Opinion
269 MDA 2023 270 MDA 2023 271 MDA 2023 272 MDA 2023 J-A23038-23
01-12-2024
ROOSEVELT HOLDING, LP Appellant v. TIMOTHY F. PASCH, THE PADDOCK 55, LP, HUNTERS CROSSING III, LP AND MARKET STREET COMMONS, LP ROOSEVELT HOLDING, LP Appellant v. TIMOTHY F. PASCH, THE HISTORIC PRESERVE AT GETTYSBURG, LP. WINDSOR PLAZA, LP & MARKET STREET COMMONS LP ROOSEVELT HOLDING, LP Appellant v. TIMOTHY F. PASCH, THE PADDOCK 55, LP, HUNTERS CROSSING III, LP AND MARKET STREET COMMONS, LP ROOSEVELT HOLDING, LP Appellant v. TIMOTHY F. PASCH, THE HISTORIC PRESERVE AT GETTYSBURG, LP. WINDSOR PLAZA, LP & MARKET STREET COMMONS LP
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered February 7, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s): 2020-SU-000819, 2020-SU-001048
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
MEMORANDUM
PER CURIAM
In these consolidated appeals, Roosevelt Holding, LP ("hereinafter, "Roosevelt"), appeals from the February 7, 2023 orders denying its application for nunc pro tunc relief and granting Appellees' motion to direct satisfaction of the judgment and mortgage in this matter. After careful review, we affirm.
Roosevelt's appeals at Nos. 269 MDA 2023, 270 MDA 2023, 271 MDA 2023, and 272 MDA 2023 were consolidated sua sponte by this Court on March 28, 2023.
The trial court summarized the extensive facts and procedural history of this case as follows:
Roosevelt brought claims, through two separately docketed complaints, relating to a series of loan agreements between Roosevelt and the various named [Appellees]. After a typical pre-trial process, these matters proceeded to a consolidated bench trial due to the substantial similar fact patterns involved. At trial, the parties stipulated that the outstanding balance of Loan #2 was $595,240.66 and the Letter of Credit was $ 328,520.41. Thus, the only matter to determine at trial was the amount of interest, late fees, and other charges due upon these two outstanding loans.
At trial it was shown Loan #2 stems from a written note dated August 17, 2012. Though a copy of the mortgage securing this note was not introduced at trial, the testimony was undisputed that a mortgage or mortgages secured this note. Further, all but one of the mortgages securing the note had been previously satisfied, leaving only the mortgage secured by a property owned by [Appellee] Windsor Plaza, LP remaining.
The Letter of Credit originated from a written agreement dated June 24, 2011 and modified in writing by an addendum dated August 16, 2016. The Letter of Credit is not secured by a mortgage.
After a two-day bench trial, we placed our lengthy findings of fact on the record in the presence of the parties, entering a verdict in favor of Roosevelt in the amount of $1,701,263.42, along with post judgment interest at the legal rate. We additionally provided [Appellant] additional time to submit the amount of its attorney's fees claim, as that calculation needed to include the time spent in trial. Lastly, we provided the parties 60 days to file their respective post-trial motions to allow the parties to obtain a trial transcript, if desired, in an effort to streamline the post-trial process.
Before the post-trial process was completed, Roosevelt filed its first two Notice[s] of Appeal on October 31, 2022. Notwithstanding its Notice of Appeal, Roosevelt filed its motion, seeking its attorney's fees. [Appellees] responded to this motion, and we ultimately awarded the entire amount of attorney's fees sought by Roosevelt. On November 29, 2022, nearly one month after filing its appeals, Roosevelt filed its Omnibus Motion for Post-Trial Relief. We denied much of the relief sought by Roosevelt; but we did grant its motion to mold the verdict to include the attorney's fees awarded and post judgment interest by order dated November 30, 2022 and docketed on December 1, 2022.
The entry of judgment in this matter was now ripe. Neither party entered judgment, however, until December 22, 2022. We bring attention to this timing, as Roosevelt had filed its Notices of Appeal prematurely on October 31, 2022, and we told Roosevelt the appeal was filed prematurely in our first 1925(a) Opinion filed of record November 15, 2022. Further, between the disposition of the post-trial motions on December 1, 2022 and the entry of judgment on December 22, 2022, the Superior Court issued a Rule to Show Cause why Roosevelt's appeal should not [be] quashed for lack of jurisdiction.
