably expected to “chill” or deter someone from engaging in protected activity; and

Fourth, there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action-that is, the complaints that were made were at least in part the reason why the adverse employment action took place.

This framework is common to retaliation claims under both the City Law and the Labor Law. I will now address each of these elements in further detail.

1. First Element: Protected Activity

The first element that Ms. Rowe must prove is that she engaged in a protected activity. A plaintiff engages in a protected activity when she complains about what she reasonably and in good faith believes to be unlawful, discriminatory employment practices. To prove that her activities were protected, Ms. Rowe need not establish that her claims of discrimination were valid. However, she must show that she expressed clear disapproval of Google's allegedly unlawful conduct by communicating, in substance, that she thought the conduct was wrong.

Ms. Rowe must also establish that she had a good faith, reasonable belief at the time she complained of Google's actions that those actions violated the anti-discrimination laws. If Ms. Rowe's concern was not raised in good faith, but rather was raised in order to, for example, protect her job or attempt to extract a benefit from Google, she has not satisfied the “good faith” requirement.

2. Second Element: Knowledge of Protected Activity

Ms. Rowe is also required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Google was aware that she had engaged in protected activity. After all, if Google did not know that she had complained about discrimination, then logically it could not have taken any adverse actions against her on account of any protected activity she may have engaged in.

To satisfy this element, it is not necessary for Ms. Rowe to prove that any specific actors or individuals knew that she had complained. She need only demonstrate general corporate knowledge by Google.

3. Third Element: Adverse Action

The third element that Ms. Rowe must prove by a preponderance of the evidence is that Google engaged in an “adverse action”-that is, conduct that would be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity. The retaliation complained of need not result in a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of the plaintiff's employment. In determining whether Ms. Rowe was subject to retaliation, keep in mind your sense of workplace realities, and the fact that the “chilling effect” of particular conduct depends on the context. The totality of the circumstances must be considered because the overall context in which the challenged conduct occurs cannot be ignored.

It is of no consequence that the challenged conduct may not have been severe or pervasive, because the challenged conduct's severity and pervasiveness are only relevant to the issue of damages, not liability. However, the defendant is not liable if the plaintiff fails to prove that the challenged conduct was caused at least in part by a retaliatory motive, or if the defendant proves that the conduct was nothing more than petty slights or trivial inconveniences.

4. Fourth Element: Causal Connection

Finally, Ms. Rowe must establish that the adverse action or actions taken by Google was or were taken, at least in part, because of Ms. Rowe's protected activity; in other words, she must establish that there was a “causal connection” between the protected activity and the adverse action(s).

To establish a causal connection, Ms. Rowe bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Google intentionally retaliated against her by taking one or more adverse actions against her, and that retaliation was a motivating factor in Google's decision to take the action or actions that it did. A motivating factor is a factor that made a difference or played a part in a decision. To be clear, that factor need not be the sole consideration or even the most important consideration motivating the adverse action or actions.

To satisfy this element, Ms. Rowe can use indirect, or circumstantial evidence, or she can introduce direct evidence of retaliatory motive.

IV. Damages

If you conclude that Ms. Rowe has met her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence with respect to her claims for unequal pay, gender discrimination, and/or retaliation, then you must determine the damages, if any, to which Ms. Rowe is entitled. On the other hand, if you find for Google on all claims, you will not consider the issue of damages at all-you will simply report a verdict for Google on all claims.

You should not infer that Ms. Rowe is entitled to recover damages merely because I am instructing you on how to calculate damages. It is exclusively your function to determine liability, and I am instructing you on damages only so that you will have guidance should you decide that Ms. Rowe prevails on any of her claims.

Damages must be based on evidence, not on speculation or sympathy, and you may only award damages for those injuries that Ms. Rowe actually suffered as a result of Google's conduct. It is the Plaintiff-that is, Ms. Rowe-who bears the burden of proving her damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

In this case, you may consider awarding several different types of damages: back pay, statutory damages under New York Law Labor Section 194, compensatory damages, nominal damages, and punitive damages. Whether such damages are actually to be awarded in this case, and if so, in what amount, are for you, the jury, to decide in accordance with my instructions.

If you make any award of damages, such award is not subject to federal income taxes and you should not consider such taxes in determining the amount of damages, if any.

The verdict form I will give you will assist you in recording the determination, if any, that you make as to damages.

A. Back Pay

The economic loss plaintiff has suffered as a result of any of claims she has put forth is called “back pay.” Back pay consists of the value not only of salary, but also of bonuses, stock awards, and other forms of compensation and benefits that Ms. Rowe would have received if not for Google's unlawful conduct, if that is what you find.

Specifically, Ms. Rowe asserts that she was paid less than men performing equal work under Labor Law Section 194. She also asserts that, because she is a woman, Google paid her less and denied her positions that would have entitled her to greater compensation, in violation of the City Law. She further asserts that, because she made protected complaints, Google denied her positions that would have entitled her to greater compensation.

Your job as the jury is to determine what damages, if any, Ms. Rowe has proved by a preponderance of the evidence for each claim. Ms. Rowe is entitled to lost wages and benefits even if they are difficult to calculate. Any uncertainty about the amount of lost compensation to be awarded to Ms. Rowe should be resolved in her favor. That said, Ms. Rowe has the burden of proving that she actually incurred a loss of back pay.

B. Statutory Damages Under New York Labor Law

If you find that Google violated Section 194 of the Labor Law, Ms. Rowe is also entitled to certain statutory damages, unless you find that Google acted in good faith. Under the law, if you find for Ms. Rowe on liability, it is Google's burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it acted in good faith.

Good faith has two requirements. First, Google must produce plain and substantial evidence of at least an honest intention to ascertain what the Labor Law requires and to comply with it. Second, Google must demonstrate objectively reasonable grounds for believing it was in compliance with the law.

Good faith requires more than ignorance of the prevailing law or uncertainty about its development. It requires an employer to take active steps to ascertain the dictates of the statute and then move to comply with the law. That a defendant did not purposefully violate the statute is not sufficient to establish that it acted in good faith. Nor is good faith demonstrated by conformity with industry-wide practice.

If you find that Google violated the Labor Law, you must also consider whether Google's actions were willful. Willfulness is established if Google knew or showed a reckless disregard for whether its unequal compensation of Rowe was prohibited by law. It is Ms. Rowe's burden to establish Google's willfulness by a preponderance of the evidence.

If you find that Ms. Rowe has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Google knew or showed a reckless disregard for whether or not its payment of her complied with the law, you will find that it acted willfully. You may find that Google acted willfully even if you find that Google did not act with an intent to violate the law. This is because willfulness can be shown where a defendant acts with reckless disregard for the law. However, if you find that Google acted unreasonably but not recklessly in determining its obligations as to how to pay Ms. Rowe, you must find that its actions were not willful.

As you will see on the verdict sheet (which I will discuss more fully in a few moments), if you find that Google violated Section 194 of the Labor Law, you must determine both whether it acted in good faith and whether its violation of the law was willful. If you find that Google's conduct was willful, you must also find that its conduct was not taken in good faith. By the same token, though, if you find that Google's conduct was in good faith, you cannot find that its conduct was willful.

C. Compensatory Damages

If you find that Ms. Rowe has established any of her claims of gender discrimination or retaliation under the City Law, you may award her compensatory damages for injuries such as emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life. Compensatory damages are an amount that will fairly compensate the plaintiff for any injury she actually sustained as a result of the defendant's conduct. There is no requirement that a claim of emotional distress be supported by proof of expenses, lost earnings, or specifically measurable damages. No expert testimony is necessary to prove such harm, and you may rest your findings solely on Ms. Rowe's testimony.

No evidence of the monetary value of such intangible things as pain and suffering has been, or need be, introduced into evidence. There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be awarded for these elements of damage. Rather, you may issue an award of monetary damages based on the emotional harm you determine the plaintiff to have suffered, based on the evidence presented, and based on your best judgment. Any award you make should be fair in light of the evidence presented at the trial.

D. Punitive Damages

If you find that Ms. Rowe prevails on either of her claims of gender discrimination or retaliation, you may, but are not required to, award her punitive damages. Punitive damages are intended to protect the community and to be an expression of the jury's indignation at a defendant's misconduct. There is no exact rule by which to determine the amount of punitive damages. It is up to the jury to decide what amount is sufficient to punish the defendant. The fact that I am instructing you on punitive damages is not any indication of my view as to what your verdict should be, or on whether punitive damages should be awarded.

Punitive damages may be awarded where a plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's actions amounted to willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or where there is a conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard. Under this standard, a defendant need not know that it was violating the law, and the plaintiff is not required to prove intentional or malicious conduct.

Where an employee engages in discrimination with willful or wanton negligence, recklessness, or a conscious disregard of her rights under City Law, the employer may be held liable for punitive damages where: (1) the offending employee exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility; (2) the employer knew of the offending employee's discriminatory conduct and acquiesced in it or failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action; or (3) the employer should have known of the offending employee's unlawful discriminatory conduct but failed to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent it.

In calculating a punitive damages award, you should consider, among other things, the (1) nature and reprehensibility of Google's conduct, including the character of the wrongdoing and Google's awareness of what harm the conduct caused or was likely to cause; (2) the amount of time Google engaged in the conduct; and (3) Google's financial condition and the impact your punitive damages award will have on Google. If you award punitive damages, you may consider Google's net worth and the impact of paying that award. Keep in mind that punitive damages are not intended to, and may not be used to, compensate a plaintiff for her injuries. Instead, the purpose of punitive damages is to punish a defendant and to deter similar conduct in the future. Any punitive damages award should be limited to the amount reasonably necessary to achieve the goals of punishment and deterrence.

You may also consider whether Google has (1) established and complied with policies, programs and procedures for the prevention and detection of discrimination by employees; and (2) a record of no, or relatively few, prior incidents of discriminatory conduct by the specific, offending employee. These factors may mitigate a punitive damages award, should you choose to impose one.

E. Nominal Damages

If you find in favor of Ms. Rowe but you find that she has not shown any injury or any actual damages to warrant an award of back pay, compensatory damages, or punitive damages, then you must return an award of nominal damages of no more than one dollar ($1.00). Nominal damages must be awarded when a defendant has deprived a plaintiff of a right but the plaintiff has suffered no actual damages of monetary value as a natural consequence of that deprivation. The mere fact that a deprivation occurred is an injury to the person entitled to enjoy that right, even when no actual damages flow from the deprivation.

Therefore, if you find that Google violated the law but that Ms. Rowe has suffered no injury as a result of Google's conduct other than the fact of a violation, you must award her nominal damages of no more than one dollar ($1.00).

V. Deliberations of the Jury

A. Right to See Exhibits and Hear Testimony

Members of the jury, that almost completes my instructions to you. You are about to go into the jury room to begin your deliberations.

The exhibits received in evidence will be accessible to you upon request. If during your deliberations you want to see a hard copy of any of the exhibits, you may request that they be brought into the jury room. If you want any of the testimony provided to you, you may also request that. Please remember that it is not always easy to locate what you might want, so be as specific as you possibly can in requesting exhibits or portions of the testimony. If you want any further explanation of the law as I have explained it to you, you may also request that.

You can take your copy of these instructions back with you to the jury room when you deliberate. To assist you in your deliberations, I will be providing you a list of the exhibits; a list of the witnesses who testified; a verdict form, which I have referred to and which I will discuss further in a moment; and a copy of these instructions. There is one of each of these items for each juror.

B. Communications with the Court

It is very important that you not communicate with anyone outside the jury room about your deliberations or about anything regarding this case. There is only one exception to this rule. If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me me-to request exhibits or testimony, or to request clarification on the law-you should send a note to me, in writing, signed by your foreperson, and given to one of the marshals or my deputy, Ms. Williams. No member of the jury should ever attempt to communicate with me except by a signed writing, and I will never communicate with a member of the jury on any subject touching on the merits of the case other than in writing, or orally here in open court. If you send any notes to me, do not disclose how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise, on any issue until after a unanimous verdict is reached.

C.

Some of you have taken notes periodically throughout this trial. I want to emphasize to you, as you are about to begin your deliberations, that notes are simply an aid to memory. Notes that any of you may have made may not be given any greater weight or influence than the recollections or impressions of other jurors, whether from notes or memory, with respect to the evidence presented or what conclusions, if any, should be drawn from such evidence. All jurors' recollections are equal. Any difference between a juror's recollection and another juror's notes should be settled by asking to have the transcript read back, for it is the court record rather than any juror's notes upon which the jury must base its determination of the facts and its verdict.

