Opinion
20cv07387 (JSR) (DF)
12-21-2021
MANUEL DE JESUS ROSARIO, Plaintiff, v. 251 E 123rd ST. REALTY, LLC, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
DEBRA FREEMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
After ruling in favor of plaintiff Manuel De Jesus Rosario (“Plaintiff) on his claim to set aside, as a fraudulent conveyance, the transfer of certain real property effected by defendants 251 E. 123rd St. Realty, LLC (the “Realty”), Jose Palma (“Palma Senior”), Jose Palma Jr. (“Palma Junior”), Maria M. Vallejos, Individually and as Trustee of The Jose Palma Irrevocable Trust (“Vallejos”), and the Jose Palma Irrevocable Trust (the “Trust”) (collectively, “Defendants”), the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, U.S.D.J., has referred the matter to this Court to report and recommend as to the amount of attorneys' fees that should be awarded to Plaintiff from the Realty, Palma Senior, and Palma Junior in connection with that ruling. For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that Plaintiff be awarded $28,194.99 in attorneys' fees and $3,065.35 in costs from these three defendants.
BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Procedural History
This action is related to an earlier-filed action, in which Plaintiff sued his employers for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., and the New York Labor Law (the “NYLL”), §§ 190, et. seq., and 650, et seq. See De Jesus Rosario v. Mis Hijos Deli Corp., No. 15cv6049 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y.). After prevailing at trial in that action and 1 having two judgments (one for damages, and another for attorneys' fees) entered in his favor, Plaintiff claimed in this separate action that certain of the defendants in the earlier action - specifically, the Realty, Palma Senior, and Palma Junior - had secretly transferred to Vallejos, as Trustee of the Trust, a valuable piece of real property, for the purpose of frustrating Plaintiff in his ability to collect on those judgments. Plaintiff accordingly sought to set aside the transfer.
At a November 23, 2020 conference with the parties, Judge Rakoff set a schedule that would allow for approximately two months of discovery in this case, to be followed by summary judgment briefing. (See Dkt. 17.) During the discovery period, which was extended three times (see Minute Entries dated Jan. 25, 2021, Feb. 19, 2021, and Mar. 10, 2021), Plaintiff apparently conducted both paper discovery and three depositions of Defendants (see Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Application for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, dated July 6, 2021 (“Pl. Mem.”) (Dkt. 33), at 2).
On April 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (See Dkt. 19 (Notice of Motion).) Plaintiff's motion was accompanied by a statement of material facts (Dkt. 19-1), an attorney declaration attaching 16 exhibits (Dkt. 20), and a 13-page memorandum of law (Dkt. 21). In opposition, Defendants filed a legal memorandum of about the same length (Dkt. 24), as well as a counter-statement of facts (Dkt. 25) and both attorney and client declarations (Dkts. 22, 23). In reply, Plaintiff filed a 10-page reply brief. (Dkt. 26.)
By Memorandum Order dated May 27, 2021 (Dkt. 27), Judge Rakoff analyzed the issues raised by the parties in their submissions, and ultimately granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, holding that the transfer at issue must be set aside, as “a reasonable jury could only find that the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance” under three sections of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law. Judge Rakoff further indicated that, following an inquest by this Court, he would award 2 reasonable attorneys' fees against the Realty, Palma Senior, and Palma Junior, noting that the Court did not need to reach the issue of whether fees could be properly awarded against Vallejos and the Trust, given that Plaintiff was not seeking such an award against them.
In the body of his decision, and in an explanatory footnote (Dkt. 27, at 14 n.8), Judge Rakoff made clear that Plaintiff was not seeking fees from the Trust, and, indeed, this is evident from Plaintiffs summary judgment briefing (see Dkt. 21, at 1, 12 n.4). In light of this, this Court understands there to be a typographical error in the summary “Conclusion” section of Judge Rakoff s decision, where it states that the Court would award fees against “Palma Senior, Palma Junior, and the Trust” (Dkt. 27, at 15), and that this should have read “Palma Senior, Palma Junior, and the Realty.”
