Opinion
03 Civ. 4072 (TPG).
August 29, 2006
OPINION
Plaintiffs have moved to vacate and for reconsideration of this court's October 1 and October 7, 2004 orders pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and Local Rule 6.3, as well as for an order certifying an interlocutory appeal and a stay of proceedings in this matter pending an interlocutory appeal or petition for mandamus before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Defendants oppose these motions and move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8.
Plaintiffs' motion to vacate or for reconsideration of the earlier orders is denied. Plaintiffs' motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal and a stay is denied as moot. Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs brought this purported class action against Columbia University and the other defendants alleging that the defendants engaged in a campaign of housing discrimination and other wrongdoing in violation of the plaintiffs' civil rights. The complaint was filed on June 4, 2003. On May 14, 2004 Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman issued an order denying plaintiffs' request for appointment of counsel and granting plaintiffs' application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On May 17, 2004 this case was transferred to the docket of the undersigned judge.
A conference was held on September 14, 2004. Plaintiffs and counsel for Columbia University were present at the conference, even though Columbia had not yet been formally served. The court agreed with portions of Magistrate Judge Freeman's order, but indicated at the conference that it would not order the United States Marshal to serve all of the more than 50 individual defendants named in the complaint. The court also indicated that it would entertain a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court memorialized its decision in an opinion dated September 17, 2004. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on September 30, 2004.
On September 20, 2004 plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the court's September 14 rulings. The main point of the appeal was an objection to the court's refusal to have the Marshals serve all of the more than 50 defendants. Court of Appeals Docket No. 04-6058-cv. In an order dated October 1, 2004, the court declined to certify the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). On December 1, 2004 plaintiff moved for reargument of the October 1 order, reconsideration of that order, and to vacate it. This was the order declining to certify the interlocutory appeal.
On October 18 plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the court's September 17 opinion. Court of Appeals Docket No. 04-6514-cv. In an order dated November 5, 2004, this court declined to certify the interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b).
Plaintiffs also moved in this court for the disqualification or recusal of the undersigned judge. The court denied that motion in an order dated October 7, 2004. On October 27, 2004 plaintiffs noticed an appeal or a petition for mandamus challenging the October 7 order. Court of Appeals Docket No. 04-5991-cv. On October 29, 2004, plaintiffs moved for reargument, reconsideration, and to vacate the court's October 7 order. Finally, on December 9, 2004 plaintiffs moved in this court for certification of their interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), as well as a stay pending the resolution of that appeal.
The motions now before the court are those of December 1 and 9, 2004.
THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
On April 11, 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed plaintiffs' appeals from the September 14 rulings and the September 17 order.Ada Rodriguez v. Trustees of Columbia University, Nos. 04-6058-cv, 04-6514-cv, 05-0636-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 11, 2005).
Also on April 11, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs' motion for mandamus because petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion warranting such relief. In re: Ada Rodriguez, et al., No. 04-5991-op (2d Cir. Apr. 11, 2005).
It should be noted that, although the Court of Appeals mandate as to the mandamus petition issued on April 11, 2005, the mandate with respect to the appeals of the September 14 rulings and September 17 order did not issue until June 27, 2006.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs' Motions
Jurisdiction follows the mandate. As the Court of Appeals has made clear, the effect of the mandate "is to bring the proceedings in a case on appeal in our Court to a close and to remove it from the jurisdiction of this Court, returning it to the forum from whence it came." Ostrer v. United States, 584 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1978). Since the Court of Appeals has issued mandates disposing of each of plaintiffs' appellate applications, jurisdiction over this action now lies entirely with this court.
Local Rule 6.3 requires that any motion for reconsideration or reargument shall be served within 10 days after the docketing of the court's determination of the original motion. The October 1 order was docketed on October 21, 2004. Pursuant to Local Rule 6.3, plaintiff had until November 4, 2004 to file a motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs' motion under Local Rule 6.3 is untimely, since it was not filed until December 1, 2004.
The October 7 order was docketed on October 12, 2004. Pursuant to Local Rule 6.3, plaintiffs had until October 26, 2004 to file a motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs' motion under Local Rule 6.3 is untimely, since it was not filed until October 29, 2004.
In any event, even if plaintiffs' motions were timely filed, they are without merit. Plaintiffs' December 1, 2004 motion sought to have the court reconsider and/or vacate its refusal to certify an interlocutory appeal from the September 14 rulings. Plaintiffs' December 9, 2004 motion sought a certification of an interlocutory appeal from the order denying recussal and denying a stay pending the resolution of that appeal.
As already described, this court has refused to certify any interlocutory appeals. The current motion is directed to these refusals. But it should be noted that plaintiffs went ahead and noticed appeals, and filed a mandamus petition, independently of the actions this court took regarding certification. Clearly plaintiffs had no right to file the appeals and the mandamus petition was without merit.
Plaintiffs are abusing the processes of both this court and the Court of Appeals. There was and is no reason for any § 1292(b) certification and the motions of December 1 and December 9 are denied. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
At the September 14, 2004 conference, the court raised the possibility that the complaint was not in compliance with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on September 30, 2004, which is now before the court. Defendants claim that in addition to violating the pleading requirements of Rule 8, the complaint suffers from numerous other defects requiring dismissal.
Rule 8Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to have "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The Rules require such a statement because "unnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage."Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs' complaint is anything but "short and plain." It is 301 pages long and contains 799 paragraphs and 49 causes of action. In addition, plaintiffs have filed 327 pages of exhibits. While there are no numerical touchstones for what constitutes a "short and plain statement," several judges on this court have rejected complaints containing far fewer pages, paragraphs, and claims. See, e.g., Martin Luther King Jr. High Sch. Parents v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 02 Civ. 1689, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14029 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2004) (60 pages comprising 597 paragraphs); Morgens Waterfall Holdings L.L.C. v. Donaldson, Lufkin Jenrette Sec. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (103 pages comprising 322 paragraphs); Robinson v. Matos, No. 97 Civ. 7144, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5447 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1999) (70 single-spaced pages alleging 32 claims).
Nonetheless, verbosity alone does not require dismissal under Rule 8. Cf. Robinson, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5447 at *2 ("Dismissal is usually reserved for cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.") (quotations omitted). Looking to the substance of those 301 pages, the court believes that dismissal is warranted. The complaint is a mass of paragraphs that drown the reader in repetitiveness and wordiness. As Judge Pollack put it in Morgens, the complaint
is hopelessly redundant, argumentative, and has much irrelevancy amid inflammatory material. It is excessively long-winded, and its wordiness is unjustified. It is hopelessly in violation of the rules of pleading.
A defendant facing this kind of a complaint is forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.Morgens, 198 F.R.D. at 610.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed. However, plaintiffs will be permitted to replead in keeping with standard practice. But plaintiffs' complaint in its present form is so glaringly defective that the court is concerned about a repetition of the same deficiencies in any amended complaint. If plaintiffs wish to amend, they are directed to submit a draft to the court. The court will review this draft preliminarily to address its sufficiency without any need for a motion by defendants. See Robinson, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5447 at *11-12 (employing a similar system).
Other deficiencies
Defendants have raised several other objections to the complaint, questioning its sufficiency on res judicata and statute of limitations grounds, among others. While such legal deficiencies may be present here, it is difficult to determine their scope based on the complaint as presently filed. Should plaintiffs file an amended complaint that the court finds to be in compliance with Rule 8, Defendants will have an opportunity to renew their motion to dismiss on other appropriate grounds.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' motions are denied. Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is granted, subject to plaintiffs' right to propose an amended complaint, as described above.
SO ORDERED.