Opinion
2:22-cv-00078-DCN-MGB
10-20-2022
Quincey Rogers, Plaintiff, v. Greenville County Detention Center; Mr. Vandermoss; and Mr. Hollister, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Quincey Rogers (“Plaintiff”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action against the Greenville County Detention Center (“GCDC”) and Jail Administrators Vandermoss and Hollister (collectively, “Defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff claims that on or around August 22, 2021, he and ten other detainees at GCDC were taken to administrative segregation for an investigation into an incident that had occurred in Plaintiff's cell block several days prior. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1.) Plaintiff claims that jail officials proceeded to use “tactical instruments” against them, including gas, pepper spray, and a rifle with some sort of “projectile.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he and the other detainees were then left in administrative segregation for approximately twenty hours without medical treatment, food, water, working toilets, or shower access. (Id.) Plaintiff apparently remained in administrative segregation for an additional five days, during which jail administrators continued to deny the detainees “medical attention, hygiene, and communication with the outside world,” including “lawyer visits” and access to the facility's grievance kiosks. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff was eventually released from administrative segregation at Defendant Vandermoss's “discretion” and “unjustly sanctioned.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff now brings this action seeking $250,000 in damages and requests that the disciplinary sanctions against him be dropped. (Id. at 5.)
Upon reviewing the Complaint, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his action was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 5.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint with the Court within twenty-one days. The order warned Plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint or cure the pleading deficiencies within the time prescribed by the order would result in summary dismissal. (Id. at 7.) The order also warned Plaintiff that it was his responsibility to promptly notify the Clerk of Court regarding any changes to his address, and that his case would be dismissed if he missed a filing deadline set by the Court because he failed to do so. (Id.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed any amended pleading, and the time to comply with the undersigned's order has lapsed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though Pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, to state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's claims are subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1983.
As the undersigned previously explained to Plaintiff, inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds are not “persons” and do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. (See Dkt. No. 5 at 2-3.) See also Sumpter v. Georgetown Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 0:20-cv-1770-JMC-PJG, 2020 WL 3060395, at *2 (D.S.C. June 8, 2020). Accordingly, GCDC is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the “physical building” or the “staff and collection of officials it houses.” Studley v. Watford, No. 3:16-cv-439-JMC-PJG, 2016 WL 2893157, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 2853546 (D.S.C. May 16, 2016); see also Barnes v. Bakersville Corr. Ctr. Med. Staff, No. 3:07-cv-195, 2008 WL 2564779 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2008) (noting that the plaintiff must name specific staff members to state a claim against a “person” as required under § 1983). Plaintiff's claims against GCDC are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
With respect to the individual Defendants, a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017). Along those same lines, the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior generally are not applicable in § 1983 actions. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
Here, the Complaint is unclear as to Defendants Vandermoss's and Hollister's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Indeed, the only specific allegation against Defendant Vandermoss is that he released Plaintiff from administrative segregation (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2), and Defendant Hollister does not appear in the Complaint beyond the caption. Without more, Plaintiff's vague references to the “jail administrators” and “Defendants” fail to establish the requisite personal involvement under § 1983. See Spivey v. Breckon, No. 7:20-cv-400-MFU-JCH, 2022 WL 2317448, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 28, 2022) (finding insufficient factual allegations of personal involvement where pleading was “replete with allegations that fail[ed] to identify who committed the alleged wrongdoing”); Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020) (finding claims frivolous where, other than naming defendants in the caption of her complaint, plaintiff failed to include sufficiently clear allegations of any personal conduct or wrongdoing in connection with the alleged federal violations), adopted, 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020); Garner v. Cohen, No. 2:16-cv-561-TLW-MGB, 2016 WL 9175627, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2016) (finding complaint's “vague references to [pro se ] Plaintiff's rights being violated, absent any specific facts or allegations against the Defendants, [were] wholly insufficient to state any sort of plausible claim”), adopted, 2017 WL 2645754 (D.S.C. June 20, 2017); see also Allen v. City of Graham, No. 1:20-cv-997, 2021 WL 2037983, at *2 (M.D. N.C. May 21, 2021) (“[G]rouping multiple defendants together in a broad allegation is insufficient to provide the defendants with fair notice of the claims against them.”). (See also Dkt. No. 5 at 2-3.)