B. Plaintiffs Fee Application
After this Court set a schedule for inquest submissions, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys' fees (Dkt. 32), accompanied by two attorney declarations (Declaration of Steven B. Ross, Esq. in Support of Plaintiff s Application For Attorneys' Fees and Costs, dated July 6, 2021 (“Ross Decl.”) (Dkt. 32-1); Declaration of Eric Dawson, Esq. in Support of Plaintiffs Application For Attorneys' Fees and Costs, dated July 6, 2021 (“Dawson Decl.”) (Dkt. 32-2)), attorney time records (Dkt. 32-3), documentation of certain costs (Dkts. 32-4 (process server invoices), 32-5 (deposition transcript invoices), and 32-6 (deposition interpreter invoices)), and a memorandum of law (Pl. Mem.). In his motion, Plaintiff seeks an award of $31,260.34, comprised of $28,194.99 in fees and $3,065.35 in costs. (Ross Decl. ¶ 12.)
Defendants filed an opposition brief on August 5, 2021 (Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion For Attorney's Fees and Costs, dated Aug. 5, 2021 (“Def Mem”) (Dkt. 34)), arguing that both the hours that Plaintiffs counsel claimed to have 3 devoted to the case, as well as the rates they charged for their work, were not reasonable (see generally id).
Even though, as noted above, Plaintiff is only seeking fees from three of the five Defendants named in this case, the opposition brief was filed on behalf of all Defendants. (See Def. Mem.)
Plaintiff has not filed a reply.
DISCUSSION
I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
Generally, in determining whether an amount of claimed attorneys' fees is appropriate, the “starting point” is “the lodestar - the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case, ” which calculates a “presumptively reasonable fee.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008); Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552-53 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For purposes of the lodestar, an attorney's hourly rate is considered reasonable when it is “in line with those [rates] prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984); see also Rosado v. City of New York, No. 11cv4285 (SAS), 2012 WL 955510, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2012) (“The relevant community to which the court should look is the district in which the case is brought.”). Although the fee applicant has the burden of demonstrating prevailing market rates for comparable work, see Broome v. Biondi, 17 F.Supp.2d 230, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the court may also apply its “own knowledge” of rates charged in the community in assessing the reasonableness of the rates sought, Miele v. New York State Teamsters Conf Pension & Ret. Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir. 1987); McDonald ex rel Prendergast v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2006). In assessing whether an hourly rate is reasonable, the court should “bear in mind that a 4 reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190.
As for the time component of the lodestar, an attorney's stated number of hours should be reduced by the court where it is greater than required to litigate the case effectively, see Seitzman v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 311 F.3d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 2002) (time component of lodestar calculation “reflects hours worked that are neither excessive nor duplicative”), or where the attorney's proffered time records are vague or otherwise inadequate to enable the court to determine the reasonableness of the work performed or the time expended, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov't of Lao People's Democratic Republic, No. 10cv05256 (KMW) (DF), 2012 WL 5816878, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012) (holding vague and block-billed time records insufficient to substantiate claimed expenditures of time; collecting cases). As the party seeking attorneys' fees bears the burden of demonstrating that its claimed fees are reasonable, Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand), 2012 WL 5816878, at *3 (citations omitted), it must submit, in support of its request for fees, contemporaneous time records that “specify, for each [timekeeper], the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done, ” id. (quoting N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where an attorney's time records are inadequate to enable the court to determine whether the time expended was reasonable, a percentage reduction may be applied as a “practical means of trimming fat” from a fee application. N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children, 711 F.2d at 1146.
In determining whether a reasonable amount of time was expended on a case, a court may consider, inter alia, the nature and quality of the work submitted by counsel in connection with the litigation, see Kirsch v. Fleet St. Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 5 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 1987), as well as the degree of counsel's success, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436 (holding that there is “no precise rule or formula” for reducing a fee award and that courts have discretion to either eliminate specific hours or reduce the lodestar to account for limited success). Other factors that a court may consider in determining the lodestar include “the difficulty of the questions involved; the skill required to handle the problem; the time and labor required; the lawyer's experience, ability, and reputation; the customary fee charged by the Bar for similar services; and the amount involved.” Weiwei Gao v. Sidhu, No. 11cv2711 (WHP) (JCF), 2013 WL 2896995, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013).
With respect to costs, “[t]he Second Circuit has consistently ‘held that attorney's fees awards include those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their clients.'” TufAmerica Inc. v. Diamond, No. 12cv3529 (AJN), 2016 WL 1029553, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2016) (quoting U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 416 (2d Cir. 1989)). Such costs may properly include, inter alia, filing fees, process-server fees, and expenses related to depositions. See id.; see also Anderson v. City of New York, 132 F.Supp.2d 239, 245-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (awarding the costs of deposition transcripts where they were “reasonably necessary” to the litigation at the time they were taken); Sai Qin Chen v. East Market Rest., Inc., No. 13cv3902 (HBP), 2018 WL 3970894, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018) (noting that “[i]nterpreter fees are [also] recoverable costs because they are included in those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their clients.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 6
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
A. Plaintiffs Requested Attorneys' Fees
Plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees only in connection with the work performed by two attorneys with the law firm of Ross & Asmar LLC (“Ross & Asmar”), one partner and one associate. The Court notes that the lean staffing of the case is not surprising, as the firm's website (http://www.rossasmar.com/) currently lists a total of only two partners, one associate, and one paralegal.
