Opinion
5:22-CV-00208-BO-RN
12-19-2022
Kaleighia Rogers & Sondra Bruton, Plaintiffs, v. Harnett County, et al., Defendants.
ORDER & MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
Robert T. Numbers, II, United States Magistrate Judge
Kaleighia Rogers and Sondra Bruton want to sue Harnett County and several individuals for wrongs that allegedly occurred during their arrest, conviction, and imprisonment on child abduction charges. They also ask the court to let them do so without paying the standard filing fee. The court will not require them to pay the filing fee because they lack the requisite resources. But this action should be dismissed because Rogers and Bruton have failed to state a federal claim for relief. The Defendants are either immune from suit or the allegations are insufficient to state a claim against them. After dismissing the federal claims, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the complaint's state-law claims.
I. Background
In mid-February 2021, police officers arrested Rogers and Bruton in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, on charges of child abduction. The charges alleged that Rogers and Bruton took two children, K.B. and L.R., from their foster family without permission. Rogers is the children's mother; Bruton is their grandmother. The children were playing with their foster family at a local church when Rogers and Bruton found them and took them back to Bruton's home.
Police officers eventually arrived at Bruton's home near Dunn, North Carolina, where she told them that she did not have the children. The officers contacted their supervisors, including Jeffrey Honeycutt, an investigator for the Dunn Police Department, to get a search warrant for the home. But because of uncertainty about the children's custody status, Honeycutt did not obtain a warrant. Cumberland County's Department of Social Services eventually gave Honeycutt court orders related to the children's custody status suggesting that a warrant was proper.
The next day, Honeycutt learned that the pair's cell phones were in Myrtle Beach. He alerted the Myrtle Beach Police Department, which obtained a search warrant and found Rogers, Bruton, and the children in a hotel room. Arrest warrants were issued, and officers took Rogers and Bruton into custody. They spent a week in jail in South Carolina before being extradited back to Harnett County, North Carolina. Upon their return to North Carolina, they were held in the Harnett County Detention Center. There, both Rogers and Bruton were charged with two counts of felony child abduction and conspiracy.
State Magistrate Deagan Williams set their bond at $300,000 each and appointed them attorneys. Stacey Weaver, Jr., represented Rogers, and Jeffrey Stalls represented Bruton. Bruton became dissatisfied with Stalls's work, so she eventually hired Mark Key to represent her. But Stalls found himself representing Bruton again after she and Key disagreed over her potential pretrial release and bond reduction. The complaint alleges that Key never filed a notice of appearance with the court and instead simply extorted Bruton and her family for money before withdrawing from Bruton's representation.
The local district attorney's office, led at that time by Suzanne Matthews, prosecuted the cases against Rogers and Bruton. As part of that process, Assistant District Attorney Donald Harrop, Jr., presented Rogers and Bruton with plea agreements.
On the advice of her attorney, Rogers signed the plea agreement and pleaded guilty to two counts of felony child abduction. Assistant District Attorney April Phillips represented the State at Rogers's plea hearing. Charles W. Gilchrist, a North Carolina Superior Court judge, sentenced Rogers to five years of supervised probation, required her to undergo DNA testing, and ordered her to refrain from consuming alcohol. Rogers was released in early October 2021. Unlike Rogers, Bruton did not have a court appearance in October. It was not until two months later that she pleaded guilty to the same charges and received almost the same sentence as Rogers. The only difference was that the court ordered Bruton to pay $10,000 in jail fees.
Rogers and Bruton wanted to appeal their guilty pleas. Stalls filed an appeal on Bruton's behalf, but Judge Gilchrist dismissed it. Rogers did not file an appeal, which she says resulted from an error by Weaver.
Rogers and Bruton seek permission to sue the District Attorney, her assistants, Magistrate Williams, Judge Gilchrist, the defense attorneys who represented the pair, Honeycutt, and Harnett County. They wish to bring a variety of state and federal claims against the Defendants related to their arrest, detention, prosecution, and sentencing. According to Rogers and Bruton, the Defendants retaliated against them because they previously sued Cumberland County (which abuts Harnett County) and its Department of Social Services. The Defendants' desire to retaliate against Rogers and Bruton allegedly stems from the close personal and professional relationships that the Defendants maintain with Cumberland County officials. Rogers and Bruton seek $30,000,000 in damages.
