Pike argues that § 4.24.010, which creates a cause of action for mental anguish in an action by a parent for the death of a child, should be construed to allow a child to recover similar damages in an action for the wrongful death of the parent. The Washington Court of Appeals held in Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 2d 92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979), that section 4.24.010 does not permit recovery for mental anguish by the child of an injured parent. Roth expressly rejected the argument made by Pike here that section 4.24.010 should be construed to permit a child to recover damages similar to those recoverable by the parent.

Twenty-one years later, the Court of Appeals addressed the same issue and it too declined to adopt the cause of action. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979). In Roth, three minor children sought damages "for loss of companionship, advice, destruction of the parent-child relationship, and future support, and emotional injury" after their mother suffered a severe stroke allegedly caused by her ingestion of birth control pills manufactured by one of the defendants. Roth, at 93.

Meredith v Scruggs, supra (Hawaii law); Turner v Atlantic C L R Co, 159 F. Supp. 590 (ND Ga, 1958) (South Carolina law); Hill v Sibley Memorial Hospital, 108 F. Supp. 739 (D DC, 1952); Jeune v Del E Webb Construction Co, 77 Ariz. 226, 227; 269 P.2d 723 (1954); Borer v American Airlines, Inc, supra, p 451; Clark v Suncoast Hospital, Inc, 338 So.2d 1117, 1118-1119 (Fla App, 1976); Halberg v Young, supra; Hankins v Derby, 211 N.W.2d 581, 584-585 (Iowa, 1973); Hoffman v Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 167-169; 368 P.2d 57 (1962); Sabatier v Travelers Ins Co, 184 So.2d 594, 595 (La App, 1966); Eschenbach v Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378; 263 N.W. 154 (1935); Bradford v Union Electric Co, 598 S.W.2d 149 (Mo App, 1979); Hoesing v Sears, Roebuck Co, 484 F. Supp. 478 (D Neb, 1980); General Electric Co v Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 368; 498 P.2d 366, 371 (1972); Russell v Salem Transportation Co, supra, p 506; Duhan v Milanowski, supra; Gibson v Johnston, 75 Ohio Law Abstract 413; 144 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ohio App, 1956); Roth v Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 101-104; 600 P.2d 602 (1979). The Michigan Court of Appeals reached the same result in Hayrynen v White Pine Copper Co, 9 Mich. App. 452; 157 N.W.2d 502 (1968).

en v. Guerrero, 420 So.2d 656 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982); Mueller v. Hellrung Constr. Co., 107 Ill.App.3d 337, 63 Ill. Dec. 140, 437 N.E.2d 789 (Ill.App.Ct. 1982); Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 231 Kan. 588, 647 P.2d 1263 (Kan. 1982); Kelly v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 353 So.2d 349 (La.App. 1977), appeal dismissed, 357 So.2d 1144 (La. 1978); Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Bradford v. Union Electric Co., 598 S.W.2d 149 (Mo.Ct.App. 1979); General Electric Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Russell v. Salem Trans. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972); De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 84 A.D.2d 17, 445 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1981), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626, 449 N.E.2d 406 (1983); Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1980); Gibson v. Johnston, 75 Ohio App.2d 413, 144 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio Ct.App. 1956), appeal dismissed, 166 Ohio St. 288, 141 N.E.2d 767 (1957); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318 (1982); Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602 (Wash.Ct.App. 1979).See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858 (1977).

The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies only when an issue actually has been litigated and decided in a prior action by a valid and final judgment. However, the Washington courts have held that denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wash.App. 92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979). The Washington courts have also stated that an order which is not appealable is not a final judgment.

Law); Jeune v. Del E. Webb Construction Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 227, 269 P.2d 723, 724 (1954), overruled on other grounds, Glendale v. Bradshaw, 108 Ariz. 582, 503 P.2d 803 (1972); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 310, 563 P.2d 858, 866 (1977); Clark v. Suncoast Hospital, Inc., 338 So.2d 1117, 1118-19 (Fla.Ct.App. 1976); Hankins v. Derby, 211 N.W.2d 581, 584-85 (Iowa 1973); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 167-169, 368 P.2d 57, 59-60 (1962); Sabatier v. Travelers Insurance Company, 184 So.2d 594, 595 (La.Ct.App. 1966); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 403-07, 37 N.W.2d 543, 546-47 (1949); General Electric Company v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 367, 498 P.2d 366, 371 (1972); Russell v. Salem Transport Company, 61 N.J. 502, 506, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc.2d 155, 158-61, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 839-41 (Sup.Ct. 1974); Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337, 246 N.W.2d 747, 753 (N.D. 1976); Gibson v. Johnston, 144 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ohio Ct.App. 1956); Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 101-104, 600 P.2d 602, 608-609 (1979). Only one court has found that a child may recover for loss of parental consortium when a nonfatal injury is involved.

In Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., see note 1, supra, the Washington Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for loss of parental consortium. The Washington Court of Appeals had earlier refused to recognize the cause of action in Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602, 608 (1979). In Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424-25 (1981), the Michigan Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for parental consortium.

At the time of the mother's death, Washington law did not permit recovery for loss of parental consortium. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979). In 1984, 4 years after the accident, this court decided to permit such recovery, but explicitly made its holding prospective only.

(Citations omitted.) Roth v. Bell, 24 Wash. App. 92, 100, 600 P.2d 602 (1979). "In applying the common law to an unprecedented situation, [the court] may properly inquire whether the traditional rule is suited to present conditions."

Denial of a motion for summary judgment is generally not an appealable order, RAP 2.2(a), and discretionary review of such orders is not ordinarily granted. See Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 104, 600 P.2d 602 (1979). It may be granted, however, where "the superior court has committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless; . . ." RAP 2.3(b)(1).