Moreover, it is worth noting that many of Plaintiff's claims seem to include the ten detainees confined with him in administrative segregation. For example, Plaintiff states that Defendants demonstrated “blatant disregard for individuals ' rights” and that “we as a whole” were subject to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1-2.) Although a pro se party like Plaintiff may bring suit for his own injuries, he does not have standing to sue on behalf of another detainee. (See Dkt. No. 5 at 3.) See Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625 (4th Cir. 1981) (confining prisoner's suit “to redress for violations of his own personal rights and not one by him as knight-errant for all prisoners”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (explaining that to have standing, the plaintiff must have suffered a “particularized” injury, which means that “the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way”); Wolfe v. Bodison, No. 8:09-cv-261-PMD, 2010 WL 374567, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2010) (noting that “the key in determining whether prison conditions become cruel and unusual is to examine the effect on the prisoner”); see also Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he competence of a layman representing himself [is] clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others.”).
Because the Complaint largely fails to clarify whether Plaintiff was personally affected by or injured as a result of the alleged constitutional violations, most of Plaintiff's allegations fall short of an actionable claim under § 1983. See Murray v. Singhi, No. 0:09-cv-451-PMD-PJG, 2009 WL 2447987, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2009) (dismissing Pro se claims “not directly related to Plaintiff's own, personal, individual constitutional or other injuries”); see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that while the “liberal pleading requirements” of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) require only a “short and plain” statement of the claim, Plaintiff must “offer more detail . . . than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant”).
The undersigned previously explained this issue to Plaintiff in great detail, addressing each of the purported constitutional violations in the proper form order. For example, with respect to Plaintiff's allegations of excessive force, the undersigned noted that it is unclear “whether Plaintiff was one of the detainees subject to the alleged use of force; and, if so, whether Plaintiff was injured as a result of the same.” (Dkt. No. 5 at 4.) With respect to Plaintiff's allegations of inadequate medical treatment, the undersigned found that “[t]he Complaint does not describe any injuries, symptoms, or medical needs specific to Plaintiff....” (Id.) With respect to the various unconstitutional conditions of confinement at GCDC, the undersigned noted that “it is unclear as to whether Plaintiff personally suffered any serious or significant injuries as a result of said conditions.” (Id. at 5.) Finally, with respect to Plaintiff's claim that the detainees in administrative segregation were “denied lawyer visits,” the undersigned explained that, “[o]nce again, the Complaint does not clarify whether Plaintiff was personally denied a visit from his attorney....” (Id. at 6.)
To be sure, the only claim in the Complaint that plainly involves Plaintiff's personal rights is the purported lack of due process during his disciplinary proceedings. However, the Complaint alleges only that Plaintiff was “unjustly sanctioned” upon his release from administrative segregation. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2.) Although a pretrial detainee is entitled to procedural due process in connection with any “punishment” imposed on him by a detention facility, Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 251-52 (4th Cir. 2016), the allegations in the Complaint provide little to no insight with respect to the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's punishment. More specifically, the Complaint fails to explain the grounds for Plaintiff's sanctions; the relevant disciplinary proceedings or the Defendants involved therewith; the extent of the sanctions; and, most importantly, how such disciplinary proceedings and/or sanctions violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Crittington v. McFadden, No. 3:21-cv-00314-MR, 2021 WL 5452134, at *7 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 22, 2021) (dismissing claims regarding detention center's disciplinary proceedings where plaintiff merely stated that the proceeding was unfair and expressed his disagreement with its outcome). Therefore, Plaintiff's allegations regarding his sanctions are insufficient to state a claim to relief under § 1983.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice and without further leave to amend, as he has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Ackbar v. Monaco, No. 4:19-cv-2774-RMG, 2020 WL 1164194, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2020), aff'd, 828 Fed.Appx. 913 (4th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).