Opinion
NUMBER 13-16-00094-CR
07-13-2017
SALVADOR RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 347th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Contreras, and Benavides
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
Appellant Salvador Rodriguez appeals his conviction for one count of aggravated assault and one count of assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 49, 2017 R.S.). By his sole issue, Rodriguez argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he caused injuries that were the subject of the assault conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault using a deadly weapon—his vehicle. See id. § 22.02(a)(2). Count One alleged that appellant's vehicle struck Justin Benavides's body, causing injuries. Count Two alleged that appellant's vehicle struck another vehicle, causing Jakobi Norman to fall and sustain injuries. The jury found appellant guilty as charged on Count One, but found appellant only guilty of the lesser-included offense of assault on Count Two.
The evidence at trial showed that on the night in question, Justin Benavides and Jakobi Norman—both sixteen years old at the time—pulled into a gas station. On the opposite side of the same pump was appellant's Mercedes. Norman went into the store, and Benavides pumped gas into his vehicle. Benavides testified that appellant appeared angry and intoxicated. At one point, appellant exited the Mercedes, tore a sign from its post, and threw it to the ground. When Benavides and Norman returned to their vehicle ten minutes later, they left the gas pumps hurriedly, but then stopped near the edge of the parking lot and exited the car. A moment later, appellant accelerated toward them. Benavides launched onto the Mercedes's hood as it collided with his vehicle.
Benavides testified that he then crawled into his car through the driver's side door and out the passenger door, where he saw Norman lying on the ground bleeding, with cuts and scrapes on his arms. Benavides testified that Norman had been getting out of the vehicle when the collision occurred, causing him to tumble onto the ground. Meanwhile, appellant began yelling and chasing Benavides. The trial court admitted security footage which showed Norman limping through the parking lot as appellant yelled at Benavides. Appellant then got back into the Mercedes and left the gas station.
Police arrived shortly thereafter. Officer Andrew Gebauer testified that Norman had a small laceration on his arm. Officer Gebauer described it as "road rash" of the kind that occurs when someone falls onto "hard concrete ground."
In total, the State offered six witnesses: Benavides; Benavides's mother, Michelle Parker; Joey Valdez, who pulled his truck into the gas station at the same time as Benavides, and who also observed appellant to be angry and intoxicated; Officer Gebauer; Officer Joseph Christian, who impounded appellant's damaged Mercedes; and Officer Lee Galloway, who authenticated the security footage from the gas station. Norman did not testify.
After the State rested, appellant moved for directed verdict concerning the alleged assault of Norman. The trial court denied the motion.
Appellant called the three other occupants of his Mercedes to testify, including his fiancée Catarina Franco, her son Anthony Govella, and Govella's wife Tamara Leal. These witnesses testified that Benavides glared at them and began an argument while they were parked at the gas pumps, that appellant was not intoxicated, and that the collision with Benavides's vehicle was accidental. Govella testified that he saw only one person in the other vehicle—Benavides—and that after the collision, Benavides appeared to be fine. Other than this, none of the defense witnesses gave testimony related to the causation of Norman's injuries.
After the parties rested, the jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault with regard to Benavides and assessed punishment at twenty years' confinement. The jury found appellant guilty of the lesser-included offense of assault with regard to Norman and assessed punishment at one year of confinement. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury's verdict, and this appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
By his sole issue, appellant challenges his conviction for assault against Norman. Appellant argues the evidence was legally insufficient to show that his actions caused injury to Norman, and the trial court therefore erred in denying his motion for directed verdict.
Appellant also argues that the prosecution did not introduce factually sufficient evidence to support his conviction for assaulting Norman. However, factual sufficiency review has been largely abolished in Texas criminal matters. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Also, appellant challenges his conviction for aggravated assault against Benavides, arguing that the charge for assaulting Benavides was somehow inherently prejudicial and "impossible" to sustain. However, appellant provides no authority or further explanation for this argument, and we hold it inadequately briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
A challenge to the denial of a motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Garza v. State, 398 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010, pet. ref'd). When determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction, we consider the cumulative force of all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). This standard requires the appellate court to defer to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally capable of supporting a conviction. Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 413.
A person commits the offense of assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1). The element of causation is satisfied if it is shown that the result would not have occurred but for appellant's conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient. Id. § 6.04 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 49, 2017 R.S.).
B. Analysis
There are at least three forms of evidence which indicate that but for appellant's actions, Norman's bodily injuries would not have occurred. Id. First, Benavides testified that as the collision occurred, Norman was getting out of the vehicle, and the collision caused Norman to fall on the ground. Benavides then testified as to his direct observation of Norman's condition: cut and bleeding, lying on the ground. Second, security footage depicts Norman limping across the parking lot, in evident pain, immediately following the collision. Third, Officer Gebauer testified that he observed an injury on Norman's arm—a laceration of the road rash type—shortly after the collision. There was no evidence of any potential concurrent cause of Norman's injuries. See id.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the cumulative force of this evidence rationally enabled the jury to find the element of causation—the only element challenged by appellant. See Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 413; Bravo v. State, 471 S.W.3d 860, 867-68 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd) (finding sufficient evidence to support causation where appellant intentionally rammed a truck, thereby injuring two child passengers in the truck other than the intended target of the assault). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole issue on appeal.
Appellant further argues that because Norman was not subject to cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause would have barred the introduction of any testimonial statement by Norman, pursuant to the Supreme Court's opinion in Crawford v. Washington. 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004). However, Rodriguez does not identify any testimonial statements by Norman that were offered by the State or admitted through any witness's testimony. Any opinion on this argument would be purely advisory, and we do not address it further. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 13th day of July, 2017.