II. IFP Motion
Rogers and Bruton ask the court to allow them to proceed with this action without paying the required filing fee and other costs associated with litigation (colloquially known as proceeding in forma pauperis or IFP). The court may grant their request if they submit affidavits describing their assets and the court finds that they cannot pay the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In assessing a request to proceed IFP, the court should consider whether the plaintiff can pay the costs associated with litigation “and still be able to provide himself and his dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotations omitted).
The court has reviewed the applications and finds that Rogers and Bruton lack the resources to pay the costs associated with this litigation. The court thus grants their motions (D.E. 1, 2) and allows them to proceed IFP.
III. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
After determining that Rogers and Bruton are entitled to IFP status, the court must analyze the viability of their claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court reviews a complaint to eliminate claims that unnecessarily impede judicial efficiency and the administration of justice. The court must dismiss any portion of the complaint it determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous because of either legal or factual shortcomings. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Legally frivolous claims are based on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory' and include ‘claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.'” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327). A complaint is factually frivolous when its factual allegations are “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Rogers's and Bruton's pro se status relaxes, but does not eliminate, the requirement that their complaint contain facially plausible claims. The court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's allegations, but it “cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts” that set forth a cognizable claim. Johnson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 867 F.Supp.2d 766, 776 (E.D. N.C. 2011).
The court may also dismiss a complaint if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immunized from liability for monetary damages. This immunity can take any number of forms, including-but not limited to-immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001), or common-law doctrines such as judicial, legislative, and prosecutorial immunity, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Below, the court will screen the viability of the complaint's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to determine whether they may proceed.
A. Several Defendants Are Immune From Suit.
Several Defendants are entitled to dismissal because they are immune from suit. Matthews, Harrop, and Phillips are immune from liability because of prosecutorial immunity. Similarly, judicial immunity protects Judge Gilchrist and Magistrate Williams from liability for the Plaintiffs' claims.
1. Prosecutorial Immunity
Rogers and Bruton seek to sue various members of the Harnett County District Attorney's Office. But it has been the law for decades that “prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages liability when they act as advocates for the State.” Savage v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 2018). This immunity “safeguards the process, not the person” so “it extends only to actions ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'” Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 117 (4th Cir.) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 490 (2018).
To determine whether a particular action is entitled to absolute immunity, courts “look to ‘the nature of the function performed,' without regard to ‘the identity of the actor who performed it,' ‘the harm that the conduct may have caused,' or even ‘the question whether it was lawful.'” Id. at 118 (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993)). Ultimately, courts distinguish between “advocative functions,” which receive absolute immunity, and “investigative or administrative functions,” which do not. Id. A prosecutor's activities fall into the former category when she “professionally evaluates evidence assembled by the police, decides to seek an arrest warrant, prepares and files charging documents, participates in a probable cause hearing, and presents evidence at trial.” Id. (citations omitted). But her actions fall into the latter category when “she gives legal advice to police during an investigation, investigates a case before a probable cause determination, and personally attests to the truth of averments in a statement of probable cause.” Id. (citations omitted).
Matthews, Harrop, and Phillips are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Matthews was the Harnett County District Attorney, and Harrop and Phillips were Assistant District Attorneys. They charged Rogers and Bruton, sought an arrest warrant, and participated in various sentencing hearings. These are all advocative functions. Thus, they enjoy absolute prosecutorial immunity against the Plaintiffs' claims. The district court should dismiss all claims against Matthews, Harrop, and Phillips.
2. Judicial Immunity
Judge Gilchrist and Magistrate Williams are similarly immune from suit. It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of her judicial actions. Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985). And “[m]agistrates are judicial officers, and are thus entitled to absolute immunity under the same conditions as are judges.” King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 1992). This immunity applies even when judges have acted “in excess of their jurisdiction, and [such acts] are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
The Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to judicial immunity. First, the doctrine does not apply to “nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). The question of “whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial' one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 22729 (1988)). The Fourth Circuit has held that a magistrate charging a defendant constitutes a judicial action. King, 973 F.2d at 358. And although the setting of bond, sentencing, and making of orders have not been explicitly held to be judicial actions, they are no doubt “function[s] normally performed by a judge.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227-29).
Second, a judge cannot claim immunity for “actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. When analyzing whether a judge acted without jurisdiction, the court must consider “whether at the time [the judge] took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. In answering that question, “the scope of the judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly[.]” Id.