On December 8, 2022, we issued an order granting relief sought by [Appellees]. In our review of the docket, [Appellees'] Motion to Deposit Judgment is absent from the record. In that Motion, [Appellees] sought permission to deposit the full amount of the judgment, including post judgment interest, with the Prothonotary and after doing so for post-judgment interest to cease, to have the judgment marked satisfied, and to have the mortgage on the Windsor Plaza property marked satisfied. We granted relief in part, allowing [Appellees] to deposit the full amount of the judgment, and upon such payment, directing interest would cease, the judgment would be stayed pending appeal, and directing the mortgage be marked satisfied. On December 19, 2022, Roosevelt
filed its third and fourth Notices of Appeal to the entry of this order. However, Roosevelt later withdrew these appeals. Notably, on December 9, 2022 [Appellees] paid the entire amount of the judgment, including interest through the date of deposit, into court as permitted by the December 8"' order.
By Order dated January 26, 2023, the Superior Court quashed Roosevelt's first and second appeals, lifted all stays imposed by it, and dismissed any pending motions. Thus, the entry of judgment became final. Roosevelt did seek reconsideration from the Superior Court, which was promptly denied. Importantly, the appeals were quashed based upon the Superior Court's lack of jurisdiction over the untimely filed appeals. Because the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction, this Court never lost jurisdiction.
On January 27, 2023 [Appellees] again sought relief from this Court in the form of seeking that the judgment, which was now final, be marked satisfied and the mortgage satisfied as well. By Order and accompanying Opinion dated February 7, 2023, we granted [Appellees'] request for relief. That same day after filing our Order and Opinion, we received a Motion for Leave to File an Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc filed by Roosevelt. We were able to address Roosevelt's motion the same day we received it and entered a second Order and Opinion on February 7[, 2023] denying leave to file an appeal nunc pro tunc.
As we stated earlier, on February 14, 2023 Roosevelt filed its fifth through eighth Notices of Appeal to both of our February 7, 2023 orders. On February 16, 2023 Roosevelt filed an Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. On February 22, 2023, we directed Roosevelt file its Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. Also on February 22, 2023, [Appellees] filed their response to Roosevelt's motion for stay. On February 27, 2023 we scheduled a hearing on Roosevelt's so-called emergency motion to take place on March 9, 2023. After that scheduling order was issued, Roosevelt filed another motion styled as an emergency, seeking to delay the effect of the
February 7, 2023 order even though that order did not take effect until after the time for the already scheduled hearing.
Not satisfied that we had already scheduled a hearing to review Roosevelt's request for a stay pending appeal, Roosevelt sought action from the Superior Court in an Emergency Application filed March 7, 2023. Notably, Roosevelt's emergency application made a material misrepresentation and a material omission. Paragraph S of the Emergency Application states this Court failed to "giv(e] Roosevelt a chance to respond or to be heard ... in accordance with the procedures governing motions practice under ... the York County Local Rules of Civil Procedure." On March 9, 2023 when questioned about this statement, Roosevelt could not state in what way the Court failed to follow the York County local rules. Further, in our January 17, 2023, 1925(a) Opinion in the appeal now withdrawn, we explained to Roosevelt the meaning and import of our local rules for motions practice. Having provided this detailed explanation of the local rules, Roosevelt is without excuse for making this material misrepresentation to the Superior Court in its application.
Roosevelt also made a material omission from its Emergency Application. Roosevelt failed to state that it has been paid $1,980,585.17, the total amount of the judgment. This Court's December 8, 2022, Order on which the appeal has been withdrawn permitted [Appellees] to deposit the amount of the judgment. [Appellees] did so. Our February 7, 2023 Order now on appeal directed the Prothonotary to release the funds to Roosevelt, which it did on February 14, 2023. Thus, Roosevelt has possession of the full amount of the judgment, did at the time of its emergency application and failed to mention this fact in an application seeking to stay the February 7, 2023, order directing payment to Roosevelt.Trial court Rule 1925(a) opinion, 3/16/23 at 1-6 (citations, emphasis and footnotes omitted).
On February 21, 2023, Appellant filed four separate notices of appeal docketed at Nos. 269 MDA 2023, 270 MDA 2023, 271 MDA 2023, and 272 MDA 2023. Although not ordered to do so, Roosevelt filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on March 14, 2023. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 16, 2023.
Roosevelt raises the following four issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Motion of [Roosevelt] for Leave to Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc?
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting [Appellee's] Motion to Direct Satisfaction of Judgment and Mortgage and directing that the judgment entered in the underlying actions be marked satisfied?
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or committed errors of law when it deviated from the process set forth in Pennsylvania's Mortgage Satisfaction Act, 21 P.S. §§ 721-1-721-12, in granting [Appellee's] Motion to Direct Satisfaction of Judgment and Mortgage and directing the satisfaction of a mortgage held by [Roosevelt], on real property owned by Defendant, Windsor Plaza, LP?
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed errors of law, and/or violated [Roosevelt's] due process rights by not giving [it] a full and fair opportunity to respond to and be heard on [Appellee's] Motion to Direct Satisfaction of Judgment and Mortgage before granting [Appellee's] Motion[?]Appellant's brief at 6-7 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
Generally, our standard of review of a non-jury trial
is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed an error of law. In making this determination, we view the evidence and all inferences derived from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the victorious party. Findings of the trial judge in a non-jury case must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as a verdict of a jury and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an error of law or abuse of discretion.Voracek v. Crown Castle USA Inc., 907 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 919 A.2d 958 (Pa. 2007).
Our Supreme Court has characterized the purpose of nunc pro tunc restoration of appellate rights as follows:
Allowing an appeal nunc pro tunc is a recognized exception to the general rule prohibiting the extension of an appeal deadline. This Court has emphasized that the principle emerges that an appeal nunc pro tunc is intended as a remedy to vindicate the right to an appeal where that right has been lost due to certain extraordinary circumstances. Generally, in civil cases an appeal nunc pro tunc is granted only where there was fraud or a breakdown in the court's operations through a default of its officers.Union Elec. Corp. v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review of Allegheny County, 746 A.2d 581, 584 (Pa. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The decision to grant or deny an appeal nunc pro tunc is within the sound discretion of the trial court. "This Court will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc unless there is an abuse of discretion." Fischer v. UPMC Northwest, 34 A.3d 115, 120 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Likewise, the trial court has discretion to mark a judgment and mortgage as satisfied, and an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's determination absent an abuse of discretion. See Gallagher v. Sheridan, 665 A.2d 485, 486 (Pa.Super 1995), appeal denied, 675 A.2d 1249 (Pa. 1996). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court, in reaching its conclusions, overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, or ill will." U.S. Bank N.A. v. Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 994 (Pa.Super. 2009).
Instantly, our thorough review of the record, including the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, reveals that Roosevelt's claims on appeal warrant no relief. The trial court's Rule 1925(a) opinion comprehensively discussed each of Roosevelt's issues and concluded that they were without merit. We find that the trial court's conclusions are supported by competent evidence and are clearly free of legal error.
Specifically, we agree with the trial court's determination that it acted properly in denying Roosevelt nunc pro tunc relief because "there was no fraud or breakdown in the court's operations" and "there is no colorable argument that Roosevelt's failure to file a timely notice of appeal was non-negligent." See trial court Rule 1925(a) opinion, 3/16/23 at 8-12. We also agree with the trial court's reasoning that it did not err in ordering satisfaction of the judgment because "the judgment is final and has been paid in full." See id. at 13-15. Additionally, we agree with the trial court's determination that it acted properly in directing satisfaction of the mortgage because the record reflects that "[Appellees] paid Roosevelt the entire amount owed under the final judgment, including the amount secured by the mortgage," and that Pennsylvania's Mortgage Satisfaction Act requires Roosevelt to satisfy the mortgage upon payment. See id. at 15-17. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that there is no merit to Roosevelts' contention that its due process rights were violated because it was not afforded an opportunity to respond to Appellees' motion to direct satisfaction of the judgment and mortgage. On the contrary, the court properly noted that Roosevelt participated in a two-day bench trial on the merits where a full record was developed by the parties and "had every opportunity afforded to it a trial litigant could expect." See id. at 17-22.
Accordingly, we adopt the comprehensive and well-reasoned March 16, 2023 opinion of the Honorable Matthew D. Menges as our own for purposes of this appellate review.
Orders affirmed.
[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.