D. Duty to Deliberate / Unanimous Verdict

For Ms. Rowe to prevail on the questions that you must answer, she must sustain her burden of proof as I have explained it to you. If you find Ms. Rowe has succeeded as to any of her claims against Google, you must return a verdict in her favor on that claim. If you find that she has not succeeded on a particular claim, then your verdict must be for Google on that claim.

Your verdict on each question must be unanimous. Each juror is entitled to his or her opinion, but you are required to exchange views with your fellow jurors. This is the very essence of jury deliberation. It is your duty to discuss the evidence. If you have a point of view and after reasoning with other jurors it appears that your own judgment is open to question, then of course you should not hesitate in yielding your original point of view if you are convinced that the opposite point of view is really one that satisfies your judgment and conscience. You are not to give up a point of view, however, that you conscientiously believe in simply because you are outnumbered or outweighed. You should vote with the others only if you are convinced on the evidence, the facts, and the law that it is the correct way to decide the case.

You are not to discuss the case until all jurors are present. Five or six jurors together is only a gathering of individuals. Only when all eight jurors are present do you constitute a jury, and only then may you deliberate.

E. Duties of Foreperson

The first thing you should do when you retire to deliberate is take a vote to select one of you to sit as your foreperson, and then send out a note indicating whom you have chosen.

The foreperson does not have any more power or authority than any other juror, and his or her vote or opinion does not count for any more than any other juror's vote or opinion. The foreperson is merely your spokesperson to the Court. The foreperson will send out any notes, and

when the jury has reached a verdict, he or she will notify the marshal that the jury has reached a verdict. Then, when you come into open court, the foreperson will be asked to state what the verdict is.

F. Verdict Form and Return of Verdict

I have prepared a special verdict form for you to use in recording your decision as to each of Ms. Rowe's claims. Please use that form to report your verdict.

You should answer every question except where the verdict form indicates otherwise. After you have reached a verdict, the foreperson should fill in the verdict sheet, the jurors should sign and date it, and then the foreperson should give a note to the marshal outside your door stating that you have reached a verdict. Do not specify what the verdict is in your note.

I will stress that each of you must be in agreement with the verdict that is announced in Court. Once your verdict is announced by your foreperson in open court and officially recorded, it cannot ordinarily be revoked.

VI. Conclusion

Members of the jury, that concludes my instructions to you. I will ask you to remain seated while I confer with the attorneys to see if there are any additional instructions that they would like me to give to you or if there is anything I may not have covered in my previous instructions to you.

In this regard, I ask you not to discuss the case while seated in the jury box because the case has not yet been formally submitted to you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. General Instructions .......................... 1

A. Introductory Remarks .......................... 1

B. The Parties .......................... 1

C. Role of the Court.......................... 1

D. Role of the Jury .......................... 2

E. Court Rulings on Evidence and Objections .......................... 2

F. Sympathy or Bias.......................... 3

II. Evaluation of the evidence .......................... 3

A. What Is and Is Not Evidence .......................... 3

B. Stipulated Facts .......................... 5

C. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence .......................... 5

D. Redactions.......................... 6

E. Credibility of Witnesses.......................... 6

F. Interested Witnesses / Employee Witnesses .......................... 8

G. Expert Witnesses.......................... 9

H. Preparation of Witnesses.......................... 10

I. All Available Evidence Need Not Be Produced .......................... 10

J. Burden of Proof.......................... 11

III. Substantive Charges.......................... 12

A. Overview of Plaintiff's Claims .......................... 12

B. New York Labor Law § 194 Claim .......................... 13

C. Discrimination Claim Under City Law.......................... 17

D. Retaliation Claims Under City Law & New York Labor Law .......................... 18

IV. Damages.......................... 21

A. Back Pay .......................... 22

B. Statutory Damages Under New York Labor Law.......................... 23

C. Compensatory Damages .......................... 24

D. Punitive Damages .......................... 25

E. Nominal Damages.......................... 27

V. Deliberations of the jury.......................... 27

A. Right to See Exhibits and Hear Testimony.......................... 27

B. Communications with the Court .......................... 28

C. Notes .......................... 28

D. Duty to Deliberate / Unanimous Verdict .......................... 29

E. Duties of Foreperson.......................... 29

F. Verdict Form and Return of Verdict .......................... 30

VI. Conclsuion .......................... 30

I. General Instructions

A. Introductory Remarks

Members of the jury, you have now heard all of the evidence in the case, as well as the final arguments of the parties. We have reached the point where you are about to undertake your final function as jurors. You have paid careful attention to the evidence, and I am confident that you will act together with fairness and impartiality to reach a just verdict in the case.

My instructions to you today will be in four parts. First, I will give you general instructions, including instructions about your role as the jury. Second, I will give you instructions concerning evaluation of the evidence. Third, I will describe the law to be applied to the facts that you find to be established by the proof. The fourth and final section of these instructions will relate to your deliberations.

Because my instructions cover many points, I have given you a copy so that you may follow along. In addition, you may take your copy of the instructions with you for reference during your deliberations. You should not single out any instruction as alone stating the law. Instead, you should consider my instructions as a whole when you retire to deliberate in the jury room.

B. The Parties

The Plaintiff in this case is Ulku Rowe. The Defendant is Google LLC (or “Google” for short). All litigants, including corporations, are equal under the law and are entitled to a just verdict. It would be improper for you to allow any personal feelings that you might have about the Plaintiff, the Defendant, or the nature of the claims to influence you in any way.

C. Role of the Court

My role, as the judge presiding over this trial, is to instruct you as to the law. It is your duty to accept these instructions of law and to apply them to the facts as you determine them. With respect to legal matters, you must take the law as I give it to you. If any attorney has stated, or states, a legal principle different from any that I state to you in my instructions, it is my instructions that you must follow. You must not substitute your own notions or opinions of what the law is or ought to be.

D. Role of the Jury

As members of the jury, you are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. You pass upon the evidence. You determine the credibility of the witnesses. You resolve such conflicts as there may be in the testimony. You draw whatever reasonable inferences you decide to draw from the facts as you have determined them, and you determine the weight of the evidence.

Although you are encouraged to use all of your life experiences in analyzing testimony and reaching a fair verdict, you may not communicate any personal or professional expertise you might have or other facts not in evidence to the other jurors during deliberations. You must base your discussions and decisions solely on the evidence presented to you during the trial and that evidence alone. You may not consider or speculate on matters not in evidence or matters outside the case.

E. Court Rulings on Evidence and Objections

At trial, it is the duty of an attorney to object when the other side offers testimony or other evidence that the attorney believes is not properly admissible. You should draw no inference from the fact that an attorney objected to any evidence.

Nor should you draw any inference from the fact that I might have sustained or overruled an objection. Simply because I have permitted certain evidence to be introduced does not mean that I have decided on its significance. That is for you to decide.

More generally, do not draw any inference from any of my rulings. The rulings I made during trial are no indication of any view on my part. You should not seek to find any such view or opinion on my part, nor should you otherwise speculate as to what I may think.

From time to time, the lawyers and I had conferences out of your hearing, known as “sidebars.” These sidebars involved procedural and other matters, and none of the events relating to these conferences should enter into your deliberations at all.

Finally, the personalities and the conduct of counsel in the Courtroom are not in any way at issue. If you formed opinions of any kind regarding any of the lawyers in the case, favorable or unfavorable, whether you approved or disapproved of their behavior as advocates, those opinions should not enter into your deliberations.

F. Sympathy or Bias

You are to evaluate the evidence calmly and objectively, without prejudice or sympathy. You are to be completely fair and impartial. Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence developed at this trial, or the lack of evidence. The parties in this case are entitled to a trial free from prejudice and bias. Our judicial system cannot work unless you reach your verdict through a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence.

It would be improper for you to consider, in deciding the facts of the case, any personal feelings you may have about the race, national origin, sex, or age of any party or any witness, or any other such irrelevant factor. This case should be decided by you as an action between parties of equal standing in the community, and of equal worth. As I previously noted, all parties are entitled to the same fair trial at your hands. All parties stand equal before the law, and are to be dealt with as equals in this Court.

II. Evaluation of the evidence

A. What Is and Is Not Evidence

You may rely only on the evidence that has been introduced throughout the trial. What is evidence? The evidence in this case consists only of the sworn testimony of the witnesses, and the exhibits that have been received in evidence.

I will describe a list of examples of things that are not evidence:

1. A question by a lawyer is not to be considered by you as evidence. It is the witnesses' answers that are evidence, not the questions. At times, a lawyer may have incorporated into a question a statement which assumed certain facts to be true, and asked the witness if the statement was true. If the witness denied the truth of a statement, and if there is no direct evidence in the record proving that assumed fact to be true, then you may not consider it to be true simply because it was contained in the lawyer's question.

2. Similarly, arguments by lawyers are not evidence, because the lawyers are not witnesses. What they have said in their opening and closing statements was intended to help you understand the evidence and to reach your verdict. However, if your recollection of the facts differs from the lawyers' statements, it is your recollection which controls.

3. Statements that I may have made concerning the evidence do not constitute evidence. Similarly, at times, I may have admonished a witness or directed a witness to be responsive to questions or to keep his or her voice up. At times, I may have asked a question myself. Any questions that I asked, or instructions that I gave, were intended only to clarify the presentation of evidence and to bring out something that I thought might be unclear. You should draw no inference or conclusion of any kind, favorable or unfavorable, with respect to any witness or any party in the case, by reason of any comment, question, or instruction of mine. Nor should you infer that I have any views as to the credibility of any witness, as to the weight of the evidence, or as to how you should decide any issue that is before you. That is entirely your role.

4. Testimony that has been stricken or excluded is not evidence, and it may not be considered by you in rendering your verdict.

5. Anything you may have seen or heard outside the Courtroom is not evidence.

Now, I will provide you with a list of some things that you may consider as evidence. As I have said, evidence may come in several forms:

1. The sworn testimony of witnesses, regardless of who called them, is evidence. This is true of the witnesses' answers on both direct and cross examination. However, if certain testimony was received for a limited purpose, you must follow the limiting instructions I have given.

2. The exhibits that were admitted during the trial are evidence. Exhibits marked for identification but not admitted are not evidence, nor are materials brought forth only to refresh a witness's recollection.

3. Prior testimony is evidence. Such testimony, known as depositions (as previously described), is produced through a procedure where, prior to trial, the attorneys for one side may question a witness or an adversary under oath. This is part of what is called pretrial discovery, and each side is entitled to take depositions. To the extent I admitted excerpts of prior testimony at trial, you may consider the prior testimony of a witness according to the same standards you would use to evaluate the testimony of a witness given at trial.

B. Stipulated Facts

The attorneys in this case entered into a stipulation agreeing to certain facts. This means that there is no dispute as to these facts, and these facts are established for the purposes of this case. You must consider the agreed facts along with all of the other evidence presented and give the agreed facts such weight as you find appropriate.

C. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence

Generally, as I told you in my initial instructions, there are two types of evidence that you may consider in reaching your verdict. One type of evidence is direct evidence. Direct evidence is testimony by a witness about something he or she knows by virtue of his or her own senses- something he or she has seen, felt, touched, or heard. For example, if a witness testified that when she left her house this morning, it was raining, that would be direct evidence about the weather.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence from which you may infer the existence of certain facts. To use the same example I gave you at the start of trial: Assume that when you came into the Courthouse this morning, the sun was shining and it was a nice day. Assume that the Courtroom blinds were drawn and you could not look outside. As you were sitting here, someone walked in with an umbrella, which was dripping wet. Then a few minutes later another person entered with a wet raincoat. You are not able to look outside of the Courtroom, you cannot see whether or not it is raining, and no one has testified that it is raining. So you have no direct evidence of that fact. But on the combination of facts that I have asked you to assume, it would be reasonable and logical for you to conclude that it had been raining.

That is all there is to circumstantial evidence. You infer on the basis of reason and experience and common sense from one established fact the existence or non-existence of some other fact. Many facts, such as a person's state of mind or intentions, are rarely susceptible of proof by direct evidence. Usually, such facts are established by circumstantial evidence. Where circumstantial evidence is presented, it is of no less value than direct evidence, for it is a general rule that the law makes no distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence.

