Summary
noting "district courts enjoy considerable discretion in such matters" but overturning District Court's denial of an opportunity for pro se plaintiff to amend complaint because of, in part, plaintiff's request for an extension of time
Summary of this case from Rizvi v. Urstadt Biddle Props. Inc.Opinion
15-3379-pr
12-22-2016
JOSE RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMAS GRIFFIN, SUPERINTENDENT AND/OR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF EASTERN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, DR. GUSMAN, MEDICAL DIRECTOR OF EASTERN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, FKA GUZMAN, DR. JOHN DOE, HEALTH CARE PROVIDER AT EASTERN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, MS. ANTHONY, REGISTERED NURSE AT EASTERN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, DOCTOR ANANDOLAS AT EASTERN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, FKA ANNDOLA, NURSE, JANE DOE, REGISTERED NURSE AT EASTERN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, JOHN/JANE DOE, NURSE ADMINISTRATOR OF MEDICAL SERVICES AT EASTERN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Defendants-Appellees.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Karen R. King (Erin J. Morgan and Patricia Perez, on the brief), Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York, NY. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No appearance.
SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court's Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation "summary order"). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of December, two thousand sixteen. PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, PETER W. HALL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
Karen R. King (Erin J. Morgan and Patricia Perez, on the brief), Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:
No appearance.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Mae A. D'Agostino, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and hereby is VACATED AND REMANDED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Jose Rodriguez appeals the dismissal of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the superintendent and six medical professionals at Eastern Correctional Facility ("Eastern"). As permitted by statute, the District Court dismissed these claims prior to service on the defendants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Nonetheless, we have appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from the sua sponte dismissal. See McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200-01 (2d Cir. 2004). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
The defendants were never served and, therefore, are not parties to this appeal. See Lewis v. State of N.Y., 547 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1976). However, we directed the New York State Attorney General's Office to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of the position of the defendants. That brief was submitted on December 9, 2016. See No. 15-3379, ECF No. 1924078 (Dec. 9, 2016).
* * *
On May 19, 2015, Rodriguez commenced this action by filing—pro se and in forma pauperis—a complaint alleging that while incarcerated at Eastern, defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide adequate medical care. Specifically, Rodriguez alleged that defendants' inadequate treatment led him to suffer a cerebral stroke on February 16, 2012—a date more than three years prior to Rodriguez's filing suit. The District Court—pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which require district courts to review sua sponte whether actions proceeding in forma pauperis and actions brought by prisoners, respectively, fail to state a claim—issued an order providing that "unless plaintiff is able to demonstrate that [Section 1983's three-year] limitations period is subject to equitable tolling, and/or that the continuing violation doctrine applies to his claims, the complaint was not timely filed and is subject to dismissal . . . ." A 29. The same order granted Rodriguez leave to amend the complaint within thirty days, and Rodriguez later requested an additional thirty-day extension, which was granted. In a pair of unusual filings on the (once-extended) deadline to amend, Rodriguez both requested an additional fifteen-day extension "to perfect the Amended Complaint," and enclosed a copy of an amended complaint. The next day, the District Court deemed the amended complaint to have been filed and denied the extension request as moot. In a subsequent order, the District Court dismissed with prejudice Rodriguez's amended complaint as time-barred.
"A" refers to the Appendix.
We review the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint de novo. McEachin, 357 F.3d at 200. Pro se submissions are reviewed with "special solicitude," and "must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). While lack of timeliness is a valid ground of sua sponte dismissal, Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) on statute of limitations grounds), the statute of limitations in Section 1983 prisoner suits is tolled while a prisoner is satisfying the mandatory administrative exhaustion process, Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318, 323-24 (2d Cir. 2011).
In his initial complaint, Rodriguez alleged that he "exhausted all his administrative remedies . . . as required by . . . the Prison Litigation Reform Act[]." A 8. He also alleged that defendants were on notice of his inadequate treatment "threw [sic] grievances filed, and/or the Inmate Liasiason [sic] Committee." A 10. The amended complaint also referenced "formal grievances filed at facility, and issues presented to the Inmate Liaison Committee, about the inadequate care and treatment at Eastern," but omitted (among other things) the initial complaint's sectional heading addressed to exhaustion of administrative remedies. A 50.
We need not decide whether those allegations, liberally construed, state a timely claim. Rather, we conclude that the District Court erred (that is, "abused its discretion") by not granting Rodriguez an opportunity for further amendment in light of the foregoing sequence of allegations and Rodriguez's request for an extension of time to improve the allegations in his amended complaint. While district courts enjoy considerable discretion in such matters, the District Court here denied a pro se plaintiff's extension request and dismissed his complaint with prejudice, without any mention of Rodriguez's apparent exhaustion of administrative remedies, nor any finding that further amendment would be futile. That was error. Indeed, Rodriguez now expressly submits, with the aid of pro bono counsel on appeal, that amendment with respect to timeliness would not be futile.
Of course, we nevertheless recognize that the District Court was presented with an unusual and equivocal pair of pro se filings.
Rodriguez submits through appellate counsel that he was in the process of exhausting administrative remedies for 239 days, whereas the District Court found the complaint untimely by a matter of 92 days. According to Rodriguez's submission on appeal, on August 20, 2013, Rodriguez filed an administrative grievance and the grievance committee thereafter recommended a determination in his favor; Eastern's superintendent, however, then denied Rodriguez's grievance, and that decision was upheld by a review committee on April 6, 2014. Were Rodriguez to include such allegations in an amended complaint, his claims, as alleged, would be timely. --------
Accordingly, we VACATE the October 5, 2015 judgment of the District Court, and we REMAND the cause to the District Court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate in light of this order.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk