Opinion
2:20-cv-01338-SB
02-27-2023
JAMES ARTHUR ROSS, Plaintiff, v. TYLER BLEWETT et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff James Arthur Ross (“Ross”) is a self-represented litigant in the custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”), currently housed at Two Rivers Correctional Institution (“TRCI”). This matter comes before the Court on Ross's motion for a preliminary injunction.(ECF No. 73.) In his motion, Ross requests that the Court order ODOC to provide him additional access to TRCI's law library or a “Securebook” laptop computer. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the district judge deny Ross's motion.
Ross titled this his third motion for a preliminary injunction, but in fact it is his fourth such motion. (See ECF Nos. 3, 20, 38, 73.)
BACKGROUND
On August 10, 2020, Ross filed this action against (now former) TRCI Superintendent Tyler Blewett, (now former) Oregon Governor Kate Brown, (now former) ODOC Director Colette Peters, and several other ODOC officials and employees (together, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to protect him from COVID-19. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8.)
On November 15, 2022, Ross filed the present motion for a preliminary injunction, alleging that TRCI's law library staff has been limiting his access to the law library to three visits per week, and requesting that the Court order ODOC personnel to increase his access to the law library, or provide him with a Securebook laptop computer, to allow him to perform timely legal work in connection with his several pending cases. (See generally Pl.'s Mot.) At the time Ross filed his motion, his operative complaint did not include any allegations regarding access to the law library, nor did Ross name any library officials as defendants. (See generally Am. Compl.)
DISCUSSION
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v.Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations omitted). The elements of the test are “balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d. 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (“For example, a stronger showing of irreparable harm to plaintiff might offset a lesser showing of likelihood of success on the merits.”). “When the government is a party, [the] last two factors merge.” Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).
A “mandatory injunction orders a responsible party to take action” and “is particularly disfavored.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2009) (simplified). The “already high standard for granting a TRO or preliminary injunction is further heightened when the type of injunction sought is a ‘mandatory injunction.'” Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 310 F.Supp.3d 1150, at 1156 (D. Or. 2018) (citing Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015)).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes additional restrictions on a court's ability to grant injunctive relief. Any such “[1] relief must be narrowly drawn, [2] extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and [3] be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). The PLRA requires that courts “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity[.]” Id.
The PLRA also requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, but Defendants have not asserted an exhaustion defense in response to Ross's current motion.
Finally, and importantly here, a plaintiff's motion for interim equitable relief must relate to the claims in his operative complaint. SeePac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med.Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 638 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The district court properly ruled that [the plaintiff's] motion for injunctive relief was unrelated to its underlying complaint. [The plaintiff] cannot seek interim equitable relief of a nature it is not seeking in the final adjudication of its lawsuit.”). The relationship with the operative complaint is sufficient if the temporary relief sought “would grant ‘relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.'” Id. at 636 (quoting De BeersConsol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)). While new allegations of misconduct may support additional claims against a defendant, “they do not support preliminary injunctions entirely unrelated to the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.” Id. Absent this relationship or nexus, the Court “lacks authority to grant the relief requested.” Id.
II. ANALYSIS
Ross moves the Court to order ODOC personnel to increase his access to the law library, or provide him with a Securebook laptop computer, to allow him to perform timely legal work in connection with his several pending cases.
As an initial matter, the Court must determine if the relief Ross seeks in his motion for a preliminary injunction has “a relationship or nexus to the underlying complaint.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, 810 F.3d at 637. In Ross's amended complaint, he sought relief for Defendants' alleged failure to protect him from exposure to COVID-19. (See generally Am. Compl.) In contrast here, Ross seeks a preliminary injunction to allow him additional access to the law library or, alternatively, a laptop computer. The preliminary injunctive relief Ross seeks bears no relation to the relief he sought in his operative complaint at the time of filing. Furthermore, Ross alleges misconduct by ODOC Legal Library Services Manager Amy Wray (“Wray”), and TRCI's law library personnel, whom Ross did not name as defendants in his operative complaint.
The Court lacks authority to grant preliminary injunctive relief because the relief Ross seeks has no relationship or nexus to the claims or remedies in his operative complaint at the time of filing, and therefore the Court recommends that the district judge deny Ross's motion. See Smith v. Gaulding, No. 2:19-09174 SVW (ADS), 2021 WL 8844647, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2021) (denying the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction requiring the nonparty prison law librarian to provide the plaintiff with additional access to the law library, and stating “[w]hile the Court acknowledges the complications Plaintiff faces as a result of being incarcerated, the Court lacks authority to grant the preliminary injunction because it has no relationship or nexus to the claims or remedies sought in the [operative complaint]” (citing Pac.Radiation Oncology, 810 F.3d at 636-37 and Quezada v. McDowell, No. ED CV 15-00613-VBF-KS, 2017 WL 11630640 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2017))); Felde v. Wilkins, No. 1:19-cv-000339-HBK (PC), 2021 WL 1050680, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2021) (denying motion for a preliminary injunction over nonparty prison library staff where the plaintiff's complaint “does not raise a denial of access to court claim or any claims concerning plaintiff's access to the law library” and the “plaintiff makes no assertion that either of the two named defendants have any authority over the law library” and “[t]hus, the court does not have authority to issue the requested injunctive relief sought” (citing Pac. Radiation Oncology, 810 F.3d at 633)), findings and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1966073 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2021); Quezada, 2017 WL 11630640, at *2 (denying motion for preliminary injunction to access prison law library where “the injury alleged in the [motion for preliminary injunction] is not sufficiently related to the conduct giving rise to the surviving claims in the operative pleading”).
Nevertheless, the Court appreciates Wray's recent instructions to TRCI library staff to increase access to the law library for “Priority Legal Users,” including Ross. (See Supp. Decl. Amy Wray ¶¶ 5-9, ECF No. 99.) In addition, the Court will continue to grant Ross's reasonable requests to extend his filing deadlines. (See ECF Nos. 33, 36, 46, 48, 71, 84, 97.)
While Ross's motion for preliminary injunction was still pending, he filed a Second Amended Complaint. (See Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), ECF No. 115.) In the SAC, Ross now alleges that Defendants failed to ensure adequate access to the law library during the pandemic. (See SAC ¶¶ 69(k), 107-08, 112-13.) Ross now names library officials as defendants, including Wray and TRCI's Eastside Law Library Coordinator. (See id. ¶¶ 26-27.) However, Ross does not allege any conduct specifically attributable to any of the defendant library officials, and therefore his new claims regarding unconstitutional denial of access to the courts are subject to dismissal. If Ross is able to amend his claims to allege unconstitutional denial of access to the courts attributable to specific library officials, and if Ross can demonstrate that any continued denial of access to the law library is causing him irreparable harm, he may file another motion for preliminary injunction. See Bishop v. Schriro, No. CV 08-0964-PHX-SMM (JRI), 2009 WL 735029, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2009) (“Injunctive relief may only be granted when a movant demonstrates by specific facts that there is a credible threat of immediate and irreparable harm. The Supreme Court has provided the standard for harm in the case of an [adult in custody's (“AIC”)] access to the courts-the [AIC] must submit evidence showing an ‘actual injury' resulting from defendants' actions. With respect to an existing case, the actual injury must be ‘actual prejudice' . . . ‘such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.'” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) and quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348 (1996))).
Ross's filing of a 48-page computer-generated SAC on February 22, 2023, more than a month before his April 4, 2023, filing deadline, belies his allegations that his access to the courts is constitutionally inadequate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that the district judge DENY Ross's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 73), without prejudice.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.