D. Redactions

Portions of certain of the exhibits received in evidence have been redacted. “Redacted” means that part of the document was blacked out or removed. The redactions have been made at the Court's direction. You are to concern yourself only with the portions of the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence, that is, the non-redacted portions. You should draw no adverse inference against either party as a result of these redactions, nor should you speculate on what may have been redacted.

E. Credibility of Witnesses

You have had the opportunity to observe the witnesses. It is now your job to decide how believable each witness was in his or her testimony. You are the sole judge of the credibility of each witness and of the importance of his or her testimony.

In making these judgments, you should carefully scrutinize all of the testimony of each witness, the circumstances under which each witness testified, the impression the witness made when testifying, and any other matter in evidence that may help you decide the truth and the importance of each witness's testimony.

How do you determine where the truth lies? Everything a witness said or did on the witness stand counts in your determination. How did the witness impress you? Did he or she appear to be frank, forthright, and candid? Or was the witness evasive and edgy, as if hiding something? What was his or her demeanor-that is, his or her carriage, behavior, bearing, manner, and appearance while testifying? Sometimes, it is not what a person says but how he or she says it that moves us.

You should use all the tests for truthfulness that you would use in determining matters of importance to you in your everyday life. You should consider any bias or hostility the witness may have shown for or against any party as well as any interest the witness has in the outcome of the case. You should consider the opportunity the witness had to see, hear, and know the things about which he or she testified, the accuracy of his or her memory, his or her candor or lack of candor, his or her intelligence, the reasonableness and probability of his or her testimony and its consistency or lack of consistency and its corroboration or lack of corroboration with other credible testimony.

In other words, what you must try to do in deciding credibility is to size a witness up in light of his or her demeanor, the explanations given, and all of the other evidence in the case. Always remember that you should use your common sense, your good judgment, and your everyday experiences in life to make your credibility determinations.

If you find that any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material fact-that is, as to an important matter-the law permits you to disregard the entire testimony of that witness upon the principle that one who testifies falsely about one material fact is likely to testify falsely about everything. However, you are not required to consider such a witness as totally “unbelievable.” You may accept so much of the witness's testimony as you deem true and disregard what you feel is false. By the processes which I have just described, you, as the sole judges of the facts, decide which of the witnesses you will believe, what portion of each witness's testimony you accept, and what weight you will give to it.

On some occasions during this trial, witnesses were asked to explain an apparent inconsistency between testimony offered at this trial and previous statements made by the witness. It is for you to determine whether a prior statement was inconsistent, and if so, how much (if any) weight to give to an inconsistent statement in assessing the witness's credibility at trial.

F. Interested Witnesses / Employee Witnesses

In deciding whether to believe a witness, you should take into account any evidence that shows that a witness may benefit in some way from the outcome of the case, such as a financial interest. Likewise, you should specifically note any evidence of hostility or affection that the witness may have towards one of the parties. You should also consider any other interest or motive that the witness may have in cooperating with a particular party.

In this case, the Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, testified before you. As a party to this action, she is, by definition, an interested witness.

An interested witness is not necessarily less believable than a disinterested witness. The mere fact that a witness is interested in the outcome of the case does not mean he or she has not told the truth. It is for you to decide from your observations and applying your common sense and experience and all the other considerations mentioned, whether the possible interest of any witness, or of any party, has intentionally or otherwise colored or distorted his or her testimony. You are not required to believe an interested witness; you may accept as much of his or her testimony as you deem reliable and reject as much as you deem unworthy of acceptance.

Similarly, several non-party witnesses who were or are presently employed by the Defendant, Google, have testified. In the order in which they testified, these are: Tariq Shaukat, Kevin Lucas, Stuart Vardaman, Stuart Breslow, William Grannis, Nicholas Harteau, April Beaupain, Ashley Elizabeth Tessier, Chris Humez, Krista Callaghan, Brian Stevens, Melissa Lawrence, Kirsten Marie Kliphouse, and Patricia Florissi.

You may consider whether the testimony of these witnesses was in any way influenced by the fact that they are now, or were previously, employed by Google.

It is your duty to consider whether the witness has permitted any such bias or interest to color his or her testimony. In short, if you find that a witness is biased, you should view his or her testimony with caution, weigh it with care, and subject it to close and searching scrutiny.

G. Expert Witnesses

In this case, I have permitted an expert witness to express her opinion about matters that are in issue. That witness is Nora Ostrofe, called by the Plaintiff to offer an opinion on Ms. Rowe's claimed economic damages.

A witness may be permitted to testify to an opinion on those matters about which she has special knowledge, skill, experience, and training. Such testimony is presented to you on the theory that someone who is experienced and knowledgeable in the field can assist you in understanding the evidence or in reaching an independent decision on the facts.

In weighing this opinion testimony, you may consider the witness's qualifications, her opinions, the reasons for testifying, as well as all of the other considerations that ordinarily apply when you are deciding whether or not to believe a witness's testimony. You may give the opinion testimony whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves in light of all the evidence in this case. You should not, however, accept opinion testimony merely because I allowed the witness to testify concerning her opinion. Nor should you substitute it for your own reason, judgment, and common sense. The determination of the facts in this case rests solely with you.

H. Preparation of Witnesses

You have heard evidence during the trial that witnesses had discussed the facts of the case and their testimony with the lawyers before the witnesses appeared in court. Although you may consider that fact when you are evaluating a witness's credibility, there is nothing either unusual or improper about a witness meeting with lawyers before testifying, so that the witness can be made aware of the subjects that he or she will be questioned about, focus on those subjects, and have the opportunity to review relevant exhibits before being questioned about them. In fact, it would be unusual for a lawyer to call a witness without such consultation. Again, the weight you give to the fact or the nature of the witness's preparation for his or her testimony and what inferences you draw from such preparation are matters completely within your discretion.

I. All Available Evidence Need Not Be Produced

The law does not require any party to call as witnesses all persons who may have been present at any time or place involved in the case, or who may appear to have some knowledge of the matters in issue at this trial. Nor does the law require any party to produce as exhibits all papers and things mentioned in the evidence in this case.

Each party has had an equal opportunity or lack of opportunity to call any witnesses. Therefore, you should not draw any inferences or reach any conclusions as to what any uncalled witnesses would have testified to had they been called. The absence of any witnesses should not affect your judgment in any way.

J. Burden of Proof

Before I instruct you on the issues you must decide, I want to define for you the standard under which you will decide whether a particular party has met its burden of proof on a particular issue. The standard that applies in this case is preponderance of the evidence. The Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, has the burden of proving all the elements of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

What does a “preponderance of the evidence” mean? To establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove that the fact is more likely true than not. A preponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of the evidence. It refers to the quality and persuasiveness of the evidence, not the number of witnesses or documents. In determining whether a claim has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, you may consider the relevant testimony of all witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all the relevant exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them.

If, after considering all of the testimony, you are satisfied that the Plaintiff, the party with the burden of proof, has carried her burden on each essential point of her claim, then you must find in her favor. If, after such consideration, you find that the evidence produced by the Plaintiff is outweighed by the evidence against the Plaintiff's position, or that the credible evidence on a given issue is evenly divided between the parties-that it is as equally probable that one side is right as it is that the other side is right-then you must decide that issue against the Plaintiff. The reason for this is that the Plaintiff, because she bears the burden of proof, must prove more than simple equality of evidence-she must prove the element by a preponderance of the evidence. On the other hand, the Plaintiff need prove no more than a preponderance. So long as you find that the scales tip, however slightly, in favor of the Plaintiff-that what she claims is more likely true than not-then that element will have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Some of you may have heard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the proper standard of proof only in a criminal trial. That requirement does not apply to a civil case such as this one, and you should put it out of your mind.

III. Substantive Charges

A. Overview of Plaintiff's Claims

I am now going to instruct you on the substantive law to be applied to the claims in this lawsuit. I want to emphasize here that you should consider each claim separately.

This case involves four claims made by Ms. Rowe against Google.

First, Ms. Rowe claims that Google violated Section 194 of the New York Labor Law by failing to pay her the same as men-specifically, Nicholas Harteau and Stuart Breslow-who she argues performed equal or substantially equal work to her.

Second, Ms. Rowe claims that Google discriminated against her on account of her gender by under-leveling her at hire, paying her less than comparable men, refusing to consider her for the role of Financial Services Vertical Lead, and generally treating her less well because of her gender, in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law.

Finally, Ms. Rowe brings two claims of retaliation, one under the New York Labor Law and one under the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleges that, in response to concerns she raised about discrimination and unequal pay practices, Google retaliated against her by refusing to consider her for two positions, the Financial Services Vertical Lead position in 2018 and the Vice President - Financial Services, Sales position in 2020, and/or otherwise engaged in retaliatory conduct against her.

Google denies these claims. It contends that at all times, it treated Ms. Rowe in accordance with the law. Specifically, Google asserts that under Section 194 of the New York Labor Law, Ms. Rowe was paid what she was lawfully owed, and that any difference in compensation between her and male employees performing equal work was based on lawful job-related factors other than gender. Google asserts that under the New York City Human Rights Law, it treated Ms. Rowe no differently than similarly situated male employees, and that all of its actions towards Ms. Rowe were motivated only by legitimate business reasons.

I will now give further instructions on each of these claims.

B. New York Labor Law § 194 Claim

Ms. Rowe brings a claim under Section 194 of the New York Labor Law. I will refer to this law as “Labor Law Section 194.” As applicable here, Labor Law Section 194 prohibits employers from paying men and women in the same establishment different wages, except under certain circumstances, as I will explain in more detail momentarily. Labor Law Section 194 is a strict liability statute, meaning that a plaintiff need not show that her employer intentionally paid her less because she is a woman. Both parties bear a burden of proof on this claim: first, Ms. Rowe bears a burden, and if she satisfies that burden, Google bears a burden of proof to avoid liability.

To prevail on this claim, Ms. Rowe must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Google paid her lower wages than a man in the same geographic area for work which required equal or substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which was performed under similar working conditions. For purposes of this claim, Ms. Rowe alleges that Google paid her less than Nicholas Harteau and Stuart Breslow.

For Ms. Rowe to prevail on her claim against Google, she must prove each of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

First, Google paid Ms. Rowe lower wages than Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow;

Second, Ms. Rowe performed equal or substantially equal work to Nicholas Harteau and/or

Stuart Breslow on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and Third, those jobs were performed under similar working conditions.

1. First Element: Lower Wages

The first element that Ms. Rowe must prove is that Google paid her lower wages than Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow. For these purposes, “wages” means earnings of an employee for labor or services rendered. Fringe benefits are also included in the comparison of wages, as are vacation and holiday pay and overtime pay.

2. Second Element: Equal or Substantially Equal Work

The second element that Ms. Rowe must prove is that her work was equal or substantially equal to the work of Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow. The word “equal” does not mean identical. It means that the work Ms. Rowe performed must have been “substantially equal” to the work performed by the male employees to whom she asserts she should be compared.

In determining whether work was “substantially equal,” you must compare the skill, effort, and responsibility required of Ms. Rowe's job with the skill, effort, and responsibility required of Nicholas Harteau's and/or Stuart Breslow's job. Insignificant, insubstantial or trivial differences in work performed do not matter and may be disregarded.

The occasional or sporadic performance of an activity which may require different skill, effort, or responsibility is not alone sufficient to justify a finding that two jobs are not substantially equal.

Work is not considered “substantially equal” if material differences in skill, effort or responsibility exist. Further, job classifications, descriptions, or titles are not controlling. It is the actual work or performance requirements of the two jobs that is important.