Judge Gilchrist and Magistrate Williams were North Carolina judicial officials at the time of the events in the complaint. The allegations against them stem from their judicial actions- including charging Rogers and Bruton, setting their bond, sentencing them, and making certain orders related to those sentences. Thus, Judge Gilchrist and Magistrate Williams are also entitled to absolute immunity, and the district court should dismiss all claims against them.
B. The Complaint's Remaining § 1983 Claims Fail.
After parsing through immunities, the only remaining claims are against Key, Stalls, Weaver, Honeycutt, and Harnett County. The complaint alleges several violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute creates civil liability for any person acting under the color of state law who deprives a plaintiff of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Id. So “[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). The § 1983 claims here, however, fail for several reasons.
1. Defense Attorneys
Rogers and Bruton wish to sue the attorneys who represented them in their state criminal proceedings under § 1983. But they cannot do so-their defense attorneys are not state actors under that statute. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Thus, the court should dismiss claims against attorneys Key, Stalls, and Weaver.
2. Honeycutt
Honeycutt is the only individual potentially amenable to a § 1983 suit because he was acting under the color of state law as an officer for the town of Dunn. Rogers and Bruton allege that their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were abridged over the course of their arrest and confinement. Compl. at 37 ¶ 2, D.E. 1-1. Specifically, their complaint alleges that they were arrested without probable cause and that their arrests and prosecution stemmed from a retaliatory conspiracy between Harnett County officials and Cumberland County officials. Id. at 35 ¶¶ 1-6. They also argue that they were arrested, absent evidence against them, because of their race and socioeconomic status. Id. at 36 ¶¶ 1-6. Finally, they allege that their arrest in Myrtle Beach resulted from a false report provided by Honeycutt. Id. at 35 ¶¶ 1-2. Ultimately, each of these claims lacks facial plausibility and should be dismissed.
While the complaint's factual allegations are in sequentially numbered paragraphs, each claim for relief restarts the numbering at 1. When necessary, the citation refers to the page number and paragraph at which the relevant information can be found.
a) Fourth Amendment Wrongful Arrest Claim
The complaint labels this claim as arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Supreme Court has held that claims alleging arrest without probable cause implicate the Fourth-not the Fourteenth-Amendment. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“Petitioner asks us to recognize a substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. We decline to do so.”). Thus, the court interprets this claim as alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 357 U.S. 43, 655- 56 (1961), protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Rogers and Bruton claim that Honeycutt violated this right by obtaining an “unlawful warrant” for their arrest. Compl. ¶ 23, and at 38 ¶ 1. According to the complaint, Honeycutt knew they had not committed a criminal act since “Rogers retain[ed] her national parental rights as afforded by the constitution[s] of North Carolina and the United States.” Id. ¶ 23. Thus, Rogers and Bruton allege that they were arrested absent probable cause.
Although the court lacks access to all state-level proceedings on the custody of Rogers's children, the undersigned finds no reason to conclude that the warrants lacked probable cause. Materials submitted in support of a prior federal lawsuit involving Rogers and Bruton reveal that K.B. and L.R. were removed from placement with Bruton in July 2020. See State Custody Order, Rogers v. Cumberland Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 5:20-CV-00477-BO (E.D. N.C. May 10, 2021), D.E. 53-2. And other records available to the court indicate that the resulting non-secure custody order remained in effect until at least August 17 of that same year. See Various Hearings at 38-44, Rogers v. Cumberland Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 5:20-CV-00477-BO (E.D. N.C. Sept. 9, 2020), D.E. 1-7.
Once a North Carolina court determines that a child should be subject to non-secure custody, the child may be placed in one of several facilities. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-505(a). These authorized placements include: a foster home; a facility operated by the North Carolina Department of Social Services; or the dwelling of the child's kin. Id. And when a child has been placed at a suitable facility, the child's parents lose their right to unsupervised visitation with the child. Id. § 7B-803.1(c). They also lose their right to take the child into their home (or the home of a former guardian). Id. These limitations on parental rights remain effective until the court determines that the child “will receive proper care and supervision in [the parents' or former guardian's] safe home.” Id.
Officers only obtained arrest warrants for Rogers and Bruton after determining that the non-secure custody order prohibiting them from unauthorized, unsupervised contact with the children remained effective. See Honeycutt Report, D.E. 1-4. And the two point to no court order altering the custody arrangement of the children prior to their abduction that would restore Rogers's right to control their physical location.
