Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-1898
October 21, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (docket no. 49) and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 54). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion will be denied and Defendants' Motion will be granted.
The parties are substantially in agreement as to the sequence of events on November 12 and 13, 1998. Disagreements are noted.
Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Northampton County Prison ("Northampton," "the Prison"), where he was a participant in the work release program. On November 12, 1998, upon return from his job site, Plaintiff was given a urine drug test by prison personnel. The next day, he was informed that he would not be allowed to go to his job. Suspecting that this prohibition was related to his urinalysis, Plaintiff contacted a friend outside the Prison to help him obtain a blood test. The friend retained counsel on behalf of Plaintiff, and counsel obtained a Court Order for the prison to allow medical personnel to draw blood from Plaintiff in order to perform a second analysis. Order of Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, No. 1962-1998, Filed Nov. 13, 1998 ("Court Order"). This order was docketed with the Prothonotary of the Court of Common Pleas in Northampton at 2:24 p.m. on November 13, 1998.
Also on November 13th, Plaintiff was informed that his urinalysis showed the presence of marijuana and alcohol. At 2:15 p.m. that day, a nurse arrived at the Prison to take Plaintiff's blood. She did not have a copy of the Court Order, which had not yet been docketed. The corrections officer on duty at the gate informed her that without an Order she would not be admitted. At about 3:00 p.m. that same day, an attorney arrived and discovered that the Prison did not have a copy of the Order. At 3:15, he returned with a copy for the Prison.
At 5:00 p.m., a man came to the front gate, saying that he had been hired to take a urine sample from Plaintiff. Upon being shown that the Court Order was for a blood sample, the man left. Significantly, at no time after the issuance of the Order did any other individual come to the prison on behalf of Plaintiff to take a blood sample or to perform a test on the urine originally tested by the Prison.
It is undisputed that the urine sample that had been tested remained available for outside testing for an entire month.
On or about November 16, 2003, a disciplinary hearing was held to determine whether Plaintiff would be given a major misconduct for his violation of the conditions of work release. Plaintiff elected to call no witnesses, but did testify on his own behalf, asserting that he had neither consumed alcohol nor used any controlled substance in the days leading up to his urine test. (Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint") at ¶ 15). The hearing officers found against him and sentenced him to thirty (30) days of disciplinary lockup.
Shortly after the hearing, an Internal Affairs agent, Defendant Jose Garcia, who had sat on the disciplinary panel, conducted an investigation into whether Plaintiff had improperly received extra furlough hours from corrections officers in exchange for materials taken from his work site. Plaintiff alleges that this investigation was either underway or envisioned at the time of his disciplinary hearing. Defendants deny that Garcia's thinking while on the panel was influenced by any ongoing or prospective investigation.
On or about November 24, 1998, all parties agree that Plaintiff met with Defendants Garcia and Matos in Defendant Hoke's office. The topic was Plaintiff's illicit furloughs and the guards who participated in them. There was some discussion of whether a deal could be made, reducing Plaintiff's punishment for the positive drug test in exchange for his testimony against the corrections officers with whom he had conspired. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants initiated this conversation; Defendants aver that Plaintiff demanded the reduction of punishment before he would talk. Ultimately, no deal emerged and Plaintiff refused to testify against the offending guards. Defendants assert that Plaintiff was not punished for taking extra furlough hours, but the guards were disciplined for their role. (Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 6).
On December 9, 1998, Plaintiff was transferred to Lehigh County Prison ("Lehigh"). Defendants contend that this transfer was to protect him from retaliation by the guards with whom he had conspired to obtain extra furlough hours. (Transcript of Oral Argument ("Transcript") at 44, 59). Plaintiff contends that the transfer was punishment for his refusal to testify against the guards. (Complaint at ¶ 30). At Lehigh, Plaintiff was unable to enter the work release program because Lehigh does not grant work release to prisoners transferred from other institutions. (Transcript at 59). Plaintiff sought return to Northhampton, but Defendants allege that the officials there continued to believe that he would be at risk for guard retaliation. (Transcript at 34, 44, 65).
Both parties agree that on November 1, 1999, Defendant Buskirk recommended parole be denied to Plaintiff because of his major misconduct stemming from the urine test. Defendants note that in October 1998, Defendant Buskirk had recommended that Plaintiff be paroled. (Transcript at 33). That recommendation was withdrawn upon Plaintiff's positive drug test. (Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 7).