As I just noted, in evaluating whether the performance requirements of the two jobs are substantially equal, you must consider the “skill,” “effort,” and “responsibility” required for these jobs. I will now tell you what is meant by the terms, “skill,” “effort” and “responsibility.”

i Skill

In deciding whether the jobs require substantially equal “skill,” you should consider such factors as the level of education, experience, training, and ability necessary to meet the performance requirements of the respective jobs. You are to compare the jobs, not the employees. Accordingly, the fact that a male employee has a qualification that Ms. Rowe does not have is relevant only if the particular qualification is necessary or useful for performing the job.

ii Effort

In deciding whether the jobs require substantially equal “effort,” you should consider the mental exertion needed to perform the job. “Equal effort” does not require people to use effort in exactly the same way. If there is no substantial difference in the amount or degree of effort to do the jobs, they require “equal effort.” However, if the jobs of Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow require additional tasks that consume a significant amount of extra time and effort that would not be expected of Ms. Rowe, then the jobs do not require substantially equal effort.

iii Responsibility

In deciding whether the jobs involve substantially equal “responsibility,” you may consider the degree of accountability expected by Google for a person filling the jobs, as well as the amount of preparation required to perform the job duties. You may also take into account such things as the level of authority delegated to Ms. Rowe as compared to Nicholas Harteau and Stuart Breslow, including whether Ms. Rowe and Nicholas Harteau and/or Stuart Breslow were equally expected to direct the work of others, or to represent Google in dealing with clients or others. Finally, you may consider the consequences to Google of effective performance in the respective jobs.

Remain mindful that “skill,” “effort” and “responsibility” constitute separate tests, each of which must be met in order for the equal pay requirement to apply.

For purposes of the second element of the New York Labor Law, it is enough for Ms. Rowe to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she performed work equal or substantially equal to that performed by Mr. Harteau and/or Mr. Breslow-at any time-for which Mr. Harteau and/or Mr. Breslow were paid more, even if the time period in which they were performing that work did not overlap.

3. Third Element: Similar Working Conditions

With respect to the third element of Ms. Rowe's claim, you must find that the jobs are performed under similar working conditions. The conditions need only be similar; they need not be identical or in the same location. In deciding whether the working conditions of the two jobs are similar, you should consider the surroundings or the environment in which the work is performed to which the respective employees may be exposed.

4. Affirmative Defense

If Ms. Rowe proves all three elements of her Labor Law Section 194 claim, then she is entitled to recover on her claim unless Google meets its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Rowe was paid less based on a bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, and experience, and that the factor was both job-related and consistent with business necessity. To meet its burden of establishing business necessity, Google must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the factor is based on a genuine business need and bears a manifest relationship to the job, or a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs.

C. Discrimination Claim Under City Law

Separate from her Labor Law Section 194 claim, Ms. Rowe brings a gender discrimination claim under the New York City Human Rights Law, which I will refer to as the City Law. Under the City Law, it is against the law for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of gender, including by paying an employee less on that basis or by refusing to hire or promote that individual. Stated more broadly, the City Law makes it unlawful for an employer to treat an employee “less well”-in any way-at least in part because of that person's gender. The question of whether Google is liable under the City Law is separate and distinct from the question of whether Google is liable under the Labor Law described a moment ago, even though some conduct may be actionable under both laws.

The City Law has been violated if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that gender played some role in Google's treatment of Ms. Rowe. Ms. Rowe need not establish that her gender was the sole consideration or even the most important consideration motivating Google in any of those circumstances-indeed, a number of factors may have contributed to the company's actions. If you find that Google treated Ms. Rowe less well-at least in part-because of her gender, then she may succeed on this claim, even if you find that Google's conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason.

Keep in mind, however, that the City Law is not a general civility code. Thus, Google can still avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the complained-of conduct at issue is nothing more than what a reasonable person would consider “petty slights or trivial inconveniences.”

In determining whether Google discriminated against Ms. Rowe because of her gender, you may consider a variety of factors, including whether the language or conduct of Google managers reveals a bias against women or preference for men; whether Google treated Ms. Rowe less well than similarly situated men; whether Google's explanations for its actions were credible or whether they are contradicted by fact or changed over time; or whether any of Google's witnesses were untruthful, either at trial or when speaking to Ms. Rowe. In making this determination, however, you may not second-guess Google's business judgment. In other words, you may not find discrimination simply because you think that a business decision that Google made was incorrect or unwise, or because you disagree with the decision.

One note on similarly situated men. While comparisons may offer some evidence of discrimination, comparisons are not the only way to prove discrimination; I noted for you just now a number of ways on which the parties agree that discrimination may be proven. However, to the extent you consider whether Google treated similarly situated men differently than Ms. Rowe, I will give you some guidelines. Under the City Law, for a plaintiff and a comparator to be similarly situated, the plaintiff is not required to show that both individuals' circumstances were identical. Rather, the fact finder must examine the acts, context, and surrounding circumstances of the plaintiff and her comparator to determine whether the comparator is similarly-situated, such that you believe a difference in their treatment could reasonably lead to the conclusion that it was because of gender. This is different from the standard I explained for comparators under the Labor Law.

D. Retaliation Claims Under City Law & New York Labor Law

Ms. Rowe also claims that Google retaliated against her for complaining about discrimination in the workplace. Such retaliation is unlawful under the New York City Human Rights Law (which I will again refer to as the “City Law”) as well as the New York Labor Law (which I will refer to as the “Labor Law”). Specifically, under the City Law, it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any person because such person has raised, reasonably and in good faith, concerns about discrimination. Similarly, under the Labor Law, it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any person because such person has made a complaint to her employer that she reasonably and in good faith believes the employer has violated the Labor Law regarding unequal pay between women and men.

In order to find for Ms. Rowe on these claims under either of these statutes, you must find that she proved each of the following four elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

First, Ms. Rowe engaged in a protected activity;

Second, her employer, Google, was aware of the protected activity;

Third, Google engaged in what is commonly referred to as an “adverse action”-that is, conduct that could be reasonably expected to “chill” or deter someone from engaging in protected activity; and

Fourth, there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action-that is, the complaints that were made were at least in part the reason why the adverse employment action took place.

This framework is common to retaliation claims under both the City Law and the Labor Law. I will now address each of these elements in further detail.

1. First Element: Protected Activity

The first element that Ms. Rowe must prove is that she engaged in a protected activity.

A plaintiff engages in a protected activity when she complains about what she reasonably and in good faith believes to be unlawful, discriminatory employment practices. To prove that her activities were protected, Ms. Rowe need not establish that her claims of discrimination were valid. However, she must show that she expressed clear disapproval of Google's allegedly unlawful conduct by communicating, in substance, that she thought the conduct was wrong. To have made a complaint, Ms. Rowe need not use any magic words; Ms. Rowe has opposed gender discrimination and/or unequal pay practices if you find that she expressed clear disapproval of the gender discrimination and/or unequal pay practice by communicating, in sum or substance, that she thought the conduct violated the law.

Ms. Rowe must also establish that she had a good faith, reasonable belief at the time she complained of Google's actions that those actions violated the anti-discrimination laws. If Ms. Rowe's concern was not raised in good faith, but rather was raised in order to, for example, protect her job or attempt to extract a benefit from Google, she has not satisfied the “good faith” requirement.

2. Second Element: Knowledge of Protected Activity

Ms. Rowe is also required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Google was aware that she had engaged in protected activity. After all, if Google did not know that she had complained about discrimination, then logically it could not have taken any adverse actions against her on account of any protected activity she may have engaged in.

To satisfy this element, it is not necessary for Ms. Rowe to prove that any specific actors or individuals knew that she had complained. She need only demonstrate general corporate knowledge by Google.

3. Third Element: Adverse Action

The third element that Ms. Rowe must prove by a preponderance of the evidence is that Google engaged in an “adverse action”-that is, conduct that would be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity. The retaliation complained of need not result in a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of the plaintiff's employment. In determining whether Ms. Rowe was subject to retaliation, keep in mind your sense of workplace realities, and the fact that the “chilling effect” of particular conduct depends on the context. The totality of the circumstances must be considered because the overall context in which the challenged conduct occurs cannot be ignored.

It is of no consequence that the challenged conduct may not have been severe or pervasive, because the challenged conduct's severity and pervasiveness are only relevant to the issue of damages, not liability. However, the defendant is not liable if the plaintiff fails to prove that the challenged conduct was caused at least in part by a retaliatory motive, or if the defendant proves that the conduct was nothing more than petty slights or trivial inconveniences.

4. Fourth Element: Causal Connection

Finally, Ms. Rowe must establish that the adverse action or actions taken by Google was or were taken, at least in part, because of Ms. Rowe's protected activity; in other words, she must establish that there was a “causal connection” between the protected activity and the adverse action(s).

To establish a causal connection, Ms. Rowe bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Google intentionally retaliated against her by taking one or more adverse actions against her, and that retaliation was a motivating factor in Google's decision to take the action or actions that it did. A motivating factor is a factor that made a difference or played a part in a decision. To be clear, that factor need not be the sole consideration or even the most important consideration motivating the adverse action or actions.

To satisfy this element, Ms. Rowe can use indirect, or circumstantial evidence, or she can introduce direct evidence of retaliatory motive.

IV. Damages

If you conclude that Ms. Rowe has met her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence with respect to her claims for unequal pay, gender discrimination, and/or retaliation, then you must determine the damages, if any, to which Ms. Rowe is entitled. On the other hand, if you find for Google on all claims, you will not consider the issue of damages at all-you will simply report a verdict for Google on all claims.

You should not infer that Ms. Rowe is entitled to recover damages merely because I am instructing you on how to calculate damages. It is exclusively your function to determine liability, and I am instructing you on damages only so that you will have guidance should you decide that Ms. Rowe prevails on any of her claims.

Damages must be based on evidence, not on speculation or sympathy, and you may only award damages for those injuries that Ms. Rowe actually suffered as a result of Google's conduct. It is the Plaintiff-that is, Ms. Rowe-who bears the burden of proving her damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

In this case, you may consider awarding several different types of damages: back pay, statutory damages under New York Law Labor Section 194, compensatory damages, nominal damages, and punitive damages. Whether such damages are actually to be awarded in this case, and if so, in what amount, are for you, the jury, to decide in accordance with my instructions.

If you make any award of damages, such award is not subject to federal income taxes and you should not consider such taxes in determining the amount of damages, if any.

The verdict form I will give you will assist you in recording the determination, if any, that you make as to damages.

A. Back Pay

The economic loss plaintiff has suffered as a result of any of claims she has put forth is called “back pay.” Back pay consists of the value not only of salary, but also of bonuses, stock awards, and other forms of compensation and benefits that Ms. Rowe would have received if not for Google's unlawful conduct, if that is what you find.

Specifically, Ms. Rowe asserts that she was paid less than men performing equal work under Labor Law Section 194. She also asserts that, because she is a woman, Google paid her less and denied her positions that would have entitled her to greater compensation, in violation of the City Law. She further asserts that, because she made protected complaints, Google denied her positions that would have entitled her to greater compensation.

Your job as the jury is to determine what damages, if any, Ms. Rowe has proved by a preponderance of the evidence for each claim. Ms. Rowe is entitled to lost wages and benefits even if they are difficult to calculate. Any uncertainty about the amount of lost compensation to be awarded to Ms. Rowe should be resolved in her favor. That said, Ms. Rowe has the burden of proving that she actually incurred a loss of back pay.

B. Statutory Damages Under New York Labor Law

If you find that Google violated Section 194 of the Labor Law, Ms. Rowe is also entitled to certain statutory damages, unless you find that Google acted in good faith. Under the law, if you find for Ms. Rowe on liability, it is Google's burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it acted in good faith.

Good faith has two requirements. First, Google must produce plain and substantial evidence of at least an honest intention to ascertain what the Labor Law requires and to comply with it. Second, Google must demonstrate objectively reasonable grounds for believing it was in compliance with the law.

Good faith requires more than ignorance of the prevailing law or uncertainty about its development. It requires an employer to take active steps to ascertain the dictates of the statute and then move to comply with the law. That a defendant did not purposefully violate the statute is not sufficient to establish that it acted in good faith. Nor is good faith demonstrated by conformity with industry-wide practice.

If you find that Google violated the Labor Law, you must also consider whether Google's actions were willful. Willfulness is established if Google knew or showed a reckless disregard for whether its unequal compensation of Rowe was prohibited by law. It is Ms. Rowe's burden to establish Google's willfulness by a preponderance of the evidence.

If you find that Ms. Rowe has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Google knew or showed a reckless disregard for whether or not its payment of her complied with the law, you will find that it acted willfully. You may find that Google acted willfully even if you find that Google did not act with an intent to violate the law. This is because willfulness can be shown where a defendant acts with reckless disregard for the law. However, if you find that Google acted unreasonably but not recklessly in determining its obligations as to how to pay Ms. Rowe, you must find that its actions were not willful.

