Opinion
January 22, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Cohen, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, without costs or disbursements, and the application is denied.
As no previously-commenced action was pending against the New York City Housing Authority, the application for leave to file a late notice of claim was improperly brought as a motion (see, Matter of Eso v County of Westchester, 141 A.D.2d 542; Matter of Lannon v Town of Henrietta, 87 A.D.2d 980; see also, Farber v County of Hamilton, 158 A.D.2d 902; City of New York Dept. of Fin. v Reznick, 113 A.D.2d 914).
Further, even if we were to conclude that the instant application had been properly commenced, reversal would nevertheless be required, since the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in permitting the prospective infant plaintiff and her mother to file a late notice of claim. It is well settled that in deciding applications for leave to serve a late notice of claim, courts are not required to grant extensions in every case involving infants (see, Cohen v Pearl Riv. Union Free School Dist., 51 N.Y.2d 256; Matter of Groshans v Town of Babylon, 143 A.D.2d 666; Montana v City of New York, 96 A.D.2d 1031). In the case at bar, the disability of infancy is outweighed by other factors. No adequate explanation was given for the 3 1/2-year delay in bringing the application for leave to serve the late notice. Nor did the papers submitted in support of the application allege facts sufficient to establish that the New York City Housing Authority had any knowledge of the circumstances underlying the claim of negligence made. In addition, the delay which ensued was unrelated to the infancy of the prospective infant plaintiff (see, Matter of Groshans v Town of Babylon, supra). Under these circumstances, the application to file a late notice of claim should have been denied. Bracken, J.P., Kooper, Sullivan and O'Brien, JJ., concur.