Opinion
Civil Action 7:23-cv-3306-TMC-KFM
03-14-2024
Israel Romero, Plaintiff, v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,[1] Mark Zuckerberg, and Jane Doe, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on Meta Platforms, Inc.'s (“Meta”) and Mark Zuckerberg's (“Mr. Zuckerberg”) motion to dismiss (doc. 25), Israel Romero's (“the plaintiff”) motion for default judgment and second motion for entry of default (docs. 31; 32), and the plaintiff's motion to dismiss Jane Doe (doc. 46). The plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Meta operates Facebook, “a service that enables users to create accounts to connect, share, discover, and communicate with friends, family, and communities on mobile devices and personal computers” (doc. 25-1 at 2). Meta is a Delaware corporation, with a principal place of business in Menlo Park, California (docs. 1 at 2; 25-2, Pricer decl. ¶ 1).
Mr. Zuckerberg is the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Meta and a citizen of California (docs. 1 at 2; 25-1 at 3; 25-6, van Loben Sels decl. ¶ 3).
The plaintiff states in his complaint that he has a J.D. and Ph.D. and is a former college professor (doc. 1 at 12). The plaintiff alleges that he created a Facebook account in 2015 and thereby entered into a contract with Meta (id. at 3). The plaintiff submits that this “contract was for [him] to make publications]” on Facebook (id. at 4). Exhibit A to the plaintiff's complaint contains portions of documents that he asserts are the contract that he entered into with Meta (doc. 1-1 at 1-15). Jennifer Pricer (“Ms. Pricer”), a case manager in Meta's legal department, testified in a declaration that page one of Exhibit A appears to be an excerpt from Meta's privacy policy for Facebook, which went into effect on January 1, 2023 (doc. 25-2, Pricer decl. ¶ 4). Ms. Pricer also testified that Exhibit A reflects some handwritten markings (id.). Moreover, Ms. Price testified that page two of Exhibit A appears to be the current version of Meta's “About Our Policies” webpage for Facebook (id.). Ms. Pricer provided copies of the entirety of these documents with her declaration (id. at ¶¶ 5, 6, ex. 1 & 2).
The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that in February 2023, his grandson's elementary school was using Facebook as a fundraising platform for the American Heart Association (doc. 1 at 4). On or about February 17, 2023, the plaintiff made a donation to this fundraiser from his Facebook page (id.). Several days later, the plaintiff's sister-in-law informed him that hackers had posted a pornographic picture on his Facebook page (id.). The plaintiff checked his Facebook page and saw that a pornographic image had been posted by an individual with the fictitious name of “Iga Mariana” and that the image was posted “following the picture of the fundraising school children” (id. at 4-5). The plaintiff contends that the pornographic image was accompanied by text that falsely claimed that the male in the image was the plaintiff (id.). The plaintiff immediately closed his Facebook account (id. at 4).
The plaintiff filed his complaint in the instant action on July 11,2023, alleging claims for breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Meta, Mr. Zuckerberg, and Jane Doe a/k/a Iga Mariana (doc. 1). On January 8, 2024, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation recommending dismissal of Jane Doe because the plaintiff had not timely served Jane Doe (doc. 44). That report and recommendation is pending before the district court. On October 9, 2023, Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and (6) on the grounds that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over them and the plaintiff has failed to allege facts stating any plausible claim (doc. 25). In the alternative, Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg move to transfer this matter to the Northern District of California (id.). By order filed on October 12, 2023, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was advised of the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's motion (doc. 28). The plaintiff filed a response on October 30, 2023 (doc. 30). On November 6, 2023, Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg filed a reply (doc. 33), and the plaintiff filed a sur reply on November 13, 2023 (doc. 34). The plaintiff also filed a motion for entry of default (doc. 32) and a motion for default judgment (doc. 31) on October 30, 2023. Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg filed a response to both motions on November 13, 2023 (doc. 35). Further, on January 19, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss Jane Doe (doc. 46). Accordingly, these matters are now ripe for review.
II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's Motion to Dismiss
1. Personal Jurisdiction
"[W]hen, as here, a district court rules on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing or without deferring ruling pending receipt at trial of evidence relevant to the jurisdictional issue, but rather relies on the complaint and affidavits alone, the burden on the plaintiff is simply to make a prima facie showing of sufficient jurisdictional basis in order to survive the jurisdictional challenge." In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 628 (4th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether plaintiff has met this burden, "the court must construe all relevant pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assume credibility, and draw the most favorable inferences for the existence of jurisdiction." Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 676, 676 (4th Cir. 1989).