As you will see on the verdict sheet (which I will discuss more fully in a few moments), if you find that Google violated Section 194 of the Labor Law, you must determine both whether it acted in good faith and whether its violation of the law was willful. If you find that Google's conduct was willful, you must also find that its conduct was not taken in good faith. By the same token, though, if you find that Google's conduct was in good faith, you cannot find that its conduct was willful.

C. Compensatory Damages

If you find that Ms. Rowe has established any of her claims of gender discrimination or retaliation under the City Law, you may award her compensatory damages for injuries such as emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life. Compensatory damages are an amount that will fairly compensate the plaintiff for any injury she actually sustained as a result of the defendant's conduct. There is no requirement that a claim of emotional distress be supported by proof of expenses, lost earnings, or specifically measurable damages. No expert testimony is necessary to prove such harm, and you may rest your findings solely on Ms. Rowe's testimony.

No evidence of the monetary value of such intangible things as pain and suffering has been, or need be, introduced into evidence. There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be awarded for these elements of damage. Rather, you may issue an award of monetary damages based on the emotional harm you determine the plaintiff to have suffered, based on the evidence presented, and based on your best judgment. Any award you make should be fair in light of the evidence presented at the trial.

D. Punitive Damages

If you find that Ms. Rowe prevails on either of her claims of gender discrimination or retaliation, you may, but are not required to, award her punitive damages. Punitive damages are intended to protect the community and to be an expression of the jury's indignation at a defendant's misconduct. There is no exact rule by which to determine the amount of punitive damages. It is up to the jury to decide what amount is sufficient to punish the defendant. The fact that I am instructing you on punitive damages is not any indication of my view as to what your verdict should be, or on whether punitive damages should be awarded.

Punitive damages may be awarded where a plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's actions amounted to willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or where there is a conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard. Under this standard, a defendant need not know that it was violating the law, and the plaintiff is not required to prove intentional or malicious conduct.

Where an employee engages in discrimination with willful or wanton negligence, recklessness, or a conscious disregard of her rights under City Law, the employer may be held liable for punitive damages where: (1) the offending employee exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility; (2) the employer knew of the offending employee's discriminatory conduct and acquiesced in it or failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action; or (3) the employer should have known of the offending employee's unlawful discriminatory conduct but failed to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent it.

In calculating a punitive damages award, you should consider, among other things, the (1) nature and reprehensibility of Google's conduct, including the character of the wrongdoing and Google's awareness of what harm the conduct caused or was likely to cause; (2) the amount of time Google engaged in the conduct; and (3) Google's financial condition and the impact your punitive damages award will have on Google. If you award punitive damages, you may consider Google's net worth and the impact of paying that award. Keep in mind that punitive damages are not intended to, and may not be used to, compensate a plaintiff for her injuries. Instead, the purpose of punitive damages is to punish a defendant and to deter similar conduct in the future. Any punitive damages award should be limited to the amount reasonably necessary to achieve the goals of punishment and deterrence.

You may also consider whether Google has (1) established and complied with policies, programs and procedures for the prevention and detection of discrimination by employees; and (2) a record of no, or relatively few, prior incidents of discriminatory conduct by the specific, offending employee. These factors may mitigate a punitive damages award, should you choose to impose one.

E. Nominal Damages

If you find in favor of Ms. Rowe but you find that she has not shown any injury or any actual damages to warrant an award of back pay, compensatory damages, or punitive damages, then you must return an award of nominal damages of no more than one dollar ($1.00). Nominal damages must be awarded when a defendant has deprived a plaintiff of a right but the plaintiff has suffered no actual damages of monetary value as a natural consequence of that deprivation. The mere fact that a deprivation occurred is an injury to the person entitled to enjoy that right, even when no actual damages flow from the deprivation.

Therefore, if you find that Google violated the law but that Ms. Rowe has suffered no injury as a result of Google's conduct other than the fact of a violation, you must award her nominal damages of no more than one dollar ($1.00).

V. Deliberations of the Jury

A. Right to See Exhibits and Hear Testimony

Members of the jury, that almost completes my instructions to you. You are about to go into the jury room to begin your deliberations.

The exhibits received in evidence will be accessible to you upon request. If during your deliberations you want to see a hard copy of any of the exhibits, you may request that they be brought into the jury room. If you want any of the testimony provided to you, you may also request that. Please remember that it is not always easy to locate what you might want, so be as specific as you possibly can in requesting exhibits or portions of the testimony. If you want any further explanation of the law as I have explained it to you, you may also request that.

You can take your copy of these instructions back with you to the jury room when you deliberate. To assist you in your deliberations, I will be providing you a list of the exhibits; a list of the witnesses who testified; a verdict form, which I have referred to and which I will discuss further in a moment; and a copy of these instructions. There is one of each of these items for each juror.

B. Communications with the Court

It is very important that you not communicate with anyone outside the jury room about your deliberations or about anything regarding this case. There is only one exception to this rule. If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me-to request exhibits or testimony, or to request clarification on the law-you should send a note to me, in writing, signed by your foreperson, and given to one of the marshals or my deputy, Ms. Williams. No member of the jury should ever attempt to communicate with me except by a signed writing, and I will never communicate with a member of the jury on any subject touching on the merits of the case other than in writing, or orally here in open court. If you send any notes to me, do not disclose how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise, on any issue until after a unanimous verdict is reached.

C.

Some of you have taken notes periodically throughout this trial. I want to emphasize to you, as you are about to begin your deliberations, that notes are simply an aid to memory. Notes that any of you may have made may not be given any greater weight or influence than the recollections or impressions of other jurors, whether from notes or memory, with respect to the evidence presented or what conclusions, if any, should be drawn from such evidence. All jurors' recollections are equal. Any difference between a juror's recollection and another juror's notes should be settled by asking to have the transcript read back, for it is the court record rather than any juror's notes upon which the jury must base its determination of the facts and its verdict.

D. Duty to Deliberate / Unanimous Verdict

For Ms. Rowe to prevail on the questions that you must answer, she must sustain her burden of proof as I have explained it to you. If you find Ms. Rowe has succeeded as to any of her claims against Google, you must return a verdict in her favor on that claim. If you find that she has not succeeded on a particular claim, then your verdict must be for Google on that claim.

Your verdict on each question must be unanimous. Each juror is entitled to his or her opinion, but you are required to exchange views with your fellow jurors. This is the very essence of jury deliberation. It is your duty to discuss the evidence. If you have a point of view and after reasoning with other jurors it appears that your own judgment is open to question, then of course you should not hesitate in yielding your original point of view if you are convinced that the opposite point of view is really one that satisfies your judgment and conscience. You are not to give up a point of view, however, that you conscientiously believe in simply because you are outnumbered or outweighed. You should vote with the others only if you are convinced on the evidence, the facts, and the law that it is the correct way to decide the case.

You are not to discuss the case until all jurors are present. Five or six jurors together is only a gathering of individuals. Only when all eight jurors are present do you constitute a jury, and only then may you deliberate.

E. Duties of Foreperson

The first thing you should do when you retire to deliberate is take a vote to select one of you to sit as your foreperson, and then send out a note indicating whom you have chosen.

The foreperson does not have any more power or authority than any other juror, and his or her vote or opinion does not count for any more than any other juror's vote or opinion. The foreperson is merely your spokesperson to the Court. The foreperson will send out any notes, and when the jury has reached a verdict, he or she will notify the marshal that the jury has reached a verdict. Then, when you come into open court, the foreperson will be asked to state what the verdict is.

F. Verdict Form and Return of Verdict

I have prepared a special verdict form for you to use in recording your decision as to each of Ms. Rowe's claims. Please use that form to report your verdict.

You should answer every question except where the verdict form indicates otherwise. After you have reached a verdict, the foreperson should fill in the verdict sheet, the jurors should sign and date it, and then the foreperson should give a note to the marshal outside your door stating that you have reached a verdict. Do not specify what the verdict is in your note.

I will stress that each of you must be in agreement with the verdict that is announced in Court. Once your verdict is announced by your foreperson in open court and officially recorded, it cannot ordinarily be revoked.

VI. Conclusion

Members of the jury, that concludes my instructions to you. I will ask you to remain seated while I confer with the attorneys to see if there are any additional instructions that they would like me to give to you or if there is anything I may not have covered in my previous instructions to you.

In this regard, I ask you not to discuss the case while seated in the jury box because the case has not yet been formally submitted to you.

EXHIBIT LIST

* indicates Exhibit admitted with Limiting Instruction

Exhibit No.	Description
P3	Position Description: Technical Director, Office of the CTO (Google Cloud Platform), Dated Aug 2016 GOOG-ROWE-00055477 - GOOG-RO WE-00055479
P4	Callaghan Email to Rowe Dated Aug 18,2016 P000434-P000438
P5	Humez Email to Burdis Dated Dec 8,2016 GOOG-ROWE-00017341.R - GOOG-ROWE-00017352.R
P6	Ulku Rowe Facebook Post, Dated Mar 13,2017 P000736
P7	Lawrence Email to Bucich Dated Aug 11,2017 GOOG-ROWE-00058796 - GOOG-ROWE-00058799
P8	Lawrence Email to Sauco, Harteau, Rowe, Baritt, Donaldson, Wilson, Stiekes, Bennett, Strong, Penberthy, Eryurek Dated Aug 28,2017 GOOG-ROWE- 00017356 - GOOG-ROWE-000173 5 8
P9	Grannis Email to Lawrence Dated Nov 18,2017 GOOG-ROWE-00017375.R - GOOG-ROWE-00017378.R

Exhibit No.	Description
P10	Lawrence Email to Polo Dated Nov 18, 2017 GOOG-ROWE-00017379.R - GOOG-ROWE-000173 81,R
P 11	Notes re Meeting with Melissa Lawrence, Dated Nov 20, 2017 POO1586
P12	Grannis Email to Lawrence Dated Dec 22, 2017 GOOG-ROWE-0001740ERR - GOOG-ROWE-00017405.RR
P13	Grannis Email to Lawrence Dated Jan 10, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017406 - GOOG-ROWE-00017407
P14	Stevens Email to Shaukat Dated Feb 13,2018 GOOG-ROWE-00058866 - GOOG-ROWE-00058867
P16	Shaukat Email to Stevens Dated May 9, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017410 - GOOG-ROWE-00017411
P19	Stevens Email to Rowe Dated Jun 7, 2018 GOOG-RO WE-P-00000714
P20	Grannis Email to Stevens and Lawrence Dated Jun 8,2018 GOOG-ROWE-OOO 17417 .R
P21	Grannis Email to Stevens Dated Jun 13,2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017425 - GOOG-ROWE-00017426
P22	Shaukat Email to Stevens and Lawrence Dated Jun 13, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017431 - GOOG-ROWE-00017432
P23	Grannis Email to Shaukat Dated Jun 13, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017427 - GOOG-ROWE-00017428
P24	Shaukat Email to Lawrence Dated Jun 13, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017429 - GOOG-ROWE-00017430
P25	Rowe Email to Shaukat Dated Jun 14, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-P-00000726 - GOOG-ROWE-P-00000727
P26	Rowe Email to Grannis and Stevens Dated Jun 14, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-P-00000729 - GOOG-ROWE-P-00000730

Exhibit No.	Description
P27	Rowe Email Invite to Rowe Dated Jun 14,2018 POO07O5 - P000706
P28	Stevens Email to Cloud OCTO Dated Jun 18,2018 GOOG-ROWE-P-00000742 - GOOG-ROWE-P-00000743
P29	Shaukat Email to Shaukat and Ferrand Dated Jun 27, 2018 GOOG-RO WE-P-00000762 - GOOG-RO WE-P-00000763
P30	Shaukat Email to Rowe and Murphy-True Dated Jul 3,2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017443
P31	Vardaman Email to Rowe Dated Jul 12, 2018 Attachment: Position Description: Head of Financial Services, Google Cloud GOOG-RO WE-P-00000 821 GOOG-ROWE-P-00004550 - GOOG-ROWE-P-00004552
P32	Rowe Email to Vardaman Dated Jul 13, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017446 - GOOG-ROWE-00017447
P34	Murray Email to Vardaman Dated Jul 29,2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017465 - GOOG-ROWE-00017469
P35	Orr Email to Vardaman Dated Aug 7, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017515 - GOOG-ROWE-00017517
P36	Srivatsan Email to Vardaman Dated Aug 7, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017518 - GOOG-ROWE-00017519
P37	Vardaman Email to Martin Dated Aug 7, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017507 - GOOG-ROWE-00017508
P38	Shaukat Email to Lucas, O'Donnell, and Scott Dated Aug 8, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017532
P40	Rowe Email to Shaukat Dated Aug 20,2018 GOOG-RO WE-00017554
P41	Vardaman Email to Beuerlein Dated Aug 28, 2018 GOOG-RO WE-00054145

