Rodriguez v. Irwin

12 Citing cases

  1. Young v. Spain

    Civil Action 3:22-CV-219 (GROH) (N.D.W. Va. Sep. 9, 2024)

    After a defendant fails to plead or defend, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides for a two-step default judgment process. Rodriguez v. Irwin, No. 7:10-CV-102-FL, 2011 WL 737316, at *5 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 23, 2011); see also Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1981).

  2. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Reyher

    CIVIL 1:23-cv-00196-MR-WCM (W.D.N.C. Apr. 24, 2024)

    ” See Rodriguez v. Irwin, No. 7:10-CV-102-FL, 2011 WL 737316, at *5 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 23, 2011); see also White Pine Ins. Co. v. Interstate Towing, LLC, No. 3:21-0429, 2022 WL 1213606, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Apr. 25, 2022); Synovus Bank v. Bokke IV L.L.C., No. 1:11-cv-00071-MR-DLH, 2013 WL 5492524, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 1, 2013).

  3. QFS Transp. v. Huguely

    1:21-cv-00769 (S.D. Ohio May. 6, 2022)

    Default under Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 is a two-step process-first, an entry of default by the Clerk and, second, the subsequent entry of a default judgment either by the Clerk or the Court. Rodriguez v. Irwin, No. 7:10-CV-102-FL, 2011 WL 737316, at *5 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 23, 2011). “The entry of default under Rule 55(a) is simply a formal matter placing defendant on notice that it is in default, and does not constitute entry of a judgment.” Id.

  4. Mut. Benefit Ins. Co. v. Breeden

    Civil No. SAG-19-1422 (D. Md. Nov. 20, 2019)

    Because Mutual Benefit seeks a monetary judgment against Kenneth Breeden alone, the entry of default judgment against Kenneth Breeden would not prejudice Miriam Breeden's defense in any way. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Irwin, 2011 WL 737316, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2011) (finding co-defendant had standing where complaint sought joint and several liability for damages). Further, even if default judgment were to be entered against Kenneth Breeden, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) would permit the order to be revised "at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities."

  5. Bruno v. Rossi

    No. 5:16-CV-911-BR (E.D.N.C. May. 13, 2019)

    [i]n multi-defendant cases, where liability has been alleged as joint and several, in order to avoid inconsistent judgments, default judgment should be reserved until the action is resolved on the merits against non-defaulting defendants so that if plaintiff loses on the merits, the complaint should then be dismissed against defaulting and non-defaulting defendants.Rodriguez v. Irwin, No. 7:10-CV-102-FL, 2011 WL 737316, at *6 n.5 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2011); see e.g., Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, 554 (1872); United States ex rel. Hudson v. Peerless Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 942, 944 (4th Cir. 1967); Phoenix Renovation Corp. v. Gulf CoastSoftware, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 580, 583 (E.D. Va. 2000). Because plaintiffs bring their FLSA claim jointly and severally against all defendants, (Compl., DE # 1, at 8-9), and defendant Rossi is not in default, plaintiffs' motion for default judgment and assessment of damages is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

  6. Navarro v. Immigration & Customs Enf't

    Case No.: 3:18-cv-2908-BEN-NLS (S.D. Cal. May. 12, 2019)   Cited 1 times

    Second and contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the Secretary has standing to challenge the entry of default against Benner and Garcia, particularly because Plaintiff's Complaint alleges all defendants are agents of one another and "collectively responsible" for Plaintiff's alleged harms. See, e.g., [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 6, 8]; see also, e.g., Sack v. Seid, 2002 WL 31409573, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2002) (appearing defendant had standing to challenge entry of default against non-appearing defendants); Rodriguez v. Irwin, 2011 WL 737316, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2011) (holding one defendant had standing to challenge entry of default against other two defendants because plaintiff alleged that all defendants acted jointly and as each other's agents). The Secretary's ex parte motion to set aside the Clerk's entry of default is GRANTED.

  7. Longo v. Trojan Horse Ltd.

    208 F. Supp. 3d 700 (E.D.N.C. 2016)   Cited 1 times

    Accordingly, because the cross-defendants have failed to answer the cross-claim, and there is no suggestion that plaintiffs' service of process of the amended complaint was insufficient, In re Smith, No. 05–81334C–7D, 2011 WL 4002251, at *2 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2011), the Court finds that entry of default on the cross-claims is appropriate. See, generally,Rodriguez v. Irwin, No. 7:10–CV–102–FL, 2011 WL 737316, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2011) ("Although Rule 55(a) authorizes the clerk to enter a default, the court is empowered under the rule to direct entry of default"). II. CLASS CERTIFICATION

  8. United States v. Scherer

    Case No. 2:14-CV-0452 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2016)   Cited 2 times

    Scherer cites a number of cases for the proposition that an injury is sufficient to confer standing on a defendant to oppose a default judgment against another defendant when the plaintiff seeks to hold both defendants jointly liable. See Sack v. Seid, No 01-C-6747, 2002 WL 31409573, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2002) (denying a motion for default judgment where a money judgment was sought against two retirement plans and the trustee they had in common, and the plaintiff sought to hold all defendants jointly liable); Rodriguez v. Irwin, No. 7:10-CV-102, 2011 WL 737316, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2011) (relying on Sack and finding that a defendant had standing to oppose default judgment against another defendant because the plaintiffs advanced a theory of joint liability); United States v. Balice, No. 14-3937, 2015 WL 4251146, at *18 (D.N.J. July 10, 2015) (allowing a taxpayer to defend against an alter-ego default judgment where the taxpayer himself was the trustee). All of these cases are distinguishable because here the United States does not seek to hold Scherer and the Trust jointly liable.

  9. Godlove v. Martinsburg Senior Towers, LP

    CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:14-CV-132 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 19, 2015)   Cited 11 times

    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides for a two-step default judgment process when a defendant fails to plead or defend. Rodriguez v. Irwin, Civil Action No. 7:10-CV-102-FL, 2011 WL 737316, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2011); see also Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1981). First, under Rule 55(a), "the clerk must enter the party's default" upon the plaintiff's request.

  10. Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Matt's Auto World Preowned Cars, LLC

    CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:14-CV-38 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 24, 2014)   Cited 2 times

    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides for a two-step default judgment process when a defendant fails to plead or defend. Rodriguez v. Irwin, No. 7:10-CV-102-FL, 2011 WL 737316, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2011); see also Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1981). First, under Rule 55(a), "the clerk must enter the party's default" upon the plaintiff's request.