Opinion
CASE NO. C2-00-316
June 11, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Cross Motions for Summary Judgement pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. # 29; Doc. # 31). Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Ohio, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, the City of Columbus, and the Columbus Division of Police. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 29, 1997, Plaintiff was detained by a Columbus Police Officer and issued a traffic citation for disobeying a traffic signal and driving without a license. ( Memorandum in Support of Defendants "Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A) [hereinafter " Defendant's Memorandum in Support"]. On December 11, 1997, Plaintiff was again issued traffic citation by a Columbus Police Officer for failing to stop at a red light and operating a motor vehicle without a license. ( Id. Ex. B).Plaintiff was ordered to appear in court on December 8, 1997, and again on December 11, 1997 to address these traffic citations. ( Id. Ex. A, B). Plaintiff did not appear in court on either occasion. As a result, bench warrants were issued for his arrest on each of those days. ( Id.).
On March 3, 1999, a Columbus Police Officer detained Plaintiff for failing to stop at a red light. ( Defendant's Memorandum in Support, at 3). When the officer ran a routine background check, the warrants issued for Plaintiff in 1997 appeared. Consequently, Plaintiff was arrested and taken to jail. ( Id.).
Plaintiff claims that this arrest was unlawful because he was not guilty. ( Complaint). Defendants argue that Plaintiff was not arrested for the alleged traffic violation on March 3, 1999. ( Defendants' Memorandum in Support, at 3). Instead, Defendants contend that Plaintiff was arrested because of the active arrest warrants issued in 1997. ( Id.).
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 15, 2000, claiming wrongful arrest and requesting ten million dollars monetary relief. (Doc. # 3). In April of 2000, Defendants motioned the Court to dismiss. (Doc. # 7; Doc. # 8). On September 25, 2000, the Court granted the Motion of the State of Ohio and the Bureau of Motor Vehicles and denied the Motion of the City of Columbus and the Columbus Division of Police Motion. (Doc. # 14).
On October 27, 2000, the Court issued notice of a pretrial conference set for January 18, 2001. (Doc. #16). Counsel for Defendants appeared at this conference. Plaintiff, however, failed to appear. On January 22, 2001, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why Plaintiff did not appear. (Doc. # 17). Plaintiff did not respond to this Order.
On May 4, 2001, Magistrate Judge Mark R. Abel issued a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. # 18). The Report recommended that this case be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff responded to this Report, filing a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion to Show Just Cause. (Doc. # 19; Doc. # 20). Plaintiff submitted a statement from his mother stating that she was diagnosed with breast cancer and that her son takes care of her. Neither Plaintiff nor his mother claimed that he was taking care of her on the particular day he was required to appear at the pretrial conference. Nor did Plaintiff explain why he did not telephone the Court and opposing counsel to advise that he was unable to attend the conference as the Court's January 22, 2001 Order to Show Cause required. As the Court's Show Cause Order indicated, the Court's telephone number appears on the Notice of the Preliminary Pretrial Conference. Also, defense counsel's telephone number appears on the October 5, 2000 Answer. (Doc. #15). Consequently, on May 30, 2001, the Court concluded that Plaintiff did not show good cause for his failure to attend the January 18, 2001 conference. (Doc. # 21).
Rather than dismissing Plaintiff's case for failure to show good cause for his failure to attend the pretrial conference and failure to notify that he would not attend, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay a one hundred dollar sanction. (Doc. # 21). The Court stated that it would renotice for a preliminary pretrial conference after Plaintiff paid the sanction.
On June 14, 2001, Plaintiff filed a sanction receipt with the Court. On July 9, 2001 the Court set the case for Preliminary Pretrial Conference. (Doc. # 22). Plaintiff attended this conference on August 3, 2001. The Court issued a Preliminary scheduling Order on September 4, 2001. (Doc. # 27). This Order set the motion filing deadline for February 1, 2002.
On January 29, 2002, Defendant City of Columbus and Defendant Columbus Division of Police filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 29). Plaintiff did not respond to this Motion. On May 28, 2002, the Court Ordered Plaintiff to respond to the Defendants' Motion within seven days. (Doc. # 30). Plaintiff responded late, combining his response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and also moving for summary judgment in his favor. (Doc. # 31).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The procedure for considering whether summary judgment is appropriate is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine; "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate however, if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Matsushita Electronic Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that Liberty Lobby, Celotex, and Matsushita have effected "a decided change in summary judgment practice," ushering in a "new era in summary judgments. Street v. J.C. Bradford Co. 886 F.2d 1472, 1476 (6th Cir. 1989). The court in Street identifies a number of important principles in new era summary judgment practice. For example, complex cases and cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment. Id. at 1479.