Exhibit No.	Description
P42	Rowe Email to Lawrence and Lucas Dated Aug 28,2018 GOOG-RO WE-P-00001229
P43	Lucas Email to Lawrence Dated Aug 29, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-OOO 17555 - GOOG-RO WE-00017557
P44	Beaupain Email to Lucas Dated Aug 30, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017563 - GOOG-ROWE-00017564
P45	Vardaman Email to Shaukat Dated Sep 1, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017565,R - GOOG-ROWE-00017566.R
P46	Sebastian Marotte Literview Feedback Reminders GOOG-ROWE-00058307 GOOG-ROWE-00058308 GOOG-ROWE-00058309 GOOG-RO WE-00058310 GOOG-RO WE-00058311 GOOG-RO WE-00058312 GOOG-ROWE-00058313 GOOG-RO WE-00058317 GOOG-RO WE-00058321 GOOG-ROWE-00058325 GOOG-RO WE-00058326 GOOG-RO WE-0005 8330 GOOG-ROWE-00058334 GOOG-RO WE-00058338 GOOG-RO WE-00058342 GOOG-ROWE-00058346 GOOG-ROWE-00058350 GOOG-RO WE-00058354 GOOG-RO WE-0005 8358 GOOG-RO WE-0005 8362
P47	Jason Martin Interview Feedback Reminders GOOG-ROWE-00058315 GOOG-RO WE-00058319 GOOG-ROWE-00058323 GOOG-RO WE-00058327 GOOG-ROWE-00058331 GOOG-ROWE-00058336

Exhibit No.	Description
	GOOG-ROWE-00058340 GOOG-RO WE-00058345 GOOG-ROWE-00058349 GOOG-ROWE-00058353 GOOG-ROWE-00058356 GOOG-ROWE-00058361 GOOG-ROWE-00058363 GOOG-ROWE-00058367 GOOG-ROWE-00058371 GOOG-RO WE-00058373 GOOG-ROWE-00058375 GOOG-RO WE-00058378
P48	Darryl Willis Interview Feedback Reminders
	GOOG-ROWE-00058314 GOOG-ROWE-00058318 GOOG-ROWE-00058322 GOOG-ROWE-00058328 GOOG-ROWE-00058332 GOOG-ROWE-00058335 GOOG-ROWE-00058339 GOOG-ROWE-00058344 GOOG-ROWE-00058347 GOOG-ROWE-00058352 GOOG-ROWE-00058357 GOOG-ROWE-00058360 GOOG-ROWE-00058364 GOOG-ROWE-00058368 GOOG-ROWE-00058370 GOOG-ROWE-00058374 GOOG-RO WE-00058377 GOOG-ROWE-00058379

Exhibit No.	Description
P49	Vats Srivatsan Interview Feedback Reminders GOOG-ROWE-00058316 GOOG-RO WE-00058320 GOOG-RO WE-0005 8324 GOOG-RO WE-00058329 GOOG-RO WE-00058333 GOOG-ROWE-00058337 GOOG-ROWE-00058341 GOOG-ROWE-00058343 GOOG-RO WE-00058348 GOOG-ROWE-00058351 GOOG-RO WE-0005 8355 GOOG-ROWE-00058359 GOOG-ROWE-00058365 GOOG-ROWE-00058366 GOOG-ROWE-00058369 GOOG-ROWE-00058372 GOOG-RO WE-00058376 GOOG-RO WE-0005 8380
P50	Vardaman Email to Rowe Dated Sep 11, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00056552 - GOOG-ROWE-00056555
P51	Shaukat Email to Scott Dated Sep 21, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017568
P53	Vardaman Email to Meadows Dated Oct 30, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-000175 83 - GOOG-ROWE-00017584
P54	Rowe Email to Shaukat and Green Dated Nov 7, 2018 GOOG-RO WE-P-00001737
P55	Lucas Email to Lawrence and Beaupain Dated Nov 8, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-OOO 17589 - GOOG-ROWE-00017591
P57	UlkuRowe ER Notes GOOG-ROWE-00017998 - GOOG-ROWE-00018001
P59	Vardaman Email to Beuerlein Dated Nov 12, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017598

Exhibit No.	Description
P60	Beaupain Email to Rowe Dated Nov 13, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017599 - GOOG-ROWE-00017602
P61	Vardaman Email to Murray Dated Nov 26, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017624 - GOOG-ROWE-00017632
P62	Shaukat Email to Lucas Dated Nov 26,2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017634.R - GOOG-ROWE-00017637.R
P63	Shaukat Email to Lucas Dated Nov 27,2018 GOOG-ROWE-0001763 8
P64	Vardaman Email to Martin, Srivatsan, Willis, and Marotte Dated Nov 27,2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017639
P65	Lucas Email to Shaukat Dated Nov 30, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00056880 - GOOG-ROWE-00056889
P66	Rowe Email to Shaukat Dated Dec 4,2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017642
P67	Shaukat Email to Lucas and O'Donnell Dated Dec 5,2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017643
P68	Bansal Email to Vardaman Dated Dec 6, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017644 - GOOG-ROWE-00017647
P69	Tariq Shaukat President, Cloud Partners and Industry Platforms Executive Recruiting Weekly Meeting, Dated Dec 21, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017722.RR - GOOG-ROWE-00017866.RR
P71	Riddle Email to Shaukat Dated Jan 21, 2019 GOOG-ROWE-00057023 - GOOG-ROWE-00057024
P72	Breslow Email to Shaukat Dated Mar 1,2019 GOOG-ROWE-00059967 - GOOG-ROWE-00059969
P73	Ensuring We Pay Fairly and Equitably, Dated Mar 4, 2019 GOOG-ROWE-00061580 - GOOG-ROWE-00061581
P76*	Email from Franco to Rowe Dated Mar 18,2019 Attachment: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Letter

Exhibit No.	Description
	P000659 - P000662 P000752 - P000753
P77	Lucas Email to Shaukat Dated Mar 25, 2019 GOOG-ROWE-00056890 - GOOG-ROWE-00056891
P78	Breslow Email to Shaukat Dated Mar 30, 2019 GOOG-ROWE-00056906 - GOOG-ROWE-00056909
P79	Lucas Email to Porter Dated Mar 31, 2019 GOOG-ROWE-00017677 - GOOG-ROWE-00017679
P80	Breslow Email to Shaukat Dated Apr 1, 2019 GOOG-ROWE-00057053 - GOOG-ROWE-00057055
P81	Grannis Email to Shaukat Dated Apr 24, 2019 GOOG-RO WE-00017690
P82	Shaukat Email to Ladd Dated Sep 6, 2019 GOOG-ROWE-00056682 - GOOG-ROWE-00056690
P85	Tessier Email to Rowe Dated Nov 1, 2019 GOOG-ROWE-00056734 - GOOG-ROWE-00056736
P87	OCTO Calibration Notes Dated Sep 29 GOOG-ROWE-00017710.R - GOOG-ROWE-00017712.R
P88	OCTO Level Overview GOOG-ROWE-OOO 18014
P89	Talking Points GOOG-ROWE-OOO 18015
P93	L8+ Assessment Based Interview Questions GOOG-ROWE-OOO19205 - GOOG-ROWE-00019208
P97	Peer Reviews: Write One Thing... GOOG-ROWE-00019740 - GOOG-ROWE-00019741
P98	Unbiasing Champ Guidance GOOG-ROWE-00019782 - GOOG-ROWE-00019786

Exhibit No.	Description
P99	Policy on Harassment, Discrimination, Retaliation, Standards of Conduct, and Workplace Concerns (US & LATAM) GOOG-ROWE-00030107 - GOOG-RO WE-00030112
PlOO	Tessier Email to Vardaman Dated Jan 21, 2020 GOOG-ROWE-00056764 - GOOG-ROWE-00056766
P101	Vardaman Email to Rowe Dated Feb 4, 2020 GOOG-ROWE-00060559 - GOOG-ROWE-00060562
P102B*	Our Leveling Approach GOOG-RO WE-00052153
P1O3	Candidate Leveling Resources GOOG-ROWE-00053767
Pl04 A	Speaking Engagements P000871 - P000873
P104B*	The Buck Starts Here: How AI Shapes the Future of Money 5 Ways Financial Sendees Organizations Will Move Faster in the Cloud 2019 Getting the Most Out of Your Modernization Journey Five Habits of Highly Effective Capita l Markets Firms Who Run in the Cloud P000787-P000791 PO0080O - P000802 P000864 P000876 - P000879
P105	Notes, Dated Feb 21, 2020 GOOG-ROWE-00058542 - GOOG-ROWE-00058555
P106	Vardaman Email to Rowe Dated Feb 25, 2020 GOOG-ROWE-00060571 - GOOG-ROWE-00060573
P107	Pay Equity at Google GOOG-ROWE-00055391 - GOOG-ROWE-00055393
P1O8	Meeting With Will Grannis Dated Apr 21,2020 GOOG-ROWE-00056990 - GOOG-ROWE-00057014
P109	Ulku Rowe Bio

Exhibit No.	Description
	GOOG-ROWE-P-00004556
Pill	Thrive Data Provided for Employment Litigation Dated May 7, 2020 GOOG-ROWE-00056272 - GOOG-ROWE-00056273
P113-A	gComps Spreadsheet GOOG-RO WE-00060591 [EXCEL SPREADSHEET]
P114	Employee Relations Investigations - Allegations Guide GOOG-ROWE-00058782
Pl 15	Stuart Breslow gHire Packet GOOG-ROWE-00083275 - GOOG-ROWE-00083300
P116	Jonathan Donaldson gHire Packet GOOG-ROWE-00063 078 - GOOG-ROWE-00063111
P118	Nicholas Harteau gHire Packet GOOG-ROWE-00056318.R-GOOG-ROWE-00056346.R
P119	Ulku Rowe gHire Packet GOOG-ROWE-00019097.R - GOOG-ROWE-00019146.R
P120	Paul Strong gHire Packet GOOG-ROWE-00061880 - GOOG-ROWE-00061904
P121	Ben Wilson gHire Packet GOOG-ROWE-00062214 - GOOG-ROWE-00062241
P122	Stuart Breslow Performance Evaluations GOOG-ROWE-00053826.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053832.R GOOG-ROWE-00053841.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053847.R GOOG-ROWE-00053875.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053878.R GOOG-ROWE-00053837.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053840,R

