Opinion
22-1442
03-06-2024
SUSAN RONNFELDT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SHELBY COUNTY CHRIS A. MYRTUE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL d/b/a MYRTUE MEDICAL CENTER and SHELBY COUNTY MEDICAL CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees.
David J. Cripe of Hauptman O'Brien Wolf &Lathrop, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant. Theodore T. Appel, Frederick T. Harris, and Byrony J. Whitaker of Lamson Dugan &Murray LLP, West Des Moines, for appellees.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Shelby County, Jeffrey L. Larson, Judge.
A plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her medical malpractice action. REVERSED.
David J. Cripe of Hauptman O'Brien Wolf &Lathrop, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant.
Theodore T. Appel, Frederick T. Harris, and Byrony J. Whitaker of Lamson Dugan &Murray LLP, West Des Moines, for appellees.
Heard by Bower, C.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
BOWER, Chief Judge.
Susan Ronnfeldt appeals the district court's dismissal of her claims of medical negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and ordinary negligence. Because the district court's orders dismissing Ronnfeldt's claims were based in part on a judgment subsequently reversed, we reverse.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The supreme court previously set forth the events leading to Ronnfeldt's claims against Myrtue Medical Center as follows:
In May 2016, Ronnfeldt underwent a hernia repair surgery at Myrtue Medical Center in Shelby County. A CT scan revealed a "significant enlargement of [her] uterus" which, according to the notes in the medical records, warranted follow-up discussions and investigation. But Ronnfeldt was never informed of the results of the scan or referred for further treatment. Four years later, Ronnfeldt returned to Myrtue Medical Center complaining of abdominal pain. Another CT scan revealed the mass had "significantly increased in size" and was now a tumor. After surgery to remove the tumor, Ronnfeldt was diagnosed with stage IV uterine cancer.Ronnfeldt v. Shelby Cnty. Chris A. Myrtue Mem'l Hosp., 984 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Iowa 2023).
Ronnfeldt sued Myrtue, alleging medical negligence. As a result of Ronnfeldt's failure to file a certificate of merit within sixty days of Myrtue's answer, Myrtue moved to dismiss the petition with prejudice. See Iowa Code § 147.140(1)(a) (2021) (setting forth the certificate-of-merit requirement in medical malpractice cases), 147.140(6) (providing dismissal with prejudice as the remedy for "[f]ailure to substantially comply with" the certificate-of-merit requirement). "That same day, Ronnfeldt voluntarily dismissed her petition." Ronnfeldt, 984 N.W.2d at 420 (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943 ("A party may, without order of court, dismiss that party's own petition .... [The first] dismissal under this rule shall be without prejudice.")). The district court concluded it retained jurisdiction to consider Myrtue's motion, which it granted, and dismissed Ronnfeldt's petition with prejudice. On appeal, the supreme court reversed the district court's order, holding "the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Myrtue's motion to dismiss" as "Ronnfeldt's voluntary dismissal was self-executing and ended the case, leaving nothing for the district court to dismiss." Id. at 421.
Specifically, Ronnfeldt claimed Myrtue "breached the duty to advise [her] of the 2016 CT scan findings and the post-surgical report in regard to the enlarged uterus; and, as a direct and proximate cause of that breach, [she] sustained injuries and damages."
While the appeal was pending, Ronnfeldt filed the present action against Myrtue, raising the same claim of medical negligence along with claims of res ipsa locquitur and ordinary negligence. The fact section of Ronnfeldt's petition was "identical to the first case." Myrtue filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss, claiming Ronnfeldt's action "fail[ed] to comply with Iowa Code section 147.140." Following a hearing, the district court granted Myrtue's motion on count I (medical negligence). But the court denied the motion on count II (res ipsa loquitur) and count III (ordinary negligence), finding "from the face of the petition, [counts II and III] may or may not require expert testimony to establish a prima facie case."
Myrtue filed a motion to reconsider, claiming counts II and III "are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion because they arise out of the same acts that were [the] subject of [Ronnfeldt]'s first claim for medical negligence" and, in the alternative, "these claims should be dismissed because on the face of the petition they require expert testimony, and that testimony was not timely provided as required in the first case." Following a hearing, the court granted Myrtue's motion and dismissed Ronnfeldt's remaining claims. At the outset, the court noted its "appreciati[on] of the continuing education received by appellate review of Iowa Code section 147.140," in particular Butler v. Iyer, No. 21-0796, 2022 WL 1100275, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2022) and Struck v. Mercy Health Servs.-Iowa Corp., 973 N.W.2d 533, 542 (Iowa 2022), which it "had [the] opportunity to review since [Myrtue]'s original motion to dismiss was first decided." Ultimately, the court determined "a certificate of merit is required for 'any claim requiring expert testimony to establish a prima facie case'" under Iowa Code section 147.140. And specifically, the court found section 147.140 required a certificate of merit on the element of causation, for which Ronnfeldt conceded expert testimony "would probably be required." The court also found Ronnfeldt's claims were based on the same facts as set forth in her earlier case, which had "already been dismissed with prejudice." As the court noted:
From the facts presented in the petition, [Ronnfeldt] suggests that the negligence stems from a lack of follow-up care from the reports observed on the scans. However, case law has already established that even a lack of follow-up care does not fall within the exception to expert testimony. Therefore, even by labeling the claims as ordinary negligence and res ipsa does not negate the need for expert testimony by analyzing what is required under the allegations presented in the fact section of the petition. And here, the petition's fact section is word-for-word the same as the petition for professional negligence in the previous case that has already been dismissed with prejudice.