The partner on this case was Steven B. Ross, Esq. (“Ross”), a 1992 graduate of Columbia Law School, who started his legal career as an associate at a major law firm, and who, by the time of Plaintiff s fee application, had over 25 years of litigation experience. (See Ross Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff seeks to recover fees for 19.8 hours of Ross's work on the case, at the rate of $450 per hour. (Id.; see also Id. ¶ 7; Dkt. 32-3 (time records).)
The single associate on the case, Eric Dawson, Esq. (“Dawson”), graduated from Fordham University School of Law in 2011, and was a ninth-year associate as of the time of the fee application. (Ross Decl. ¶ 8; Dawson Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff seeks to recover fees for 55.11 hours billed by Dawson. (Ross Decl. ¶ 10; Dawson Decl. ¶ 7.) The submitted attorney declarations are inconsistent as to whether Plaintiff seeks to recover for that time at the rate of $300 per hour or $350 per hour (compare Dawson Decl. ¶ 5 (“Mt [sic] time has been billed at $300 per hours [sic]”), with Ross Decl. ¶ 8 (“My associate, Eric Dawson, has billed his time at $350 per hour”)), but the submitted time records reflect that Dawson's billings have, in fact, been calculated at the higher rate of $350 per hour (see Dkt. 32-3).
Although, apparently, there was also some paralegal time spent on this case, Plaintiff is not seeking to include any such time in the requested fee recovery. Rather, Ross has represented 7 that he “eliminated [from the fee application] all paralegal time spent on the matter.” (Ross Decl. ¶ 4.)
1. Reasonableness of Requested Hourly Rates
To calculate the lodestar, this Court must first determine reasonable hourly rates for the work performed by Ross and Dawson in this case. This is not a difficult task, as, in the related litigation that led to this suit, Judge Rakoff has already been found that the rates that were then being sought by Ross and Dawson ($400/hour and $300/hour, respectively) were reasonable. See De Jesus Rosario v. Mis Hijos Deli Corp., No. 15cv6049 (JSR), 2020 WL 2614761, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May, 22, 2020) (observing that “[t]he federal district courts in New York have approved hourly rates for experienced law firm partners in the range of $500 to $800 per hour[] [and] for law firm associates in the range of $200 to $450 per hour” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Moreover, this Court notes that, while the rates that have been awarded in this District in wage-and-hour cases brought under the FLSA and NYLL have tended to fall below, or at the lower end of, the rates that commercial litigators in this District may charge, see, e.g., Lin v. La Vie En Schezuan Rest. Corp., No. 15cv09507 (DF), 2020 WL 1819941 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2020) (finding that courts in this District had recently determined that a reasonable rate for senior attorneys handling wage-and-hour cases, in this market, typically ranged from $300 to $400 per hour (citing Shanfa Li v. Chinatown Take-Out Inc., No. 16cv7787 (JCM), 2019 WL 3715086, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2019)), the case now before this Court is not a wage-and-hour suit. Rather, this fraudulent-conveyance case required counsel to demonstrate an understanding of real estate transfers, an ability to review chains of title, a grasp of the laws governing trusts, and a knowledge of statutes covering both fraudulent conveyances and constructive fraudulent 8 conveyances. Although Defendants attempt to argue that the earlier wage action was “more complex” than this action (Def. Mem., at 7), this Court does not agree, and notes that attorneys in this District have generally awarded higher rates in cases like this one than in wage cases, see, e.g., In re Palermo, No. 08cv0741 (RPP), 2011 WL 3874866, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011) (approving, in 2011, rates of up to $525 per hour for attorneys at small firm, after trial of fraudulent-conveyance claim); see also Bank of Commc'ns, N.Y. Branch v. Ocean Dev. Am., Inc., No. 07cv4268 (TPG), 2014 WL 6838502, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2014) (in 2014, finding rates of $485 and $450 per hour for attorneys on a fraudulent-conveyance case to be reasonable). Certainly, this Court sees no reason why Ross and Dawson should be awarded lower rates here than they were awarded in the related case.