At bottom, Rogers and Bruton seem to believe that Rogers's inherent authority as the children's mother trumps the North Carolina custody arrangement. Compl. ¶ 23. But the undersigned can find no situation in which a court has ruled that a theory of parental rights provides an exception to a legally binding non-secure custody arrangement. In fact, a cursory search of case law counsels the opposite conclusion. Cf. Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Child.'s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510 (1982) (noting that children in foster care are in the “custody of their foster parents in essentially the same way, and to the same extent, other children are in the custody of their natural or adoptive parents”).
Rogers and Bruton present no evidence that Honeycutt conspired to arrest or prosecute them without probable cause. Thus, any claim alleging that law enforcement apprehended the pair in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be dismissed.
b) First Amendment Retaliation Claim
The complaint's next § 1983 claim alleges violations of Rogers's and Bruton's First Amendment rights. Compl. at 34 ¶ 1. The two believe that Honeycutt and Harnett County officials conspired to arrest and convict them because they filed a lawsuit against neighboring Cumberland County and its Department of Social Services. Id. at ¶ 47. Because the government employees in each county share close personal relationships, the complaint alleges, the Harnett County officials targeted Rogers and Bruton. Id.
To bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege three elements: First, she must show that she engaged in protected speech. Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2000). Next, she must allege that the defendant's retaliatory action impaired the protected speech. Id. Finally, she must indicate “that a causal relationship exists between [her] speech and the defendant's retaliatory action.” Id.
Federal courts have held that filing a lawsuit is protected speech. See, e.g., Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2009); Teen v. Hale, Case No. 18-cv-01473-JPG, 2021 WL 1208906, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2021); Gillis v. Smith, Civil Action No. 5:22-cv-00027-TES-CHW, 2022 WL 2287929, at *3 (M.D. Ga. June 24, 2022). And because arresting someone for filing a lawsuit would likely deter others from exercising their First Amendment rights, Rogers and Bruton have alleged facts sufficient to satisfy the second element of retaliation at this stage. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005).
But Rogers and Bruton fail to plead sufficient facts to overcome the final prong. Addressing the causality between their prior lawsuit and the events leading to their convictions, their First Amendment claim largely consists of conclusions that are not supported by factual allegations. For example, paragraph two of their claim asserts that “[a]ll named Defendants victimized the Plaintiffs, for exercising [their] right to free speech.” Id. at 34 ¶ 2. Under Iqbal, the court need not accept this unsupported conclusion-or any others in the complaint-as true. See 556 U.S. at 664.
The complaint neither provides evidence nor points to the existence of evidence that would substantiate Rogers's and Bruton's claim that they were arrested, prosecuted, or convicted as the result of a conspiracy between local government officials. And even if a conspiracy did exist between Harnett County officers and their peers to the south, Rogers and Bruton do not allege that Honeycutt-who is not employed by Harnett County-was part of that conspiracy. Considered holistically, the materials that Rogers and Bruton have provided compel the conclusion that they were arrested and convicted because they did, in fact, commit a crime. Thus, the district court should dismiss their retaliation claim.
c) Eighth Amendment Excessive Bail Claim
The complaint next claims that Honeycutt violated Rogers's and Bruton's Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail by urging Magistrate Williams to set their bond at $300,000 each. Compl. at 39 ¶ 4.
But in North Carolina, state magistrates-not law enforcement officers-have the authority to set bail. Thus, even if the bond amount is excessive, police cannot be held liable when a magistrate makes a bail determination. See, e.g., Howie v. McGhee, No. 1:11CV484, 2015 WL 1458046, at *11 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 30, 2015); Haizlip v. Richardson, No. 1:11CV376, 2012 WL 2838386, at *5 (M.D. N.C. July 10, 2012). Rogers and Bruton provide no allegation suggesting that Honeycutt violated state policy and determined their bond amount. Thus, their Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed.
d) Fifth Amendment Claims
Rogers and Bruton further allege that Honeycutt deprived them of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Compl. at 44 ¶ 1. They claim that Honeycutt conspired to launch criminal proceedings against them and provided a false report stating that the children were in the custody of North Carolina. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. But Honeycutt is a state actor, and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause only applies to federal actors. United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 573 n.11 (4th Cir. 2004). Thus, Honeycutt may not be sued under § 1983 for an alleged violation of Rogers's and Bruton's Fifth Amendment right to due process. See, e.g., Reid v. Sandy, No. 3:20-CV-166, 2022 WL 898720, at *6 (N.D. W.Va. Mar. 28, 2022).