"[T]o validly assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, two conditions must be satisfied." Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2001). First, the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized by the long-arm statute of the forum state, and second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must not "overstep the bounds" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Anita's N.M. Style Mexican Food, Inc. v. Anita's Mexican Foods Corp., 201 F.3d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 2000). South Carolina's long-arm statute has been construed to extend to the outer limits allowed by the Due Process Clause. Foster v. Arletty 3 Sarl, 278 F.3d 409, 414 (4th Cir. 2002). As a result, "the sole question becomes whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate due process." Cockrell v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 611 S.E.2d 505, 508 (S.C. 2005) (internal citation omitted). Due process requires the existence of minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of "fair play and substantial justice." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464 (1985); see also Infl Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
There are two categories of personal jurisdiction: (1) general, wherein a cause of action is unrelated to a defendant's contacts with the forum but the party's activities in the forum state have been found to be "continuous and systematic"; and (2) specific, wherein the cause of action arises out of a party's contacts with the forum state. See ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1997). Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg argue that this court lacks both specific and general personal jurisdiction over them.
Regarding specific jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applies a three-part test: (1) whether and to what extent the defendants purposely availed themselves of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum state and thus invoked the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) whether the plaintiff's claims arise out of those forum-related activities; and (3) whether the exercise of jurisdiction is constitutionally "reasonable." Nolan, 259 F.3d at 215-16 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984)); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 476-77 .
The purposeful availment prong "is grounded on the traditional due process concept of 'minimum contacts,' which itself is based on the premise that 'a corporation that enjoys the privilege of conducting business within a state bears the reciprocal obligation of answering to legal proceedings there.'" Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Tire Eng'g v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 2012)). This prong "ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts," or due to "the unilateral activity of another party or a third person." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "In determining whether a foreign defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in a forum state, we ask whether the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum [s]tate are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 559-60 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although not argued by the parties, the interactivity of a website is also “a jurisdictionally relevant fact” when the defendants' electronic contacts are at issue. Fidrych v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 952 F.3d 124, 141 (4th Cir. 2020). In ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., the Fourth Circuit considered “when it can be deemed that an out-of-state citizen, through electronic contacts, has conceptually entered the State via the Internet for jurisdictional purposes” and adopted the approach set out in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 293 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 2002). The Zippo court concluded that “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.” 952 F.Supp. at 1124. Recognizing a “sliding scale” for defining when electronic contacts with a state are sufficient, the Zippo court elaborated:
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.Id. at 1124 (citations omitted). In “[a]dopting and adapting the Zippo model” in ALS Scan, the Fourth Circuit held as follows:
[W]e conclude that a State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a person outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential case of action cognizable in the State's courts.293 F.3d at 714.
The Fourth Circuit has subsequently noted that “[t]he internet we know today is very different from the internet of 1997, when Zippo was decided[,] and on today's internet, [i]t is an extraordinarily rare website that is not interactive at some level.” Fidrych, 952 F.3d at 141 n.5 (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit cautioned that “if we attach too much significance on the mere fact of interactivity, we risk losing sight of the key issue in a specific jurisdiction case -whether the defendant has purposefully directed [its] activities at residents of the forum.” Id. at 142 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Kurbanov, 963 F.3d 344, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2020) ("Regardless of where on the sliding scale a defendant's web-based activity may fall, however, [w]ith respect to specific jurisdiction, the touchstone remains that an out-of-state person have engaged in some activity purposefully directed toward the forum state ... creating a substantial connection with the forum state.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Construing all relevant pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff pleads the following contacts with South Carolina in his complaint: (1) Meta operates Facebook, a website that is accessible in South Carolina, (2), Mr. Zuckerberg is the CEO of Meta, (3) the plaintiff accessed Facebook while in South Carolina, and (4) Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's failure to stop a third-party from posting pornographic content on the plaintiff's Facebook page caused injury to the plaintiff in South Carolina (see doc. 1 at 1-13).
The undersigned finds that these allegations, without more, are insufficient to show that Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg directed electronic activity into South Carolina. See ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714. The plaintiff sets forth allegations supporting the conclusion that Facebook is interactive, as he pleads that he created a Facebook page in 2015 and would post on that page (doc. 1 at 3, 5). Moreover, it is undisputed that Meta operates a website that is accessible in South Carolina and that Mr. Zuckerberg is the CEO of Meta. Additionally, the plaintiff argues, but does not plead, that Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg have millions of daily contacts in South Carolina through their social media platforms (doc. 30 at 15). Significantly, however, the plaintiff failed to allege that Facebook has directed electronic activity into South Carolina by targeting that state in particular. See Fidrych, 952 F.3d at 141 (“[E]ven though Marriott's website is interactive, Marriott does not use it to target South Carolina residents in particular. The general availability of the website to South Carolina residents thus does not create the substantial connection to South Carolina necessary to support the exercise of jurisdiction.”) (internal citations omitted); ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 715 (finding no jurisdiction in Maryland in part because the defendant “did not direct its electronic activity specifically at any target in Maryland”); Conrad v. Benson, C/A No. 9:20-cv-1811-RMG, 2020 WL 4754332, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2020) (finding no specific jurisdiction when the defendant operated a website that was “accessible to all but targeted at no one in particular”). Rather, the plaintiff acknowledges that he created a Facebook account, and his allegations reflect that, “[i]nstead of targeting any particular state, the website makes itself available to any one who seeks it out, regardless of where they live.” Fidrych, 952 F.3d at 141.
