Opinion
Opinion filed May 29, 1933.
1. LIMITATIONS OF ACTION — when admission is sufficient to revive debt. An unqualified admission that a debt is due and unpaid, accompanied by nothing said or done to rebut the presumption of a promise to pay it, is sufficient to revive the debt as against the statute of limitations.
2. LIMITATIONS OF ACTION — when new promise to pay is implied. If the debtor clearly admits the debt to be due and unpaid and uses language indicating an intention to pay it, a new promise to pay, effective against the running of the statute of limitations, is implied.
3. LIMITATIONS OF ACTION — when admissions of liability and payment of interest prevent corporation's pleading statute as defense. A corporation cannot plead the five-year statute of limitations against its liability to the makers of a note representing money borrowed, at the request of the corporation's president, for the corporation's use, when, almost every time the note came due and regularly was renewed, through a series of years extending down to a time within less than five years before the maker's suit against the corporation was brought, the corporation's president admitted the corporation's debt to the note's makers and stated that the corporation would pay the debt when it was in a position to do so, and when, less than five years before the bringing of the suit, the corporation, as it had been accustomed to do in accordance with agreement, itself paid the interest on the note directly to the payee.
Appeal by defendant from the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. WILLIAM B. WRIGHT, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1933. Affirmed. Opinion filed May 29, 1933.
W. G. MURPHY, for appellant.
WILSON WILSON and KRAMER, CAMPBELL, COSTELLO WIECHERT, for appellees.
In 1923 Richard Wiechert was president and S. A. Ross, appellee, was secretary of the appellant. The corporation was in need of funds and the president requested Mr. Ross to secure $1,000 for its use. Mr. Ross and his father Phillip Ross went to the bank and borrowed that amount on their own note and deposited $1,000 to the credit of appellant. That note was renewed every 90 days until late in 1929. By mutual agreement between the parties appellant paid the interest directly to the bank instead of paying it to appellees. During all of that time Mr. Wiechert continued to be president of appellant. About every time the note came due he admitted that the debt to appellees was due and that appellant would pay it when it was in a position to do so. Such a promise was made as late as the winter of 1928. After Mr. Ross severed his connection with appellant, appellant paid no further interest. The last interest paid by appellant was on September 28, 1929. Appellees then paid the bank the amount of the note and sued appellant. A jury was waived and appellees recovered a judgment for $1,185.26.
On the trial appellant offered no evidence. It filed a plea of the general issue and a plea of the five-year statute of limitations. An unqualified admission that a debt is due and unpaid, accompanied by nothing said or done to rebut the presumption of a promise to pay it, is sufficient to revive the debt against the Statute of Limitations; Sneed v. Parker, 262 Ill. App. 333; Carroll v. Forsyth, 69 Ill. 127. If the debtor clearly admits the debt to be due and unpaid, and uses language indicating an intention to pay it, a new promise to pay is implied; Walker v. Freeman, 209 Ill. 17.
Under the law and the evidence the statute of limitations presents no defense to the action. Some complaint is made in regard to the rulings of the court on the admission and exclusion of evidence but there is no reversible error and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.