Opinion
2:22-CV-29-DWC
09-27-2022
ROKKO M., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
ORDER AFFIRMING DEFENDANT'S DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS
DAVID W. CHRISTEL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial review of Defendant's denial of Plaintiff's applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. See Dkt. 4.
After considering the record, the Court concludes that the summary provided by Dr. Hirdes is not a medical opinion and the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was not required to evaluate it using the factors provided by the new regulations. Accordingly, the Court affirms the ALJ's decision in finding Plaintiff not disabled.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 12, 2020, Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB, and on October 1, 2020, filed for SSI, alleging a disability onset date of February 28, 2017 in both applications. See Dkt. 12; Administrative Record (“AR”) 22, 64-65, 70-71. The applications were denied upon initial review and on reconsideration. AR 22, 68, 74.
ALJ Angelita Hamilton held a hearing on March 29, 2021 and issued a decision on May 28, 2021, finding Plaintiff not disabled AR 19-35, 42-61. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to review the ALJ's decision, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See AR 8-12; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
In Plaintiff's Opening Brief, Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not properly evaluate the supportability and consistency of Dr. Steven C. Hirdes's medical opinion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of social security benefits if the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)).
DISCUSSION
Whether the ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Opinion
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to evaluate the supportability and consistency of Dr. Hirdes's medical opinion. Dkt. 12, pp. 4-13.
On August 27, 2019, Dr. Hirdes provided a summary of his findings after conducting a psychological evaluation of Plaintiff on July 25, 2019. AR 317-19. In the first paragraph, Dr. Hirdes wrote, “The purpose of this brief summary is to assist the client with a basic understanding of the psychological findings, along with the identified diagnostic considerations and treatment recommendations.” AR 317. Dr. Hirdes then included comments about Plaintiff's intellectual functioning, anxiety, emotional distress, ability to make decisions, depression, and ability to form relationships. AR 317-18. Dr. Hirdes also included that Plaintiff was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, Leve11, unspecified anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder. AR 318. Finally, Dr. Hirdes offered “recommendations,” stating that providing Plaintiff with accommodations would “allow her to work at a more slowed pace and deliberate pace,” and that Plaintiff “should work not more than on a part-time basis.” See AR 319. Dr. Hirdes further recommended that based on Plaintiff's psychological symptoms, “she should consider making application for Social Security Disability Services.” See id.
The ALJ found Dr. Hirdes's summary “unpersuasive,” but provided no further explanation as to why because the ALJ considered it “evidence that is inherently neither valuable nor persuasive” under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(c). See AR 28.
Plaintiff filed her applications after March 27, 2017. AR 22, 64, 70. Under the applicable rules, the ALJ must “articulate how [she] considered the medical opinions” and “how persuasive [she] find[s] all of the medical opinions” by considering their supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.152c(c), 416.920c(c). The ALJ is specifically required to consider the two most important factors, supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a).
The supportability factor requires the ALJ to consider the relevance of the objective medical evidence and the supporting explanations presented by the medical source to justify their opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The consistency factor involves consideration of how consistent a medical opinion is with the other record evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). Under the new regulations, “an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor's opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792. On the other hand, an ALJ need not provide analysis if the evidence is “neither valuable nor persuasive to the issue,” such as decisions by other governmental agencies and nongovernmental entities,” and “statements on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See 20 C.F.R § 416.920b(c)(1)-(2).
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred because the ALJ rejected Dr. Hirdes's opinion without considering its supportability and consistency. Dkt. 12, p. 9. In contrast, Defendant argues that what Dr. Hirdes provided was not a medical opinion, but rather statements on issues reserved to the Commissioner. See Dkt. 14, p. 2. Thus, according to Defendant, the ALJ did not need to discuss it and its persuasiveness. See id. The Court agrees.
Under the regulations, a “medical opinion” is a “statement from a medical source about what [a claimant] can still do despite [the claimant's] impairment(s) and whether [the claimant has] one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions” in the claimant's ability to perform the physical, mental, and other demands of work activities, and adapt to environmental conditions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(2)(i)-(iv).
Here, Dr. Hirdes's summary consists mostly of Plaintiff's results from psychological assessments and Dr. Hirdes's impressions of her impairments. See AR 317-19. While Dr. Hirdes did provide some comments about Plaintiff's employability, the comments were limited and lacked any functional limitations that speak to Plaintiff's ability to perform work activities despite her impairments. For example, Dr. Hirdes commented on Plaintiff's interest in screen printing, calling it a “reasonable type of employment” as it has “few demands of social interaction,” and wrote about “concerns about her ability to manage requirements and obligations of timeliness and efficiency.” See AR 819. But besides these general statements, ALJ provided no details about her functional limitations, such as how Plaintiff can meet “mental demands of work activities.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2)(ii).
Dr. Hirdes also stated that “pronounced levels of accommodations” would allow Plaintiff to work, that “[s]he should work not more than on a parti-time basis,” and recommended that she consider applying for Social Security benefits. AR 318. But statements regarding how a claimant is or is not “disabled, blind, able to work, or able to perform regular or continuing work” are statements on issues reserved to the Commissioner, not medical opinions. See AR 318-19; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(c)(3)(i).
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Hirdes's statement limiting Plaintiff to part-time work is not a statement reserved to the Commissioner, and cites to a case where this Court found that a statement concerning a claimant's likelihood of sustaining full-time employment is a medical opinion. Dkt. 12, p. 7 (citing Caroline M.H. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:21-CV-00212-TLF, 2021 WL 5937167, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 2021)). But unlike the statement in that case, Dr. Hirdes's statement here was not an opinion about Plaintiff's “likelihood” of being able to sustain employment. Rather, Dr. Hirdes made a conclusory statement that Plaintiff be limited to parttime work. See AR 319.
Furthermore, Dr. Hirdes himself wrote that the summary is meant to assist Plaintiff understand his assessments, diagnostic condensations, and treatment recommendations. AR 317. It does not include the work-related functional limitations that would render it a “medical opinion” as defined by the regulations, therefore the ALJ was not required to evaluate it as such and consider its supportability and consistency. Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in rejecting the statements provided Dr. Hirdes without evaluating its supportability and consistency.
Even assuming that Dr. Hirdes's summary is a medical opinion, the ALJ's RFC assessment is nonetheless consistent with Dr. Hirdes's notes. Dkt. 14, p. 3. The ALJ found, in pertinent part, that Plaintiff's “work must be ... free of production rate pace.” AR 26. Plaintiff contends this portion of RFC is inconsistent with Dr. Hirdes's statement Plaintiff would benefit from working “at a more slowed and deliberate pace” because “free of production rate pace” may entail fast or normal pace. See Dkt. 12, p. 12; AR 319. But Plaintiff provides no authority to show that this may be the case. Accordingly, the Court rejects this argument as well.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby finds the ALJ properly concluded Plaintiff was not disabled. Accordingly, Defendant's decision to deny benefits is affirmed and this case is dismissed with prejudice.