Rogers and Bruton also allege that they faced double jeopardy. Compl. at 37 ¶ 2. But they provide no evidence to support this claim. It appears that the pair believes double jeopardy protection was implicated because they were arrested in South Carolina, extradited to North Carolina, and later arrested in North Carolina on the same charges. Id. at 44 ¶¶ X.1-2. Even if monetary damages would be available for a breach of Rogers's and Bruton's right to be free from double jeopardy, the factual underpinnings of this case provide no suggestion that they faced “multiple criminal punishments for the same offense[.]” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (emphasis and citation omitted).
3. Harnett County
The complaint also alleges violations of § 1983 by Harnett County based on the actions of the individual Defendants. These claims fail for two reasons: First, counties can only be held liable under § 1983 if an alleged constitutional violation resulted from a governmental policy or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rogers and Bruton do not claim that such an unconstitutional policy exists. Second, a local government may only be held liable for constitutional violations perpetrated by its own employees. Id. at 694 (explaining that local governments can be held liable for an “injury inflicted by” a municipality's “employees or agents” if the injury was the result of a governmental policy or custom). Honeycutt-the sole remaining individual Defendant in this case-worked for the Dunn Police Department, not Harnett County. Thus, the complaint's § 1983 claims against Harnett County fail.
C. Claims Based on Violations of Federal Criminal Law Are Inappropriate in a Civil Action.
Three claims seek damages for alleged violations of federal criminal law. In their first claim, Rogers and Bruton allege that the Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1201, which makes it illegal to seize, abduct, or kidnap someone. And the complaint's eighth claim alleges that the Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1513, a statute criminalizing retaliation against a witness to an official proceeding. Finally, the complaint's twelfth claim alleges that the Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1505. This provision forbids interfering with the administration of the law in any pending legal proceeding.
Criminal statutes “proscribe crimes; they do not, of themselves, create civil liability.” Kebort v. Stiehl, No. 5:17-CV-418-D, 2018 WL 2927762, at *3 (E.D. N.C. May 17, 2018); see Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (refusing to infer a private right of action from a “bare criminal statute”). While a federal prosecutor could bring charges against someone who violated a federal criminal law, Rogers and Bruton-private citizens-may not. See McMillan v. Ratner Cos., C/A No. 3:19-1698-CMC-SVH, 2019 WL 3900204, at *2 (D.S.C. July 19, 2019), adopted by 2019 WL 3890841 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2019). As a result, the lack of any legally cognizable interest renders the complaint's first, eighth, and twelfth claims frivolous. The district court should dismiss them.
D. The Court Should Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction Over the Remaining State Law Claims.
A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from the same case or controversy as claims grounded in federal question jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. See id. § 1367(c). A district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over state-law claims where the state-law claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, where the state-law claim substantially predominates over the federal question claims, where all the federal question claims have been resolved, or in other exceptional circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4).
Rogers and Bruton allege that they have been the victims of legal malpractice (a state-law claim) and violations of the North Carolina Constitution. Compl. at 42 ¶ 1 through 44 ¶ 11, and at 47 ¶ 1 through 48 ¶ 19. And the complaint's theory of respondeat superior liability based on Harnett County's employment of a tortfeasor also falls under state law. But if all federal claims are dismissed, in the interest of judicial economy, fairness, and comity, the court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Rogers's and Bruton's state claims. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cheever, No. 5:15-CT-3050-FL, 2017 WL 2539764, at *4 (E.D. N.C. June 12, 2017).
IV. Conclusion
Though the court grants Rogers's and Bruton's request to proceed IFP (D.E. 1, 2), their complaint fails to allege a viable claim that may proceed.
All claims against Williams, Gilchrist, Harrop, Phillips, and Matthews are barred by judicial and prosecutorial immunity. In addition, the complaint's § 1983 claims against Stalls, Weaver, and Key are barred because those individuals are not state actors. The surviving constitutional claims against Honeycutt should likewise be dismissed for the many reasons discussed above. The complaint's first, eighth, and twelfth claims improperly seek civil damages for violations of criminal statutes. And finally, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims if it dismisses all federal claims.
In sum, no cause of action should be allowed to go forward.
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”) on each party who has appeared in this action. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals.