P. 210. 210 F.2d 76, affirmed. Douglas D. Batchelor argued the cause for petitioners.

This section of the Jones Act has been interpreted to "give rights to employees against employers and against no other." Roth v. Cox, 210 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1954). Therefore, the Jones Act is only "applicable if the employment relationship exists."

Vega v. The Malula, 5 Cir. 1961, 291 F.2d 415; McMahon v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 5 Cir. 1962, 297 F.2d 268; Morales v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 5 Cir. 1953, 208 F.2d 218. Roth v. Cox, 5 Cir. 1954, 210 F.2d 76, aff'd, 348 U.S. 207, 75 S.Ct. 242, 99 L.Ed. 260. LeGate v. The Panamolga, 2 Cir. 1955, 221 F.2d 689; Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 3 Cir. 1951, 189 F.2d 303.

The Jones Act gives a seaman a right of action only against his employer “and against no others.” Roth v. Cox, 210 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1954).

(quoting F. Harper, F. James, O. Gray, 3 The Law of Torts § 10.2 at 46 (2d ed. 1986)). Under the Jones Act, a seaman cannot sue a fellow employee for negligence. Pullman v. Bouchard Transp. Co., No. 99-3008, 2000 WL 1818496, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2000); see also Roth v. Cox, 210 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 207 (1955) ("[T]here is nothing in the Jones Act which grants to seaman a right to bring an action against anyone except his employer . . . .") Because Thompson cannot be directly liable to Lacour under the Jones Act, Yellow Fin is barred from seeking indemnification from Thompson for Lacour's personal injury claims. The Ninth Circuit reached an identical result in California Home Brands, Inc. v. Ferreira. 871 F.2d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that "[s]ince indemnity is only available where the would be indemnitor is independently liable to the injured party, a shipowner-employer has no right to be indemnified by its employee for damages paid to another crewmember under the Jones Act").

It is well-settled under the Jones Act and even before its enactment, that a seaman could not sue a fellow employee for negligence. See Roth v. Cox, 210 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1954); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.Ct. 483, 47 L.Ed. 760 (1903); Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 322 (N.D.Miss. 1980).

It is generally recognized that the Jones Act gives a seaman a right of action only against his employer, see, e. g., Petition of United States, 367 F.2d 505 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Black v. United States, 386 U.S. 932, 87 S.Ct. 953, 17 L.Ed.2d 805 (1966); Allen v. United States, 338 F.2d 160 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961, 85 S.Ct. 1104, 14 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964); Hartsfield v. Seafarers International Union, Atlantic Gulf Lakes and Inland Waters District, AFL-CIO, 427 F.Supp. 264 (S.D.Ala.1977); Stallworth v. McFarland, 350 F.Supp. 920 (W.D.La.1972). In Roth v. Cox, 210 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1954), the Fifth Circuit stated: The Jones Act, 46 USCA s 688 provides that a seaman suffering injury " in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, ... and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law ... and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable."

The Jones Act requires that the employee has rights only against his employer and no others. "[T]here is nothing in the Jones Act which grants to seamen a right to bring an action against anyone except his employer. . . ." Roth v. Cox, 210 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir., 1954). The injury must be sustained in the course of employment during the employee-employer relationship.

Roth v. Bird, 239 F.2d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 1956). See Roth v. Cox, 210 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1954). The Ninth Circuit relied on Roth and Schulz v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. in affirming the trial court's denial of a petition for limitation of liability in a Jones Act action sounding in negligence for the disappearance of a tugboat.

The respondent shipowner concedes that, had Section 30 of Article 75 not been repealed, the substitution would have to be ordered just as it was in The Student, 238 F. 936 (4 Cir., 1916). It is generally accepted that, where the law of a state provides rights and liabilities with respect to conduct within borders, including navigable waters, and where that law does not run counter to federal laws or matters particularly within exclusive federal jurisdiction, admiralty courts will entertain a libel in personam. See Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 61 S.Ct. 687, 85 L.Ed. 903 (1941); Roth v. Cox, 210 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir., 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 207, 75 S.Ct. 242, 99 L.Ed. 260; Abbott, Adm'x v. United States, D.C., 207 F. Supp. 468, 1962 AMC 2350, 2357, and Union Carbide Corporation v. Goett, 256 F.2d 449, at 453 (4th Cir., 1958), wherein it was said: "A cause of action for damages accrued prior to a decedent's death, whether based on unseaworthiness or on negligence, will survive if the applicable state statute so provides."