Opinion
05 CV 3536 (TPG).
August 4, 2006
OPINION
Plaintiff Felicia Rolle brings this action against her former employer, defendant New York State Liquor Authority ("NYSLA"), alleging discrimination on the basis of race, age, and disability. Plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq., Plaintiff seeks money damages.
Defendant has moved to dismiss the case. The motion is granted.
THE COMPLAINT
The following allegations are drawn from the Second Amended Complaint and will be assumed true for the purposes of the present motion.
Plaintiff is a forty-seven year old African-American female. Plaintiff was employed by the NYSLA for approximately 25 years as a "keyboard specialist."
In March 1998, plaintiff sustained a work-related injury to her right hand, which was diagnosed as a cubital tunnel compression of the ulnar nerve, carpal tunnel syndrome, and ulnar neuropathy at the right elbow. Plaintiff had surgery relating to these problems on March 5, 2001, at which point she was placed on disability leave. On October 25, 2001, plaintiff was permitted by her treating physician to resume her employment with certain "light duty" restrictions. Upon her return to work, plaintiff presented defendant with documentation of her medical condition and the light duty work restrictions prescribed by her doctors.
Plaintiff alleges that, despite the medical documentation submitted to defendant, which restricted plaintiff from performing certain duties ordinarily performed by a keyboard specialist, Fred Gioffre, Deputy Commissioner of the NYSLA, demanded that plaintiff carry out all of her duties with no restrictions. The complaint alleges that plaintiff was required to perform duties which required constant use of her right arm, right wrist, and right hand, causing severe pain and the worsening of her condition.
The complaint also alleges that plaintiff was subjected to racist, derogatory and demeaning comments from Gioffre. However, the complaint contains no specific allegations to substantiate this claim.
On April 6, 2004, plaintiff's condition worsened and she was again placed on medical leave by her treating doctor. On May 26, 2004, plaintiff attended a medical evaluation requested by defendant. The evaluation was performed by Dr. Ann Marie Finnegan of Affiliated Physicians. Finnegan informed defendant that plaintiff was "unable to return to the essential duties of Keyboard Specialist I at this time," and recommended a re-evaluation in three to four months. However, defendant did not schedule any follow-up appointments to assess plaintiff's work capacity. Plaintiff did not return to work.
On September 11, 2004, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination against defendant with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The charge, which alleged that defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations for plaintiff's disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, stated:
I was placed on light duties with no keyboarding. Mr. Frederick Gioffre ordered me to work on phone duties, which has many lines. I was not accommodated. When working on the phone I began to have a lot of pain in my right hand and it began to swell. Because of working on the phone, I became totally disabled.
The charge did not allege a claim of discrimination on the basis of race or age. On September 23, 2004, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter stating that it was "unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes."
On April 6, 2005, one year after plaintiff left work on medical leave, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment. The termination was effected pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 73, which provides that when an employee has been continuously absent from a position for one year or more by reason of a disability the employment status may be terminated.
Plaintiff, initially proceeding in this action pro se, filed a complaint with this court's Pro Se Clerk's Office on December 22, 2004, approximately three months prior to her termination. In an order dated April 6, 2005, Chief Judge Mukasey dismissed that complaint for failure to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), but granted leave to amend. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, still pro se, on May 19, 2005. Plaintiff subsequently obtained an attorney and filed a Second Amended Complaint on September 15, 2005.
DISCUSSION
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court should dismiss the complaint only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Curto v. Edmundson, 392 F.3d 502, 503 (2d Cir. 2004). The Court must accept all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Koppel v. 4987 Corp., 167 F.3d 125, 127 (2d Cir. 1999). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1995).
Exhaustion of Remedies
Plaintiff's First Cause of Action alleges that defendant subjected her to racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000eet seq. A claimant may bring suit under Title VII in a federal court only if there has been a timely complaint with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) and (f); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d);Shah v. N.Y. State Dep't of Civil Serv., 168 F.3d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1999); Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 983 F.2d 1204, 1208 (2d Cir. 1993). A district court only has jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims that either are included in an EEOC charge or are based on conduct subsequent to the EEOC charge which is "reasonably related" to that alleged in the EEOC charge.Stewart v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 762 F.2d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 1985); Butts v. New York Dep't of Hous. Preservation Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir. 1993).
In the present case, plaintiff's Title VII claim, alleging that defendant discriminated against her on the basis of race, is defective because she did not assert it in her EEOC charge. Plaintiff's failure to raise her Title VII claim before the EEOC leaves the court without jurisdiction to consider it.
Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the New York State Human Rights Law, by discriminating against her on the basis of her age and disability. These claims must be dismissed because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Eleventh Amendment prevents federal suits against a state and its agencies unless the state has unequivocally consented or Congress has abrogated the state's immunity pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-100 (1984).
Defendant, the New York State Liquor Authority, is an agency of the State of New York, and is therefore shielded from federal suits by the Eleventh Amendment. See Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 10.
Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action, for age discrimination, is brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. However, the Supreme Court has held that "the ADEA does not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity." Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000); see also McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2001). Because the State of New York has not consented to suit in federal court, and there has been no waiver of immunity for ADEA claims, plaintiff's ADEA claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must be dismissed.
Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action alleges that by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for her disability, and insisting that she perform her regular duties in violation of her doctor's restrictions, defendant violated of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111- 12117. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in the employment of persons with disabilities and requires employers to make certain reasonable accommodations for such individuals. This claim is also foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment.
In Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001), the Supreme Court explicitly held that Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in enacting Title I of the ADA. Plaintiff cites Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), to argue that the ADA validly abrogated state sovereign immunity. However, Lane involved Title II of the ADA, dealing with public accommodations, and is therefore entirely inapposite. Furthermore, the State of New York has not consented to suit with respect to this claim. Accordingly, plaintiff's ADA claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and is therefore dismissed.
Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action, under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq. is similarly barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In addition to prohibiting suits against a state based upon federal law, the Eleventh Amendment also protects states against suit in federal court for violations of state law. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 122. Furthermore, New York has not consented to suits in federal court brought under the NYSHRL. Pazamickas v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation Dev. Disabilities, 963 F. Supp. 190, 196-97 (N.D.N.Y. 1997);Cajuste v. Lechworth Developmental Disabilities Serv., 03-CV-0161, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82 at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. January 4, 2005). Plaintiff's claims under the NYSHRL must therefore be dismissed as well.
CONCLUSION
The Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED