Opinion
No. 05-02-00468-CV
Opinion Filed August 4, 2003
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 98-11259-C
DISMISS
Before Justices BRIDGES, O'NEILL, and FITZGERALD.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Manuel Antonio Romero appeals a take-nothing judgment entered in favor of appellee Daaboul Hussein d/b/a Cedar Auto Sales ("Hussein"). In three issues, Romero challenges the trial court's rulings on the issues of agency and lien rights. However, the judgment from which Romero appeals is not final. Accordingly, we dismiss Romero's appeal for want of jurisdiction.
In August 1997, Abel Perez agreed to store Romero's truck on a lot owned by Perez in return for a monthly rental payment. Romero never made any payments to Perez. Five months later, Perez took the truck to Hussein to be repaired. Perez planned to sell the truck to get his rental payments. However, when Hussein contacted Perez to tell him the work was finished, Perez no longer had the money to pay him. Eventually, Hussein undertook a title search and learned Romero was the record owner of the truck. Hussein contacted Romero in October 1998, but Romero refused to pay for the repairs. Hussein "auctioned" the truck to himself for the cost of the repairs.
Romero sued Perez and Hussein for conversion of his truck. Perez failed to answer. Hussein answered and counterclaimed against Romero on alternative theories: the existence of a mechanic's lien and quantum meruit. Hussein also filed — with the trial court's permission and Romero's agreement — a third-party claim against Perez for contribution and indemnity. Perez failed to answer this claim as well.
Romero and Hussein tried their case to the court. The trial court entered judgment that, inter alia, provided Romero was to take nothing from Hussein on the conversion claim and validated Hussein's mechanic's lien in the truck. Romero appealed the judgment on these grounds. However, the judgment also recited the following:
Although Perez did not answer or appear personally for trial, he was deposed, and the parties offered portions of that deposition testimony at trial.
1. A Default Judgment is hereby rendered against Defendant ABEL PEREZ in the amount of $25,000.00.
Neither Perez nor the other parties' claims against Perez were otherwise mentioned in the judgment.
With limited exceptions — none of which are relevant to this case — our jurisdiction extends only to appeals from final judgments. Pinchin v. Kinney, 623 S.W.2d 783, 788 (Tex.App.-Austin 1981, no writ). To constitute a final judgment, the judgment must particularly determine the specific rights and the specific liabilities of each party to the litigation. Id. at 787. The judgment must also be sufficiently certain that it can be enforced by writ of execution. H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bay, Inc., 808 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). Indeed, our supreme court has directed that a final judgment must be sufficiently definite that "ministerial officers can carry the judgment into execution without ascertainment of facts not therein stated." Stewart v. USA Custom Paint Body Shop, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1994).
In this case, both Romero and Hussein made claims against Perez. Perez did not answer either claim. But when the trial court entered its judgment assessing a $25,000 default against Perez, the court did not identify whether that amount was to be paid entirely to Romero, entirely to Hussein, or to both in some combination. Ministerial officers could not carry this judgment into execution without ascertaining additional facts. See Stewart, 870 S.W.2d at 20; H.E. Butt Grocery, 808 S.W.2d at 680.
We conclude the trial court's judgment is not sufficiently definite to be a final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss this cause for lack of jurisdiction. See H.E. Butt Grocery, 808 S.W.2d at 681 (dismissing cause for lack of jurisdiction when judgment did not establish which of two rates of pre-judgment interest would apply to award).