Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4825-12T4
03-25-2015
JOHN RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
John Rodriguez, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Megan E. Shafranski, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Maven and Carroll. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections. John Rodriguez, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Megan E. Shafranski, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
John Rodriguez, an inmate at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center in Avenel (facility), appeals from a final decision of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC), which found he committed prohibited act *.202, possession or introduction of a weapon, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). As a result of the adjudication, Rodriguez was sanctioned with ten days of detention, ninety days of administrative segregation, 180 days loss of commutation time, and fifteen days loss of recreation privileges.
On the morning of May 1, 2013, Rodriguez was working in the facility's sewing shop. That day, Anita Spaulding, the supervisor of the sewing shop, noticed that a seam ripper was missing from the tool box. The seam ripper is a plastic-handled pointed metal tool approximately two-and-a-half inches in length. Spaulding knew that it had been in Rodriguez's possession. She reported the missing tool to Senior Officer Brenda Hunt.
Hunt and Spaulding confronted Rodriguez about the missing seam ripper. He explained that he had placed the tool in the back room of the sewing shop when he went to the bathroom, but forgot to turn it in. Officer Maple located the missing tool. The corrections officers then took Rodriguez to prehearing detention.
There, Rodriguez wrote a short statement:
I work [at the sewing shop]. I[n] the morning I get tools I need for work. This morning I went to the bathroom and left my tool in a box in the back of the room to hide it from others. When I got back from the bathroom, I forgot to get the tool back from the box and give it to [Spaulding] my boss. I then went to group this morning.
At 10:25 a.m. on May 2, 2013, Sergeant Schonyers served Rodriguez with a disciplinary report for "*.202 possession or introduction of a weapon, such as but not limited to a sharpened instrument, knife or unauthorized tool." The report stated that Rodriguez "admitted that he hid the tool in the back room. . . ." Schonyers also investigated the charge, determined that it had merit, and referred the matter to a hearing officer.
The disciplinary hearing began on May 3, 2013. Rodriguez pled not guilty and requested the assistance of counsel substitute, which the hearing officer properly granted. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12(a) ("When an inmate has been charged with an asterisk offense, the inmate shall be afforded the right to request representation by a counsel substitute."). The hearing was postponed three times, because the hearing officer requested additional documents, and because Rodriguez requested a copy of the regulations governing the sewing shop and then a picture of the seam ripper.
The hearing resumed on May 10, 2013. Rodriguez stated that he put the seam ripper in a box so he could go to the bathroom, and then he forgot about it. His counsel substitute added that Rodriguez had no previous disciplinary charges, and that he had a bad memory and likely forgot about the seam ripper. Rodriguez also submitted six identical typed statements that were signed by unidentified inmates. The hearing officer, however, declined to consider these statements because their origin was unclear. Rodriguez called no witnesses.
The hearing officer adjudicated Rodriguez guilty of the *.202 charge, relying in part, on Rodriguez's admission that he hid the tool. She also found that the seam ripper could have been used as a weapon to harm other inmates or staff members.
On May 12, 2013, Rodriguez filed an administrative appeal, alleging that his due process rights had been violated, and requesting a modification of his charge. On May 14, 2013, the Assistant Superintendent upheld the decision of the hearing officer. Rodriguez appeals that decision.
On appeal, Rodriguez raises the following claims:
POINT I: VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 10a:4-9.3 NOTIFICATION OF USE IMMUNITY.
POINT II: VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGE SHEET WAS NOT FACTUALLY WRITTEN.
POINT III: VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 10A:4-9.15(A) EVIDENCE REQUIRED. [DEPARTMENT HEARING OFFICER] NEVER STATES HER REASON FOR FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY.
POINT IV: APPELLANT WOULD LIKE TO ARGUE THE MERITS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR'S REASONS OF WHY HE UPHELD THE CHARGE AND SANCTIONS[.] HOWEVER, THE ADMINISTRATOR AND/OR DESIGNEE CONTINUOUSLY REFUSES TO EXPRESS THEM SO THAT THE APPELLANT WILL HAVE THEM FOR REVIEW BY
THE APPELLATE DIVISION. THIS VIOLATES DUE PROCESS.We have considered these arguments, and affirm.
The scope of our review of an agency decision is limited. "Ordinarily, an appellate court will reverse the decision of the administrative agency only if it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)); see also Szemple v. Dep't of Corr., 384 N.J. Super. 245, 248 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 187 N.J. 82 (2006). "Our role is to engage in a 'careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings.'" DeCamp v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 386 N.J. Super. 631, 636 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000). However, "[w]e cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency where its findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Johnson v. Dep't of Corr., 375 N.J. Super. 347, 352 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80).
Rodriguez takes issue with his disciplinary adjudication on four grounds. First, he argues that he was deprived of due process because he was not notified of "use immunity" while in prehearing detention. He refers us to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.3, which requires officials to notify prisoners that any statement they submit in connection with a disciplinary hearing may not be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. This regulation is irrelevant to this appeal.
Next, Rodriguez faults the disciplinary report for inaccurately stating the timeframe during which he took the seam ripper. However, the reporting officer filed a subsequent amendment to her initial report that explains the inadvertent error. We decline to disturb the Department's decision on the basis of such a clerical error.
Similarly, in his third and fourth points, Rodriguez faults the hearing officer and the DOC for their failure to articulate the evidentiary basis for their decisions. Yet the hearing officer's adjudication report references several documentary exhibits, including Rodriguez's own statement. We have reviewed these documents, and conclude that they all establish that Rodriguez removed a seam ripper, a potentially dangerous instrument, from his work area, and hid it out of the sight of others.
We are satisfied that the evidence relied upon by the hearing officer and the assistant superintendent provided the required "substantial" evidence to support the disciplinary charge against Rodriguez. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 195 (1995); N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). We are further satisfied that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with all applicable due process requirements. See Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975). It follows that the disciplinary decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and should not be disturbed. Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80. To the extent that we have not specifically addressed Rodriguez's remaining arguments, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION