Opinion
21-P-536
03-17-2022
Alexander Santiago ROSA v. AFFORDABLE INTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Alexander Santiago Rosa, filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging that he was injured at work because of the negligence, gross negligence, and reckless, willful, and wanton conduct of his employer, Affordable Interior Systems, Inc. (AIS). Before answering the complaint, AIS filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (or, in the alternative, for summary judgment) arguing that Rosa (1) had waived his right to bring claims against AIS, and (2) was barred from filing suit against AIS under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation Act (the act). The judge agreed and allowed the motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). On appeal, Rosa argues, among other things, that dismissal of his tort claims pursuant to rule 12 (b) (6) was error because the motion judge impermissibly considered documents outside of the complaint. Because we agree that consideration of these extrinsic documents should have converted the motion to one for summary judgment, we reverse the judgment of dismissal.
The judge denied Rosa's motion for reconsideration, concluding that the motion "raises no new facts and demonstrates no error of law."
Background. 1. The complaint. We summarize the allegations in the complaint. While cleaning a work area in an AIS facility, Rosa was severely injured when his hand was caught in a machine. At the time of the accident, Rosa was employed by AIS through Randstad North America, Inc. (Randstad), a temporary staffing agency. An investigation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration concluded that another AIS employee had removed the machine's safety guard and failed to replace it. The investigation concluded that AIS "created the hazard, controls the times and operation of machines, trains employees to operate the machines and holds oversight of the employees."
At the time the complaint was filed, Rosa had received $25,393.95 in workers’ compensation benefits from Randstad's insurer, ACE American Insurance Company (ACE). The complaint further alleged that Rosa's injuries were permanent, and that his projected damages exceeded $477,000.
2. Documents attached to the motion to dismiss. In support of its motion to dismiss, AIS attached a number of documents regarding the contractual relationship between AIS and Randstad. These extrinsic documents included: (1) the staffing services agreement between Randstad and AIS; (2) a document purported to have been signed by Rosa waiving any claims against Randstad's clients for injuries covered by workers’ compensation statutes; (3) the cover page of Randstad's workers’ compensation insurance policy with ACE; and (4) two endorsements to the workers’ compensation insurance policy which, according to AIS, extended workers’ compensation insurance coverage to AIS. Based on the content of these documents, AIS argued that Rosa had explicitly waived his right to bring personal injury claims against AIS, or, even if Rosa had not waived the claims, the act provided his only remedy.
Discussion. We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011). We first address whether the judge properly considered the extrinsic documents in allowing the motion to dismiss. The general rule is that, in deciding a motion to dismiss, a court may consider the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, items appearing in the record of the case, and matters of public record. See Merriam v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 464 Mass. 721, 723 (2013). When "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in [ Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974)]." Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b).
Here, the exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss were not part of the complaint, did not appear in the record of the case, and were not matters of public record. Nevertheless, the judge did not exclude the extrinsic documents. Nor did he treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Relying on Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 224 (2011), the judge concluded that "conversion to summary judgment is inappropriate." In Golchin, the Supreme Judicial court held that, while it is generally true that consideration of extrinsic documents will convert a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, conversion is not required "[w]here ... the plaintiff had notice of [the extrinsic] documents and relied on them in framing the complaint" (citation omitted). Id. Mindful of this exception to the general rule, we consider the extent to which Rosa relied on the extrinsic documents in framing his complaint.
The complaint did not refer to or incorporate any of the documents attached to AIS's motion to dismiss. Nor does it appear, based on our review of the record, that Rosa relied on them in framing his complaint. For example, Rosa could not have relied on the written waiver of his right to bring a personal injury claim against Randstad's clients in filing suit against AIS. Rosa brought the claim in spite of that waiver. Similarly, mere mention in the complaint of Rosa's receipt of workers’ compensation benefits from Randstad's insurer does not mean that Rosa relied on the workers’ compensation insurance policy between Randstad and ACE. Indeed, AIS contends that the insurance policy and its endorsements support an argument that AIS is immune from Rosa's claim. See Molina v. State Garden, Inc., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 173, 178-180 (2015). Simply put, while Rosa may have had notice of the extrinsic documents before filing suit, the record does not support a conclusion that he relied on those documents in framing his complaint. Accordingly, the extrinsic documents should have been excluded or, in the alternative, the motion should have been treated as one for summary judgment.
Rosa may have relied on the staffing services agreement between Randstad and AIS because the complaint alleges that Rosa was assigned by Randstad to work as a temporary employee for AIS. But that document, without more, did not require dismissal of the complaint.
We appreciate the candor of Rosa's counsel in acknowledging that he knew of the documents attached to the motion to dismiss and had no reason to question their authenticity.
Judgment reversed.