Opinion
Civil No. CCB-06-1315.
April 26, 2007
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Deborah Rose ("Rose") filed this civil action alleging that the defendant, Visiting Nurse Association of Maryland, LLC ("VNA"), discriminated against her on the basis of her chronic anxiety in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Now pending before me is VNA's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, I will grant VNA's motion.
Rose's opposition brief is titled, "Plaintiff Deborah Rose Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of Summary Judgment." Because Rose did not actually file a cross motion for summary judgment, I will deem her submission an opposition to VNA's motion for summary judgment and cite it accordingly.
BACKGROUND
Rose joined Bay Area Health Care, which VNA later acquired, as a certified nursing assistant in July 1988. (Rose Dep. at 17, Ex. A to Def.'s Mem.) Rose occasionally worked with the company's hospice program, but she spent most of her time in home care. ( Id.) In that capacity, Rose traveled to her patients' homes, where she bathed them, prepared their meals, and helped them exercise. ( Id. at 17-18.) Although Rose could have worked as a nursing assistant in a hospital or nursing home, she instead chose home care "because that's what I like." ( Id. at 12-13, 81-82.)Rose, however, suffered from chronic anxiety, particularly whenever she drove on bridges and beltways. ( Id. at 29, 31.) By avoiding bridges and beltways, Rose could otherwise function normally in her daily life. ( Id. at 32-33.) Therefore, at the outset of her employment, Rose was assigned routes that did not require travel over bridges or beltways. ( Id. at 33.)
The company, however, in 2003 shifted Rose to a "trucker's route," which apparently involved driving over bridges and beltways. ( Id. at 69.) This transition exacerbated Rose's anxiety, and on June 8, 2004, her physician wrote a letter recommending that she confine her driving to city streets "for the time being." (Letter from Arthur M. Hildreth (June 8, 2004), Ex. C to Def.'s Mem.) VNA responded that same day by placing Rose on a leave of absence. (Letter from Roy A. Bryan, Jr. to Deborah Rose (June 8, 2004), Ex. to Pl.'s Opp'n Mem.) VNA's director of human resources explained, "Unfortunately, your [driving] restriction will not allow us to schedule you for visits on your team. I also checked with other teams that do the city but they are fully staffed so I cannot move you to another team. Therefore, I have no choice but to put you on a leave of absence until your restriction is lifted." ( Id.) VNA eventually terminated Rose after she had been inactive with the company for a period of one year. (Letter from Roy A. Bryan, Jr. to Deborah Rose (May 22, 2006), Ex. to Pl.'s Opp'n Mem.)
In July 2004, after being ordered to take the leave of absence, Rose filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that VNA discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. (Charge of Discrimination, Ex. A to Compl.) The EEOC conducted an investigation and concluded in November 2004 that it had "reasonable cause" to believe VNA violated the ADA. (EEOC Determination at 2, Ex. to Pl.'s Opp'n Mem.) The EEOC, however, offered little reasoning in support of its determination.
The EEOC also suggested that Rose had been discriminated against because she asserted her right to a reasonable accommodation. (EEOC Determination at 1-2, Ex. to Pl.'s Opp'n Mem.) Rose offers no evidence or argument, however, in support of this assertion.
After the EEOC's attempts at conciliation failed, Rose filed this suit in May 2006. She alleges that VNA violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her impairment and by ultimately terminating her. (Compl. ¶¶ 15-35.) VNA, however, contends that Rose did not have a "disability" within the meaning of those statutes. I agree and will therefore grant VNA's motion for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment:
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
"The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment `may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must `set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness' credibility," Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002), but the court also must abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
A plaintiff asserting a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act must demonstrate that she had a "disability" according to those statutes. See Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 387 (4th Cir. 2001); Morris v. Mayor City Council of Balt., 437 F. Supp. 2d 508, 514 (D. Md. 2006). Those statutes define a "disability" as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Morris, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
Because the relevant provisions of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act parallel each other, Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 388 n. 13 (4th Cir. 2001), I will analyze all of Rose's claims together.
Rose apparently argues that her anxiety substantially limited her in the major life activity of working. (Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. at 3.) "The phrase `substantially limits' sets a threshold that excludes minor impairments from coverage under the ADA." E.E.O.C. v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 486-88 (1999)). An impairment substantially limits an employee's ability to work only where that employee is unable to work in "a broad class of jobs." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491. In other words, "one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice." Id. at 492. In the Fourth Circuit, an employee must demonstrate that because of her impairment, she was "generally foreclosed" from jobs utilizing her skills. Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 388 (citing Gupton v. Virginia, 14 F.3d 203, 205 (4th Cir. 1994)).
In the instant action, Rose's evidence of her inability to work in a broad class of jobs consists solely of her health care providers' diagnoses. (Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. at 3-4.) Such reports fall short of demonstrating disability within the meaning of the statutes. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) ("It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability status . . . to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment."). Furthermore, Rose was not disabled, because all other evidence shows that she could have used her skills to work elsewhere. For example, Rose conceded in her deposition that a nursing assistant could work in a hospital, nursing home, or hospice. (Rose Dep. at 12-13, 80-82, Ex. A to Def.'s Mem.) Assuming that these positions existed close to Rose's home, she could have taken the same route to work each day without driving over a bridge or beltway. Rose, however, chose home care, because that was what she liked to do. While that choice is understandable, and home care is indeed important, the inability to work in a particular job of choice does not render an employee substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. As a result, Rose cannot be found "disabled" under the statutes.
Moreover, VNA did not "regard" Rose as disabled. An employer regards an employee as disabled only where it erroneously believes either that the employee has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, or that the employee's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Id. at 489. Where the major life activity is working, the employer must perceive the employee "`to be significantly restricted in [her] ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.'" Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1998)).
In the present case, there is no evidence that VNA regarded Rose as substantially limited in her ability to work. In its letter dated June 8, 2004, VNA acknowledged its awareness of Rose's anxiety about bridges and beltways, but explained that she could not work elsewhere within the company because all other teams were fully staffed. (Letter from Roy A. Bryan, Jr. to Deborah Rose (June 8, 2004), Ex. to Pl.'s Opp'n Mem.) VNA's knowledge of Rose's impairment, without more, does not indicate that the company regarded her as disabled. See Haulbrook v. Michelin North Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 703 (4th Cir. 2001). Additionally, the fact that VNA viewed Rose as incapable of performing one aspect of her job — driving to certain locations — does not mean that she was regarded as disabled. See Rohan, 375 F.3d at 278 (explaining that where an employer merely considered an employee unable to perform a "particular facet of a particular job," she was not regarded as disabled).
For the foregoing reasons, while I agree it is unfortunate that VNA could not continue to assign Rose to routes compatible with her anxiety disorder, I cannot conclude that Rose had a "disability" under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Consequently, VNA's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
A separate Order follows.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the foregoing Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:1. the defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket entry no. 21) is GRANTED;
2. judgment is entered in favor of the defendant;
3. copies of this Order and the foregoing Memorandum shall be sent to the plaintiff and counsel of record; and
4. the Clerk shall CLOSE this case.