Plaintiff's Complaint raises several claims. Counts I and n seek damages against Defendants for either intentional falsification of the urine test or negligent mishandling thereof. Counts III and IV seek damages against Defendants for preventing independent blood or urine tests from being conducted on November 13th or the days that followed. Counts V and VI seek damages for the punishment given to Plaintiff and for the allegedly improper procedures used at his disciplinary hearing. Counts VII and VII seek recovery for damages allegedly caused by retribution against Plaintiff based on his refusal to participate in the investigation of the officers who gave him extra furlough hours. Counts DC and X seek recovery from Northampton County officials for failure to prevent the abuses alleged in the preceding counts. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages.
II. Legal Standard
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "the test is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56; Med. Protective Co. v. Watkins. 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)). "Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine', that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The Court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, "there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact'. . .[where the non-moving party's] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of [its] case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (emphasis added).
III. Analysis
A. Counts I and II
Counts I and n claim violations of the federal Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution based on alleged intentional falsification or negligent mishandling of the urine sample taken from Plaintiff on November 12, 1998. The principal evidence of this alleged misconduct is the failure to fill in the time at which the sample was taken on the sample's chain of custody sheet. Defendants do not dispute that this sheet was not filled out properly at the time the sample was taken. However, the sheet was filled out the next day by a supervisor, who noted the mistake and contacted the officer who took the sample to determine the time at which it had been taken. The supervisor then entered that time on the sheet, noting that the entry was not original. Plaintiff has made much of this failure, arguing that it creates a triable issue of fact over whether there was negligence. (Plaintiff's Sur-Reply Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs Sur-Reply") at 2-4).
Plaintiff does not dispute that the time entered, albeit belatedly, accurately reflects the approximate time the sample was taken. Nor does Plaintiff assert that any difference between the approximate time listed and the precise time the sample was actually taken is significant. Rather, Plaintiff relies on his assertion that the late entry of the time was, as a matter of law, improper and that it creates a material issue of fact as to whether Defendants acted negligently when taking and preserving the sample. The Court disagrees. See Webb v. Anderson. 224 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir.), cert.den., 531 U.S. 999 (2000) ("[T]he omissions in the Chain of Custody form and the toxicology report at issue in this case are not so serious as to preclude the prison's reliance on them").
Plaintiff has produced evidence that in some cases and in some institutions, a chain of custody form similarly filled out would be treated as unreliable. (Plaintiff's Sur-Reply at 2-4). Although chain of custody forms that originally were incomplete may in some cases be discarded, such result is not uniformly required. The Plaintiff has produced no evidence that the results were falsified or intentionally mishandled. The urine sample was tested twice. (Transcript at 29-30). More importantly, although the urine tested remained available for outside testing for one month, Plaintiff failed to make any additional effort to have it examined. (Transcript at 32-33). The question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the urine was mishandled or that the results were falsified, despite the fact that all parties agree that the time subsequently entered on the chain of custody form was approximately accurate. As the Court has held that the initial failure to complete the chain of custody form is not negligence as a matter of law, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment must be denied.
With respect to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has produced no evidence of intentional falsification. The facts as alleged reveal, at most, negligence. The Plaintiff's claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that "the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Daniels v. Williams. 474 U.S. 329 (1986). "In other words, where a government official is merely negligent in causing the injury, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required." Davidson v. Cannon. 474 U.S. 346 (1986). Accordingly, since Plaintiff has introduced evidence sufficient only to permit a conclusion of negligent deprivation, but not enough to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the deprivation, if any, was intentional, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted as to Count I.
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The same logic demands that Summary Judgment be granted as to Count II. See Kaehley v. City of Pittsburgh. 988 F. Supp. 888, 891, note 1 (W.D. Pa. 1997) ("Challenges brought under the Pennsylvania Constitution are subject to the same test as those challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution"); Puricelli v. Houston. 2000 WL 760522, *14 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
B. Counts III and IV
Counts III and IV address the attempts to take a blood sample from Plaintiff on November 13, 1998. Plaintiff alleges that the Prison's failure to allow access as required by the Court Order constituted deliberate indifference to his Due Process rights. However, in this case the undisputed facts reveal that the Court Order was not violated.
"A prison official's knowing refusal to obey a state court order affecting a prisoner's rights would make that official liable for infringing upon the inmate's personal liberty protected by the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Johnson v. Coughlia 1997 WL 431065, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), quoting Arce v. Miles. 1991 WL 123952, *9 (S.D.N.Y 1991); Tasker v. Moore. 738 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (S.D.W.Va. 1990) (internal quotations omitted).
Had the nurse who arrived at 2:15 p.m. come after the Court Order had been docketed, or had the person who came at 5:00 p.m. been capable of taking blood, the Prison would have had a duty to produce Plaintiff and to allow blood to be taken. Had the Court Order authorized urine testing, the Prison would have had a duty to produce Plaintiff and to allow an additional sample to be taken. However, neither was the case.
