Summary
holding trial court is not required "to review a convicted person's entire trial record in ruling on a motion for post-conviction DNA testing"
Summary of this case from Nicholas v. StateOpinion
No. 05-03-00049-CR
Opinion issued October 29, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F95-02453-QI. AFFIRMED
Before Justices MORRIS, O'NEILL, and LANG.
OPINION
In this appeal, James Arnett Roughley challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for post-conviction DNA testing. He complains in three points of error that the trial court erred by failing to consider the entire record of his original trial, finding that identity was not an issue in his case, and finding that he did not show a reasonable probability exists that he would not have been prosecuted or convicted if the DNA test results were exculpatory. We conclude appellant's arguments are without merit and affirm the trial court's order. During his murder trial, appellant admitted he stabbed the complainant in the neck with a steak knife and threw him over a balcony, but he claimed he had acted in self-defense. He asserted that the complainant had attacked him with a pocketknife and, at one point during their struggle, cut his hands. In his first point of error, appellant complains the trial court erred by failing to consider the entire trial record before denying his motion. In its order, the trial court states it reviewed "the briefs filed by the parties and the supporting documents thereto" in determining that identity was not an issue in appellant's case. The statutes discussing motions for post-conviction DNA testing do not require trial courts to review a convicted person's entire trial record in ruling on a motion for post-conviction DNA testing; rather, they provide that the convicted person must include with the motion an affidavit "containing statements of fact in support of the motion." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(a) (Vernon Supp. Pamph. 2003); see also Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Before a trial court can order post-conviction DNA testing, the convicted person must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a reasonable probability exists that he would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing. SeeTex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A). Appellant, therefore, must provide specific references to the original trial to meet this burden. The State, for its part, is entitled to refute the convicted person's assertions with references of its own. Because the trial court was not required to examine the entire record of appellant's murder trial, we overrule appellant's first point of error. In his second point of error, appellant complains the trial court erred in finding that identity was not an issue in his case. Unless it finds that identity was or is an issue in the original trial, a convicting court may not order post-conviction DNA testing. See id. art. 64.03(a)(1)(B). Because the question of whether an identity was an issue in the case is an application-of-law-to-fact question, we review the trial court's determination de novo. See Eubanks v. State, 113 S.W.3d 562, 565 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet. h.). Here, appellant contends, despite his admission that he stabbed the complainant and threw him over a balcony, identity was an issue in his case because "[t]he identity of the first aggressor was critical to [his] claim of self-defense." We disagree. There was no "identity" issue in appellant's claim of self-defense. The critical assertion of appellant's self-defense claim was not the complainant's identity as the first aggressor but the fact of first aggression by the complainant. In other words, as the State points out in its brief, the issue in appellant's case was not " who committed the crime" but rather " why appellant stabbed [the complainant]." Appellant admitted he caused the complainant's death. For the purposes of article 64.03, there was no identity issue in his trial. We overrule appellant's second point of error. In his final point of error, appellant complains the trial court erred by finding appellant did not show a reasonable probability exists that he would not have been prosecuted or convicted if DNA results were exculpatory. As discussed above, a trial court may order post-conviction DNA testing only if the court finds, among other things, that identity was or is an issue in the case. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(a)(1)(B). Because we have already determined in appellant's second point of error that identity was not an issue in appellant's trial, we need not address this additional complaint. We overrule appellant's third point of error. We affirm the trial court's order denying appellant's motion for post-conviction DNA testing.