Rose did not appeal the first dismissal, and we affirmed the second dismissal, concluding in relevant part that Younger abstention was warranted under Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). See Rose v. Utah, 399 F. App'x 430, 435-36 (10th Cir. 2010). II

If these criteria are met, the federal court should abstain unless there is a "showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate."Rose v. Utah, No. 10-4000, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21779, at *10-13 (10th Cir. Oct. 22, 2010) (quoting Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 435) (internal citations omitted). Despite Deters' argument that "no proceeding is pending in State Court," [Record No. 1, p. 14], there is little question that the state bar disciplinary process constitutes an ongoing state judicial proceeding.

Ms. Rose did appeal from that dismissal, and a panel of our court "affirm[ed] . . . for the same reasons given by the district court," including Younger abstention. Rose v. Utah, 399 F. App'x 430, 436 (10th Cir. 2010). Although the panel assessed monetary sanctions, it declined to issue "an injunction preventing Ms. Rose from pursuing . . . litigation related to the Utah State Bar's pending disciplinary proceedings."

But a jurisdictional challenge is insufficient in and of itself to overcome the application of Younger. See, e.g., Rose v. Utah, 399 F. App'x 430, 435 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming the application of Younger where the plaintiff challenged the jurisdiction of the underlying state proceedings). Otherwise, any question regarding the state court's jurisdiction could be turned into a federal lawsuit.

d be disposed of on state sovereign immunity grounds pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and common law. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).See generally Aubrey v. Estate of Tobolowsky, 2021WL 787379 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2021) (explaining how suits against state bar associations fall on state sovereign immunity grounds because they tpically are “state agenc[ies] that [are] protected from suit in federal court by Eleventh Amendment immunity.”) (citingGreen v. State Bar of Texas, 27 F.3d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994)); Hunter v, Virginia State Bar, 786 F.Supp.2d 1107 (E.D. Va. 2011) (same); Otworth v. The Florida Bar, 71 F.Supp.2d 1209 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (same); Delacruz v. State Bar of California, 2015 WL 13743889 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2015) (same); Rose v. Utah State, 2009 WL 5066687 (D. Utah Dec. 16, 2009) (affirmed on other grounds, 399 Fed.Appx. 430 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (same). Because the State Bar of South Dakota is an arm of the state, SDCL

To the extent Plaintiffs assert violation of the General Mining Act of 1872 against Defendant Voorhis in his individual capacity, this claim fails because this law does not expressly permit a private right of action, nor has such a right been implied under it. See High Country Citizens Alliance v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 1177, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Rose v. Utah, 399 F. App'x 430, 437 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that a plaintiff "cannot rely on [28 U.S.C.] § 1331" for jurisdiction in the absence of a private right of action). Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs' claim under the 1872 Mining Law be dismissed with prejudice with respect to Defendant Voorhis in his individual capacity.

Further, the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provide a mechanism for appellate review of the disciplinary hearing board's final decision regarding, inter alia, public censure, suspension, or disbarment. Colo. R. Civ. P. 251.27; cf. Rose v. Utah, 399 F. App'x 430, 435 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)

Section 1331 "confers jurisdiction only where a federal question is at issue, it does not create federal jurisdiction." Rose v. Utah, 399 F. App'x 430, 437 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Plaintiff makes no allegation that his claims arise under any law of the United States.

Section 1331 “confers jurisdiction only where a federal question is at issue, it does not create federal jurisdiction.” Rose v. Utah, 399 Fed.Appx. 430, 437 (10th Cir.2010) (unpublished) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs make no allegation that their emotional distress claim arises under any law of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1343 is a jurisdictional statute; it does not create a cause of action. Rose v. Utah, 399 Fed. Appx. 430, 437 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that § 1983 "requires not only that the technical requirements of jurisdiction be met but that suit against the parties named as defendants be authorized under the cognate provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.")(quoting Symm v. United States, 439 U.S. 1105, 1108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (emphasis added)). The Court will assume, in the absence of allegations expressly eschewing reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Plaintiffs are relying on § 1983 for their federal causes of action.