Ross v. Denan

7 Citing cases

  1. Kosich v. Poultrymen's Service Corp.

    136 N.J. Eq. 571 (N.J. 1945)   Cited 15 times
    In Kosich v. Poultrymen's Service Corp., 136 N.J. Eq. 571, 43 A.2d 15, the Court said, quoting from Hennessy v. Carmony, Ch., 50 N.J. Eq. 616, 25 A. 374: My neighbor "has no right... to throw sand, earth, or water upon my land in ever so small a quantity.

    Noises, vibrations, dust, dirt, and offensive odors have all been declared nuisances under certain circumstances in this jurisdiction. Some of the decisions in point are: Ross v. Butler ( Chancery), (smoke and cinders, noise and offensive odors), 19 N.J. Eq. 294; Demarest v. Hardham (vibrations), supra; Hennessy v. Carmony (noises and vibrations), supra;Seligman v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (noises and vibrations), 71 N.J. Eq. 697; 63 Atl. Rep. 1093; affirmed on the opinion below, 72 N.J. Eq. 946; 73 Atl. Rep. 1118; Reilley v. Curley ( Court of Chancery), (noise), 75 N.J. Eq. 57;71 Atl. Rep. 700; Kroecker v. The Camden Coke Co. ( Court ofChancery), (smoke, cinders, soot, dirt and offensive odors), 82 N.J. Eq. 373; 88 Atl. Rep. 955; Wallace Tiernan Co., Inc., v. U.S. Cutlery Co. (vibrations), supra; Ross v. Denan ( Courtof Errors and Appeals), (noises, smoke and offensive odors), 101 N.J. Eq. 281; 137 Atl. Rep. 416; Friedman v. Keil ( Courtof Errors and Appeals), (smoke, noise and odors), 113 N.J. Eq. 37;166 Atl. Rep. 194; Abend v. Royal Laundry Service, Inc. ( Court of Errors and Appeals), (increased smoke, noise, vibration and soot), 122 N.J. Eq. 77; 192 Atl. Rep. 239;Melucci v. Egan ( Court of Errors and Appeals), (noise and offensive vapors), 124 N.J. Eq. 241; 1 Atl. Rep. 2d 452;Benton v. Kernan (noxious odors, noise and vibration), supra. (1) DUST, DIRT, MEAL, CHAFF AND GRAIN RESIDUE:

  2. Damadio v. Levinsohn

    161 A. 504 (N.J. 1932)   Cited 4 times

    Noise alone may constitute a nuisance, but, in determining whether it is a nuisance, the character and volume, and the time, place and duration of its occurrence and the locality must be considered. Peragallo v. Luner, 99 N.J. Eq. 726, 729;Cleveland v. Citizens Gas Light Co., supra; Reilley v. Curley, 75 N.J. Eq. 57. The real question in all such cases is the question of fact, viz., whether the annoyance is such as materially to interfere with the ordinary comfort, physically, of human existence. Kroecker v. Camden Coke Co., supra; Ross v. Denan, 101 N.J. Eq. 281, 283. The complainants herein are a grocer and a tailor, respectively, lessees of stores in a building owned by the defendant Levinsohn, the upper part of which building is leased to the defendant Stetson Shirt Company. Complainants not only urge that the noise and vibration of which they complain as nuisance subject them to a condition of discomfort which warrants equitable relief in their behalf by means of injunction, but they also claim they suffer a loss of business in consequence of such noise and vibration, and that such loss is not measurable in damages and therefore injunction should issue.

  3. Bloch v. McCown

    135 So. 633 (Ala. 1931)   Cited 4 times

    A gasoline filling station and tire service station, though not a nuisance per se, will become a nuisance when erected in a residential section, surrounded by residences. Bloch v. McCown, 219 Ala. 656, 123 So. 213; Higgins v. Bloch, 213 Ala. 209, 104 So. 429; Magnolia Pet. Co. v. Wright, 124 Okl. 55, 254 P. 41; McPherson v. Presbyterian Church, 120 Okl. 40, 248 P. 561, 31 A.L.R. 1215; Laughlin, Wood Co. v. Cooney, 220 Ala. 556, 126 So. 864; White v. Luquire Funeral Home, 221 Ala. 440, 129 So. 84; Selma v. Jones, 202 Ala. 83, 79 So. 476, L.R.A. 1918F, 1020; Ross v. Denan, 101 N.J. Eq. 281, 137 A. 416; Carney v. Penn Oil Co., 291 Pa. 371, 140 A. 133; Tuscaloosa v. Standard Oil Co., 221 Ala. 670, 130 So. 186; Code 1923, § 9271. The statute authorizing a city to divide the territory within its corporate limits into business, industrial, and residential zones or districts cannot justify an ordinance undertaking to zone a distinctly residential section as a commercial district.

