The Annechinos also rely on Roth v. Kay, 35 Wn. App. 1, 664 P.2d 1299 (1983), to argue that Worthy and Reynolds voluntarily assumed a duty to properly structure their accounts and, therefore, can be held personally liable for failing to do so. In Roth, a worker brought a negligence claim against a doctor for failing to file his worker's compensation application with the Department of Labor and Industries.

In Roth v. Kay, this court observed, quoting Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, “ ‘It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.’ ” 35 Wn. App. 1 , 4, 664 P.2d 1299 (1983) (quoting Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236 , 239, 135 N.E. 275 (1922))

Furthermore, one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may be held liable for his or her negligence in carrying out the act. See Roth v. Kay, 35 Wn. App. 1, 4, 664 P.2d 1299 (1983). See also Curran v. City of Marysville, 53 Wn. App. 358, 365, 766 P.2d 1141 (1989) (one who voluntarily assumes responsibility for the care of a child has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect that child).

In Roth v. Kay, this court observed, quoting Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, " 'It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.' " 35 Wash.App. 1, 4, 664 P.2d 1299, (1983) (quoting Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, (1922) ). The principle applies in voluntary rescue cases.

'It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.' Roth v. Kay, 35 Wn. App. 1, 4, 664 P.2d 1299 (1983) (quoting Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276, 233 N.Y. 236 (1922)) (internal quotations omitted). Whether a duty exists is a question of law.

In those cases, the courts held that a person who chooses to assist another, even gratuitously, inducing reliance on that assistance, may be liable for failure to exercise reasonable care. See Alston v. Blythe, 88 Wn. App. 26, 943 P.2d 692 (1997); Roth v. Kay, 35 Wn. App. 1, 664 P.2d 1299 (1983); Sheridan v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 3 Wn.2d 423, 100 P.2d 1024 (1940). These principles are inapplicable here because Gonzaga did not undertake to render aid or warn John Doe.

The Wilberts next contend that Metro affirmatively undertook a duty to enforce its alcohol policy, and that its failure to cancel the event because of violations of the alcohol policy proximately caused Wilbert's death. The Wilberts rely upon Roth v. Kay, 35 Wn. App. 1, 4, 664 P.2d 1299 (1983), which held that "one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." The Wilberts have cited numerous violations of the alcohol policy which, for the purposes of summary judgment, we accept as true. These included (1) late application by Ghetto Down for its banquet permit, (2) public advertising of the event, (3) opening the event to the public, (4) selling alcohol by Ghetto to patrons, (5) consuming alcohol outside the room rented, (6) consuming alcohol by minors, and (7) allowing more patrons (300) than estimated in the application (150).

Even after he stopped his truck, he still did not owe a duty to help Alston cross the street safely — unless and until he undertook to wave her in front of the truck and across the southbound lanes. If he did that, a jury could find that he assumed a duty to help Alston cross the street; that he was obligated to discharge that duty with reasonable care; and that he failed to exercise reasonable care by not perceiving Blythe, or by failing to warn of Blythe's presence. Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 86 Wn.2d 293, 299, 545 P.2d 13 (1975); Roth v. Kay, 35 Wn. App. 1, 4, 664 P.2d 1299 (1983); Panitz v. Orenge, 10 Wn. App. 317, 320, 518 P.2d 726 (1973).Brown, 86 Wn.2d at 299; see also Panitz, 10 Wn. App. at 320; Ashley v. Ensley, 44 Wn.2d 74, 78-79, 265 P.2d 829 (1954).

According to Lords, actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising during employment are recognized in Washington. He cites Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 65 Wn. App. 552, 829 P.2d 196, review granted, 120 Wn.2d 1011 (1992), Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1988), and Roth v. Kay, 35 Wn. App. 1, 4, 664 P.2d 1299, review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1026 (1983). [1]No Negligence Cause of Action.

Although there is no assertion that Barthel was required to do this, she and the Church still may be liable for negligence. See Roth v. Kay, 35 Wn. App. 1, 4, 664 P.2d 1299, review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1026 (1983) (voluntary assumption of a duty may give rise to liability for negligence). However, assuming that Barthel breached her duty of ordinary care by failing to accompany Black to the intersection, Barthel's negligence was not a proximate cause of Black's death.