As for the firm's request for a $50-per-hour rate increase for each of the two attorneys who staffed the case, this Court also finds this appropriate, despite Defendant's objection that the proposed increased rates are “inflated.” (Def. Mem., at 7.) Attorneys are permitted to increase their billing rates over time, see Wise v. Kelly, 620 F.Supp.2d 435, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (when determining fees, the court “accept[s] the obvious proposition that billing rates continue to increase over time”), and the proposed increases here are not extraordinary. Further, based on the caselaw cited above, the proposed hourly rates of $450 for a partner and $350 for a ninth-year associate fall within the range of those that have been approved in this District for attorneys who have successfully litigated fraudulent-conveyance cases. Accordingly, I recommend that, in this case, the Court approve the requested rates of $450 per hour for Ross and $350 per hour for Dawson. 9
2. Reasonableness of Expended Hours
In justifying the time they spent on the case, Plaintiff's counsel note that they not only prepared summary judgment papers, but also assessed “multiple deeds” entered by Defendants during the pendency of the action, conducted three depositions of Defendants (with interpreters), and researched both New York law (including prior versions of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law, which, according to Plaintiff, had been “recently reformed”) and Delaware law, as it might have been implicated in the action. (Pl. Mem., at 2.) Ross also represents that, “in the exercise of billing judgment, ” he undertook to eliminate from the submitted time records not only paralegal time, as noted above, but also any attorney hours that he believed “were not justifiable.” (Ross Decl. ¶ 4.)
In opposition, Defendants contend, as a general matter, that “Plaintiff unreasonably protracted the instant litigation by engaging in extensive motion practice with respect to [] information subpoenas and rejected engagement in settlement discussions, ” despite the fact that Defendants were cooperative and “immediately provided the information sought by Plaintiff.” (Def. Mem., at 4.) Defendants additionally make the specific argument that the 23.93 hours recorded by Plaintiff's counsel for preparing Plaintiff's summary-judgment motion were excessive. (Id., at 5 (“Plaintiff's counsel offers no convincing justification to support that exorbitant number of hours for the drafting of their opening memorandum of law . . . .”).) Each of Defendants' arguments is unpersuasive.
First, with respect to Plaintiff's supposed refusal to engage in settlement discussions, this Court notes that, even though settlement may often be a desirable outcome, Plaintiff was not required to engage with Defendants in settlement talks, especially in light of Defendants' apparent failure to satisfy the prior judgments and claimed lack of bad faith in the secret transfer 10 of what may have been their principal asset. Certainly, considering Plaintiff's allegations of fraud, the Court should not second-guess Plaintiff's desire to proceed here with his claim to have that transfer judicially set aside.
Second, with respect to the supposedly wasteful time that Plaintiff spent litigating information subpoenas, the Docket does not, in fact, reflect “extensive motion practice” relating to such subpoenas, nor, based on their submitted time records, does it appear that counsel are seeking to recover for much, if any, time spent in such motion practice. (See generally Dkt. 32-3.) Rather, based on Plaintiff's submissions, the most significant discovery-related time for which recovery has been sought was time spent preparing for and conducting depositions, and even that time is shown to have totaled only about 10 hours. (See id. (time entries for 3/5/21-3/8/21, 3/15/21, 3/18/21).) Moreover, Defendants cannot convincingly maintain that the depositions were unnecessary, as Plaintiff relied on the deposition testimony in moving for summary judgment, and that motion was granted over Defendants' opposition.
Third, Defendants' suggestion that counsel spent an “exorbitant” number of hours in drafting Plaintiff's summary judgment brief is absurd. Even if, as Defendants suggest, Plaintiff's counsel had spent close to 24 hours drafting Plaintiff's moving brief, that amount of time would not have been excessive for the task and the work produced. It is, however, apparent that not all of the cited hours were spent drafting that brief. Rather, it seems clear from counsel's time records that the 23.93 hours referenced by Defendants also included the preparation of the requisite Local Civil Rule 56.1 statement, which, in this case, consisted of 58 numbered and specifically supported paragraphs (Dkt. 19-1), and a supporting counsel declaration, with exhibits that were assembled to marshal the evidence on which the motion relied (see Dkt. 20). 11 The amount of time claimed for counsel's having prepared this full set of motion papers is inherently reasonable.