Exhibit No.	Description
P123	Jonathan Donaldson Performance Evaluations GOOG-ROWE-00056275 GOOG-ROWE-00056312 - GOOG-ROWE-00056315 GOOG-ROWE-00056287 - GOOG-ROWE-00056294 GOOG-ROWE-00056276 - GOOG-ROWE-00056282 GOOG-RO WE-000563 03 - GOOG-ROWE-00056311 GOOG-RO WE-00056283 - GOOG-RO WE-00056286 GOOG-ROWE-00056295 - GOOG-ROWE-00056302 GOOG-ROWE-00079130 - GOOG-ROWE-00079133 GOOG-RO WE-00082596 - GOOG-RO WE-00082603 GOOG-ROWE-00082943 - GOOG-ROWE-00082949 GOOG-ROWE-00082628 - GOOG-ROWE-00082636 GOOG-ROWE-00082764 - GOOG-RO WE-00082771 GOOG-RO WE-00079321 - GOOG-ROWE-00079323 GOOG-ROWE-00079317 - GOOG-ROWE-00079320 GOOG-ROWE-00079382 - GOOG-ROWE-00079386 GOOG-ROWE-00079175 - GOOG-ROWE-00079176 GOOG-ROWE-00079406 - GOOG-ROWE-00079407
P124	Evren Eryurek Performance Evaluations GOOG-RO WE-00053 889 .R - GOOG-ROWE-00053890.R GOOG-RO WE-00053 833.R - GOOG-RO WE-00053 835.R GOOG-RO WE-00053 891.R - GOOG-RO WE-00053 894.R GOOG-ROWE-00053864.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053868.R GOOG-RO WE-00053 852.R - GOOG-RO WE-00053 86 l.R GOOG-RO WE-00053901.R - GOOG-RO WE-00053909.R GOOG-ROWE-00053885.R - GOOG-RO WE-00053 888.R GOOG-ROWE-00053879.R - GOOG-ROWE-0005388l.R GOOG-ROWE-00067197 - GOOG-ROWE-00067207 GOOG-ROWE-00067208 - GOOG-ROWE-00067213 GOOG-ROWE-00067233 - GOOG-ROWE-00067237 GOOG-ROWE-00082556 - GOOG-ROWE-00082564 GOOG-RO WE-000825 85 - GOOG-ROWE-00082595 GOOG-ROWE-00082565 - GOOG-ROWE-00082573 GOOG-ROWE-00082574 - GOOG-ROWE-00082584 GOOG-ROWE-00079027 - GOOG-ROWE-00079031 GOOG-ROWE-00079104 - GOOG-ROWE-00079107 GOOG-ROWE-00079095 - GOOG-ROWE-00079098 GOOG-ROWE-00079099 - GOOG-ROWE-00079103 GOOG-ROWE-00078984 - GOOG-ROWE-00078993 GOOG-ROWE-00079145 - GOOG-ROWE-00079153 GOOG-ROWE-00083158

Exhibit No.	Description
	GOOG-ROWE-00083159 - GOOG-ROWE-00083160
P125	Nicholas Harteau Performance Evaluations GOOG-RO WE-00053 811.R GOOG-ROWE-00053803,R - GOOG-ROWE-00053810.R GOOG-ROWE-00053812.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053819.R GOOG-RO WE-00053 798.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053 802.R GOOG-ROWE-00053820.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053824.R GOOG-ROWE-00067168 - GOOG-ROWE-00067177 GOOG-ROWE-00067178 - GOOG-ROWE-00067186 GOOG-ROWE-00067187 - GOOG-RO WE-00067191 GOOG-ROWE-00067192 - GOOG-ROWE-00067196 GOOG-ROWE-00082923 - GOOG-ROWE-00082928 GOOG-ROWE-00082929 - GOOG-ROWE-OOO82933 GOOG-ROWE-00082647 - GOOG-ROWE-00082648 GOOG-ROWE-00082688
P126	Ulku Rowe Performance Evaluations GOOG-ROWE-000 17907 - GOOG-ROWE-00017913 GOOG-ROWE-00017929 - GOOG-ROWE-00017933 GOOG-ROWE-00017914 - GOOG-ROWE-000 17918 GOOG-ROWE-00017885 - GOOG-ROWE- 000 17890 GOOG-ROWE-00017936 - GOOG-ROWE- 000 17941 GOOG-ROWE-00017897 - GOOG-ROWE- 000 17906 GOOG-ROWE-00017949 - GOOG-ROWE-O 000 17957 GOOG-ROWE- 000 17919 GOOG-ROWE- 000 1793 5 GOOG-ROWE-00056246 - GOOG-ROWE-00056251 GOOG-ROWE-00082816 - GOOG-ROWE-00082820 GOOG-ROWE-00082918 - GOOG-ROWE-000 82922 GOOG-ROWE-00082726 - GOOG-ROWE-00082731 GOOG-ROWE-00082821 - GOOG-ROWE-00082827 GOOG-ROWE-00079122 - GOOG-ROWE-00079124 GOOG-ROWE-00079125 - GOOG-ROWE-00079126 GOOG-ROWE-00079022 GOOG-ROWE-00079128 - GOOG-ROWE-00079129 GOOG-ROWE-00079156 - GOOG-ROWE-00079161 GOOG-ROWE-00079165 - GOOG-ROWE-00079168 GOOG-RO WE-00083196

Exhibit No.	Description
P127	Paul Strong Performance Evaluations GOOG-ROWE-00067274 GOOG-ROWE-00067253 - GOOG-ROWE-00067256 GOOG-ROWE-00067257 - GOOG-ROWE-00067264 GOOG-ROWE-00067272 GOOG-RO WE-00067265 - GOOG-ROWE-00067271 GOOG-ROWE-00067273 GOOG-RO WE-00067275 - GOOG-ROWE-00067281 GOOG-ROWE-00082702 - GOOG-ROWE-00082708 GOOG-ROWE-00082950 - GOOG-ROWE-00082955 GOOG-ROWE-00082637 - GOOG-ROWE-00082646 GOOG-ROWE-00082805 - GOOG-ROWE-00082815 GOOG-ROWE-00079134 GOOG-ROWE-00079242 GOOG-ROWE-00079405 GOOG-ROWE-00079062 - GOOG-ROWE-00079063 GOOG-ROWE-00079170 - GOOG-ROWE-00079174 GOOG-ROWE-00079056 - GOOG-ROWE-00079061 GOOG-RO WE-00083184 - GOOG-ROWE-00083184 GOOG-ROWE-00083185 - GOOG-ROWE-00083185
P128	Ben Wilson Performance Evaluations GOOG-RO WE-00053 862.R GOOG-RO WE-00053 863 .R GOOG-ROWE-00053848.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053851.R GOOG-ROWE-00053882.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053884.R GOOG-ROWE-00053869.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053874.R GOOG-ROWE-00053895,R - GOOG-ROWE-00053900.R GOOG-RO WE-00053 825,R GOOG-ROWE-00053836.R GOOG-ROWE-00067225 - GOOG-ROWE-00067232 GOOG-ROWE-0006723 8 - GOOG-ROWE-00067246 GOOG-ROWE-00067214 - GOOG-ROWE-00067218 GOOG-ROWE-00067219 - GOOG-ROWE-00067224 GOOG-ROWE-00082732 - GOOG-ROWE-00082739 GOOG-ROWE-00082900 - GOOG-ROWE-00082908 GOOG-ROWE-00082614 - GOOG-ROWE-00082627 GOOG-RO WE-00082649 - GOOG-ROWE-00082661 GOOG-RO WE-00079127 GOOG-RO WE-00079169
P129	Stuart Breslow Compensation Letters

Exhibit No.	Description
	GOOG-ROWE-00053774.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053775.R
P130	Jonathan Donaldson Performance Evaluations GOOG-RO WE-000553 86 GOOG-ROWE-00055389 - GOOG-RO WE-00055390 GOOG-ROWE-00078246 - GOOG-ROWE-00078247 GOOG-RO WE-0006845 8 - GOOG-ROWE-00068459 GOOG-ROWE-00078273 - GOOG-ROWE-00078274
P131	Evren Eryurek Compensation Letters GOOG-ROWE-00053776.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053777.R
P132	Nicholas Harteau Compensation Letters GOOG-ROWE-00053782.R GOOG-ROWE-00053783.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053784.R GOOG-ROWE-00053785.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053786.R
P133	Yolande Piazza Compensation Letters GOOG-RO WE-00078071 - GOOG-ROWE-00078072 GOOG-ROWE-00078069 - GOOG-ROWE-00078070 GOOG-ROWE-00083094 - GOOG-ROWE-00083095 GOOG-ROWE-00083096 GOOG-ROWE-00083097 - GOOG-ROWE-00083098
P134	Ulku Rowe Compensation Letters GOOG-ROWE- 000 17984 - GOOG-ROWE- 000 17985 GOOG-ROWE- 000 1795 8 - GOOG-ROWE- 000 17959 GOOG-ROWE-00078216 - GOOG-ROWE-00078217 GOOG-ROWE-00078244 - GOOG-ROWE-00078245 GOOG-ROWE-00078294 - GOOG-ROWE-00078295 GOOG-ROWE-00083067 - GOOG-RO WE-00083068 GOOG-RO WE-00083 069 GOOG-RO WE-00083 070 - GOOG-RO WE-00083 071
P135	Paul Strong Compensation Letters GOOG-ROWE-00067249 - GOOG-ROWE-00067250 GOOG-ROWE-00067251 - GOOG-ROWE-00067252 GOOG-ROWE-00067247 - GOOG-ROWE-00067248 GOOG-ROWE-00068466 - GOOG-ROWE-00068467 GOOG-ROWE-00078292 - GOOG-ROWE-00078293 GOOG-ROWE-00083046 - GOOG-ROWE-00083047

Exhibit No.	Description
	GOOG-ROWE-00083048 GOOG-ROWE-00083049 - GOOG-ROWE-00083050
P136	Ben Wilson Compensation Letters GOOG-ROWE-00053787.R GOOG-ROWE-00053788.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053789.R GOOG-ROWE-00053790.R - GOOG-ROWE-00053791.R GOOG-ROWE-00068464 - GOOG-ROWE-00068465
P137	Stuart Breslow Offer Letter, Dated Apr 25, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00060576 - GOOG-ROWE-00060578
P138	Jonathan Donaldson Offer Letter, Dated Jan 31, 2017 GOOG-ROWE-00054163 - GOOG-RO WE-00054165
P139	Evren Eryurek Offer Letter, Dated Sep 26, 2016 GOOG-RO WE-00054168 - GOOG-ROWE-00054170
P140	Nicholas Harteau Offer Letter, Dated Apr 11, 2017 GOOG-RO WE-00054161 - GOOG-ROWE-00054162
P141	Yolande Piazza Offer, Dated Aug 3, 2022 GOOG-ROWE-00078198 - GOOG-RO WE-00078202
P142	Ulku Rowe Offer Letter, Dated Dec 9, 2016 GOOG-ROWE-00017920 - GOOG-ROWE-00017922
P143	Paul Strong Offer Letter, Dated Dec 13,2016 GOOG-ROWE-00064798 - GOOG-ROWE-00064800
P144	Ben Wilson Offer Letter, Dated Jan 4,2017 GOOG-ROWE-00054166 - GOOG-ROWE-00054167
P145	Google LLC's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Second Amended Complaint [ECF 111]
P146	Defendant Google LLCs Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Admission
P149	Shaukat Email to Marotte Dated Aug 8,2018 GOOG-ROWE-00017533 - GOOG-ROWE-000 17538
P150	Greene Email to Shaukat Dated Jun 22, 2018 GOOG-ROWE-00056487 - GOOG-ROWE-00056488

Exhibit No.	Description
P151	Ulku Rowe Dossier GOOG-RO WE-00054218 - GOOG-RO WE-00054264
DI	GOOG-RO WE-000173 75.R-173 78.R Email chain dated November 15-17, 2017
D2	P001586 Rowe summary notes from discussion with Lawrence
D3	GOOG-ROWE- 00017406 17407 Email chain dated January 10, 2018
D4	GOOG-ROWE- 00017410-17411 Email chain dated May 8-9, 2018
D5	GOOG-RO WE-00017425-17426 Email chain dated June 13, 2018
D6	GOOG-RO WE-P-00000821 GOOG-RO WE-P-00004550-04552 Position Specifications for Head of Financial Services, Google Cloud
D7	GOOG-ROWE-00017554 Email dated August 20, 2018
D8	GOOG-ROWE-P-00001229 Email dated August 28, 2018
D9	GOOG-ROWE-000 17555-17557 Email chain dated August 28-29, 2018
D10	GOOG-RO WE-00017565 .R-l 7566.R Email dated September 1, 2018
D11	GOOG-ROWE-00017568 Email dated September 21, 2018
D12	GOOG-ROWE-00017589-17591 Email chain dated November 7-8, 2018
D13	GOOG-ROWE- 000 17598 Email dated November 12, 2018

Exhibit No.	Description
D14	P000102 Email dated November 13, 2018
D15	GOOG-RO WE-00017642 Email chain dated December 4, 2018
D16	GOOG-ROWE-00017643 Email dated December 5, 2018
D17	GOOG-RO WE-00018015 Investigation Notes for discussion with Ulku
D18	GOOG-ROWE-00030107-30112 Policy on Harassment, Discrimination, Retaliation, Standards of Conduct, and Workplace Concerns (US & LATAM)
D19	GOOG-ROWE-00053767 Candidate Leveling Resources - Our Leveling Philosophy
D20	GOOG-ROWE-00060571-60573 Email chain dated February 4-25, 2020
D21	GOOG-ROWE-00055391-55393 Pay Equity at Google Policy
D23	GOOG-ROWE-00060579.R-60590.R Breslow application interview feedback
D24*	GOOG-RO WE-00063078-63111 Donaldson Hiring Packet
D25*	GOOG-ROWE-00056318.R-56346.R Harteau Hiring Packet
D26*	GOOG-RO WE-00019097. R-l 9146.R Rowe Hiring Packet
D27*	GOOG-RO WE-00061880 61904 Strong Hiring Packet
D28*	GOOG-RO WE-00062214-62241 Wilson Hiring Packet
D29	GOOG-ROWE-00053 826.R-53 832.R GOOG-ROWE- 00053837.R-53840.R