In addition, in responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party "cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must `present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.'" Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 257). The nonmoving party must adduce more than a mere scintilla of evidence in order to overcome the summary judgment motion. Id. It is not sufficient for the nonmoving party to merely "`show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Id. (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586). Moreover, "[t]he trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. That is, the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff brings this action pro se. The pleadings of a pro se litigant are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 903 (6th Cir. 1992). The Court has, therefore, viewed Plaintiff's claims pursuant to this less stringent standard.
Although Plaintiff's Complaint makes no reference to the basis for this Court's jurisdiction, the Court assumes that Plaintiff claims violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere. Tuttle v. Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. 808, 85 L.Ed.2d 791, 105 S.Ct. 2427 (1985). Section 1983 has two basic requirements: (1) state action that (2) deprived an individual of federal statutory or constitutional rights. Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1998); United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 960 F.2d 31, 33 (6th Cir. 1992). The requirement that there be state action is not contested in this case. Thus, the issue becomes whether Plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional rights.
A. Columbus Division of Police
Defendant Columbus Division of Police moves for judgment as a matter of law on all the claims against it because it is not sui juris, and thus, is not capable of being sued. Defendant's argument is well founded. The Division of Police is merely an administrative vehicle by which the City of Columbus operates and performs its functions, and therefore, it lacks the capacity to be sued. Hall v. City of Columbus, 2 F. Supp.2d 995, 996 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Williams v. Dayton Police Dept., 680 F. Supp. 1075, 1080 (S.D. Ohio 1987); State, ex rel. Cleveland Municipal Court v. Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St.2d 120 (1973), syllabus paragraph 1.
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendant Columbus Division of Police.
B. City of Columbus
A city or other governmental entity cannot be held responsible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries inflicted by its employees or agents merely because it employs the wrongdoer. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 1997). The theory of respondeat superior cannot provide the basis for liability in Section 1983 actions. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Taylor v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995). To prevail in a civil rights suit filed against a city or other governmental entity, the plaintiff must allege and prove that the governmental entity had a policy or custom, the execution of which, caused injury to the plaintiff and violated his constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692; Stemler, 126 F.3d at 865.
In the case at bar, the city offers evidence that Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to facially valid warrants. An arrest made pursuant to a facially valid warrant cannot sustain a Section 1983 action even if the individual is arrested and detained as a result of mistaken identity. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (no violation of Section 1983 when mistakenly held three days pursuant to facially valid warrant); Thompson v. Columbus Police Dept., 2001 U.S. App. 4324 (6th Cir. 2001) (no violation of Section 1983 by detaining an innocent person based a facially valid warrant which erroneously listed the middle initial "J" instead of "L").
Plaintiff does not deny that the arrest warrants were facially valid. Instead, Plaintiff claims that he was arrested on the job and that he was not guilty. Plaintiff contends that his cousin obtained fraudulent identification in his name. ( Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support, at 2). Plaintiff asserts that "the system noted that my cousin had prior traffic charges with my name that occurred on November 29 and December 1, 1997." ( Id.). As noted above, the Court has been provided with two arrest warrants for Plaintiff, neither of which was for traffic violations on the dates he claims his cousin was arrested. Thus, it is unclear of which act Plaintiff claims he is not guilty. The Court concludes, however, that designating the act to which Plaintiff refers is not necessary. Even if Plaintiff is not guilty of the traffic violations for which the arrest warrants were issued, the warrant is still facially valid. Further, even if the arrest warrant was issued mistakenly, or mistakenly identified Plaintiff, the arrest warrant is still facially valid.
In addition, and also dispositive in this case, Plaintiff offers no evidence that the City of Columbus operated pursuant to a policy or custom that violated his constitutional rights. Nor does Plaintiff attempt to connect the policies or customs set forth in his Amended Complaint to the city itself or to show that his particular injury was incurred because of the execution of those policies. Although pro se complaints are construed liberally the Court is not "required to `conjure up unpled allegations' or create [Plaintiff's] claims for him.'" Plowden v. Cole, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19202, at * 5 (6th Cir. 2000) citing Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) and Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff has failed to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of elements essential to his case and on which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Consequently, no reasonable jury could return a verdict for Plaintiff. Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendant City of Columbus.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 25) is GRANTED and Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED (Doc. # 31). The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter Judgment for Defendants and against Plaintiff.