Opinion
No. 4:04-CV-784-A.
January 26, 2005
ORDER
Came on for consideration the above-captioned action wherein Riky Carl Roosa is petitioner and Douglas Dretke is respondent. This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On December 28, 2004, the United States Magistrate Judge issued his proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation, and ordered that the parties file objections, if any, thereto by January 18, 2005. On January 15, 2005, petitioner filed a document entitled "Exhibit and Copys [sic] of Siad [sic] Letters of Dinied [sic] Copys [sic] of Any and All Files by Attoreys [sic] Judge and Court Clerks of Fort Worth," which the court is construing as petitioner's objections. Respondent has not made any further response. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court makes a de novo determination of those portions of the proposed findings or recommendations to which specific objection is made. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). The court is not addressing any nonspecific objections or any frivolous or conclusory objections. Battle v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
The magistrate judge recommended that the instant petition be dismissed as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244. A liberal reading of petitioners objections reveals several arguments for equitable tolling, which extends only to cases presenting "sufficiently `rare and exceptional' circumstances." Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999).
Petitioner first argues that he is ignorant of the law and that because he was in administrative segregation, petitioner was unable to receive help from another prisoner in preparing his application. However, a petitioner's ignorance of the law is not a rare and exceptional circumstance that warrants equitable tolling. E.g., Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998).
He next argues that he was denied access to documents, including the state's file from the underlying criminal action, needed to bring his petition. Even assuming that petitioner was entitled to the documents from his criminal proceeding, the lack of access to such documents does not justify the application of equitable tolling in this case. The alleged lack of documents did not prevent petitioner from filing habeas petitions in state court on August 23, 2002, and August 26, 2002, respectively, and he has failed to show how the alleged lack of documents justifies the eighteen-month delay in filing his federal petition after his state petitions were denied.
Finally, petitioner states that he is on "mental health drugs." The Fifth Circuit has recognized the possibility that mental incompetency might support equitable tolling of a limitation period. Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d at 710, 715 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Hood v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 168 F.3d 231, 232-33 (5th Cir. 1999)). To be mentally incompetent for the purposes of tolling, a petitioner's mental problem must have prevented him "from managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them." See Hennington v. Johnson, 2001 WL 210405 at *4 n. 9 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (citing Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir.)). In this case, petitioner has failed to allege sufficient facts or adduce evidence that any effects of his "mental health drugs" rendered him mentally incompetent, so as to prevent him from timely filing his federal petition. As indicated in his response, petitioner has been taking such drugs since 2001, and as noted above, they did not prevent him from timely filing two habeas petitions in state court. Therefore, the court concludes that equitable tolling is not warranted in this case. See, e.g., Hennington, 2001 WL 210405 at *2. Petitioner's objections are overruled. Accordingly,
Petitioner's response is an untitled document filed November 9, 2004.
The court accepts the findings, conclusions and recommendation of the magistrate judge and ORDERS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus in this action be, and is hereby, dismissed with prejudice as time-barred.