Exhibit No.	Description
	Breslow Performance Reviews
D30	GOOG-ROWE-00056312-56315 GOOG-ROWE- 00056287-56294 GOOG-ROWE-00056276-56282 GOOG-ROWE-00056303-56311 GOOG-ROWE- 00056283-56286 GOOG-ROWE-00082943-82949 GOOG-ROWE-00082764-82771 GOOG-ROWE- 00079130-79133 GOOG-ROWE-00079382-79386 Donaldson Performance Reviews
D31	GOOG-ROWE-00053833.R-53835.R GOOG-ROWE-00053891.R-53894.R GOOG-ROWE-00053852.R-53861.R GOOG-RO WE-00053885.R-53888.R GOOG-RO WE-00067197-67207 GOOG-RO WE-00067208-67213 GOOG-ROWE-00079099-79103 GOOG-ROWE-00078984-78993 GOOG-ROWE-00079145-79153 Eryurek Performance Reviews
D32	GOOG-ROWE-00053803.R-53810.R GOOG-ROWE- 00053820.R-53824.R Harteau Performance Reviews
D33	GOOG-ROWE-00017907-17913 GOOG-ROWE-000 17967-17971 GOOG-RO WE-00017936-17941 GOOG-ROWE-00017949-17957 GOOG-ROWE-00017919 GOOG-ROWE-00082816-82820 GOOG-RO WE-00082918-82922 GOOG-ROWE-00082726-82731 GOOG-ROWE-00082821-82827 GOOG-RO WE-00079122-79124 GOOG-ROWE-00079128-79129 GOOG-ROWE-00079156-79161 Rowe Performance Reviews
D34	GOOG-ROWE-00067253-67256 GOOG-ROWE-00067257-67264 GOOG-ROWE-00067272 GOOG-RO WE-00067265-67271 GOOG-RO WE-00067273 GOOG-ROWE-00082950-82955 GOOG-ROWE-00082637-82646 GOOG-ROWE-00079242 GOOG-ROWE-00079062-79063 GOOG-ROWE-00079056-79061 Strong Performance Reviews
D35	GOOG-RO WE-00053 848-53 851 GOOG-RO WE-00053869-53874 GOOG-ROWE-00053825.R GOOG-RO WE-00067225-67232 GOOG-ROWE-00067214-67218 GOOG-ROWE-00082732-82739 GOOG-

Exhibit No.	Description
	ROWE-00082900-82908 Wilson Performance Reviews
D38	P001584-1585 Eng-Wide Leveling Guide (2020 Perf)
D39	No Bates Number Solutions Consultant Job Ladder
D40*	GOOG-ROWE-P-00000827 828 Email dated July 17, 2018
D41	GOOG-ROWE-00056975 Email chain dated March 22-25, 2019
D42*	GOOG-RO WE-00061917-61966 Eryurek Hiring Packet
D44*	GOOG-RO WE-00063516-63589 Penberthy Hiring Packet
D46	GOOG-RO WE-00019062 Excel spreadsheet of gHire activity
D47	P000550-552 Email chain dated August 18-25, 2016
D48	GOOG-ROWE-00058500 Excel spreadsheet of October 2019 Rowe Analysis
D53	GOOG-ROWE-00054267 Breslow Job History
D54	GOOG-RO WE-00018551-18552 Breslow Resume
D56	P000729-733 Email chain dated June 13-14, 2018
D57	P000735 Rowe Notes from Conversation with Shaukat
D58	GOOG-RO WE-P-00000773-775 Email chain dated June 27, 2018

Exhibit No.	Description
D59	GOOG-ROWE-00059673-59677 Email chain dated July 3 - August 6, 2018
D60	GOOG-RO WE-00057051 57052 Email dated September 21,2018
D61	GOOG-ROWE-00057020 Email dated October 19, 2018
D63	GOOG-RO WE-00017717-17720 Technical Solutions Consultant Ladder
D67	GOOG-RO WE-00018011-18013 Email chain dated August 29 - November 13, 2018
D70*	GOOG-ROWE-00055394.R-55418.R Layfield - My gHire
D71*	GOOG-ROWE-0006233 7-62344 Clark - My gHire
D74	GOOG-ROWE-00082370-82372 Status Report: Vice President, Financial Services Sales, Google Cloud - NYC dated February 21, 2020
D75	GOOG-RO WE-00082367-823 69 Job Description - Financial Services Industry Leader, Google Cloud
D76	GOOG-RO WE-000823 59-823 66 Status Report: Vice President, Financial Services Sales, Google Cloud-NYC, dated February 14, 2020
D77	GOOG-RO WE-000823 56-82358 Status Report: Vice President, Financial Services Sales, Google Cloud - NYC, dated January 28,2020
D78	GOOG-RO WE-00082351-82355 Status Report: Vice President, Financial Services Sales, Google Cloud-NYC, dated February 7, 2020
D79*	GOOG-RO WE-00078164-78169 Piazza Hiring Packet
D81	GOOG-ROWE-00060560-60562

Exhibit No.	Description
	Job Description - Financial Services Industry Leader, Google Cloud
D82	GOOG-ROWE-00069067-69071 Bodkin Workday (2022)
D83	GOOG-ROWE-00068834-68838 Bums Workday (2022)
D84	GOOG-ROWE-00068890-68894 East Workday (2022)
D85	GOOG-ROWE-00068703-68708 Hildebrand Workday (2022)
D86	GOOG-ROWE-00064541 64544 Kropf Workday (2022)
D87	GOOG-ROWE-00068515-68518 McCormack Workday (2022)
D88	GOOG-ROWE-00068946-68951 Marano Workday (2022)
D89	GOOG-ROWE-00068895-68900 Moscaro Workday (2022)
D90	GOOG-ROWE-00068797-68801 Minton Workday (2022)
D91	GOOG-ROWE-00069008-69015 Penberthy Workday (2022)
D92	GOOG-ROWE-00068680-68683 Schenk Workday (2022)
D93	GOOG-ROWE-00068776-68779 Sternberg Workday (2022)
D94	GOOG-ROWE-00068606-68610 Stiekes Workday (2022)
D95	GOOG-ROWE-00019996-19997 Tech/Non-Tech Promotion Policy

Exhibit No.	Description
D96	GOOG-ROWE-00078369-78374 Wilson Workday (2022)
D97	GOOG-ROWE-00078434-78440 Eryurek Workday (2022)
D98	GOOG-ROWE-00078508-78514 Rowe Workday (2022)
D99	GOOG-ROWE-0007853 0-78535 Donaldson Workday (2022)
D100	GOOG-ROWE-00078460-78464 Harteau Workday (2022)
D101	GOOG-ROWE-00078411-78417 Strong Workday (2022)
D102	GOOG-ROWE-00068214-68254 GOOG-ROWE-00067314-67348 GOOG-ROWE-00068255-68297 GOOG-ROWE-00067464-67495 GOOG-ROWE-00067600-67632 GOOG-ROWE-0006753 8-67585 GOOG-ROWE-00067931-67955 GOOG-ROWE-00068171 682I3 GOOG-ROWE-00067282-67313 GOOG-ROWE-00067349-67365 GOOG-ROWE-000673 92-67432 GOOG-ROWE-00067633-67652 GOOG-ROWE-00067729-67743 GOOG-ROWE-00067685-67728 GOOG-ROWE-00068298-68332 GOOG-ROWE-00068333-68366 Equity Account Summaries (2021)

WITNESS LIST

Date	Witness
10/10/2023	Ulku Rowe, Plaintiff
10/11/2023	Ulku Rowe, Plaintiff (continued) Tariq Shaukat
10/12/2023	Tariq Shaukat (continued) Kevin Lucas Stuart Vardaman
10/13/2023	Stuart Vardaman (continued) Stuart Breslow William Grannis
10/18/2023	William Grannis (continued) Nicholas Harteau April Beaupain Ashley Tessier Ben Wilson, via deposition (live reading) Evren Eryurek, via deposition (live reading) Nora Ostrofe, via video conference Jennifer Burdis, via video deposition Chris Humez
10/19/2023	Chris Humez (continued) Krista Callaghan Brian Stevens Melissa Lawrence Kirsten Kliphouse Patricia Florissi

VERDICT FORM

According to the principles of law as charged by the Court and the facts as you find them, please answer the following questions:

I. Liability

A. New York Labor Law § 194

1. Has Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Google paid Ms. Rowe less than Nicholas Harteau or Stuart Breslow in violation of New York Labor Law § 194?

Nicholas Harteau: YES_______________ NO_______________

Stuart Breslow: YES_______________ NO_______________

If your answer is “No” to both persons in Question 1, proceed to Question 3 without answering Questions 2. If your answer is “Yes” to either person in Question 1, proceed to Question 2 only as to the person(s) for whom you answered “Yes.”

2. Has Defendant, Google, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the differential in pay between Ms. Rowe and Mr. Harteau or Mr. Breslow was the result of a bona fide factor other than sex, which was job-related and justified by business necessity?

Nicholas Harteau: YES_______________ NO_______________

Stuart Breslow: YES_______________ NO_______________

B. New York City Human Rights Law (Gender Discrimination)

3. Has Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant, Google, has on at least one occasion treated her less well, at least in part, because of her gender?

YES_______________ NO_______________

C. New York City Human Rights Law (Retaliation)

4. Has Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, established by a preponderance of evidence that Defendant, Google, has on at least one occasion retaliated against her in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law?

YES_______________ NO_______________

D. New York Labor Law (Retaliation)

5. Has Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, established by a preponderance of evidence that defendant, Google, has on at least one occasion retaliated against her in violation of the New York Equal Pay Law?

YES_______________ NO_______________

if you answered “No” to Questions 3, 4, and 5 andeither answered “No” to both persons in Question 1 or “Yes” to both persons in Question 2, please do not answer any further questions and have the foreperson sign and date the verdict sheet. Otherwise, please answer the questions in Section II.

II. Damages

6. Has Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she suffered any injury or any actual damages as a result of Google's unlawful conduct?

YES_______________ NO_______________

If you have answered “Yes” to Question 6, please proceed to Question 7. Ifyou have answered “No” to Question 6, you must award Plaintiff Ulku Rowe $1: Stop here, have the foreperson sign and date this Verdict Sheet, and advise the Court by note that you have reached a verdict.

A. Back Pay

7. What amount of back pay, if any, do you find that Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, has proved by a preponderance of the evidence?

$___________________

B. Statutory Damages Under New York Labor Law

8. Of the amount awarded in Question 7, how much, if any, is attributable to damages incurred in connection with answering Yes to Section I.A?

$___________________

9. Has Defendant, Google, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it had a good faith and reasonable basis to believe that its underpayment, as found in Question 8, was in compliance with the law?

YES_______________ NO_______________

If your answer is “No” to Question 9, please proceed to Question 10. If your answer is “Yes” to Question 9, please proceed to Question 11 without answering Question 10.

10. Has Plaintiff, Ulku Rowe, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Google's underpayment, as found in Question 8, was willful?

YES_______________ NO_______________

C. Compensatory Damages Under New York City Human Rights Law

11. If you answered “Yes” to Question 3 or Question 4, state the amount of noneconomic damages that you award to the Plaintiff, if any, for emotional distress, pain and suffering, or mental anguish:

$___________________

D. Punitive Damages Under New York City Human Rights Law

12. If you answered “Yes” to Question 3 or Question 4, do you find that Defendant, Google, should be subjected to punitive damages under the New York City Human Rights Law?

YES_______________ NO_______________

13. If you answered “Yes” to Question 12, state the amount of punitive damages, if any, that you award to Plaintiff:

$___________________

Please have the foreperson sign and date this Verdict Sheet and advise the Court by note that you have reached a verdict.