To the extent that the plaintiff alleges that Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg have connections to South Carolina because the plaintiff is a South Carolina resident and was injured in South Carolina, the connection between the defendant and the forum “must arise out of contacts that the defendants] create[] with the forum State,” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). Further, the plaintiff does not allege that Meta or Mr. Zuckerberg had any activity in the forum state other than maintaining a website that is accessible there. See ESAB, 126 F.3d at 626 (“Although the place that the plaintiff feels the alleged injury is plainly relevant to the inquiry, it must ultimately be accompanied by the defendant's own contacts with the state if jurisdiction over the defendant is to be upheld.”).
Other courts addressing similar situations have also concluded that personal jurisdiction over Meta was lacking notwithstanding the fact that Facebook was available to and used by residents of those states and allegedly caused harm in those states. See, e.g., Rich v. Meta Platforms, Inc., C/A No. 21-11956-FDS, 2023 WL 8355932, at *8 (D. Mass. Dec. 1, 2023) ("As a general matter, Meta could have anticipated that Massachusetts residents (like residents of any other state) would access its online services. However, this broad and generic degree of foreseeability is insufficient, standing alone, to rise to the level of purposeful availment. It cannot be sufficient that wherever plaintiff accesses Meta services, there is jurisdiction. Jurisdiction cannot be carted from state to state, enabling a plaintiff to sue in any state to which he chooses to roam.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Richard v. Facebook, Inc., C/A No. 2018-CP-2606158, 2019 WL 8324749, at *2-5 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. May 22, 2019) (examining federal cases and finding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Facebook and noting that operating a website and causing an alleged injury in a state is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction); Harrison v. Facebook, Inc., C/A No. 18-0147-TFM-MU, 2019 WL 1090779, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2019) (“Plaintiff's allegations that Facebook failed to delete content that she or her agent, who happen to be residents of Alabama, posted on her Facebook page fail to show with reasonable particularity any specific conduct by Facebook that would support an exercise of specific jurisdiction in Alabama.”), R&R adopted by 2019 WL 1102210 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 8, 2019); Ralls v. Facebook, 221 F.Supp.3d 1237, 1244 (W.D. Wash. 2016) ("The court further notes that personal jurisdiction over Facebook may not exist simply because a user avails himself of Facebook's services in a state other than the states in which Facebook is incorporated and has its principal place of business.").
The plaintiff also submits, but does not plead, various arguments about why this court has specific jurisdiction over Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg. However, even if the plaintiff had pled these arguments, the undersigned would nevertheless conclude that the court does not have specific jurisdiction over Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg. The plaintiff argues that specific jurisdiction exists because Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg submitted to this court through filing documents on October 9, 2023 (doc. 30 at 4). The docket reflects that Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg filed their instant motion to dismiss and answers to interrogatories pursuant to Local Civil Rule 26.01 (D.S.C.) on that date (docs. 25; 26). However, Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg base their motion to dismiss in part on the lack of personal jurisdiction and their answers to interrogatories are made subject to, and expressly reference, their jurisdictional defenses and motion (docs. 25; 26). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the plaintiff's argument is without merit.
The plaintiff further argues that an exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper because one of Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's attorneys is not licensed to practice law in South Carolina and has therefore committed crimes by submitting false documents to the court (docs. 30 at 14-16; 34 at 4-5). The plaintiff asserts that while one of Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's attorneys is licensed in South Carolina, their other attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law because, in the motion to dismiss, she stated that her application for admission pro hac vice was forthcoming (docs. 30 at 1-2; 25 at 2). However, Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's motion to dismiss was electronically signed by a member of the South Carolina bar who is licensed to practice before this court. His co-counsel, who is not licensed in South Carolina, did not sign the motion, and her information appears alongside a designation that an application for admission pro hac vice was forthcoming. See Local Civ. Rule 83.I.04 (D.S.C.). This attorney has now been admitted pro hac vice (doc. 37). Based on the foregoing, the undersigned declines to find the court lacks personal jurisdiction over Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg because one of their attorney's pro hac vice admittance was forthcoming at the time that the motion to dismiss was filed.