The Court recognizes the difficulties of running a prison and the importance of clear rules in dealing with inmates, visitors, and others.See Wolff v. McDonnell. 418 U.S. 539, 558-562 (1974). The Prison did not grant access for a urine test at 5 p.m. because the court order specified a blood test. Adherence to the plain text of a court order does not constitute deliberate indifference. At no time after the order was docketed did anyone arrive at the Prison to take Plaintiff's blood. Absent such occurrence, there is no evidence that the Prison officials acted with the intention of depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional rights or with deliberate indifference thereto.
"A protected liberty interest may arise from only one of two sources: the Due Process Clause or the laws of a state." Asquith v. Dept. of Corrections. 186 F.3d 407, 409 (3d Cir. 1999). Due Process does not require the kind of chaos that would ensue were every prisoner found to have an affirmative right to a blood test provided for him upon oral request. See Wolff. 418 U.S. at 560 ("(C)onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action," quoting Cafeteria Restaurant Workers v. McElroy. 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). Accordingly, Plaintiff had no Due Process right to a blood test upon oral request and Prison officials did not intentionally disregard Plaintiff's constitutional rights. For this reason, Counts in and IV will be dismissed.
Count IV is the state constitutional version of Count III. This claim must be decided under the same standards as its federal counterpart. See supra, p. 7.
C. Counts V and VI
Plaintiff also challenges the procedures under which his Disciplinary Hearing was conducted. Plaintiff challenges both the result of the proceedings and the procedures that produced that result, specifically the presence of an internal affairs investigator, Jose Garcia ("Garcia"), on the hearing panel. Garcia was the chief officer investigating the illicit furloughs received by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Garcia therefore had a conflict of interest; by finding a misconduct against Plaintiff, he acquired leverage to force Plaintiff to cooperate in the investigation. (Complaint at ¶ 22-24). This constitutes the alleged procedural violation.
In Sandin v. O'Connor. 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court re-affirmed that an inmate has no Due Process right to remain in the general population while in prison. Sandin. 515 U.S. at 479, citingHewitt v. Helms. 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983). The Third Circuit has held that there is no protected liberty interest in remaining in a community release program which afforded substantially more flexibility to prisoners than did the work release program in question. Asquith. 186 F.3d at 411. There is no liberty interest in a prisoner being taken off work release and placed immediately into disciplinary segregation. See Asquith. 186 F.3d at 412, citing Sandin. 515 U.S. at 485-86 ("Sandin does not permit us to compare the prisoner's own life before and after the alleged deprivation. Rather, we must compare the prisoner's liberties after the alleged deprivation with the normal incidents of prison life."). Accordingly, the Plaintiff had no liberty interest at stake.
In the New Jersey program, the prisoner lived at a halfway house, with the attendant flexibility in lifestyle, including periodic leave to shop, eat at a restaurant, go to the gym, or visit family. In the Northampton program, prisoners returned each night to the prison and during their time at the Prison were subject to all the regulations and restrictions of imprisonment.
Because Plaintiff had no liberty interest, he had no Due Process rights in the procedures followed at his hearing. In Sandin. the prisoner was given a hearing which, he alleged, did not comport with Due Process, since he was not allowed to call witnesses. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that he could not recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he had no right to a hearing at all. Sandin. 515 U.S. at 487. Under Sandin and Asquith. Plaintiff had no liberty interest either in remaining on work release or in remaining in the general population. Accordingly, judgment against Plaintiff will be entered as a matter of law.
Count VI is the state constitutional version of Count V. This claim must be decided under the same standards as its federal counterpart. See supra, p. 7.
D. Counts VII and VIII
Plaintiff alleges that, at a later meeting, he was offered clemency for his misconduct if he testified against guards who had given him extra furlough hours. He alleges that this was ade facto re-opening of his Disciplinary Hearing and thus that he was entitled to Due Process. Plaintiff's argument that the offer of clemency re-opened his hearing is meritless, but in any event, this contention would entitle him only to those rights to which he was entitled at the original hearing. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot recover on these counts.
Count VIII is the state constitutional version of Count VII. This claim must be decided under the same standards as its federal counterpart. See supra, p. 7.
E. Counts IX and X
Counts IX and X charge Defendant Glenn Reibman, the Northampton County Executive, with failing to prevent the harms alleged in Counts V-VUI. As the Court has found that the harms alleged do not give rise to a cause of action, the Plaintiff cannot recover on these counts.
Count X is the state constitutional version of Count IX. This claim must be decided under the same standards as its federal counterpart. See supra, p. 7.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.