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declining to recognize exception and concluding that "[t]o suggest that one should not begin to plow because they may then become liable for an icy condition during the snowstorm is contrary to the holding of Kraus , which did not find a duty to clear snow or to spread sand or ashes while a storm continues"
Summary of this case from Herrera v. Meadow Hill, Inc.Opinion
No. CV-07-5002619
June 17, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. BACKGROUND AND ALLEGATIONS OF FACT
This case involves a slip and fall at MidState Medical Center (MidState) in Meriden during a snow storm. The plaintiff, Elsa Rodriguez, filed an amended complaint in this action against MidState on December 14, 2007, alleging that she slipped and fell on ice and snow during the early morning hours of February 21, 2005, in the MidState parking lot on her way to work as a phlebotomist for Clinical Lab Partners (CLP).
Rodriguez filed this action on October 15, 2007, although she originally brought this action on or about January 22, 2007, against this and other defendants. However, the count against MidState in the original action was stricken by the court and she now brings this new action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-592.
MidState filed this motion for summary judgment on May 20, 2008, claiming there is no material issue of fact and that it did not owe Rodriguez a duty to remove ice and snow because at the time of her fall there was a snow storm in progress. Rodriguez opposes the motion and claims MidState negligently removed the snow in a manner causing it to be packed down, creating an icy effect, resulting in a fall and injury to her left wrist and hand.
The following additional facts are generally undisputed by the parties. Snow began falling at approximately 11:33 p.m. on February 20, 2005, and continued through 10:57 a.m. on February 21, 2005. Rodriguez awoke at 3:30 a.m. on February 21, 2005, and proceeded in her car to work while the snowstorm was in progress. When she parked her vehicle in the employee parking lot at MidState for a 5:00 a.m. shift, it was snowing and the MidState grounds and parking area were in the process of being plowed. When she exited her vehicle, it was necessary for her to hold onto it to prevent herself from falling on snow that had accumulated between parking spaces. As Rodriguez walked towards her place of employment at CLP, she fell at approximately 4:40 a.m. on a thin layer of packed snow left by the plow. At the time of the plaintiff's fall, there was a snowstorm in progress which did not end until 10:57 a.m. on February 21, 2005, according to a meteorologist, Bob Cox. Approximately two inches of snow fell to the ground by 4:30 a.m. on February 21, 2005, and there was no snow on the ground from a prior storm by the time it began snowing at 11:33 p.m. on February 20, 2005.
Rodriguez brought a complaint sounding in negligence against MidState, specifically alleging that MidState (a) failed to ensure that the driveway, parking lots and areas surrounding the hospital were clear of ice and snow for all pedestrians coming to and from the hospital; (b) failed to warn pedestrians of the hazardous and slippery condition of the premises; and (c) failed to sand and salt the premises in order to make it safe for all pedestrians.
II. DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Allen v. Cox, 285 Conn. 603, 609, 942 A.2d 296 (2008). "[T]he party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bednarz v. Eye Physicians of Central Connecticut, P.C., 287 Conn. 158, 169 (2008). "A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McKinney v. Chapman, 103 Conn.App. 446, 450, 929 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 928, 934 A.2d 243 (2007).
B. Duty of Care During Snowstorms
"The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury . . . The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant [breached] that duty in the particular situation at hand . . . If a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) CT Page 10105 Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co., 286 Conn. 563, 593, 945 A.2d 388 (2008).
MidState contends that it did not owe Rodriguez a duty to remove ice and snow because at the time of her fall there was a snowstorm in progress. The Supreme Court has held that a property owner in Connecticut owes no duty to remove snow or ice during an ongoing storm. Kraus v. Newton, 211 Conn. 191, 558 A.2d 240 (1989). In Kraus, a freezing rain began falling the evening before and continued at the time of the plaintiff's arrival at the defendant's premises. Id., 192-93. Upon descending the stairs, which were covered in ice, the plaintiff slipped and fell, causing injuries. Id., 193. The court held that "in the absence of unusual circumstances, a property owner, in fulfilling the duty owed to invitees upon his property to exercise reasonable diligence in removing dangerous accumulations of snow and ice, may await the end of a storm and a reasonable time thereafter before removing ice and snow . . ." Id., 197-98. The court reasoned that "[t]o require a landlord or other inviter to keep walks and steps clear of dangerous accumulations of ice, sleet or snow or to spread sand or ashes while a storm continues is inexpedient and impractical." Id., 198.
Rodriguez counters that there is a material question of fact; namely, that in plowing the snow, MidState unreasonably compacted it in a way that, without sanding, created an icy and dangerous condition that would not have otherwise existed. In support of this theory of liability, the plaintiff cites Frechette v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 83, 132 A. 467 (1926), a municipal sidewalk case predating Kraus. In Frechette, the Supreme Court held that a preexisting icy condition, upon which new snow had fallen, was a proper legal basis for municipal liability. "Their verdict meant that they found that the presence thereon of this snow and ice was a defect and in violation of defendant's duty to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. They also found that the freshly fallen snow was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries." Frechette v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 83, 93, 132 A. 467 (1926).
Although the parties dispute the reasonableness of plowing during a snowstorm and leaving behind a layer of compacted snow without sanding, the court finds this factual dispute to be immaterial to the issue of liability in this case. In addition to predating Kraus, the facts in Frechette are materially different from the facts alleged in this case, where there is no allegation of an icy condition predating the snowstorm. Furthermore, in discussing the icy condition in her deposition, Rodriguez stated: "If you can call it ice, then that's what it was. But it was, like I said, what they leave behind when they plow." (Emphasis added.) Deposition of Elsa Rodriguez, March 31, 2008, Exhibit A., p. 41. Therefore, the icy condition alleged here was created by the process of plowing the MidState parking lot and that snowplowing process was in progress.
The court finds that the allegations in this case do not involve something so unusual as to constitute an exception to the holding in Kraus. It is not unusual to plow during a snowstorm. To suggest that one should not begin to plow because they may then become liable for an icy condition during the snowstorm is contrary to the holding of Kraus, which did not find a duty to clear snow " or to spread sand or ashes while a storm continues . . ." (Emphasis added.) Kraus v. Newton, supra, 211 Conn. 198.
III. CONCLUSION
There is no dispute between the parties that a snowstorm was in progress at the time of the fall and there is no claim that the snow or icy condition, which caused the plaintiff's fall, resulted from a preexisting condition as was found in Frechette v. New Haven, supra, 104 Conn. 83. As there is no dispute over the material facts in this case, MidState's motion for summary judgment is granted.