  4. Coal Supply Co. v. Garchev

    123 Ohio St. 316 (Ohio 1931)   Cited 5 times

    An examination of the petition certainly discloses that it states a case in equity, for injunction on account of a continuing private nuisance. Ross v. Denan, 101 N.J. Eq. 281, 137 A. 416; Faulkenbury v. Wells, 28 Tex. Civ. App., 621, 68 S.W. 327. The defendant admits the operation of the coal tipple.

  5. Oettinger v. Iwaskiw

    DOCKET NO. A-3966-17T3 (App. Div. Apr. 8, 2019)

    An actual injury to one's health is not required to establish that fumes, smoke, or odor constitute a nuisance. Ross v. Denan, 101 N.J. Eq. 281, 282 (E & A 1927); Benton v. Kernan, 127 N.J. Eq. 434, 462 (Ch. 1940), modified, 130 N.J. Eq. 193 (E. & A. 1941). Discomfort is enough:

  6. State v. Holland

    132 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 1975)   Cited 20 times
    In State v. Holland, 331 A.2d 626 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. 1975), the court upheld an ordinance very similar to sec. 24.04(1), MGO.

    The leading case, and the one most often cited, is Benton v. Kernan, 130 N.J. Eq. 193 (E. A. 1941) which laid down the test that "A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance . . . but it must be a noise which affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent", and it ". . . becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener" [at 198]. See Reilly v. Curley, 75 N.J. Eq. 57 (Ch. 1908); Kroecker v. Camden Coke Co., 82 N.J. Eq. 373 (Ch. 1913); Peragallo v. Luner, 99 N.J. Eq. 726 (Ch. 1926); Ross v. Denan, 101 N.J. Eq. 281 (E. A. 1927); Damadio v. Levinsohn, 111 N.J. Eq. 84 (Ch. 1932); Kosich v. Poultrymen's Service Corp., 136 N.J. Eq. 571 (Ch. 1945); Oechsle v. Ruhl, 140 N.J. Eq. 355 (Ch. 1947); Lou Menges Organization v. North Jersey Quarry Co., 3 N.J. Super. 494 (Ch.Div. 1949); State v. Mundet Cork Corp., 8 N.J. 359 (1952) cert. den. 344 U.S. 819, 73 S.Ct. 14, 97 L.Ed. 637 (1952); Hrycenko v. Bd. of Adjustment, Elizabeth, 27 N.J. Super. 376 (App.Div. 1953); Sans v. Ramsey Golf Country Club, Inc., 29 N.J. 438 (1959); aff'g 50 N.J. Super. 127 (App.Div. 1958); Protokowicz v. Lesofski, 69 N.J. Super. 436, 444-445 (Ch.Div. 1961); Weber v. Pieretti, 72 N.J. Super. 184 (Ch.Div. 1962) aff'd 77 N.J. Super. 423 (App.Div. 1962) certif. den. 39 N.J. 236 (1963); cf. Cranberry Lake Quarry Co. v. Johnson, 95 N.J. Super. 495 (App.Div. 1967) certif.

  7. Damadio v. Levinsohn

    161 A. 504 (Ch. Div. 1932)

    The real question in all such cases is the question of fact, viz. whether the annoyance is such as materially to interfere with the ordinary comfort, physically, of human existence. Kroecker v. Camden Coke Co., supra; Ross v. Denan, 101 N. J. Eq. 281, 283,137 A. 416. The complainants herein are a grocer and a tailor, respectively, lessees of stores in a building owned by the defendant Levinsohn, the upper part of which building is leased to the defendant Stetson Shirt Company.