The plaintiff also argues that the court has specific jurisdiction over Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg because their attorneys agreed that the venue was proper (doc. 30 at 4-5). It appears that the plaintiff is referencing one of Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's answers to the Local Civil Rule 26.01 interrogatories (see doc. 26). Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's answer (D) states in full:
Defendants are not subject to jurisdiction in the District of South Carolina and will be making a dispositive motion on that basis. Subject to the jurisdictional issue and without waiver of its jurisdictional defenses, Defendants agree that the Spartanburg Division is the most appropriate venue for this action in the District of South Carolina pursuant to Local Civil Rule 3.01(A)(2) because no Defendants reside in South Carolina and Plaintiff resides in the Spartanburg Division.(Id. at 2). Because Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg maintained that they were not subject to this court's jurisdiction, the undersigned declines to find that they waived such argument through this answer. Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of making a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction.
The undersigned also finds that it does not have general jurisdiction over Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg. “General personal jurisdiction requires ‘continuous and systemic' contacts with the forum state.” Perdue Foods LLC v. BRF S.A., 814 F.3d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16). “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989) (defining “domicile” as “physical presence in a place in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one's intent to remain there”). For a corporation to be “at home” in a foreign state, the corporation must have affiliations with that state so substantial that it is “comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 133 n.11. “[T]he threshold level of minimum contacts to confer general jurisdiction is significantly higher than for specific jurisdiction.” ESAB, 126 F.3d at 623 (citation omitted). This standard is appropriately stringent, “because ‘[a] court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim against that defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different state.'” Pandit v. Pandit, 808 Fed.Appx. 179, 184 (4th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that such jurisdiction will exist only in the “exceptional case.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19.
The plaintiff again argues, but does not plead, that the court has general jurisdiction over Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg because of their millions of daily contacts in South Carolina through their social media platforms (doc. 30 at 15). However, even if this was alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff's argument is insufficient to make a prima facie showing of general personal jurisdiction. Meta is a Delaware corporation with its primary place of business in California. Additionally, there is no evidence of any affiliations with South Carolina that are so substantial that Meta may be considered comparable to a South Carolina company. Further, Mr. Zuckerberg is a citizen of California, and there are no allegations that he is domiciled in South Carolina. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that this court does not have general personal jurisdiction over Meta or Mr. Zuckerberg. See, e.g., Rich, 2023 WL 8355932, at *5 (finding no general jurisdiction over Meta); Richard, 2019 WL 8324749, at *2 (same); Georgalis v. Facebook, Inc., 324 F.Supp.3d 955, 959-61 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (same). Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's motion to dismiss.
Because the undersigned recommends that the district court find that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg, those defendants' additional arguments in their motion to dismiss will not be addressed.
B. The Plaintiff's Motions for Default Judgment
As set out above, the plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default (doc. 32) and a motion for default judgment (doc. 31) on October 30, 2023. In his motions, the plaintiff argues that Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's motion to dismiss is “false” and “null and void” due to their counsel engaging in the unauthorized practice of law (docs. 31-1 at 1-4; 32-1 at 24). The plaintiff also seeks sanctions against Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg because of this alleged unauthorized practice of law (docs. 31-1 at 9; 32-1 at 4).
Securing a default judgment is a two-step process. First, “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Because Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg filed a timely motion to dismiss and are actively defending the plaintiff's allegations, the undersigned finds that there is no basis for entry of their default.
The undersigned also finds that the plaintiff's argument that Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg failed to timely answer the complaint - based on their counsel allegedly engaging in the unauthorized practice of law when filing the motion to dismiss - is without merit. As discussed above, Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's motion to dismiss was electronically signed by a member of the South Carolina bar who is licensed to practice before this court. His co-counsel, who is not licensed in South Carolina, did not sign the motion, and her information appears alongside a designation that an application for admission pro hac vice was forthcoming. See Local Civ. Rule 83.I.04 (D.S.C.). This attorney has now been admitted pro hac vice (doc. 37). Based on the foregoing, the undersigned declines to find that the motion to dismiss is “false” or “null and void.” Moreover, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny the plaintiff's request for sanctions, as the plaintiff has failed to identify any conduct by Meta, Mr. Zuckerberg, or their counsel warranting such action. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny the plaintiff's motions for entry of default and default judgment (docs. 31; 32).
C. The Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant Jane Doe
On January 19, 2024, the plaintiff also filed a motion to dismiss Jane Doe from the case, because Jane Doe “does not exist as a person making impossible to execute service of process” (doc. 46 at 1). As set out above, the undersigned has previously filed a report and recommendation recommending that Jane Doe be dismissed based on the plaintiff's failure to timely serve this defendant (doc. 44). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant the plaintiff's motion to dismiss Jane Doe.
III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant Meta and Mr. Zuckerberg's motion to dismiss (doc. 25), deny the plaintiff's motions for entry of default and default judgment (docs. 31; 32), and grant the plaintiff's motion to dismiss Jane Doe (doc. 46).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).