Having closely reviewed counsel's proffered time records, this Court also notes that they do not suffer from any marked deficiencies, such as systemic vagueness or block-billing, that might justify a deduction in the requested hours. Cf. Thai-Lao Lignite, 2012 WL 5816878, at *10. Rather, across the board, counsel's time has generally been recorded in a clear manner that is adequate to explain the nature of the services that were being performed and the time expended on particular tasks. The records also show that almost three-quarters of the time on the case was billed for work performed by Dawson, the junior member of the team, appropriately reflecting Ross's more supervisory role. Cf. Hitachi Data Sys. Credit Corp. v. Precision Discovery, Inc., No. 17cv6851 (SHS), 2020 WL 5731953, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2020) (noting that “[c]ourts frequently reduce fee requests where work that could have been handled by more junior lawyers was instead performed by a senior partner” (citing HTV Indus., Inc. v. Agarwal, 317 F.Supp.3d 707, 721 (S.D.N.Y. 2018))).
For all these reasons, I further recommend that the Court accept counsel's reported hours as reasonable.
3. Lodestar Calculation
Despite the above, this Court notes that, when it sought to calculate the lodestar in this case (i.e., by multiplying each attorney's reasonable rate by his total reasonable hours, and then taking the sum of those products), the total fees that resulted from that calculation differed slightly from the amount being requested. Specifically, while Plaintiff has requested $28,194.99 in attorneys' fees, this Court calculated Plaintiff's fees as $28,198.50 (representing $8,910.00 for Ross (i.e., $450/hour x 19.8 hours) plus $19,288.50 for Dawson (i.e., $350/hour x 55.11 hours)). 12
In studying the math, so as to understand the reason for this discrepancy, this Court has discovered that, while, for the purposes of his time records, Dawson apparently rounded off his time (for example, by showing two-thirds of an hour as “.67” hours (see Dkt. 32-3 (time entry for 9/11/20)), the firm's fee calculations were, nonetheless, more precisely done. Thus, for the example this Court has just provided, the billable fee was recorded as $233.33 (see id.), which actually reflects (at a $350/hour rate), approximately .66666 hours of work. As this Court is persuaded that the total fees recorded by the firm are more accurate than this Court's overall lodestar calculation, and as the requested amount is slightly lower than the lodestar, I recommend that the requested attorneys' fees of $28,194.99 be awarded, without the need for any adjustments.
B. Plaintiffs Requested Costs
In addition to seeking fees for the time expended by counsel, Plaintiff also requests an award of $3,065.35 in litigation costs. In particular, Plaintiff seeks to recover his initial case filing fee of $400.00, plus process-server fees of $313.30, deposition transcript fees of $1,352.05 (incurred for depositions relied upon by Plaintiff in his summary judgment motion (see Dkts. 20-6, 20-7, 20-8)), and deposition interpreter fees of $1,000.00. Apart from the filing fee (of which the Court may take judicial notice), Plaintiff has documented the claimed costs with copies of receipts or invoices. (See Dkts. 32-4, 32-5, 32-6.)
As stated above, the Second Circuit has held that reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their clients are recoverable. TufAmerica Inc., 2016 WL 1029553, at *7. In this instance, each category of costs sought by Plaintiff has been recognized to be recoverable. See Shannon v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 156 F.Supp.2d 279, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (reimbursing plaintiff for, inter alia, filing fees); Anderson, 132 F.Supp.2d at 245-47 13 (allowing recovery for, inter alia, filing and service costs); Nat'l Integrated Grp. Pension Plan, 2014 WL 887222, at *11 (reimbursing plaintiff for deposition transcript costs where the depositions were used on summary judgment); Sai Qin Chen, 2018 WL 3970894, at *5 (reimbursing plaintiff for interpreter fees). Moreover, this Court has reviewed the submitted documentation and finds it adequate, and the charged amounts reasonable.
Accordingly, I recommend that the requested costs, in the total amount of $3,065.35, be awarded.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that the Court grant Plaintiff's fee application in its entirety, without modification, such that Plaintiff be awarded $28,194.99 in attorneys' fees and $3,065.35 in costs, jointly and severally, from defendants 251 E. 123rd St. Realty, LLC, Jose Palma, and Jose Palma Jr.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 (allowing three (3) additional days for service by mail). Such objections, and any responses to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Jed Rakoff, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, Room 1340, New York, New York 10007, in the event Judge Rakoff's Individual Practices require such courtesy copies. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Rakoff. FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993); 14 Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1992); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1988); McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1983).
Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, U.S.D.J. 15