In light of the directive in Struck, which reiterated the command of section 147.140(6) mandating the dismissal of pleadings filed without the requisite certificate of merit in order to end cases early, the Court here is without discretion. The Court finds that given the procedural history of this case, the verbatim identical fact section on the petition, and the analysis of the claims therein that should only give rise to professional negligence claims already previously dismissed with prejudice in a prior proceeding, this case is also subject to dismissal under the preclusive effect of Iowa Code section 147.140. (Internal citations omitted.) Ronnfeldt filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. Ronnfeldt appeals.
Ronnfeldt filed her notice of appeal in September 2022. The following month, the supreme court granted Myrtue's motion to stay the appeal pending the court's decision in Ronnfeldt. The supreme court issued its opinion in Ronnfeldt in January 2023, lifted the stay in February, and transferred the appeal to this court in June.
II. Standard of Review
"Under Iowa Code section 147.140, '[w]e review both a motion to dismiss and a district court's statutory construction for correction of errors at law.'" Est. of Butterfield by Butterfield v. Chautauqua Guest Home, Inc., 987 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Iowa 2023) (quoting Ronnfeldt, 984 N.W.2d at 421).
III. Discussion
On appeal, Ronnfeldt challenges the district court's dismissal of her claims of res ipsa loquitur and ordinary negligence, finding the claims required her to file a certificate of merit pursuant to Iowa Code section 147.140. According to Ronnfeldt, "under either a cause of action of ordinary negligence or res ipsa loquitur, [she] would not be required to submit a certificate of merit as the prima facie elements of standard of care and breach can be established without the need of expert testimony." See also, e.g., id. at 840 ("We conclude Iowa Code section 147.140(1)(a) does not require plaintiffs to submit certificates of merit attesting to causation even though expert testimony about causation is necessary for the plaintiff to state a prima facie case.").
These claims were raised in counts II and III of Ronnfeldt's petition.
Ronnfeldt acknowledges "[e]ventually [she] may be required to adduce an expert to provide testimony on causation i.e. what the delay in diagnosis of the cancer caused as far as progression of the disease, life expectancy, etc.," but she claims "such testimony would still be regulated under Iowa Code [section] 668.11." Accord Iowa Code § 147.140(3) ("The parties shall comply with the requirements of section 668.11 and all other applicable law governing certification and disclosure of expert witnesses.").
Myrtue counters, arguing Ronnfeldt's claims are precluded by res judicata as "[t]here was a final decision on the merits in the first action, that was not reversed, at the time the district court decided the second action." We are not persuaded by Myrtue's argument. However, we find the unique situation of this case presents a different, dispositive hurdle for our review.
Here, as noted, the district court dismissed Ronnfeldt's claims based in part on the fact the petition was based on the same facts and claims "in the previous case," which was "dismissed with prejudice." However, on appeal, the supreme court reversed the district court's order dismissing the case, holding Ronnfeldt's rule 1.943 voluntary dismissal was "self-executing and end[ed] the case as soon as the dismissal [was] filed," therefore, the court "lacked jurisdiction to rule on Myrtue's [subsequent] motion to dismiss under section 147.140." Ronnfeldt, 984 N.W.2d at 426, 429. "Thus, we have before us a judgment based on a judgment subsequently reversed." Fennelly v. A-1 Mach. &Tool Co., 728 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Iowa 2007).
As the court has observed, "[t]his situation is covered by section 16 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments," id., which provides:
A judgment based on an earlier judgment is not nullified automatically by reason of the setting aside, or reversal on appeal, or other nullification of that earlier judgment; but the later judgment
may be set aside, in appropriate proceedings, with provision for any suitable restitution of benefits received under it.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 16, at 145 (1982); accord Fennelly, 728 N.W.2d at 185; see also Levi Strauss &Co. v. Abercrombie &Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("[A] bedrock principle of preclusion law has been that a reversed judgment cannot support preclusion; indeed, 'a second judgment based upon the preclusive effects of the first judgment should not stand if the first judgment is reversed.'" (citation omitted)). "A comment to the section states when an appeal from the second judgment is pending when the first judgment is reversed, '[t]he court should then normally set aside the later judgment.'" Fennelly, 728 N.W.2d at 185 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 16, cmt. c, at 147).
Accordingly, we reverse the orders dismissing Ronnfeldt's claims of medical negligence, ordinary negligence, and res ipsa loquitor. See id.; see also Banks v. City of Ames, 369 N.W.2d 451, 457 (Iowa 1985) (vacating a judgment based on a judgment later reversed); Butler v. Eaton, 141 U.S. 240, 244 (1891) (noting "the whole foundation of that part of the judgment which is in favor of the defendant is, to our judicial knowledge, without any validity, force, or effect, and ought never to have existed" and therefore concluding "we may dispose of the case here").
We note Ronnfeldt did not challenge the court's dismissal of count I (medical negligence) based on the supreme court's January 2023 Ronnfeldt decision until her March 2023 reply brief. Indeed, Ronnfeldt "concede[d] she did not resist the motion [on count I] via briefing" but asked us to also review the district court's ruling on that count. Ronnfeldt's challenge to the court's dismissal of count I would not be preserved under ordinary circumstances. See Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass'n v. Anderson, 551 N.W.2d 621, 642 (Iowa 1996) ("Parties cannot assert an issue for the first time in a reply brief. When they do, this court will not consider the issue."). However, because the district court dismissed count I upon finding "the previous action has now been ruled on, dismissing with prejudice [Ronnfeldt's] claim of medical negligence," we conclude count I also falls under the authority set forth in section 16 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, as set forth by Fennelly. Accordingly, we reverse the court's dismissal of that count as well.
REVERSED.